# Woods

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11332915

## Case

- **Full name:** Ronnie W. Woods v. National Association of Realtors, Franklin Hughes, Nicola Hughes, and Kendall Caputo
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11332915

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining the application of the Younger abstention doctrine in the civil context

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION

RONNIE W. WOODS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 5:26-cv-13-JSS-PRL

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
REALTORS, FRANKLIN HUGHES,
NICOLA HUGHES, and KENDALL
CAPUTO,

Defendants.

ORDER
Plaintiff Ronnie Woods, proceeding pro se, filed this action against the National
Association of Realtors; Franklin Hughes, a real estate broker and former senior Florida Real
Estate Commission official; Nicola Hughes, the owner of a real estate firm; and Kendall
Caputo, a real estate broker (collectively, the “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff seeks to
proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis is taken under advisement, and in an abundance of caution,
Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend the complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia by filing a “Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Non-Prisoner Complaint)” on
the standard form on September 6, 2025. (Doc. 1). He alleges that Defendants “conspired to
suppress [his] For-Sale-By-Owner [“FSBO”] real estate sales between 2021 and 2025” by use
of “fraudulent valuations, contract manipulation, and premature withdrawals of listings.” (See
id. at p. 4). Plaintiff contends that these alleged bad acts constitute violations of 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1982, 1983, the U.S. Constitution, and the Sherman Antitrust Act (the “Sherman Act”).
(See id. at p. 3). As a result, Plaintiff asserts that he was unable to sell his four investment
properties and has thus suffered financially, physically, and emotionally. (See id. at pp. 4-5).

He claims to have evidence to substantiate his claims and attaches several exhibits, including
email correspondence and documents filed in ongoing and/or closed state court proceedings.
(See Doc. 1 at p. 4; Doc. 1-2; Doc. 1-3).1 Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief. (See
Doc. 1 at p. 5).
Simultaneously with the filing of the complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis on September 6, 2025. (Doc. 2). On January 6, 2026, this case was transferred
from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to this Court. (Doc. 15; see
Doc. 12).
The Court notes that Plaintiff previously brought a similar suit in the Middle District

of Florida that closely resembles the events that are alleged in this case. See Woods v. Franklin

1 These documents reference Case Nos. 2025-CA-000209 and 2024-SC-006838 in the Fifth
Judicial Circuit Court in and for Marion County, Florida (“Marion County Circuit Court”). Case
No. 2024-SC-006838 appears to have been “re-closed,” while Case No. 2025-CA-000209 was
subsequently transferred to Leon County, Florida, pursuant to an order dated June 9, 2025, and
remains ongoing. See cases in the Marion County Circuit Court, available at
https://www.civitekflorida.com/ocrs/app/search.xhtml?tab=1; see also Ronet v. Clerk of the Thirteenth
Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough Cnty., No. 6:08-cv-1748-ORL-31KRS, 2008 WL 5110820, at *1
(indicating that courts may consider records outside the pleadings when determining whether a
complaint should be dismissed as frivolous under § 1915) (citation omitted); United States v. Glover,
179 F.3d 1300, 1302 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that “[a] court ‘may take judicial notice of its own
records and the records of inferior courts’”) (quoting United States v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1457 n.5
(11th Cir. 1987)).
Plaintiff’s state court case, Case No. 2025-CA-001578, in Leon County Circuit Court
remains open and pending. See cases in the Leon County Circuit Court, available at
https://cvweb.leonclerk.com/public/online_services/search_courts/search_by_name.asp. Since the
filing of Plaintiff’s complaint and the motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff has filed
supplemental documents relating to his pending state court proceeding. (See Doc. 21).
Hughes, et al., No. 5:25-cv-376-SPC-PRL (M.D. Fla. June 16, 2025) (“Prior Action”). In the
Prior Action, Plaintiff similarly asserted that defendants (including Franklin Hughes, as well
as various state agencies and officials) violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under § 1983
related to “[d]efendants’ actions [that] have prevented Plaintiff from selling his four

investment properties, driving him into bankruptcy[,] and forcing him to rely on his
girlfriend’s charity,” all of which was supported by Plaintiff’s filings in a related state court
case in Marion County Circuit Court. See id. at doc. 4 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2025).2 The
undersigned took Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis under advisement due to
deficiencies noted in Plaintiff’s amended complaint and gave Plaintiff the opportunity to file
a second amended complaint on or before October 31, 2025. See id. at doc. 10 (M.D. Fla. Oct.
3, 2025). In that Order, the undersigned advised Plaintiff of the deficiencies in the amended
complaint. See id.
On October 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Non-Commencement and

Consolidation in the District of Columbia” (“Notice”), indicating that he was proceeding with
the Prior Action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, no further
relief was requested in the notice “beyond noting the non-commencement status,” and he
wanted the docket to reflect that the case will not proceed further in the Middle District of
Florida. See id. at doc. 11 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2025). On October 24, 2025, the Court construed

2 Additionally, Plaintiff’s amended complaint consisted of a litany of apparent grievances
with defendants that appeared to stem entirely from his inability to sell his investment properties
over the past few years. See id. While the Court could not discern the precise nature of Plaintiff’s
allegations, they seemed to involve four investment properties that Plaintiff listed for sale starting in
2022, but due to “regulatory misconduct,” “suppression” of Plaintiff’s listings on the internet, and in
“retaliation” for filing grievances with the FREC and DBPR regarding such regulatory misconduct,
defendants purportedly prevented him from selling those properties, causing him to go into
bankruptcy. See id. at ¶¶ 11-13, 19-20, 37-38.
Plaintiff’s Notice as a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i), noting that the Notice was self-executing, and dismissed the
case without prejudice. See id. at doc. 12 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2025). On January 20, 2026,
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Related Actions in the Prior Action (which is now closed), notifying

the Court that the Prior Action is related to this instant action, and he listed three other related
state court proceedings therein, including Case Nos. 2025-CA-000209 and 2024-SC-006838.
See id. at doc. 15 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2026).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
An individual may be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis if he declares in an
affidavit that he is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
However, before a plaintiff is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is obligated
to review the complaint to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief. See id. § 1915(e)(2). If the complaint is deficient, the Court is
required to dismiss the suit sua sponte. See id.
“A lawsuit is frivolous if the plaintiff’s realistic chances of ultimate success are slight.”
Clark v. Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 639 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations
omitted); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (stating that an action is frivolous if
“it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”); Jackson v. Farmers Ins. Grp./Fire Ins. Exch.,
391 F. App’x 854, 856 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (defining a frivolous case as one
containing “clearly baseless” factual allegations or one based on an “indisputably meritless”
legal theory) (quoting Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). A

district court may dismiss a complaint under § 1915 on grounds of frivolousness if an
affirmative defense would defeat the action. See Clark, 915 F.2d at 640, 640 n.2 (indicating
that absolute immunity of a defendant would justify the dismissal of a claim as frivolous).
Indeed, “[i]ndigence does not create a constitutional right to the expenditure of public funds
and the valuable time of the courts in order to prosecute an action which is totally without

merit.” See Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted)
In evaluating a complaint under § 1915, courts must liberally construe pro se filings and
hold them to less stringent standards than papers drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But courts cannot act as counsel for plaintiffs or rewrite pleadings. See
United States v. Cordero, 7 F.4th 1058, 1068 n.11 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Pro se
litigants must still comply with the procedural rules applicable to ordinary civil litigation. See
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Nevertheless, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged
misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
While this pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” See id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” and must provide “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]” See Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Although a court must accept as true well-pleaded

allegations, it is not bound to accept a legal conclusion stated as a “factual allegation” in the
complaint. See id.; Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (citations omitted).
Subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue in any case pending in the United States

District Court. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, which are “‘empowered to
hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III
of the Constitution,’ and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant
authorized by Congress.” See Univ. of So. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir.
1999) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). “[A] court must
zealously [e]nsure that jurisdiction exists over a case, and should itself raise the question of
subject matter jurisdiction at any point in the litigation where a doubt about jurisdiction
arises.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001); see Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys.
R.R., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court not only has the power but also

the obligation at any time to inquire into jurisdiction whenever the possibility that jurisdiction
does not exist arises.”). This inquiry should be done at the earliest stage in the proceedings
and sua sponte whenever subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. See Univ. of So. Ala., 168
F.3d at 410; Fitzgerald, 760 F.2d at 1251. If a court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Morrison
v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[O]nce a court determines that
there has been no [jurisdictional] grant that covers a particular case, the court's sole remaining
act is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Failure to Comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
At the most basic level, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet the pleading requirements
set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff’s allegations are vague, conclusory,

non-specific, and lack well-pled facts. Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that he is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8(a)(2). See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is “still required to conform to
procedural rules, and the court is not required to rewrite a deficient pleading.” See Washington
v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 256 F. App’x 326, 327 (11th Cir. 2007).
B. The Sherman Act
Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a claim under the Sherman Act. Article III standing in
federal court requires that a plaintiff must show that: (1) he suffered an injury in fact that is
concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) the defendants likely caused his injury;

and (3) a favorable decision can likely redress his injury. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594
U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); Tokyo
Gwinnett, LLC v. Gwinnett Cnty., Ga., 940 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).3

3 All three requirements are necessary, and the failure to establish any of them deprives a
federal court of jurisdiction over that claim. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013);
Polelle v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 131 F.4th 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2025). An injury in fact is “an invasion of
a legally protected interest that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.” See Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir.
2020) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560) (internal quotation marks omitted); A&M Gerber Chiropractic
LLC, 925 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2019) (stating that the controversy “cannot be conjectural,
hypothetical, or contingent; it must be real and immediate, and create a definite, rather than
speculative threat of future injury” that can be resolved by the court’s intervention) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); Wood v. Raffensperger, 981 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir. 2020)
(indicating that “[a] particularized injury is one that affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual
way[,]” rather than a mere generalized grievance that anybody could pursue) (citation omitted).
“A proper antitrust plaintiff, however, must have more than Article III standing (‘injury in
fact’ and ‘case or controversy’). . . . [t]he plaintiff must have antitrust standing.” Dean v. Roku,
Inc., No. 8:24-cv-2383-WFJ-TGW, 2025 WL 2299403, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025)
(internal citations omitted).

To have standing to assert a claim under the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) he suffered an antitrust injury, and (2) the plaintiff must be an “efficient
enforcer” of the antitrust laws. See Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. Estee Lauder Companies, Inc., 797
F.3d 1248, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). An antitrust injury is “injury
of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent” and “should reflect the anticompetitive
effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.” See
Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Brunswick Corp v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)); Duty Free
Americas, Inc., 797 F.3d at 1272-73 (“When a plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief, this means

it ‘must allege threatened injury that would constitute antitrust injury if inflicted upon the
plaintiff and the defendant’s causal responsibility for such threatened injury.’”) (quoting
Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1452 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Plaintiff fails to allege an injury reflecting the anticompetitive nature of any conduct
by the Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff merely alleges in a conclusory manner that Defendants
“coordinated conduct amounts to retaliation, suppression of [his] ability to sell property For-
Sale-By-Owner[,] . . . mirror[ing] the anticompetitive restraints[,]” and that “the Florida Real
Estate Commission and DBPR [i.e., Florida Department of Business and Professional
Regulation] . . . selectively refused enforcement while brokers and associations used state-

backed MLS rules to restrain trade and exclude [him] from the market.” (See Doc. 1 at pp. 3-
4). It is unclear what specific action(s) taken by Defendants violate the Sherman Act.
Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct is unconstitutional, seemingly Plaintiff’s
only injury is his inability to sell his four investment properties. As such, Plaintiff lacks
standing to bring a claim under the Sherman Act. See Claudet v. Sheriff of Osceola Cnty., No.

6:16-cv-301-ORL-40TBS, 2016 WL 6125671, at *2 (finding that pro se plaintiff lacked standing
to bring a claim under the Sherman Act because plaintiff alleged “no injury reflecting the
anticompetitive nature of any conduct by the Sheriff”).
Even if Plaintiff did have standing to bring a claim under the Sherman Act, Plaintiff’s
complaint fails to state a claim under § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman
Act declares illegal “[e]very contract . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations[.]” See 15 U.S.C. § 1. To establish a claim
under § 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must allege an agreement between two or more
parties that unreasonably restrains trade. See Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d

1538, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327,
1332-33 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Aviation Spec., Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 568 F.2d 1186,
1191-92 (5th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits
monopolizing, or attempting to monopolize, or combining or conspiring to monopolize trade
or commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 2; Feldman v. Jackson Mem’l Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1000, 1010 (S.D.
Fla. 1983), aff’d, 752 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[A]ll three offenses covered by § 2 of the
Sherman Act: monopolization, attempt to monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize” and
“[t]he general elements required to prove each of these violations are well-settled”).
Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to plausibly establish a violation under § 1 or § 2

of the Sherman Act. He generally alleges that Defendants “conspired to suppress [his] For-
Sale-By-Owner [“FSBO”] real estate sales between 2021 and 2025” by use of “fraudulent
valuations, contract manipulation, and premature withdrawals of listings.” (See Doc. 1 at p.
4). Although Plaintiff claims a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, he does not identify an
agreement between two or more parties, nor does he show how such an agreement harmed

him. Further, Plaintiff fails to allege what cause of action he is asserting under § 2 of the
Sherman Act (i.e., monopolization, attempt to monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize),
and therefore, the Court is unable to evaluate the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claim under § 2 of
the Sherman Act. See Silva v. Powell, No. 3:24-cv-742-MMH-LLL, 2024 WL 5375479, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2024); Feldman, 571 F. Supp. at 1010. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a
plausible claim under the Sherman Act.
C. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions and conduct constitute violations under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983. (See Doc. 1 at p. 3). Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a

civil rights violation.
Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination in the making and enforcement of private
contracts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. To state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must plead facts
demonstrating (1) “that [he] is a member of a racial minority”; (2) “that the defendant
intended to discriminate on the basis of race”; and (3) “that the discrimination concerned one
or more of the activities enumerated in the statute” (i.e., the right to make, perform, modify,
and terminate contracts, and enjoy all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship). See Moore v. Grady Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 834 F.3d 1168, 1171-72 (11th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004));

Jimenez v. WellStar Health Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “[t]o
state a claim under § 1981 for interference with a right to contract, ‘a plaintiff must identify
an impaired contractual relationship under which the plaintiff has rights’”) (quoting Kinnon
v. Arcoub, Gopman & Assocs., Inc., 490 F.3d 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2007)); Munnings v. FedEx
Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 6:07-cv-282-ORL-19KRS, 2008 WL 1849003, at *11 (M.D. Fla.

Apr. 22, 2008) (indicating that to establish the third element of a § 1981 claim, “a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant failed to perform a contractual obligation”) (citation omitted);
Ziyadat v. Diamondrock Hosp. Co., 3 F.4th 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021) (“A contractual injury
includes any injury relating to ‘the making, performance, modification, [or] termination of
[the] contract[ ],’ or to ‘the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship.”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)).
Section 1982 prohibits racial discrimination as to the inheritance, purchasing, leasing,
selling, holding, and conveying real and personal property. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Section 1982
is similar to § 1981 “except that it focuse[s], not upon rights to make and to enforce contracts,

but rights related to the ownership of property.” See CBOS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442,
446-47 (2008). To state a claim under § 1982, a plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) that he
is a member of a protected class; (2) that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him
on the basis of race; and (3) interference in his rights or benefits connected with the ownership
of his property. See Doss v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. 8:17-cv-653-T-27AEP, 2017 WL
5624265, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2017) (citing Daniels v. Dillard’s, Inc., 373 F.3d 885, 887
(8th Cir. 2004)); Todd v. Alabama Power, No. 09-0746, 2010 WL 749334, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Mar.
1, 2010) (internal footnote and citations omitted); Prestige Restaurants & Ent., Inc. v. Bayside
Seafood Rest., Inc., No. 09-23128-CIV, 2010 WL 680905, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2010), aff’d
sub nom. Prestige Restaurants & Ent., Inc. v. Bayside Seafood Resturant, Inc., 417 F. App’x 892
(11th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “interfered with [his] property and contract rights”
through “[t]heir coordinated conduct amount[ing] to retaliation, [and] suppression of [his]

ability to sell property For-Sale-By-Owner.” (See Doc. 1 at p. 3). Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid
of any allegations demonstrating that he is a member of a protected group, that any of the
Defendants intended to discriminate against him based on his race, and that his ability to
make and enforce contracts was impaired. Plaintiff offers only conclusory allegations and
provides no factual allegations showing that a contract existed. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a
plausible claim under either § 1981 or § 1982.
Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim against Defendants pursuant to § 1983, alleging
violations of his constitutional rights. (See id.). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private
right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” See Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but
merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” See Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)
(internal quotations omitted)).
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated
by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998). Importantly, “[l]ike

the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law
element of § 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private conduct, no matter how
discriminatory or wrongful.’” See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)
(quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)); see also Hernandez v. Echarte, No. 24-
11488, 2024 WL 4235458, at *1 (11th Cir. Sept. 19, 2024) (per curiam) (“To act ‘under color

of state law’ under section 1983, a deprivation must involve a state actor.”) (citing Charles v.
Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 694 (11th Cir. 2021)). “[M]ore than conclusory and vague allegations
are required to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Hannah v. Union Corr. Inst.,
No. 3:12-cv-436-J-20JBT, 2012 WL 1413163, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2012) (citing L.S.T.,
Inc. v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[o]nly in rare circumstances can a private
party be viewed as a ‘state actor’ for section 1983 purposes.” See Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d
1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992). Private parties are considered state actors and can be held liable
under § 1983 if one of the following conditions are met: (1) the state coerced or significantly

encouraged the alleged unconstitutional action (known as the “state compulsion test”); (2)
the private parties performed a public function that was traditionally the state’s exclusive
prerogative (known as the “public function test”); or (3) the state became a joint participant
because it insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private parties (known
as the “nexus/joint action test”). See Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347
(11th Cir. 2001) (citing Nat’l Broad Co. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 860 F.2d 1022,
1026-27 (11th Cir. 1988)).
Here, even if the Court were to presume Plaintiff sufficiently alleged the violation of a
federal constitutional right (which he has not), Plaintiff has failed to allege that any of the

Defendants, who all appear to be private parties, satisfy any of the three conditions stated
above to be considered a state actor. Plaintiff asserts in a vague and conclusory manner that
“Defendants acted under color of state law by jointly engaging with the Florida Real Estate
Commission and DBPR [i.e., Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation]
to suppress [his] FSBO sales.” (See Doc. 1 at p. 4). The complaint, however, lacks any further

factual allegations supporting such a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (stating that conclusory
allegations are “not entitled to be assumed true”) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55); see also
Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd., 297 F.3d at 1188 (indicating that the Court need not accept such an
allegation as true because it is a legal conclusion masquerading as a fact). There are no factual
allegations suggesting that each of the Defendants was acting in concert with state officials or
that the state insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Defendants. Thus,
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim under § 1983.
D. Younger Abstention Doctrine
To the extent Plaintiff is asking the Court to intervene in any ongoing state court

proceeding, this Court cannot interfere in such a proceeding pursuant to the Younger
abstention doctrine. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-37 (1982) (explaining the application of the
Younger abstention doctrine in the civil context). “Younger and its progeny reflect the
longstanding national public policy, based on principles of comity and federalism, of allowing
state courts to try cases—already pending in state court—free from federal court interference.”
Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Under the Younger abstention doctrine, “federal courts ordinarily must refrain from
deciding the merits of a case when (1) there is a pending state judicial proceeding; (2) the

proceeding implicates important state interests; and (3) the parties have an adequate
opportunity to raise any constitutional claims in the state proceeding.” See Newsome v. Broward
Cnty. Pub. Defenders, 304 F. App’x 814, 816 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Middlesex
Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432); see also Boyd v. Georgia, 512 F. App’x 915, 918 (11th Cir.
2013) (per curiam) (“In order to decide whether the federal proceeding would interfere with

the state proceeding, we look to the relief requested and the effect it would have on the state
proceedings.”) (quoting 31 Foster Child. v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003)); Sprint
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013) (explaining that under the Younger abstention
doctrine, federal courts will not interfere with certain state civil proceedings, including “civil
proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability
to perform their judicial functions”) (citation omitted).
In Plaintiff’s complaint and a myriad of documents filed in support of his allegations
in the complaint, Plaintiff makes references to a state court proceeding, which appears to be
active and pending in Leon County, and asks the Court to issue injunctive relief against

Defendants “prohibiting suppression of For-Sale-By-Owner property sales” and “preventing
retaliatory takedowns of FSBO listings,” and requests “an order requiring preservation of all
records, emails, and communications” that appear to be related to his state court proceeding.
(See Doc. 1 at pp. 5, 11; Doc. 1-2; Doc. 1-3). Based on Plaintiff’s requested relief, it appears
that the Younger abstention doctrine may apply to the extent that the state court proceeding
referenced in the complaint and supporting documents in this action remains active and
pending.4 See 31 Foster Child., 329 F.3d at 1276 (determining that an ongoing state judicial

4 And to the extent the state court proceeding has concluded, this Court would still not be an
available avenue to seek review because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal courts (other
than the United States Supreme Court) from reviewing and rejecting final state court judgments or
proceeding exists when the state court is actively involved in overseeing or enforcing orders
in a case); Macleod v. Bexley, 730 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding that plaintiff’s
request in the complaint asking the court to review a state court order was barred by the
Younger abstention doctrine because it “involve[d] an order ‘uniquely in furtherance of the

state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions’”) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc., 571
U.S. at 73); Chestnut v. Canady, 853 F. App’x 580, 583 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (indicating
that “[g]enerally, in the absence of authority to the contrary, a federal court should assume
that a state’s procedures will afford the plaintiff an adequate remedy”) (citing 31 Foster Child.,
329 F.3d at 1279).
E. Amendment
In an abundance of caution, the Court will provide the Plaintiff with an opportunity
to file an amended complaint to clarify the basis of his claims. Plaintiff must provide the Court
with sufficient information in a coherent manner so that it can perform the review required

under § 1915. The amended complaint must clearly state the legal theory or theories upon
which Plaintiff seeks relief and explain with factual allegations how each defendant is
responsible. Plaintiff should carefully consider whether he can allege a claim in good faith
because pursuing frivolous claims could lead to the imposition of sanctions.
Plaintiff is cautioned that, despite proceeding pro se, he is required to comply with this
Court’s Local Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Plaintiff may obtain a copy of the Local Rules from the Court’s website

orders. See, e.g., Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (explaining the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
(http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov) or by visiting the Office of the Clerk of Court. Additionally,
resources and information related to proceeding in court without a lawyer, including a
handbook entitled “Guide for Proceeding Without a Lawyer,” can be located on the Court’s
website (http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/pro_se/default.htm). Plaintiff should also consult
the Middle District of Florida’s Civil Discovery Handbook for a general discussion of this
District’s discovery practices (http://www. □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
(Doc. 2) is TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on
or before March 17, 2026. The amended complaint must comply with all pleading
requirements contained in Rules 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
those contained in the Local Rules of the Middle District of Florida. Failure to comply with
this Order may result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed for failure to
prosecute.
DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida on February 17, 2026.

Sorweensn
PHILIP R. LAMMENS
United States Magistrate Judge
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

-17-

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11332915. Public record. Not legal advice.