# J. Spallone v. PSP

> Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 28, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11332984

## Case

- **Court:** Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 28, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Fizzano Cannon
- **Judges:** Fizzano Cannon
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11332984

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- describing plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims as “a species of tort liability”
- stating that the plaintiff’s assertions of invasion of privacy, defamation, and infliction of emotional distress “are tort claims in the nature of trespass within the meaning of Section 761(a)(1)(v)”
- concluding that the plaintiff’s claims under the PHRA and other theories “are in the nature of an action in tort”
- declining jurisdiction where plaintiff claimed wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress against state agency in connection with employment termination

## Opinion text

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jordan Spallone, : CASES CONSOLIDATED
Appellant :
:
v. :
: No. 1275 C.D. 2024
Pennsylvania State Police :

Lauren Spallone, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
: No. 1276 C.D. 2024
Pennsylvania State Police : Argued: March 4, 2026

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: May 28, 2026

Jordan Spallone and Lauren Spallone, husband and wife, petition for
review of identical July 25, 2024, orders of the Court of Common Pleas of
Westmoreland County (trial court). The Spallones’ claims against their employer,
the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), arose under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower
Law.1 The trial court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
Spallones’ claims, sustained the PSP’s preliminary objections to that effect, and
transferred the cases to this Court’s original jurisdiction. Upon review, we affirm
and direct the trial court to effectuate transfer to this Court.

1
Act of December 12, 1986, P.L. 1559, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1421-1428.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The Spallones have been married since 2015 and both work for the PSP.
Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 5a. They initially filed their complaints with the trial
court in August 2023. Trial Ct. Order & Op. at 1. After the PSP’s initial preliminary
objections, the Spallones filed amended complaints in October 2023, which are the
basis of this matter. See id.
Mr. Spallone’s amended complaint averred as follows. He began with
the PSP in 2003 and became a sergeant in 2016. R.R. at 5a. In 2020, a superior
officer instructed him to drop charges against individuals involved in an incident and
to direct another officer to alter investigative findings regarding the incident. Id. at
6a-7a. He complied, feeling he had no other option, but subsequently reported his
concerns to higher-level PSP officials. Id. at 7a-8a. Days later, he was called to a
meeting about his report and his union representative was told to leave before the
meeting began. Id. at 8a-9a. He was then subjected to what he believed was an
improper internal affairs investigation, attempts to remove him from his field
command and transfer him to a desk job, and multiple refusals to grant him
promotions he believed he had earned based on well-established criteria. Id. at 9a-
11a.
Mrs. Spallone’s complaint averred as follows. She began with the PSP
in 2009 and became a sergeant in 2019. R.R. at 22a. Since the above-described
events regarding Mr. Spallone, she did not get promotions that she believed she had
earned based on well-established criteria. Id. at 28a. A supervisor told her it was
because she is married to Mr. Spallone. Id. at 23a.

2
The Spallones asserted that in violation of the Whistleblower Law, the
PSP retaliated against them for Mr. Spallone’s decision to report his supervisor’s
wrongdoing. R.R. at 12a-13a & 29a-30a. They claimed loss of seniority rights, loss
of higher wages from ungranted promotions, reputational damage, and mental and
other damages. Id. at 13a & 30a. They sought promotions to the rank of lieutenant,
restoration of lost pay, employment status, and rights, and money damages for each
of them in excess of $30,000. Id. The PSP filed preliminary objections asserting
that the Spallones’ amended complaints were legally insufficient because
Whistleblower Law claims against state actors and entities fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of this Court rather than our trial-level courts. Id. at 37a-38a &
43a-44a.
In July 2024, after briefing and argument, the trial court issued identical
orders sustaining the PSP’s preliminary objections in both cases. The trial court
concluded that although no published decisions expressly lodged jurisdiction over
Whistleblower Law claims against state entities with this Court, there is a “clear and
persuasive pattern of holdings” to that effect, which the trial court declined to
contradict. Trial Ct. Orders, July 25, 2024, at 3-4. Thus, the trial court ordered the
Spallones’ cases transferred to this Court. Id. at 4. The Spallones filed motions to
certify the trial court’s otherwise interlocutory order for appeal to this Court, which
the trial court granted. Trial Ct. Orders, Aug. 30, 2024, at 1. The Spallones then
sought this Court’s permission to appeal, which we granted; we also consolidated
their cases for purposes of this appeal. Petitions for Permission to Appeal, Sept. 27,
2024, at 1; Orders, Jan. 7, 2025. These matters have been briefed and argued en
banc and are now ripe for disposition.

3
II. Issue
The Spallones argue that Whistleblower Law claims seeking money
damages against the Commonwealth or its agencies may be brought in trial-level
courts because they are not within this Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction as
set forth in Section 761(a)(1) of our Judicial Code.2 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1).
Spallones’ Br. at 13-16. They assert that their claims fall within the exception at
Section 761(a)(1)(v) for “actions or proceedings in the nature of trespass as to which
the Commonwealth government formerly enjoyed sovereign or other immunity and
actions or proceedings in the nature of assumpsit relating to such actions or
proceedings in the nature of trespass.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(v). Id.

III. Discussion
Section 761 of the Judicial Code states in relevant part:
(a) General rule.--The Commonwealth Court shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) Against the Commonwealth government,
including any officer thereof, acting in his official
capacity, except:

....

(v) actions or proceedings in the nature of
trespass as to which the Commonwealth
government formerly enjoyed sovereign or
other immunity and actions or proceedings in
the nature of assumpsit relating to such
actions or proceedings in the nature of
trespass.

42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1).

2
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9913.

4
In Balshy v. Rank, 490 A.2d 415 (Pa. 1985), which concerned federal
civil rights claims arising from an allegedly wrongful arrest and prosecution, the
plaintiff sought money damages under Sections 1983 and 1985 of Title 42 of the
United States Code. Id. at 416 (analyzing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985). Our Supreme
Court characterized the plaintiff’s claims as entailing “a species of tort liability” and
concluded that such claims “are outside the original jurisdiction of Commonwealth
Court and are properly commenced in the Courts of Common Pleas.” Id. at 420-21.
Similarly, in Miles v. Beard, 847 A.2d 161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), an inmate sought
money damages for Section 1983 violations relating to kosher meals, which he had
received at prior correctional facilities. Id. at 163. This Court concluded that the
inmate’s allegations belonged at a trial-level court because “this Court lacks original
jurisdiction over tort actions for money damages that are premised on either common
law trespass or a civil action for deprivation of civil rights.” Id. at 164.
Money damages claims for violations of other statutory arrangements
must also be brought in our trial-level courts. In Hill v. Department of
Environmental Protection, 679 A.2d 773 (Pa. 1996), the plaintiff asserted
employment discrimination under two federal laws, the Pennsylvania Constitution,
and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA).3 Our Supreme Court
explained:
These statutory provisions permit Hill to seek monetary
damages for unlawful injuries done in the employment
context. As such, these claims are in the nature of an
action in tort. See Balshy, supra. Therefore, original
jurisdiction over Hill’s complaint rests with the Lycoming
County Court of Common Pleas.

3
Act of October 27, 1955, P.L.744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963.

5
Id. at 774. In fact, the PHRA expressly states that once certain procedural
prerequisites are met, a plaintiff “shall be able to bring an action in the courts of
common pleas of the Commonwealth based on the right to freedom from
discrimination granted by this act.” 43 P.S. § 962(c)(1).
Since Balshy and Hill, our courts have also concluded that employment-
oriented money damages claims not sounding in either federal civil rights or
statutory arrangements like the PHRA, but based on traditional common law torts,
are also properly brought within our trial-level courts. In Stackhouse v.
Commonwealth, 832 A.2d 1004 (Pa. 2003), the plaintiff claimed that the PSP, her
employer, harmed her privacy and reputational interests in the course of an internal
investigation in association with her application for a promotion. Id. at 1006. Our
Supreme Court concluded that this Court lacked jurisdiction and returned the case
to the trial-level court because the “core” of the plaintiff’s complaint sounded in
traditional tort liability for an unlawful injury and for which the Commonwealth
formerly enjoyed immunity. Id. at 1007-09 (citing Balshy); see also Lynn v. Smith,
566 A.2d 360, 362 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (declining jurisdiction where plaintiff
claimed wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress against
state agency in connection with employment termination). Thus, it is generally
settled that claims against state entities for money damages that are based on tort
theories or statutes that are analogous to tort law will not fall within this Court’s
original jurisdiction and must be directed to our trial-level courts.
Returning to Section 761, this Court possesses exclusive, original
jurisdiction over “all civil actions or proceedings . . . [a]gainst the Commonwealth
government[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1). With regard to the exception at Section
761(a)(1)(v), this Court does not have jurisdiction over “actions or proceedings in

6
the nature of trespass as to which the Commonwealth government formerly enjoyed
sovereign or other immunity and actions or proceedings in the nature of assumpsit
relating to such actions or proceedings in the nature of trespass.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
761(a)(1)(v). As our Supreme Court explained in Balshy, after the abrogation of
common law sovereign immunity in 1978, which “pav[ed] the way for actions for
tort liability against the Commonwealth to be brought in Commonwealth Court,” the
General Assembly “immediately took action to remove from Commonwealth Court
the responsibility for any resulting routine tort litigation”:
[E]ach time it became apparent to the General Assembly
that actions for tort liability could be maintained against
the Commonwealth or its officers in Commonwealth
Court the General Assembly amended § 761 to provide
that those actions be brought in Common Pleas Court and
not in Commonwealth Court. This leads us inescapably to
the conclusion that there exists a legislative intent that all
actions against the Commonwealth or its officers acting in
their official capacity, asserting tort liability, are outside
the original jurisdiction of Commonwealth Court.

490 A.2d at 419-20.
Accordingly, the legislature has made clear that causes of action for
money damages against the Commonwealth or its entities that are in “the nature of
trespass,” meaning that the core of the action sounds in common law torts or can be
reasonably analogized to tort liability, must be brought in our trial-level courts. See
Stackhouse, 832 A.2d at 1007 (stating that the plaintiff’s assertions of invasion of
privacy, defamation, and infliction of emotional distress “are tort claims in the nature
of trespass within the meaning of Section 761(a)(1)(v)”); Hill, 679 A.2d at 774
(concluding that the plaintiff’s claims under the PHRA and other theories “are in the
nature of an action in tort”); Balshy, 490 A.2d at 420 (describing plaintiff’s federal
civil rights claims as “a species of tort liability”).

7
In essence, “the policy consideration underlying tort law is the
protection of persons and property from losses resulting from injury to th[ose]
persons or property.” Hazleton Area Sch. Dist. v. Bosak, 671 A.2d 277, 283 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1996) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 901 (A.L.I. 1977)). By
contrast, the Whistleblower Law has never been characterized as sounding in or
analogous to common law tort liability. In O’Rourke v. Department of Corrections,
778 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 2001), which was brought initially in this Court’s original
jurisdiction, our Supreme Court stated:
[W]e believe that the Whistleblower Law is not primarily
designed to punish an employer for harboring retaliatory
motives, but is, rather, chiefly a remedial measure
intended to enhance openness in government and compel
the government’s compliance with the law by protecting
those who inform authorities of wrongdoing. In enacting
the statute, the General Assembly aimed to effectuate such
design by ensuring that employees are not discouraged
from reporting violations of legal or ethical codes.
Additionally, recovery under the statute is proportionate to
the harm suffered, as punitive damages are not available.

Id. at 1202-03 (citations, footnote, and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme
Court added that to the extent some aspects of the Whistleblower Law can be
construed as punitive to employers, “such provisions are secondary to—and
supportive of—the primary purpose of the statute, which is to encourage employees
to come forward in good faith with information about substantial illegal or unethical
conduct.” Id. at 1203 n.11. Relatedly, in Bailets v. Pennsylvania Turnpike
Commission, 181 A.3d 324 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court reiterated that the aspects
of the Whistleblower Law that entail waiver of sovereign immunity, as expressed in
the Section 761(a)(1)(v) exception to this Court’s original jurisdiction, do not negate
its primarily remedial nature:

8
Although we recognize the [Whistleblower] Law’s
design perhaps entails overlapping purposes of waiving
sovereign immunity on the one hand, and of compelling
compliance by protecting those who expose wrongdoing
on the other, we cannot accept [the employer’s]
conclusion the sovereign immunity waiver aspects of the
[Whistleblower] Law override its remedial protective
aspects when it comes to determining the precise meaning
of the phrase “actual damages” under the [Whistleblower]
Law. . . . Instead, we view the immunity waiver aspect
of the [Whistleblower] Law as supportive of its primary
purpose—to protect whistleblowers who come forth with
good faith reports of wrongdoing.

Id. at 333 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Moreover, unlike most tort-oriented claims, Whistleblower Law claims
are not tried before a jury. Zenak v. Police Athletic League of Phila., 132 A.3d 541,
553-55 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). We have also held that where the Whistleblower Law
applies in the context of at-will public or governmental employment, the tort of
wrongful termination will generally not be available to the plaintiff. Javitz v.
Luzerne Cnty., 344 A.3d 505, 520-21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025). Thus, the basic
allegations that constitute a claim under the Whistleblower Law have been treated
as distinct from and not analogous to any tort counterpart.
Unlike the PHRA, the Whistleblower Law does not expressly direct
claims to our trial-level courts. Rather, it states: “A person who alleges a violation
of this act may bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate
injunctive relief or damages, or both, within 180 days after the occurrence of the
alleged violation.” 43 P.S. § 1424(a) (emphasis added). Generally, Whistleblower
Law cases against localities and local agencies have been brought in trial-level courts
and cases against the Commonwealth or its agencies have been brought in this Court.
For example, in Carpenter v. William Penn School District, 295 A.3d 22 (Pa.

9
Cmwlth. 2023), the plaintiff brought his Whistleblower Law claims against the
school district in the county court of common pleas, whose jurisdiction over the case
was not in dispute. Id. at 25. By contrast, in Bailets, the plaintiff brought his
Whistleblower Law claims against the state agency in this Court’s original
jurisdiction, which was not in dispute. 181 A.3d at 327. See also O’Rourke, 778
A.2d at 1196 (same); Golaschevsky v. Dep’t of Env’t Res., 683 A.2d 1299, 1300 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1996) (same).
When the issue of jurisdiction has arisen in Whistleblower Law matters
against state entities, we have maintained this distinction, albeit in unpublished
cases. In Bradley v. West Chester University (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 368 C.D. 2019, filed
Jan. 10, 2020), 2020 WL 118614 (unreported),4 the plaintiff, a budget and financial
director for the university, which is part of the Pennsylvania State System of Higher
Education (PASSHE), was terminated after challenging what she believed was a
legally and ethically questionable directive. Id., slip op. at 2, 2020 WL 118614, at
*1. She sued the university, PASSHE, and individual defendants in a trial-level
court, asserting Whistleblower Law and emotional distress claims. Id., slip op. at 3,
2020 WL 118614, at *1. Months later, that court issued a judgment of non pros and
the matter reached this Court in our appellate capacity. Id., slip op. at 4, 2020 WL
118614, at *2. Although the plaintiff brought her case in a trial-level court, she
argued on appeal that the trial-level court lacked jurisdiction over her claims and that
the judgment of non pros should be vacated and the case transferred to this Court’s
original jurisdiction. Id., slip op. at 5, 2020 WL 118614, at *2. The defendants

4
Under Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, an unpublished
memorandum opinion of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, although not binding precedent,
may be cited for its persuasive value. 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

10
agreed that this Court had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s Whistleblower Law claims
but maintained that the trial-level court had jurisdiction over her tort claims. Id.
This Court first noted in Bradley that the plaintiff brought her
Whistleblower Law claim “against two Commonwealth entities—PASSHE and the
University—thereby bestowing on this Court exclusive, original jurisdiction over
her claim pursuant to Section 761(a)(1) of the Judicial Code[.]” Bradley, slip op. at
7, 2020 WL 118614, at *3. We then noted ancillary jurisdiction over her
Whistleblower Law claims against the individual defendants and her common law
tort claims, depriving the trial-level court of subject matter jurisdiction over the
entire case. Id., slip op. at 7-11, 2020 WL 118614, at *3-4.
In Vance v. Cheyney University of Pennsylvania (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 210
M.D. 2017, filed July 8, 2021), 2021 WL 2834612 (unreported), the plaintiff
originally filed multiple claims against another PASSHE university in a trial-level
court, which dismissed the plaintiff’s Whistleblower Law count because “the
Commonwealth Court maintain[ed] original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
whistleblower claim” against a state entity. Id., slip op. at 1 n.1, 2021 WL 2834612,
at *1. The plaintiff did not dispute the trial-level court’s actions or explanation and
refiled her claim in this Court’s original jurisdiction. Id., slip op. at 1 n.1, 2021 WL
2834612, at *1.
In Lee v. Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 714 M.D. 2019,
filed July 14, 2022), 2022 WL 2720095 (unreported), the plaintiff initially sued the
state agency in a trial-level court claiming wrongful termination and Whistleblower
Law violations. Id., slip op. at 1 n.1, 2022 WL 2720095, at *1. The trial court
transferred the case to this Court because “this Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions brought against Commonwealth agencies and officers.” Id.,

11
slip op. at 2, 2022 WL 2720095, at *1. As in Vance, the plaintiff in Lee did not
dispute or appeal the trial court’s actions or explanation. We note that “[e]ven where
a party fails to raise the issue, it is still the affirmative duty of [a c]ourt to consider
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.” Martin v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of W.
Vincent, 230 A.3d 540, 544 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). That
our Supreme Court has never objected to this Court assuming original and exclusive
jurisdiction over Whistleblower Law claims against state entities suggests at least an
implicit endorsement of this approach.
Here, the trial court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the Spallones’ Whistleblower Law claims against the PSP. Trial Ct. Order &
Op. at 3-4. The trial court acknowledged that Bradley, Vance, and Lee are
unpublished but maintained that they “show a clear and persuasive pattern of
holdings” reflecting that this Court “considers itself to have original jurisdiction in
Whistleblower Law claims against Commonwealth entities.” Id. The trial court
declined to “contradict that practice.” Id.
The Spallones argue that money damages claims under the
Whistleblower Law are “materially indistinguishable” from employment-based
money damages claims that have been deemed suitable for origination in trial-level
courts. Spallones’ Br. at 13. The Spallones claim, for example, that no significant
difference exists between employment discrimination claims under the PHRA,
which protects a worker’s immutable traits such as race, age, or gender, and claims
under the Whistleblower Law, which protects workers who report governmental
wrongdoing. Id. at 14. They assert that any policy differences between the two
statutes are immaterial. Id. They aver that Vance and Lee, in addition to being
nonprecedential, are inapposite because jurisdiction was not directly in dispute in

12
either case. Id. at 14-15. The Spallones further assert that Bradley, where
jurisdiction was at issue, was wrongly decided because it “wandered astray in
attempting to distinguish between” the plaintiff’s Whistleblower Law and common
law tort claims, “resulting in an improper exercise” of this Court’s original
jurisdiction over the former and ancillary jurisdiction over the latter. Id. at 15.
The PSP responds that Whistleblower Law claims against state
agencies clearly fit within Section 761’s general rule that this Court has exclusive
and original jurisdiction over all actions against the Commonwealth government.
PSP’s Br. at 11. The PSP notes that in O’Rourke, which was originally brought in
this Court, our Supreme Court considered the matter in its appellate jurisdiction and
did not raise an issue of this Court’s jurisdiction, thus tacitly acknowledging the
propriety of how that case proceeded. Id. at 13. The PSP adds that reading Section
1424 of the Whistleblower Law with Section 761 of the Judicial Code reveals that
trial-level courts are “court[s] of competent jurisdiction” for claims against localities
and local agencies that do not fit within Section 761’s general rule, while this Court
is the “court of competent jurisdiction” for claims against the state and its agencies
because they do fit within Section 761’s general rule. Id. at 14. The PSP points out
that if the General Assembly wished for all Whistleblower Law claims to begin in
trial-level courts, it would have expressly said so as it did in the PHRA. Id. at 14 &
19-20. To the PSP, that the legislature did not do so demonstrates the propriety of
our courts’ longstanding practice of “splitting up” Whistleblower Law cases
depending on the nature of the defendant as either a local or state entity. Id.
The PSP adds that the Section 761(a)(1)(v) exception to this Court’s
original jurisdiction does not apply here. PSP’s Br. at 16. The PSP avers that there
is a meaningful difference between the remedial contours of the Whistleblower Law,

13
which is intended to discourage government wrongdoing, and the federal civil rights
claims in Balshy, which arose out of constitutional protections against bodily and
property harm in the form of unreasonable searches and seizures and were, as our
Supreme Court explained, a “species of tort liability.” Id. at 16-17 & 20. Similarly,
the PSP distinguishes Stackhouse, where the claims were not statutory at all, but
were standard tort allegations that fit readily within the exception. Id. at 21-22.
In their reply brief, the Spallones reiterate that their Whistleblower Law
claims are materially indistinguishable from the employment discrimination claims
in Hill that arose under the PHRA and were deemed akin to tort actions within the
jurisdiction of trial-level courts, the employment-oriented tort claims in Stackhouse,
and the general import of Balshy’s holding that money damages claims against state
agencies based on tort liability must originate in trial-level courts. Spallones’ Reply
Br. at 1-5.
As outlined above, however, the Whistleblower Law is not analogous
to tort litigation in the same way as civil rights litigation under Section 1983 or the
PHRA. See Harrison v. Health Network Laboratories Ltd. P’ships, 232 A.3d 674,
684-85 (Pa. 2020) (acknowledging that the Whistleblower Law may overlap with
but does not replicate Section 1983 and the PHRA). Contrary to the Spallones’
argument, there is a qualitative difference between these tort-adjacent categories and
the remedial Whistleblower Law. See O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1202-03. Moreover,
Section 1983 and PHRA claims generally address harms to individual constitutional
rights that are suited for treatment like tort claims because they are themselves “in
the nature of an action in tort” or a “species of tort liability.” See Hill, 679 A.2d at
774; Balshy, 490 A.2d at 420. Whistleblower Law plaintiffs are not entitled to
similarly heightened protection because, for the most part, employment in

14
Pennsylvania, even with a governmental entity, is not a right but an at-will
arrangement. “[T]here is no common law cause of action against an employer for
termination of an at-will employment relationship” and exceptions to this rule “have
been recognized in only the most limited of circumstances, where discharges of at-
will employees would threaten clear mandates of public policy,” such as
“infringements on statutory and constitutional rights.” Weaver v. Harpster, 975
A.2d 555, 563 (Pa. 2009).
The Spallones’ Whistleblower Law claims are solely related to their at-
will employment relationship with the PSP. These claims do not sound in common
law torts and are not analogous to Section 1983 and PHRA claims, which are
statutory in nature but grounded in personal constitutional rights, the violation of
which is suitable for tort-oriented duty-breach analysis, as recognized in the Section
761(a)(1)(v) exception to this Court’s original jurisdiction. The same is not true of
the Whistleblower Law, which the legislature created in 1986 to address
governmental wrongdoing by protecting employees who report it. See O’Rourke,
778 A.2d 1202-03 & n.11.
As such, there is no legal basis to conclude that Whistleblower Law
claims should be treated like tort-oriented claims for money damages where
jurisdiction has been reserved to our trial-level courts through the Section
761(a)(1)(v) exception to this Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction. The trial
court correctly sustained the PSP’s preliminary objections challenging the trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute and transferred the Spallones’
cases to this Court’s original jurisdiction.

15
IV. Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, the trial court’s July 25, 2024, orders in
these now-consolidated matters are affirmed and the trial court is directed to
effectuate transfer to this Court.

__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

16
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jordan Spallone, : CASES CONSOLIDATED
Appellant :
:
v. :
: No. 1275 C.D. 2024
Pennsylvania State Police :

Lauren Spallone, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
: No. 1276 C.D. 2024
Pennsylvania State Police :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 28th day of May, 2026, the identical July 25, 2024,
orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, which granted the
preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania State Police and transferred these now-
consolidated cases to be adjudicated in our original jurisdiction, are AFFIRMED.
The trial court is directed to effectuate transfer to this Court.

__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11332984. Public record. Not legal advice.