# Stephens

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · March 25, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11332803

## Case

- **Full name:** Glenn H. Stephens, Ill v. Denise Dieter, Magisterial District Judge, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 25, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11332803

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that court must construe pro se filings liberally
- discussing futility exception to exhaustion of state remedies in Section 2254 habeas cases

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GLENN H. STEPHENS, Ill, :
Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-337

V. : (JUDGE MANNION)
DENISE DIETER, Magisterial :
District Judge, et al.,
Respondents

MEMORANDUM
Currently before the Court are the following applications, petitions, and
motions filed by pro se Petitioner Glenn H. Stephens, Ill (“Stephens”): (1) an
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”); (2) a
“Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Petition of [sic] Emergency Writ of
Habeas Corpus’ under 28 U.S.C. §2241; (3) a notice of removal of a pending
state criminal case; (4) an amended Section 2241 habeas petition; (5) a
hybrid motion seeking habeas and mandamus relief; (6) a motion for

summary judgment; (7) a “Motion for Expedited Mediation of Combined
(Joined) Cases”; and (8) a motion to stay. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court will: (1) grant the IFP Application; (2) deem withdrawn Stephens’s
motions for a preliminary injunction and mandamus relief; (3) deny his
motions to stay, “Motion for Expedited Mezdiation of Combined (Joined)

Cases,” and motion for summary judgment; (4) strike his purported notice of
removal; (5) dismiss without prejudice his amended Section 2241 petition;
(6) decline to issue a certificate of appealability; and (7) direct the Clerk of
Court to close this case.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Underlying State Court Proceedings
According to the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania Web Portal
(https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch), Stephens is facing criminal
charges in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County (“CCP”) for: (1)
one count of criminal attempt to commit theft by extortion (18 Pa. C.S.
§§901(a), 3923(a)(2)); two counts of stalking (18 Pa. C.S. §2709.1(a)(2)):
and (3) two counts of harassment (18 Pa. C.S. §2709(a)(7)). See
Commonwealth v. Stephens, No. CP-41-CR-1498-2024 (Lycoming Cnty. Ct.
Com. PI.).' It does not appear that a trial date has been set in the case. See
id. However, the docket reflects that Stephens is currently incarcerated in the
Lycoming County Prison (“LCP”) after the CCP revoked his bail on June 16,

' The Court takes judicial notice of the docket for Stephens’s underlying
criminal case. See, e.g., Orabi v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537
n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (“We may take judicial notice of the contents
of another Court’s docket.”); Mickell v. Lycoming Cnty. Cent. Collections Off.
& Admin., 821 F. App’x 74, 75 (3d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (taking “judicial
notice of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County criminal docket”
for plaintiff's underlying criminal case).
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2025. See id. It also appears that he is proceeding pro Se in his criminal case.
See id.
B. Stephens’s Submissions in This Case
Stephens commenced the instant action by filing a document titled,
“Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Petition of [sic] Emergency Writ of
Habeas Corpus,” which the Clerk of Court docketed on February 25, 2025.
(Doc. 1.) In this submission, Stephens, who identifies himself as “a Berkeley
Law School graduate and member-in-good-standing in E.D. FDC Michigan,”
generally asserts that he has been wrongfully imprisoned in Lycoming
County. (/d. at 1.) In particular, he describes the criminal proceedings against
him as follows:
Like his candidacy for Magisterial District Judge and his earlier
whistleblower campaign against a landlord ignoring city and PA
code — CO [sic] alarms — and the attempted criminal activity of
that landlord and his property manager, this motion/petition
arises from interrelated campaigns-free speech (in emails)
against a landlord ignoring renter safety (black mold) and this
criminal activity of that landlord (a bounced check of $500 as part
of a breach of an exit agreement from the black mold infested
rental) which generated Stephens [sic] lawful repeated request
[sic] for restitution. The unlawful retaliatory criminalization of
Stephens [sic] restitution efforts, intalaced [sic] with his ADA/Fair
Housing Act complaint and opposition[] by Lycoming County Law
Enforcement + [sic] Judge is the real reason he is in prison.
(Id. at 2.)

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Stephens argues that a Lycoming County Judge held “an
unconstitutional ultra vires bail hearing” in which the Judge raised
Stephens’s bail from $15,000 to $25,000. (/d. at 3.) Stephens believes that
this $25,000 bail is excessive and retaliatory, causing him to “remain{]
wrongfully incarcerated.” (/d.) He identifies other cases where similar bail
amounts were ordered and appears to argue that the charges in those cases

were more serious than his charges, and he even provides his own “expert
statistical analysis” of his allegedly excessive bail. (/d. at 3, 5-8, 10-13.)
For relief, Stephens seeks a stay or injunction of his Lycoming County
criminal proceedings, an order requiring “all Lycoming County law
enforcement and judges to cease and desist” until this Court resolves his
habeas petition, and his immediate release from incarceration. (/d. at 14.)
Regarding his request for a stay or an injunction, Stephens argues that
abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) does not apply in his

case because “the balancing of equities and irreparable harm favor{[s] federal
court action” and Younger “is inappropriate where state proceedings
advance to harass or [are conducted] in bad faith.” (/d. at 1-2.)
In addition to his emergency motion/habeas petition, Stephens filed his
IFP Application. (Doc. 4.) Unfortunately, he did not submit a certified prisoner
trust fund account statement with his IFP Application as required by the in

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forma pauperis statute, see 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2) (requiring that when
applying for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, an incarcerated litigant must
submit “a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional
equivalent) for the [litigant] for the 6-month period immediately preceding the
filing of the [petition], obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at
which the [litigant] is or was confined”); as such, an Administrative Order
issued requiring the Warden of LCP to submit Stephens’s certified account
statement to the Clerk of Court. (Doc. 5.) Stephens’s certified account
statement was docketed on March 14, 2025. (Doc. 6.)
In early to mid-June 2025, Stephens filed three (3) submissions with
the Clerk of Court. The first of those submissions is a purported notice of
removal in which Stephens claims to have removed his Lycoming County
criminal case to this civil habeas docket. (Doc. 7.) The second submission is

a completed form petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2241,
which the Court construes as an amended Section 2241 habeas petition.
(Doc. 8.) In his amended petition, Stephens appears to assert that he, inter
alia, properly rernoved his criminal case to this Court, has been the victim of
abuses of process, has been unlawfully imprisoned since August 2025
despite a lack of probable cause to arrest and imprison him, and is being
unlawfully retaliated against for running for ‘a magisterial district judge seat

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in Lycoming County and advocating on behalf of “poor renters.” (/d. at 1-7.)
For relief, Stephens seeks to have the Court: (1) issue a temporary
restraining order “staying all state court actions, warrants, bench warrants,
etc. until after’ the November 2025 magisterial district judge election; (2)
release him into the custody of federal Marshals “if [he is] seized”; (3) deny
any “remand motion” because he cannot “get a fair trial in Lycoming County”;
and (4) join this federal case with his state criminal case “if [he is] tried for
crimes [he] did not commit.” (/d. at 7.) As for the third of Stephens’s
submissions, it consists of forms from the Lycoming County Board of
Elections seemingly related to his nomination petition for a magisterial district
judge election. (Doc. 9.) The Court presumes that Stephens intended that
these documents serve as supporting exhibits to his amended Section 2241
petition and will consider them as such.
On August 8, 2025, Stephens filed a “Memorandum on Black Mold”
(Doc. 10), and a “Motion” in which he both sought habeas relief and a writ of
mandamus ordering “defendants to cease and desist all constitutional
retaliation againts [sic] him until after November 5, 2025” (Doc. 12). Less
than a week later, on August 14, 2025, Stephens filed a motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 13) and a document titled, “Attachment Iqbal [sic] Twombley
[sic] Addendum to Privileges and Immunities Clause Complaint” (Doc. 14).

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Stephens then filed a brief in support of his motion for summary judgment on
August 20, 2025. (Doc. 15).
Stephens continued submitting documents in this case in September
2025, when he first filed a document titled, “Evidentiary Supplement,” on
September 3, 2025. (Doc. 16.) He then filed a document titled, “Additional
Vicarious Admission — Memorialization for Purposes of Summary Judgement
[sic],” on September 26, 2025. (Doc. 17.) On November 4, 2025, Stephens
filed a document titled, “Motion for Expedited Mediation of Combined
(Joined) Cases,” along with a supporting brief. (Docs. 18, 19.) On February
18, 2026, Stephens filed a motion to stay and a brief in support of his motion.
(Docs. 20, 21.) Stephens’s applications, motions, and petitions are ripe for
review.
ll. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Applications for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1), a district court “may authorize the
commencement. . . of any [civil] suit, .. . without prepayment of fees or
security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a

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statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to

pay such fees or give security therefor.”* /d. This statute
“is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful
access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Specifically,
Congress enacted the statute to ensure that administrative court
costs and filing fees, both of which must be paid by everyone
else who files a lawsuit, would not prevent indigent persons from
pursuing meaningful litigation. [Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d
1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995)]. Toward this end, §1915(a) allows a
litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court in
forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit stating, among
other things, that [they are] unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827.
Douris, 293 F. App’x at 131-32 (unpublished).
B. Preliminary Review of Section 2241 Habeas Petitions
Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts, applicable to Section 2241 petitions through
Rule 1(b), see R. 1(b), 28 U.S.C. foll. §2254 (“The district court may apply
any or all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not [involving a petition
under 28 U.S.C. §2254].”): see also In re Gorbey, 833 F. App’x 371, 372 (3d
Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (“As the District Court noted in its October 13, 2020
order, the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases are applicable to §2241

2 “The reference to prisoners in §1915(a)(1) appears to be a mistake.
In forma pauperis status is afforded to all indigent persons, not just
prisoners.” Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App’x 130, 132 n.1 (3d Cir.
2008) (unpublished).
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petitions by Rule 1(b).” (citing Bowers v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, Warden, 760
F.3d 1177, 1183 n.8 (11th Cir. 2014))), this Court must examine a Section
2241 habeas petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.”
R. 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. §2254. If it appears that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief, “the judge must dismiss and petition and direct the clerk to notify the
petitioner.” /d.; see also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994)
(explaining that district courts are “authorized to dismiss summarily any
habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.” (citing R. 4, 28
U.S.C. foll. §2254)).
C. Habeas Petitions Filed by State Pretrial Detainees
When a judgment against a habeas petitioner in a state criminal
proceeding has not yet been entered and the petitioner files an application
for a writ of habeas corpus while in pretrial detention, jurisdiction for federal
habeas review arises under Section 2241, not 28 U.S.C. §2254, because
Section 2254 requires that the petitioner be “in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State Court.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(a) (emphasis added): see also
Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1975) (“For state prisoners,
federal habeas corpus is substantially a post-conviction remedy... .”
(citations and footnote omitted)). Section 2241 provides that “[w]rits of

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habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof,
the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.”
28 U.S.C. §2241(a). In addition, the writ of habeas corpus under Section
2241 may extend to a prisoner in pretrial detention if they are “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” /d.
§2241(c)(3); see also Duran v. Thomas, 393 F. App’x 3, 4 (3d Cir. 2010)
(unpublished) (“[Sjection 2241 authorizes a federal court to issue a writ of
habeas corpus to any pre-trial detainee who is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Although federal courts have jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas

corpus before a judgment is entered in a state criminal proceeding pursuant
to Section 2241, see, e.g., Moore, 515 F.2d at 443, in the pretrial setting,
“federal habeas corpus does not lie, absent ‘special circumstances’ to
adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior
to a judgment of conviction by a state court.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973); see also Moore, 515 F.2d at 443
(“[JJurisdiction without exhaustion should be exercised at the pre-trial state
unless extraordinary circumstances are present.”). Disfavor of pretrial
intervention in state criminal proceedings is based on the notion of comity,

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“a principle of deference and ‘proper respect’ for state government functions
in our federal system.” Evans v. Ct. of Com. PI. Del. Cnty., Pa., 959 F.2d
1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971));
see also Duran, 393 F. App’x at 4 (explaining that Section 2241 jurisdiction
“must be exercised sparingly in order to prevent in the ordinary circumstance
‘pre-trial habeas interference by federal courts in the normal functioning of
state criminal processes” (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 445—46)).
DISCUSSION
A. The lFP Application (Doc. 4)
After reviewing the IFP Application and Stephens’s prisoner trust fund
account statement, the Court finds that he cannot prepay the fee for this
action. Therefore, the Court will grant the IFP Application and permit
Stephens leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this habeas case.
B. Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 1)
Stephens filed a motion for a preliminary injunction along with his
petition for an emergency writ of habeas corpus, the latter of which the Court
construes as his initial Section 2241 habeas petition. (Doc. 1.) As for his
motion for a preliminary injunction, Stephens niever filed a brief in support of
the motion as required by the Court’s Local Rules. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.5
(“Within fourteen (14) days after the filing cf any motion, the party filing the

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motion shall file a brief in support of the motion. .. . A brief shall not be
required: (a) In support of a motion for enlargement of time if the reasons for
the request are fully stated in the motion, (b) In support of any motion which
has concurrence of all parties, and the reasons for the motion and the relief
sought are fully stated therein, or (c) In support of a motion for appointment
of counsel.”). Therefore, the Court will deem the motion for a preliminary
injunction withdrawn due to Stephens’s failure to file a supporting brief. See
id. (“If a supporting brief is not filed within the time provided in this rule the
motion shall be deemed to be withdrawn.”).
C. “Motion” Seeking Immediate Release and Mandamus Relief
(Doc. 12)
Stephens filed a submission which he titled as a “Motion,” in which he
sought an Order directing his immediate release from confinement as well

as an Order granting his “petition for a writ of mandamus” to require
“defendants” to “cease and desist all constitutional retaliation against [him]
until after November 5, 2025.” (Doc. 12 at 1.) The Court will deem this
“Motion” withdrawn to the extent it seeks any form of relief because Stephens
did not file a supporting brief within fourteen days of filing the “Motion,” as
required by Local Rule 7.5. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.5. Furthermore, even if the
Court would not deem withdrawn Stephens’s “Motion” seeking, inter alia,
mandamus relief, he has not stated any grounds upon which this Court would
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grant him mandamus relief. See Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep't
of Health & Hum. Servs., 2 F.4th 121, 132 (3d Cir. 2021) (explaining that for
mandamus to issue, “a litigant must satisfy three requirements that courts
have characterized as jurisdictional: (1) a clear and indisputable right to
relief, (2) that the government agency or official is violating a clear duty to
act, and (3) that no adequate alternative remedy exists” (citation omitted)).
D. Motion to Stay (Doc. 20)
Stephens filed a motion to stay Local Rule 7.10, which pertains to
motions for reconsideration,? until the United States Supreme Court reviews
his petition for a writ of certiorari that he apparently filed or, alternatively,
extend the deadline for filing a motion for reconsideration to thirty days if the
movant is a pro se prisoner. See (Docs. 20 at 1; 21 at 1-8). It is unclear why
Stephens filed this motion in this case because he has not filed any motion
for reconsideration, and it appears that he primarily focuses his motion on
another of his several civil actions he has filed in this district over the past
year, see Stephens v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2356 (M.D. Pa.), which is assigned
to the Honorable Julia K. Munley. See, e.g., (Doc. 21 at 7 (“[MJovant seeks

3 Local Rule 7.10 states that “[a]ny motion for reconsideration or
reargument must be accompanied by a supporting brief and filed within
fourteen (14) days after the entry of the order concerned. This rule is not
applicable to a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.10.
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the evitable [sic] relief of 30 days (calendar) to move for reconsideration of
4:25-cv-2356 from today.”)). Regardless, since there is no pending motion
for reconsideration in this case, there is no basis for this Court to apply, much
less discuss, Local Rule 7.10. As such, at least as it pertains to this case,
Stephens’s motion to stay is frivolous. Accordingly, the Court will deny the
motion to stay.
E. “Motion for Expedited Mediation of Combined (Joined)
Cases” (Doc. 18)
Stephens moves to have the Court jain all pending cases he has filed
in this District, except for three of those cases, “into one complaint.” (Doc. 19
at 11.) Although Stephens does not identify all his cases in his motion or his
supporting brief, the Court notes that he has filed the following actions in this
District since July 1, 2025: (1) Stephens, III v. Dieter, et al., No. 25-cv-1261-
MEM (M.D. Pa. filed July 11, 2025); (2) Stephens v. Marino, et al., No. 25-
cv-1761-KMN (M.D. Pa. filed Sept. 22, 2025); (3) Stephens v. Ogden
Newspapers, Inc., et al., No. 25-cv-1824-JFS (M.D. Pa. filed Sept. 30, 2025);
(4) Stephens v. Welickovitch, et al., No. 25-cv-1825-JPW (M.D. Pa. filed
Sept. 30, 2025); (5) Stephens, et al. v. Wascher, et al., No. 25-cv-1907-PJC
(M.D. Pa. filed Oct. 10, 2025): (6) Stephens v. UPMC-Williamsport, No. 25-
cv-2069-KM (M.D. Pa. filed Nov. 3, 2025); (7) Stephens v. Epic Games, Inc.,
No. 25-cv-2081-JFS (M.D. Pa. filed Nov. 4, 2025); (8) Stephens v. Keller,
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No. 25-cv-2266-KMN (M.D. Pa. filed Nov. 26, 2025); (9) Stephens v. Trump,
No. 25-cv-2356-JKM (M.D. Pa. filed Dec. 9, 2025); and (10) Sfephens v.
Bench, U.S. Dist. Ct., M.D. Pa., No. 26-cv-652-JKM (M.D. Pa. filed Mar. 13,
2026). All the above actions are non-habeas civil actions in which Stephens
filed a complaint, and several of them are already closed. See Stephens, III

v. Dieter, et al., No. 25-cv-1261-MEM (M.D. Pa.), ECF No. 9; Stephens v.
Welickovitch, et al., No. 25-cv-1825-JPW (M.D. Pa.), ECF Nos. 23, 24:
Stephens v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 25-cv-2081-JFS (M.D. Pa.), ECF No. 6;
Stephens v. UPMC-Williamsport, No. 25-cv-2069-KM (M.D. Pa.), ECF No.
7; Stephens v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2356-JKM (M.D. Pa.), ECF Nos. 7, 8;
Stephens v. Bench, U.S. Dist. Ct., M.D. Pa., No. 26-cv-652-JKM (M.D. Pa.),
ECF No. 4; Stephens v. Marino, et al., No. 25-cv-1761-KMN (M.D. Pa.), ECF
No. 16. Therefore, considering that these other actions are not habeas cases
and many of them are already closed, this Court will not consolidate any of
them with the instant Section 2241 habeas case. Moreover, Stephens has
failed to articulate any plausible reason to submit this case for mediation.
Accordingly, the Court will deny Stephens’s “Motion for Expedited Mediation
of Combined (Joined) Cases.”

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F. Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13)
Stephens moves for summary judgment on the ground that Lycoming
County’s “[b]ails [sic] violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause and, in
turn, . . . the [Eighth] Amendments [sic] [p]rohibition [a]Jgainst excessive
[b]ails [sic].” (Doc. 15 at 1.) Stephens asserts that his bail was set at $25,000
even though he has no criminal record, he has been wrongfully accused of
nonviolent crimes, he is not a flight risk, and he is domiciled in Virginia. See
(id.). He claims that he can provide “several dozen examples” of Lycoming
County residents who were accused of violent offenses and did not have
their bail set as high as Stephens’s bail. See (id. at 1-2). This information is
allegedly set forth in the Williamsport Gazette case reports, and Stephens
requests that the Court take judicial notice of this information. See (id. at 2).
For the reasons stated below, the Court will cleny this motion.
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, and district courts may apply those Rules to Section 2241
habeas petitions “to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any
statutory provisions or’ the Rules themselves. R. 12, 28 U.S.C. foll. §2254:
see also R. 1(b), 28 U.S.C. foll. §2254 (“The district court may apply any or
all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not covered by Rule 1(a).”).
Although it appears that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to address

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this issue, at least three other circuit courts of appeal have concluded that
Rule 56 applies to habeas cases. See Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 132
(4th Cir. 2011) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ‘applies to habeas
proceedings.” (quoting Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407, 412 (4th Cir.
1991))); Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (“As a
general principle, Rule 56 . . . applies with equal force in the context of
habeas corpus cases.” (citations omitted)); McBride v. Sharpe, 25 F.3d 962,
969 (11th Cir. 1994) (“As a general principle, Rule 56... . is applicable in
habeas corpus cases.” (citations omitted)). On the other hand, one circuit
court of appeals has concluded that summary judgment principles do not
apply when a federal district court is ruling on the merits of a federal habeas
claim. See Black v. Carpenter, 866 F.3d 734, 742-43 (6th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that “[s]ummary-judgment procedures simply do not apply to a
federal habeas court's final adjudication of a [habeas] claim” because [the
petitioner has] the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that [they are] entitled to relief’ (citations ornitted)). Judges in this District
have reached conflicting decisions on the applicability of Rule 56 to habeas
proceedings. Compare Stinson v. Wakefield, No. 07-cv-1237, 2010 WL
1462536, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2010) (“Summary judgment is appropriate
in a habeas proceeding ... .”), with Meade v. Spaulding, No. 16-cv-2212,

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2017 WL 3425181, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2017) (denying motion for

summary judgment as unnecessary in Section 2241 habeas action).
This Court is persuaded by the reasoning of those cases that have
determined that summary judgment motions are “superfluous and

unnecessary in determining the merits of a habeas corpus petition.” Levack

v. Burton, No. 16-cv-125, 2018 WL 11648114, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 2,
2018); see also Scott v. FC! Fairton, No. 09-cv-929, 2010 WL 2540456 at *3
(D.N.J. June 16, 2010) (“In a habeas proceeding, the petitioner does not
proceed to trial. Therefore, Petitioner's motion for summary judgment is
improper. For all practical purposes, summary judgment is equivalent to the
Court's [sic] making a determination on the merits of a habeas petition. As
the Court will rule on the petition for writ of habeas corpus in due course, a
motion for summary judgment in a habeas proceeding serves no purpose.”),
aff'd, 407 F. App’x 612 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpulblished). Moreover, even if the
Court would consider a motion for summary judgment in a Section 2241
proceeding, Stephens’s motion is premature insofar as the Court has not yet
directed Respondents to file a response to his habeas petition. Therefore,
the Court will deny Stephens’s motion for sunnmary judgment.

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G. Notice of Removal (Doc. 7)
Stephens filed a “Notice of Removal by Plaintiff,” which the Clerk of
Court docketed on June 6, 2025. (Doc. 7.) In this single-page (excluding the
certificate of service) notice, Stephens seeks to remove his CCP criminal

case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1332, 1441, and 1446. See (id.
at 1). He claims that he has satisfied the “procedural requirements for
removal” and asserts that this Court “has subject-matter and diversity
jurisdiction” over his criminal case. (/d.) He also claims that “[s]ervice of this
notice of removal immediately divests the State [sic] court of jurisdiction,
rendering void any orders or warrants it issues [and t]o regain jurisdiction the
[s]tate must successfully move the District Court for a remand.” (/d.) As
explained below, Stephens’s notice is improper, ineffective, and inaccurate.
Under 28 U.S.C. §1455, a criminal defendant may remove a criminal
prosecution from a state court, see 28 U.S.C. §1455(a) (indicating that
“defendant or defendants desiring to remove any criminal prosecution from

a State court” must file notice of removal with district court “for the district
and division within which such prosecution is pending”). A defendant seeking
to remove a criminal prosecution in a state court must file the notice of
removal “not later than 30 days after the arraignment in the State court, or at

any time before trial, whichever is earlier, except that for good cause shown

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the United States district court may enter an order granting the defendant . .

. leave to file the notice at a later time.” 28 U.S.C. §1455(b)(1). The criminal
defendant desiring to remove a criminal prosecution must also file, along with
the notice of removal, “a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served

upon such defendant or defendants in such action.” 28 U.S.C. §1455(a).
After receiving a notice of removal, “[t]he . . . district court. . . shall
examine the notice promptly[, and it clearly appears on the face of the
notice and any exhibits annexed thereto that removal should not be
permitted, the court shall make an order for summary remand.” 28 U.S.C.
§1455(b)(5). “The removing party .. . carries a heavy burden of showing that
at all stages of the litigation the case is properly before the federal court.
Removal statutes are to be strictly construed, with all doubts to be resolved
in favor of remand.” Brown v. Jevic, 575 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir. 2009) (infernal
citations omitted). Nevertheless, because Stephens is a pro se litigant, the
Court is mindful that his allegations and claims in the notice of removal must
be liberally construed. See, e.g., Vogt v. Weizel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir.
2021) (explaining that court must construe pro se filings liberally). Yet,
despite the liberal construction afforded to pro se filings, pro se litigants such

as Stephens “cannot flout procedural rules—-they must abide by the same

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rules that apply to all other litigants.” /d. (quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)).
In this case, the Court has reviewed Stephens’s purported notice of
removal pursuant to Section 1455(b)(5) and finds that it clearly appears on
the face of the notice that removal should not be permitted for several

reasons. First, Stephens attempts to remove his criminal case into an
ongoing Section 2241 habeas action. Stephens has not identified, and this
Court has not located, any statute, rule, or case, which would permit a state
criminal defendant to remove their criminal case into an ongoing civil case,

even if that case involves a Section 2241 habeas petition challenging the
ongoing state criminal case. If Stephens wanted to properly remove his state
criminal case, he needed to do so as an entirely new action. Based on this
defect alone, the Court would be warranted in striking the notice from the
docket as having been improperly filed.
Second, Stephens has not identified a legitimate ground for removal in
the notice. He attempts to remove this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1332,
1441, and 1446 (Doc. 7 at 1), none of which are applicable here. Section
1441 relates to removing civil actions generally, Section 1446 sets forth the
procedure for removing civil actions, and Section 1332 provides for diversity
jurisdiction in civil actions. See 28 U.S.C. §§1332, 1441, 1446; New York v.

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Milchamot, No. 24-cv-9296, 2024 WL 5119327, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
2024) (rejecting state criminal defendant’s attempt to remove his criminal

case to federal court under, inter alia, (1) Section 1332 because it “describes
federal district courts’ jurisdiction in civil actions [and the] case [wa]s a
criminal matter” and (2) Section 1446 “because it is about the procedure for
removing civil cases to federal district court[s and, a]s already explained,
[the] case [wa]s a criminal matter”); Sabino v. Port Auth. Police Dep't, No.
21-cv-5731, 2022 WL 2441021, at*1 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2022) (“[Section] 1441
is not a basis for removal of the State Criminal Proceeding because [Section]
1441 only provides for the removal of ‘civil actions.’”” (footnote omitted)).
Although the instant Section 2241 habeas case is a civil action, Stephens is
attempting to remove a criminal case. Therefore, none of these statutes
provide grounds or jurisdictional bases for the removal of Stephens’s criminal

case to this Court.
Third, the notice of removal does not comply with Section 1455(a)
insofar as it does not include “a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders
served upon” Stephens in his criminal case. See 28 U.S.C. §1455(a). Fourth,
the notice of removal is untimely as the publicly available docket entries show
that Stephens was arraigned in December 2024, and yet he did not attempt
to remove the case until more than six (6) months later. See 28 U.S.C.

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§1455(b)(1) (stating that notice of removal must be filed “not later than 30
days after the arraignment in the State court, or at any time before trial,
whichever is earlier’). This untimely filing is not excusable because Stephens
has not set forth good cause to file the belated notice. See id. (providing that
“for good cause shown in the United States district court may enter an order
granting the defendant. . . leave to file the notice at a later time’). In fact,
Stephens does not acknowledge that his notice of removal is untimely.
Fifth, and finally, contrary to Stephens’s assertions in his notice of
removal and amended Section 2241 petition, the filing of the notice of
removal has no impact on his underlying state-court criminal proceedings. In
this regard, “[t]he filing of a notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall
not prevent the State court in which such prosecution is pending from
proceeding further, except that a judgment of conviction shall not be entered
unless the prosecution is first remanded.” 28 U.S.C. §1455(b)(3) (emphasis
added). As such, the Court of Common Pleas was not prohibited from
continuing with Stephens’s criminal proceedings despite his unsuccessful
attempt at removal.
Overall, Stephens improperly filed a notice of removal in this habeas

case. As such, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to strike it from the
docket in this case.

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H. Section 2241 Habeas Petitions (Docs. 1, 8)
Preliminarily, the Court notes that it is unclear from Stephens’s
submission of a completed Section 2241 habeas petition using the Court’s
standard form, which was docketed on June 13, 2025 (Doc. 8), whether he
intended it to be an amended petition or a supplement to his emergency
petition (Doc. 1). Nevertheless, as indicated above, the Court will construe
the completed form Section 2241 habeas petition as an amended petition
because it is a fully completed petition and Stephens did not require leave of
Court to file it, which he would have needed to do if he wanted to supplement
his original petition. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) (providing that “[a]
party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course no later than (A)
21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive
pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21
days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is
earlier’), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (“On motion and reasonable notice, the
court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading
setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date
of the pleading to be supplemented.” (emphasis added)). So construed, the

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Court will dismiss without prejudice the amended Section 2241 petition due

to Stephens’s failure to exhaust his state-court remedies prior to filing it.
Regarding exhaustion, Section 2241 does not contain a statutory
exhaustion requirement like Section 2254, see 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A)
(‘An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it

appears that[] .. . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State... .”); nevertheless, “an exhaustion requirement has
developed through decisional law, applying principles of federalism.” Moore,
515 F.2d at 442. Moreover, “although there is a distinction in the statutory
language of [Sections] 2254 and 2241, there is no distinction insofar as the
exhaustion requirement is concerned.” /d. Accordingly, a Section 2241
habeas petitioner must have exhausted their state-court remedies regarding
their claims before the federal court can consider their merits. /d.; see
Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have consistently
applied an exhaustion requirement to claims brought under §2241.”).

4 Even if the Court construed Stephens;’ form Section 2241 petition as
a supplement to the original emergency petition, it would not alter the
ultimate result.

-~25 -

To properly exhaust state remedies, a Section 2241 habeas petitioner
must invoke “one complete round of the state’s established appellate review
process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). The petitioner
bears the burden of showing that all claims alleged have been “fairly
presented” to the state courts, and “it is not enough that the petitioner
presents to the state court the facts upon which a federal claim is based.”
Brown v. Cuyler, 669 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
Here, Stephens has not shown that he exhausted his available state
remedies in his amended Section 2241 petition. See Lambert v. Blackwell,
134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The habeas petitioner carries the burden
of proving exhaustion of all available state remedies.” (citation omitted)).
Instead, he points out that he raised a claim about his allegedly excessive
bail and unlawful seizure through various “internal prison requests” on
several dates from January through March 2025. (Doc. 8 at 2.) Filing such
internal prison requests, or even grievance documents within the prison
system, is insufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement for habeas
claims because those are not state courts. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845
(explaining that Section 2241 habeas petitioners must invoke “one complete
round of the state’s established appellate review process” to exhaust their
state remedies); see also Battle v. Eagleton, No. O07-cv-1841, 2008 WL

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2952349, at *5 n.3 (D.S.C. July 28, 2008) (“The distinction between
administrative remedies which must be exhausted under the [Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)] in [42 U.S.C. §1983] cases .. ., and state
court remedies which must be exhausted in habeas cases are different.
Exhaustion under the PRLA ends at the issuance of the [prison’s] final

response in non-habeas prison condition cases. However, judicial review
remains a necessary step in the exhaustion of state court remedies required
in habeas matters.”), aff'd, 308 F. App’x 692 (4th Cir. 2009).
Stephens does not aver that he first raised any of his claims for habeas
relief in his underlying criminal proceedings and identify how the Court of
Common Pleas addressed those claims. In addition, although the publicly
available docket entries for Stephens’s criminal case show that he has filed

numerous pro se pretrial motions in his criminal case, the CCP has
addressed only a motion for recusal and a motion to modify bail (both of
which it granted). See CCP Dkt. Thus, it appears that Stephens may still
raise his constitutional claims pertaining to, inter alia, his arrest and any
seizures in the Court of Common Pleas and then challenge any adverse
rulings therein in the Pennsylvania state appellate courts.

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Stephens attempts to avoid the exhaustion requirement by arguing that
exhaustion would be futile. (Doc. 8 at 2.) Even if the Court presumes that
futility serves as an exception to the exhaustion requirement as it does in
Section 2254 cases, see Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir.
2012) (discussing futility exception to exhaustion of state remedies in Section
2254 habeas cases), Stephens has not provided the Court with any evidence
showing that exhaustion would be futile. Instead, he merely speculates that
exhaustion is futile. Furthermore, he has yet to receive a ruling on any of his
habeas claims in the CCP in the first instance, much less appealed from any
adverse decisions to the Pennsylvania appellate courts. Merely filing
documents within the prison and not receiving responses, as well as filing
motions which are still pending before the CCP, does not equate to his state-
court remedies being unavailable or ineffective. See Moore, 515 F.2d at 444—
45 (finding petitioner failed to exhaust because his motions for interlocutory
review constituted neither a ruling on the merits of his constitutional claim

nor an opportunity to consider the merits); see also Cuevas v. Pennsylvania,
No. 19-cv-1733, 2020 WL 1911511, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2020)
(concluding that Section 2241 habeas petitioner was not entitled to relief on
his claims for excessive bail, speedy-trial violations, and challenges to his
arrest, due his failure to exhaust state-court remedies, because, inter alia,

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the petitioner's charges were still pending and “[h]is various pro se appeals
of the trial court’s interlocutory orders denying his pro se motions,” which

were all quashed, “do not constitute rulings by the state courts on his
claims”). Therefore, Stephens’s futility argument is meritless.
Stephens has also failed to show that his criminal case presents the
type of “extraordinary circumstances” necessary to excuse his failure to
exhaust. Accordingly, because Stephens has not exhausted his state-court
remedies, demonstrated that those state-court remedies are unavailable or
ineffective, or shown extraordinary circumstances to excuse his failure to
exhaust, the Court will dismiss his Section 2241 petition without prejudice to
him refiling it if he fully exhausts his state-court remedies. See Callwood, 230
F.3d at 634 (vacating district court's order dismissing Section 2241 habeas
petition on the merits and remanding with instructions to the district court to
“dismiss for failure to exhaust [state] remedies without prejudice to
Callwood’s refiling his challenge under §2241 after exhaustion”); see □□□□
Lambert, 134 F.3d at 513 (“The exhaustion requirement does not foreclose
federal relief, but merely postpones it.”).
Although the Court will dismiss Stephens’s amended habeas petition
due to his failure to exhaust, the Court also notes that some district courts in
the Third Circuit will abstain from considering Section 2241 habeas petitions

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filed by petitioners with unresolved state criminal charges pursuant to
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971):
Where, as is the case here, state-court remedies are
unexhausted, “principles of federalism and comity require district
courts to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal
proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Moore, 515 F.2d at 447-48. Younger
abstention will apply when: “(1) there are ongoing state
proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings
implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings
afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.”
Lazardis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408
(3d Cir. 2005)). If the three Younger requirements are satisfied,
abstention is required unless the petitioner demonstrates that the
state proceedings are motivated by bad faith, the state law being
challenged is patently unconstitutional, or there is no adequate
alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be
raised. /d. at 670 n.4 (citing Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106
(3d Cir. 1989)). These exceptions are to be construed “very
narrowly” and invoked only in “extraordinary circumstances.” /d.;
Moore, 515 F.2d at 448[; sjJee also Brian R. Means,
POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES, §10.3 Westlaw (database
updated June 2021).
Arrington v. Commonwealth, No. 21-cv-1282, 2022 WL 317147, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. Jan. 13, 2022) (citing Pa. R. Crim. P. 576(4), (5)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 314675 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2022).
If the Court analyzed whether to abstain from resolving this case under
Younger, abstaining would be appropriate. Initially, there is an ongoing
judicial proceeding insofar as there is a criminal prosecution in the Lycoming
County Court of Common Pleas. Granting habeas relief here would interfere
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with those criminal proceedings. Additionally, the Commonweaith’s criminal

case against Stephens implicates important state interests because the
Commonwealth has a strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws. Finally,
as already explained, there is no indication that Stephens will not have the
opportunity to raise claims challenging his arrest, any searches, and any
evidence obtained by the Commonwealth in his criminal proceedings. See,

e.g., Pa. R. Crim. P. 578 (requiring that all requests for pretrial relief, such

as those seeking the “suppression of evidence” or “to quash or dismiss an
information,” to be “included in one omnibus motion”). Therefore, Stephens’s
claims relating to his state-court criminal proceedings aiso meet the
requirements for Younger abstention, despite his unpersuasive and
conclusory arguments that Younger is inapplicable in this case.
l. Certificate of Appealability
Because Stephens is a state pretrial detainee, the Court presumes that
he requires a certificate of appealability (“COA”) should he decide to appeal
from this decision. See 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that unless a
circuit justice or judge issues a COA, a petitioner may not appeal from “the
final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained
of arises out of process issued by a State court”); Reese v. Pennsylvania,
No. 19-cv-775, 2019 WL 5746276, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2019) (concluding

-31-

that COA requirement applies to Section 2241 petitions filed by state pretrial
detainees); see also Harris v. Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 20-cv-962, 2021
WL 880477, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2021) (declining to issue COA as part of
dismissal of state pretrial detainee’s Section 2241 petition). A COA may
issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). When deciding whether to issue

a COA after a dismissal on procedural grounds, the Court applies the
following standard:
[w]hen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional
claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least,
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling. ... Where a plain procedural
bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to
dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either
that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the
petitioner should be allowed to proceed further. In such a
circumstance, no appeal would be warranted.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
In this case, jurists of reason would not find the ultimate disposition of
this case debatable, e., that Stephens failed to exhaust his state-court
remedies as to any cognizable claims prior to filing his Section 2241 petition
here, and that he failed to present extraordinary circumstances to warrant
this Court considering the petition. See, e.g., Burley v. Superintendent Forest

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SCI, No. 22-2719, 2023 WL 2560361, at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 3, 2023)
(unpublished) (denying COA because “reasonable jurists would not debate
the conclusion that there was no reason for the District Court to exercise
jurisdiction over Appellant’s current [Section 2241] habeas petition because
he failed to establish that (1) he exhausted his state-court remedies or (2)
his case presents ‘extraordinary circumstances.” (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d
at 443)). Accordingly, the Court will not issue a COA in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court will: (1) grant the IFP Application; (2)
deem withdrawn Stephens’s motions for a preliminary injunction and
mandamus relief; (3) deny his motions to stay, “Motion for Expedited
Mediation of Combined (Joined) Cases,” and motion for summary judgment;
(4) strike his purported notice of removal; (5) dismiss without prejudice his
amended Section 2241 petition; (6) decline to issue a certificate of
appealability; and (7) direct the Clerk of Court to close this case. An
appropriate Order follows.

United States District Judge
pate: 3AS/26
25-0337-01

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11332803. Public record. Not legal advice.