# Wright

> District Court, D. Oregon · May 19, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11333523

## Case

- **Full name:** Jason P. Wright and Jacqueline A. Wright v. Nationstar Mortgage, doing business as Rushmore Servicing; Clear Recon Corp; Aldridge Pite, LLP; John Scott Bailey – Quick Collect; Chandler & Newville, Inc.; Razzle Dazzle Properties, LLC; Wolf Family Trust; Jason M. Wolf; Stacy Chandler Wilcut Wolf; Willcuts Company Realtors; Ron Willcuts; Stacy Willcuts; Matt Willcuts; Marc Willcuts; Chandler Willcuts; Renee Verlee Hanks Willcuts; Red Hills Development LLC; Ryan Rowlands; Lori Fettig Goodwin; Renee Atkinson; Paris Fettig; Betsy Fettig; Elizabeth Fettig; Allison Fettig; Fettig Family Trusts; Samantha Cooley; Opt Real Estate; Drew Coleman; Lynn Earl Smith; Jessica Freed, also known as Jessica Cain and Jessica Kane; Premium Property
- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** May 19, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11333523

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that Younger abstention likely barred federal action challenging eviction proceedings

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

JASON P. WRIGHT and JACQUELINE A. Case No.: 3:26-cv-00987-AN
WRIGHT,

Plaintiffs, OPINION AND ORDER
v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, doing business
as Rushmore Servicing; CLEAR RECON
CORP; ALDRIDGE PITE, LLP; JOHN SCOTT
BAILEY – QUICK COLLECT; CHANDLER &
NEWVILLE, INC.; RAZZLE DAZZLE
PROPERTIES, LLC; WOLF FAMILY TRUST;
JASON M. WOLF; STACY CHANDLER
WILCUT WOLF; WILLCUTS COMPANY
REALTORS; RON WILLCUTS; STACY
WILLCUTS; MATT WILLCUTS; MARC
WILLCUTS; CHANDLER WILLCUTS;
RENEE VERLEE HANKS WILLCUTS; RED
HILLS DEVELOPMENT LLC; RYAN
ROWLANDS; LORI FETTIG GOODWIN;
RENEE ATKINSON; PARIS FETTIG; BETSY
FETTIG; ELIZABETH FETTIG; ALLISON
FETTIG; FETTIG FAMILY TRUSTS;
SAMANTHA COOLEY; OPT REAL ESTATE;
DREW COLEMAN; LYNN EARL SMITH;
JESSICA FREED, also known as Jessica Cain
and Jessica Kane; PREMIUM PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, INC.; JOSH NOBLE; RON
NOBLE; DAM NOBLE; JOSHUA KAUFMAN
MENDENHALL; AUSTIN SCHULTZ; and
DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10,

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Jason P. Wright and Jacqueline A. Wright, who are self-represented and thus
proceeding pro se, bring this action against numerous defendants regarding an allegedly wrongful
foreclosure of real property. Alongside the complaint, plaintiffs additionally filed an application to
procced without paying filings fees, (i.e., in forma pauperis or “IFP”) and a motion for a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction. For the reasons stated below, plaintiffs’ IFP
application and plaintiffs’ motion for TRO and preliminary injunction are both DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. IFP
District courts are authorized by statute to permit a party to commence litigation “without
prepayment of fees or security therefor” if that party submits an affidavit showing that, in light of the assets
of that party, they are “unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Section
1915 “applies to all persons notwithstanding” its references to incarcerated litigants. Andrews v. Cervantes,
493 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Lister v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th
Cir. 2005)). When determining what, if any, filing fee a plaintiff must pay, “‘the court may consider the
plaintiff’s cash flow in the recent past, and the extent to which the plaintiff has depleted his savings on
nonessentials.’” Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 768 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Alexander
v. Carson Adult High Sch., 9 F.3d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1993)).
In addition to permitting litigants to proceed without paying filing fees, Section 1915 also requires
a court to dismiss a complaint on its own accord, even before service of process, if it determines that the
complaint is “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), meaning it does not
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Watison v. Carter, 668
F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.”). When this standard is not met, “section 1915(e)
not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” Lopez,
203 F.3d at 1127. Additionally, a court must dismiss a complaint on immunity grounds once it has
“sufficient information to make a determination” that defendants are entitled to absolute or qualified
immunity. Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016).
B. Pleadings by Self-Represented Litigants
In determining whether a self-represented litigant’s complaint lacks merit, courts must use “less
stringent standards than” those used for “formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Further, “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect,” a self-represented litigant
proceeding IFP is “entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to
dismissal of the action.” Garity v. APWU Nat’l Labor Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).
C. TROs
TROs are subject to substantially the same factors as preliminary injunctions. See Stuhlbarg Int’l
Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). Each is an “extraordinary remedy
that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Generally, a party seeking a TRO or preliminary injunction must
show (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in the favor of the party; and (4) an injunction is in the
public interest. Id. at 20-22. In the Ninth Circuit, “serious questions going to the merits and a hardship
balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two
elements of the Winter test are also met.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th
Cir. 2011).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides that a court “may issue a preliminary injunction only
on notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). A court may issue an ex parte TRO without notice
to the adverse party only if “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly shows that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be
heard in opposition” and “the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the
reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). The issuance of ex parte TROs is
“extremely limited” because “‘our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken
before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute.’” Reno
Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Granny Goose Foods, Inc.
v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda County, 415 U.S. 423, 438-
39 (1974)). Courts have recognized that issuance of an ex parte TRO may be appropriate in limited
circumstances “where notice to the adverse party is impossible either because the identity of the adverse
party is unknown or because a known party cannot be located in time for a hearing” or “because notice to
the defendant would render fruitless the further prosecution of the action.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are based on plaintiffs’ complaint and the documents attached thereto.
Plaintiffs currently reside at a residential property located on Keyes Lane in Dundee, Oregon (the
“Property”), which plaintiffs allege maintains a fair market value exceeding one million dollars. Verified
Compl., ECF 1, at 2 (all citations refer to ECF pagination). Although plaintiffs tried to pay debts owed on
the Property, the Property was ultimately foreclosed upon. Id. at 2-3. On February 17, 2026, a trustee
auction was held, and “[o]n March 9, 2026, a deed was recorded selling the property at auction to Defendant
Chandler & Newville, Inc. for $520,000.” Id. at 3. On March 10, 2026, a deed was recorded showing that
the property was sold to defendant Razzle Dazzle Properties, LLC for $605,700. Id. Plaintiffs allege that
various defendants conspired together and used deceptive practices to carry out the foreclosure and sales.
See id.
On March 13, 2026, the Yamhill County Circuit Court issued a summons eviction against plaintiffs
and all other occupants of the Property. Id. at 8. The summons eviction, which was issued in Case Number
26LT06196, warned plaintiffs that their “landlord wants to evict” them and ordered plaintiffs to appear at
the Yamhill County Courthouse on March 24, 2026. Id. (capitalization modified). Plaintiffs allege that
they tried to seek a stay of proceedings and to disqualify the state judge presiding over the Yamhill County
case, but that they “cannot obtain a constitutionally compliant hearing.” Id. at 3. Plaintiffs further allege
that defendants “caused to be filed multiple fraudulent, clouded, and unverified liens,” that defendant Renee
Atkinson wrongfully notarized the transfer deeds despite a conflict of interest, and that the “state court
judge has direct, extensive familial, financial, and corporate ties to a regional real estate development,
property-flipping, and debt-collection” group that includes certain defendants. Id. at 3-4. On March 17,
2026, a notice of lis pendens was issued in Yamhill County Circuit Court Case Number 26CV12886. Id.
at 9-10. The notice states that “[t]he object of the action is the wrongful foreclosure of the [Property].” Id.
at 9. Plaintiffs are named as the petitioners on the notice. Id. On May 15, 2026, plaintiffs filed an
emergency motion to disqualify and to stay the state court proceedings. Id. at 4.
Plaintiffs initiated this action on May 18, 2026, by filing the complaint; an application to proceed
IFP, ECF 2 (“IFP Appl.”); and a motion for TRO and preliminary injunction, ECF 3 (“Pls. Mot.”). Although
plaintiffs do not expressly plead any causes of action, they appear to at least bring claims under the Federal
Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). See Verified Compl. 2. Plaintiffs plead numerous prayers for relief,
including an order “enjoining Defendants and local law enforcement from executing any eviction, lockout,
or property transfer regarding the [Property]”; a “judicial declaration stating that the underlying foreclosure
sale and all subsequent state court eviction proceedings in local Circuit Court are unconstitutional, null, and
void”; “[a]n order quietening [sic] title to the [Property] . . . and restoring [] Plaintiff[s] to the peaceful,
unencumbered ownership of their 20-year family homestead”; compensatory and punitive damages; and an
order allowing plaintiffs to pursue discovery via various subpoenas. Id. at 4-6. In the motion for TRO,
plaintiffs ask the Court to halt “all eviction, construction, and lockout actions regarding the subject
property.” Pls. Mot. 2. As far as the Court is aware, none of these filings have been served on defendants.
DISCUSSION
A. IFP Application
Plaintiffs appear to have jointly filed one IFP application. See IFP Appl. Although it is signed
only by Jason Wright, the first page begins, “I, Jason P. Wright, Jacqueline Wright declare that I am the
plaintiff in the above-entitled proceeding.” Id. at 1, 4-5. Each plaintiff must file their own IFP application,
which they must each sign respectively. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Crim, No. 3:18-cv-1816-AC, 2018 WL
11581863, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 5, 2018); Harrod v. Durik, No. 2:25-cv-01575-MMD-MDC, 2025 WL
2581895, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 4, 2025). While it appears that both plaintiffs would likely satisfy the
economic eligibility requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court cannot make this determination based on
the current filing. Plaintiffs’ IFP application is therefore denied with leave to amend.
Moreover, as described below, plaintiffs’ complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. This separately requires that plaintiffs’ IFP application be denied. See Beckler v. Umpqua
Bank, No. 6:24-cv-2002-MC, 2024 WL 4972032, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2024) (“To qualify for in forma
pauperis status, a civil litigant must demonstrate both that the litigant is unable to pay court fees and that
the claims the litigant seeks to pursue are not frivolous.”).
B. Complaint
Plaintiffs’ complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted and must therefore
be dismissed as frivolous under Section 1915. The thrust of plaintiffs’ allegations is that defendants have
conspired to unlawfully foreclose upon and evict plaintiffs from the Property, and that the state court
proceedings have been fundamentally unfair. However, this Court may not interfere with ongoing state
court proceedings or review final state court decisions.
Beginning with challenges to ongoing state court proceedings, “Younger abstention is a common
law equitable doctrine holding that a federal court should refrain from interfering with a pending state court
proceeding.” Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 669 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004). “Younger abstention
applies when: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the claims implicate important state interests; and
(3) the state proceedings provide an adequate forum to raise federal questions.” Beckler, 2024 WL
4972032, at *2 (citing Weiner v. County of San Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1994)). All prongs appear
to be met here, where plaintiffs challenge eviction proceedings occurring in state court. See id. (noting that
Younger abstention likely barred federal action challenging eviction proceedings); see also Espiriquetzal v.
Quality Loan Serv. Corp. of Wash., No. 3:18-cv-00157-YY, 2018 WL 2988513, at *2 (D. Or. Apr. 19,
2018) (“Issuing a TRO in this case requiring Defendant . . . to stop its eviction would implicate important
state interests regarding the rightful possession to real property. Plaintiff has the opportunity to raise
challenges to the eviction in that case. It would be entirely inappropriate for this Court to interfere with the
state court process.”). And though there is a narrow exception providing that federal courts should not
abstain “if there is a ‘showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would
make abstention inappropriate,’” plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts showing such bad faith or
extraordinary circumstances. Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765-66 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982)). Plaintiffs’ allegations
on this point, for example that “Plaintiff cannot obtain a constitutionally compliant hearing or due process
in the local state forum due to the extensive political and financial influence of the Defendants’ network,
which explicitly includes the family of the presiding judge whose spouse served as a state legislator,” are
too conclusory and attenuated to support plaintiffs’ claims. Verified Compl. 3.
Federal courts are also prohibited from review[ing] final judgments of a state court in judicial
proceedings” under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482
(1983). “Rooker-Feldman prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over
a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139
(9th Cir. 2004). District courts must also refuse to hear cases where “the parties do not directly contest the
merits of a state court decision” but the “claims raised in the federal court action are inextricably intertwined
with the state court’s decision such that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state
ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules.” Reusser v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Ninth
Circuit has held that Rooker-Feldman applies to actions challenging unlawful evictions. See Bumphus v.
Hazeltree Apartments, 63 F. App’x 382, 383 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The district court properly dismissed [the
plaintiff’s] claim, which alleged a conspiracy that resulted in his illegal eviction, because the claim
effectively seeks review of a final, state court decision.”). It thus appears that this Court does not have
jurisdiction to address plaintiffs’ claims.
Even if this Court could reach the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, they are not sufficient to withstand
Section 1915 scrutiny. As to the FDCPA claim, “the Ninth Circuit has held that actions taken to facilitate
a non-judicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default and notice of sale, are not attempts to collect
a ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the [FDCPA].” Espiriquetzal, 2018 WL 2988513, at *2 (citing Ho v.
ReconTrust Co., N.A., 858 F.3d 568, 571-72 (9th Cir. 2017)). As to the Fourteenth Amendment claim,
plaintiffs must allege that the defendants are state actors, that each defendant’s actions “have resulted in a
deprivation of [plaintiffs’] constitutional rights” and that there exists “a sufficient causal connection
between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation.” Boyce v. DePaul, No. 3:24-cv-00596-HZ,
2024 WL 1603683, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2024) (citing Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980),
abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991)). Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged
that defendants are state actors, that defendants have each taken actions that resulted in deprivation of
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, or that defendants’ actions caused plaintiffs’ deprivation. As to the RICO
claim, plaintiffs have not alleged the requisite “facts that establish a pattern of racketeering activity based
on a minimum of two predicate acts, a criminal enterprise in which the defendant[s] participated, and a
causal relationship between the predicate acts and the harm suffered by the plaintiff[s].” Moye v.
Jiraittewanna, No. C 08-2056 PJH, 2008 WL 1944126, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2008) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68, 2314, 2315 and Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1985)). Plaintiffs’
complaint must therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under
Section 1915.
C. TRO and Preliminary Injunction
There is no doubt that plaintiffs may suffer irreparable harm if they are evicted from their home.
However, for the same reasons that plaintiffs have not stated a viable claim, plaintiffs have also not
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. Because plaintiffs have not shown even serious
questions going to the merits, they have not shown that a TRO or preliminary injunction is warranted at this
juncture.
Separately, a preliminary injunction cannot issue without notice to the adverse party, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 65(a)(1), and plaintiffs have also failed to meet the procedural requirements for requesting a TRO ex
parte. Plaintiffs’ motion does not include either a certificate of service or a showing of efforts made to give
notice and the reasons that notice should not be required in this case. Nor do plaintiffs indicate that they
are unable to contract defendants such that they could not provide notice. And plaintiffs have not alleged
that defendants would take any steps to frustrate the purpose of this action if given notice. For all of these
reasons, the motion for TRO and preliminary injunction is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs’ application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF 2, is
DENIED with leave to amend. Plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, ECF 3, is also DENIED. The Court DISMISSES plaintiff's complaint, ECF 1, for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Dismissal is without prejudice and, out of an abundance of
caution, with leave to amend. Any amended complaint must be filed by June 19, 2026.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 19th day of May, 2026.

Adrienne Nelson
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11333523. Public record. Not legal advice.