# Isham

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · May 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11330103

## Case

- **Full name:** John Isham v. City of Belle Meade, ET AL.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** May 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11330103

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that it is reversible error for a district court to issue a preliminary injunction “where there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits (quoting Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc., 609 F.3d 404, 408 (6th Cir. 2010))
- noting that even if “monetary damages are difficult to calculate” this does not mean that “the injury is irreparable”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOHN ISHAM, )
)
Plaintiff, ) No. 3:26-cv-00473
)
v. ) JUDGE RICHARDSON
)
CITY OF BELLE MEADE, ET AL., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is a “Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (Doc. No. 13,
“Motion”), filed by Plaintiff, John Isham. The Motion is supported by the declaration of Plaintiff
(Doc. No. 12, “Plaintiff’s Declaration”), and a memorandum (Doc. No. 14, “Memorandum”).1
Also accompanying the Motion is a proposed preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 13-1, “Proposed
Preliminary Injunction”) for this Court proposedly to enter in the event that the Motion is granted.
As shown by the Proposed Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff seeks via the Motion an order
enjoining the City of Belle Meade (“Defendant Belle Meade”), which is one of the two defendants
in this action,2 “and those in privity or acting in concert with it, or as its agents,” from “[e]nforcing
the Stop Work Order at 1025 Chancery Lane until the trial in this matter.” (Doc. No. 13-1 at 2).
Defendants have filed a response (Doc. No. 16) in opposition to the Motion. Plaintiff has filed a
reply (Doc. No. 17) in further support of the Motion, which is supported by the Declaration of

1 Plaintiff’s Declaration and the Memorandum were filed in support also of Plaintiff’s motion for a
temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 11) that was previously denied by the Court in an order (Doc. No.
15).

2 The other defendant is Mary Samaniego (“Defendant Samaniego”), who is sued in her individual capacity.
The Court herein refers to Defendant Belle Meade and Defendant Samaniego collectively as “Defendants.”
Jerry Johnson (Doc. No. 18)—the general contractor for Plaintiff working on the construction
project at 1025 Chancery Lane. (Id. at 1).
For the reasons described below, the Motion (Doc. No. 13) is DENIED.
BACKGROUND

This action, which was removed to this Court from Davidson County Circuit Court based
on federal-question jurisdiction, (Doc. No. 1),3 arises out of a dispute over a stop work order (“Stop
Work Order”) issued by Defendants that prevents construction from taking place on a structure
located at Plaintiff’s property at 1025 Chancery Lane S., Nashville, TN 37205. (Doc. No. 1-1 at
1-3).4 In his complaint (Doc. No. 1-1 at 1-27), Plaintiff contends that the Stop Work Order was
improperly issued. Plaintiff brings a claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-102 seeking a
declaratory judgment against Defendant Belle Meade (Count I) (Doc. No. 1-1 at 10-19). Plaintiff
also seeks temporary and permanent injunctive relief against Defendant Belle Meade (Count II),
enjoining Defendant Belle Meade “from enforcing the Stop Work Order against Plaintiff.” (Doc.
No. 1-1 at 19). Plaintiff also brings a claim for (alleged) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Defendant Samaniego (Count III) (Doc. No. 1-1 at 19-25).5

3 In stating the basis for removal to this Court (i.e., the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction), the notice of
removal (Doc. No. 1) also seemingly refers to the existence of diversity jurisdiction when it asserts that
“the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs.” (Doc. No. 1 at 2). But the
notice of removal does not establish that there is diversity of citizenship between the parties, as is required
for this Court to have diversity jurisdiction (by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1332). The Complaint does not speak
directly to citizenship because it does not indicate the domicile of the two individuals who are parties, and
without knowing such domicile it is not possible to know whether there is complete diversity of parties as
required for diversity jurisdiction. But if the Complaint suggests anything, it suggests that there is no
diversity of citizenship (because it states that at least the residence of the individuals who are parties in this
action, Plaintiff and Defendant Samaniego, is in Tennessee). (Doc. No. 1-1 at 3).

4 The Court notes that the property and structure at 1025 Chancery Lane is not the site of Plaintiff’s current
home/residence. (Doc. No. 14 at 10).

5 Although Plaintiff categorizes its request for “Injunctive Relief” (Count II) (Doc. No. 1-1 at 19) as a
“count”, “‘[i]njunctive relief’ is not a cause of action, it is a remedy.’” Thompson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 563 F. App’x. 440, 442 n.1 (6th Cir. 2014). Put another way, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief
Now, via the instant Motion, Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining Defendant Belle Meade
“and those in privity or acting in concert with it, or as its agents,” from “[e]nforcing the Stop Work
Order at 1025 Chancery Lane until the trial in this matter.” (Doc. No. 13-1 at 2).
DISCUSSION

Those seeking a preliminary injunction must meet four requirements.6 They must show a
likelihood of success on the merits; likely irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; that

“[is more] appropriately pleaded as relief for a particular claim.” Brown v. Tax Ease Lien Servicing, LLC,
No. 3:15-CV-00208-CRS, 2015 WL 7431044, at *14 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 20, 2015).

6 Published Sixth Circuit case law stands unmistakably for the proposition that these four items are factors
rather than requirements, except that irreparable harm is a requirement (and, if it exists and thus keeps the
possibility of a preliminary injunction alive, thereafter becomes a factor to be balanced along with the other
three factors). See, e.g., D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019). Alas, this case law
is inconsistent with other (including more recent) Sixth Circuit case law and with Supreme Court cases
(including Winter) that describe these as all being requirements (i.e., things that must be established. See,
e.g., id. at 328, 329 (Nabaldian, J., concurring) (noting that “[Winter]'s language seems clear—a
plaintiff must establish the factors” and questioning “whether the balancing analysis itself aligns
with Winter.”).
Notably, other courts have likewise treated the four items as requirements (prerequisites), rather than as
factors. E.g., Southern Poverty Law Ctr. v. United States Dep't Homeland Sec., Civil Action No. 18-760
(CKK), 2020 WL 3265533, *10 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020); Transatlantic, LLC v. Humana, Inc., 8:13–CV–
1925–T–17TBM, 2013 WL 3958361, *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2013).
The Court believes that it needs to choose between the two approaches—even if the substance or the
outcome of the Motion does not turn on such choice—because the approach does dictate how a court goes
about explaining its analysis and decision on a motion for a preliminary injunction. And the Court believes
that it should follow the latter line of cases, i.e., those that treat the standard as involving requirements
rather than factors.
First, explaining and applying the standard in terms of requirements is substantially more straightforward
than the alternative—which is to explain that the four items are factors to be balanced, except that, well,
that's only partially true because actually irreparable harm is a requirement (but also, if it exists, then a
factor to be balanced along with the other factors) and likelihood of success (at least to some minimal
extent) is also required. D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Thus, although
the extent of an injury may be balanced against other factors, the existence of an irreparable injury is
mandatory.”); S. Glazer's Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir.
2017) (noting that it is reversible error for a district court to issue a preliminary injunction “where there is
simply no likelihood of success on the merits (quoting Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc., 609 F.3d 404, 408 (6th
Cir. 2010))). Second, it is easier to articulate a conclusion as to whether requirements are satisfied (which
is done in simple yes/no, or satisfied/unsatisfied, terms) than to articulate the outcome of some so-called
“balancing” of (mismatched) factors. This is especially true given that case-specific balancing apparently
is based in part on some inscrutable sliding scale of required likelihood of success on the merits that depends
on the strength of the other three factors. See, e.g., In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th
Cir.1985) (“[T]he degree of likelihood of success required may depend on the strength of the other
factors.”).
the balance of equities favors them; and that the public interest favors an injunction. Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., 56
F.4th 400, 403 (6th Cir. 2022).
Here, Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction falters on the second requirement for

issuance of a preliminary injunction: that Plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of his requested injunction. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (“Our frequently reiterated standard requires
plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence
of an injunction.”). The requirement that irreparable harm be likely to occur absent a preliminary
injunction issuing is crucial, because “[i]f the plaintiff isn’t facing imminent and irreparable injury
[absent the requested injunctive relief], there’s no need to grant relief now as opposed to at the end
of the lawsuit.” D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942 F.3d at 327. In order for the Court to issue a
preliminary injunction (or a TRO for that matter), the threatened irreparable harm must be “both
[reasonably] certain [to occur] [as well as] immediate,” not “speculative or theoretical.” Nacco
Materials Handling Grp., Inc. v. Toyota Materials Handling USA, Inc., 246 F. App'x 929, 943 (6th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150,
154 (6th Cir. 1991)). See also Advoc. & Res. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 2:11-CV-00097,
2011 WL 4738250, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 6, 2011) (“A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must
demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely in the absence of an injunction, not merely

The Court notes that herein it quotes some case law that refers to these items as “factors” and describes
them in language that befits factors more than requirements—as for example by referring to
the issue of whether issuing the injunction would harm others (factor-style language) rather than
the requirement that the balance of equites favors the movant, or by referring to the issue of where the
public interest lies (factor-style language) rather than the requirement that the public interest favors an
injunction. In so doing, the Court is confident that the astute reader readily will be able to translate the
factor-style language into the corresponding language of requirements for purposes of following the Court's
analysis herein.
speculative.”). Importantly, a “plaintiff’s harm [] is irreparable if it is not fully compensable by
monetary damages.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th
Cir. 2002) (considering irreparable harm in the context of an appeal of the denial of a preliminary
injunction).

Plaintiff asserts that if his requested preliminary injunction is not issued, he will suffer
several types of harm that he contends are irreparable, namely that (1) the structure at 1025
Chancery Lane will suffer damage due to Plaintiff not being permitted to resume work on that
structure; (2) “Plaintiff is [and will be] denied his right to enjoyment or possession of his own
land—an irreparable harm” “because enforcing the Stop Work Order locks 1025 Chancery Lane
in its presently unfinished state and makes the property functionally unusable”; (3) Plaintiff will
face inconvenience from having to maintain two separate residences (his current home and the
structure at 1025 Chancery Lane) and from being prevented from moving to and residing at the
structure at 1025 Chancery Lane; and (4) Plaintiff will continue to suffer the stress and
psychological and emotional harm from “navigating the ongoing management of the unfinished

construction” at 1025 Chancery Lane. (Doc. No. 14 at 9-11).
The Court concludes that none of Plaintiff’s asserted harms are irreparable. As an initial
matter, and with respect to the first (purported) irreparable harm that Plaintiff asserts will result
absent his requested preliminary injunction—the damage to the structure at 1025 Chancery Lane—
the Court cannot conceive how damage to a structure is not compensable via monetary damages.
Plaintiff seems to assert that calculating the monetary loss that he would suffer as a result of
damage to the structure at 1025 Chancery Lane would be “exceedingly difficult” to calculate. (Doc.
No. 14 at 9). But even “if damages are difficult to calculate, this does not mean that damages are
impossible to calculate or that the injury cannot be remedied by money damages.” Blockbuster of
Tennessee, Ltd. v. Blockbuster Inc., No. 2:06-CV-02599, 2009 WL 10698647, at *4 (W.D. Tenn.
Aug. 31, 2009). See also Cellnet Commc'ns, Inc. v. New Par, 291 F. Supp. 2d 565, 569 (E.D. Mich.
2003) (noting that even if “monetary damages are difficult to calculate” this does not mean that
“the injury is irreparable”).

What’s more, in Plaintiff’s Declaration, Plaintiff puts a minimum monetary value on the
damage the structure at 1025 Chancery Lane would suffer absent a preliminary injunction, stating
that without an injunction “over $700,000.00 worth of installed cabinetry, trim, hardwood flooring,
and sheetrock are reasonably expected to and will sustain damage resulting from the heightened
humidity,” (Doc. No. 12 at 3), and that his total repair costs to the structure at 1025 Chancery Lane
“may exceed $1,000,000.00.” (Id. at 4). Accordingly, the first harm that Plaintiff advances in his
Motion is not irreparable as required for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, because any
harm that may result to the structure at 1025 Chancery Lane is plainly compensable with monetary
damages. Overstreet, 305 F.3d at 578 (“plaintiff’s harm [] is irreparable if it is not fully
compensable by monetary damages.”).

The next (purported) irreparable harm is that Plaintiff supposedly will be denied his right
to enjoyment or possession of his own land at 1025 Chancery Lane unless the Stop Work Order is
enjoined and Plaintiff is permitted to resume construction on the structure at 1025 Chancery Lane.
Plaintiff specifically argues that because the structure at 1025 Chancery Lane will be “lock[ed]”
in its “presently unfinished state” by the Stop Work Order, this will render “the property
functionally unusable.” (Doc. No. 14 at 11). It is true, as Plaintiff contends, that “interference with
the enjoyment or possession of land is considered ‘irreparable’ since land is viewed as a unique
commodity for which monetary compensation is an inadequate substitute.” Consol. Rail Corp. v.
State of Mich., 976 F. Supp. 1085, 1089 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (quoting Pelfresne v. Village of
Williams Bay, 865 F.2d 877, 883 (7th Cir. 1989)). And preventing someone from continuing
construction of a structure (for example via a stop work order, like the Stop Work Order) on a
particular piece of property may lead to some amount of interference with one’s enjoyment or use
of that property in general (rather than legal) terms. However, the Court does not discern that this

actually constitutes “interference with the enjoyment or possession of land” id., so as to constitute
irreparable harm.
The aforementioned principle that interference with the enjoyment or use of land may
constitute irreparable harm is normally stated in terms of enjoining a trespass to one’s property or
enjoining the actual loss of possession of or title to one’s property. See e.g., United States v. Wilson,
No. 3:09-CV-166-ECR-RAM, 2010 WL 1849338, at *2 (D. Nev. May 6, 2010) (“[Defendant’s]
continued occupation of the property would cause Plaintiff irreparable harm in the absence of
injunctive relief: real property is unique, and [defendant's] continued occupation of the subject
property would cause the [plaintiffs] harm that cannot be compensated with money alone.”); 7-
Eleven, Inc. v. Khan, 977 F.Supp.2d 214, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that “it is well-settled that

unauthorized interference with a real property interest constitutes irreparable harm as a matter of
law” and holding that the continued occupancy of property by another constitutes irreparable harm)
(quotation marks omitted); 2660 Woodley Rd. Joint Venture v. ITT Sheraton Corp., No. CIV. A. 97-
450 JJF, 1998 WL 1469541, at *6 (D. Del. Feb. 4, 1998) (noting that if a continuing trespass was
found, the landowners would “clearly suffer irreparable harm from such deprivations
of possession and control which cannot easily be established in dollars.”); Celtic Bank Corp. v.
Jacobs, No. A-13-CA-040-SS, 2013 WL 12109028, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2013) (finding lack
of irreparable harm where there was no threat of “losing [] actual real property” absent an
injunction and noting that “[a]t most, [plaintiff] will ultimately recover possession of the land and
may be compensated in money damages for any harm done to the land, buildings, or equipment
during the pendency of the litigation”); Consol. Rail Corp., 976 F. Supp. at 1086-87, 1089 (finding
irreparable harm in context of dispute over quiet title to piece of real property). Here, of course,
Plaintiff has not asserted that there is a risk of either trespass to or loss of the property at 1025

Chancery Lane.
What’s more, at least one federal court of appeals has explicitly cast doubt on the notion
that the “general rule” that “interference with the enjoyment or possession of land is considered
‘irreparable’” actually encapsulates circumstances involving interference with buildings rather
than land (i.e., circumstances where damage or destruction may be inflicted on buildings).
Pelfresne, 865 F.3d at 883.7 And Plaintiff does not identify in his Memorandum or Reply any case
law to suggest that preventing someone (for example via a stop work order) from continuing
construction of a structure on a particular piece of property constitutes interference with the
enjoyment or possession of land so as to constitute irreparable harm.

7 Though not binding, the full reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Pelfresne (included immediately below)
strikes the Court as persuasive on this point:

It is also not clear that [the plaintiff] would suffer irreparable injury if a preliminary
injunction were not granted. As a general rule, interference with the enjoyment or
possession of land is considered “irreparable” since land is viewed as a unique commodity
for which monetary compensation is an inadequate substitute. See, e.g., United Church of
the Medical Center v. Medical Center Comm'n, 689 F.2d 693, 701 (7th
Cir.1982) (uniqueness of land “settled beyond the need for citation”). However, it is not
clear that a similar rule should apply to buildings located on a given piece of real estate,
since the buildings, unlike the land, can be repaired or replaced if injured or
destroyed. Although [the plaintiff’s] testimony indicates that, in general, the buildings'
roofs are intact and their floors are not sagging, it does not suggest any particular reason
why these buildings are irreplaceable if [the plaintiff] is awarded money damages after the
[plaintiff] razes the structures. We also note that the buildings are not currently occupied;
their demolition will not displace any commercial or residential tenants. [The district
court’s] conclusion that [the plaintiff] has an adequate legal remedy is thus amply supported
by the record.

Pelfresne, 865 F.2d at 883.
The upshot is that Plaintiff cannot bootstrap harm to a physical building—which is a type
of harm that federal courts regularly find compensable via monetary damages (and thus not
irreparable), see e.g., Pelfresne, 865 F.2d at 883, McBean v. Guardian Ins. Agency, 52 F. Supp. 2d
518, 521 (D.V.I. 1999) (damage to home not irreparable harm because harm “can be adequately

remedied by an award of monetary damages at a trial on the merits.”)—into a claim for irreparable
harm resulting from a purported interference with his use or enjoyment of land. Thus, the second
harm that Plaintiff advances—that the Stop Work Order interferes with his use and enjoyment of
the property at 1025 Chancery Lane—also does not serve to justify Plaintiff’s requested injunctive
relief.
That takes the Court to the third (purported) irreparable harm that Plaintiff contends he will
suffer: the inconvenience Plaintiff will (purportedly) suffer from having to maintain two separate
(would-be) residences (his current home and the structure at 1025 Chancery Lane) and from being
prevented from moving into and residing at the structure at 1025 Chancery Lane. On this point,
Plaintiff specifically contends:

Any delays resulting from the failure to enjoin the Stop Work Order would
be devastating. Plaintiff’s house is not presently up to the standards of a Certificate
of Occupancy, without which Plaintiff cannot legally reside on the premises.
(Verified Compl. ¶ 55.) As such, the longer that the Stop Work Order is enforced,
the longer that Plaintiff will have to go before he may use 1025 Chancery Lane as
intended—as his home. (Id. ¶ 56.) This leaves Plaintiff in a frustrating limbo.
Plaintiff and his wife had planned to move their family into 1025 Chancery Lane
prior to the start of the 2026-27 school year to minimize the impact upon their
children. (Isham Decl. ¶ 6.) Because of the delays, the intended timeline is
increasingly impossible, leaving Plaintiff to bear the burden and inconvenience of
both maintaining two separate would-be residences (his current home and 1025
Chancery Lane) for far longer than anticipated and preparing to move at an
indeterminate and inconvenient future juncture. (Id. ¶¶ 6–8.)

Put otherwise, enforcing the Stop Work Order will prevent Plaintiff from
settling his family in their home on the timeline that was amenable to their specific
needs. The value of being able to move oneself and one’s family into and thus enjoy
their home, and the personal cost of being unable to do so for an indefinite period
of time, do not lend themselves to easy quantification. Something is lost in that
delay. How much is hard to calculate.

(Doc. No. 14 at 10). As an initial matter, Plaintiff cites no legal authority to suggest that the
(purported) inconvenience he will suffer absent a preliminary injunction actually constitutes
irreparable injury so as to justify preliminary injunctive relief issuing. Indeed, it is well settled that
“[m]ere injuries, however substantial, in terms of [] time and energy necessarily expended in the
absence of [an injunction], are not enough [to justify preliminary injunctive relief issuing],”
Griepentrog, 945 F.2d at 154 (considering irreparable harm in the context of a stay pending
appeal), and “[p]ersonal inconvenience is not the irreparable harm that warrants preliminary
injunctive relief.” Loc. 553, Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 695
F.2d 668, 677 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court sympathizes with Plaintiff’s frustration as to the
inconvenience he will (purportedly) suffer absent his requested preliminary injunction, but mere
frustration and inconvenience do not constitute irreparable harm so as to warrant preliminary
injunctive relief issuing. And indeed, the Court notes that if a movant’s frustration or
inconvenience did constitute irreparable harm so as to warrant a preliminary injunction issuing,
there would be conceivably no civil action that did not see a motion for a preliminary injunction
being made.
That takes the Court to Plaintiff’s final asserted harm—that Plaintiff will (purportedly)
continue to suffer stress and psychological and emotional harm from “navigating the ongoing

management of the unfinished construction” at 1025 Chancery Lane. (Doc. No. 14 at 11). Plaintiff
asserts:
To add insult to irreparable injury, navigating the ongoing management of
the unfinished construction has caused and continues to cause Plaintiff serious
hardship, stress, and other psychological and emotional harm that he would
otherwise avoid if the Stop Work Order was not enforced. (Isham Decl. ¶¶ 8–10,
18, 22.) Such emotional and psychological injury is yet another harm that federal
courts routinely deem irreparable. See Caspar v. Snyder, 77 F. Supp. 3d 616, 640
(E.D. Mich. 2015) (compiling a list of cases in which emotional or psychological
injury constituted irreparable harm).

(Doc. No. 14 at 11). It is true that federal courts sometimes deem emotional and psychological
injury irreparable harm so to warrant a preliminary injunction issuing. And the Court is
sympathetic to Plaintiff and recognizes that he may be suffering some level of emotional and
psychological injury stemming from the consequences of the Stop Work Order. However, federal
courts have generally found that for emotional or psychological harm to be the type of harm that
supports issuance of a preliminary injunction issuing—i.e., irreparable harm—such emotional
harm or suffering must be extreme. See e.g., Cannon v. Allied Universal Sec. Servs., No. 25-CV-
01794 (DLF), 2025 WL 3516157, at *2 (D.D.C. July 28, 2025) (“To rise to the level of irreparable
harm, emotional suffering must be extreme.” (quoting Santos v. Collins, Civ. A. No. 24-1759, 2025
WL 1823471, at *8 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2025))); Lore v. City of Syracuse, No. 00-CV-1833 HGM
DEP, 2001 WL 263051, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2001) (“In extraordinary circumstances, some
courts have held that emotional harm is irreparable and requires a preliminary injunction” but
noting that “in more banal situations, emotional harm is not considered sufficient cause to justify
a preliminary injunction.”).
This rule only makes sense. For one thing, although it may not always be easy to assign a
particular amount of monetary damages as compensation for emotional harm, doing so is generally
considered feasible by the law; indeed, juries regularly are asked to do exactly that. For another, if
a plaintiff could justify a motion for a preliminary injunction based merely on experiencing (from
the alleged circumstances underlying the plaintiff’s asserted claims(s)) stress or emotional harm in
just any amount, then—considering how prevalent such stress (at least in some minimal amount)
naturally is for plaintiffs—a preliminary injunction would morph from being a remedy for
extraordinary circumstances into a remedy for commonplace circumstances.
Here, according to Plaintiff’s Declaration, the uncertainty resulting from the Stop Work
Order is causing “significant stress, anxiety, and other emotional and psychological harm to

[Plaintiff] and to [Plaintiff’s] family.” (Doc. No. 12 at 2). But this assertion does not evince the
kind of “extreme” emotional harm that federal courts have found sufficient to warrant preliminary
injunctive relief issuing. See e.g., Porretti v. Dzurenda, 11 F.4th 1037, 1050 (9th Cir. 2021)
(affirming district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction where district court found that a
movant would “suffer irreparable harm in the form of ‘very serious or extreme damage to his
mental health’” including “suicide or self-harm and ‘debilitating symptoms’ like paranoid
delusions, auditory hallucinations, and ‘compulsive ingestion of metal parts’” absent preliminary
injunctive relief). In other words, this asserted harm is not the kind of harm—i.e., irreparable
harm—that warrants a preliminary injunction.
All told, none of Plaintiff’s asserted harms warrant a preliminary injunction issuing. Thus,

the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not satisfied one of the requirements for his requested
preliminary injunctive relief: a demonstration that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent his
requested injunctive relief. Therefore, the Court need not and will not analyze whether Plaintiff
has satisfied any of the three remaining preliminary injunction requirements given that the Court's
finding with respect to any of these other requirements would not unsettle the Court’s ultimate
conclusion that the Motion must be denied. See Jones v. City of Monroe, MI, 341 F.3d 474, 476
(6th Cir. 2003) (“a district court is not required to make specific findings concerning each of the
four factors used in determining a motion for preliminary injunction if fewer factors are dispositive
of the issue”).*
CONCLUSION
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the
movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet,
305 F.3d at 573 (citing Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729,739 (6th Cir. 2000)). It bears
emphasizing why a preliminary injunction is deemed an extraordinary remedy subject to stringent
requirements: the party receiving it 1s treated, while the litigation 1s ongoing, in some respects as
if it had ultimately prevailed on its claims even though it has not yet done so and could not possibly
do so until the litigation is concluded. It is no small thing for a party to be treated (even if only
temporarily and for a limited purpose) as if it had ultimately prevailed on the merits of its claims
when in fact it has not yet done so. See Doughtie & Co. v. Rutherford Cnty., No. 3-13-0209, 2013
WL 3995277, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 5, 2013) (“Essentially, [the p]laintiff is asking the Court to
order, on the ‘front end’ of this action, the relief it ultimately seeks in this lawsuit. The Court finds
that [the p]laintiff has failed to show the need for this extraordinary relief.”).
Therefore, and for the reasons stated herein, the Motion (Doc. No. 13) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Richardson □
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

* Notably, although Jones calls the four items “factors” rather than “requirements,” it plainly was treating
the items as if they could function as requirements, inasmuch as it indicates that fewer than all of them (and,
for all Jones indicates, the absence of even a single one of them) could be dispositive.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11330103. Public record. Not legal advice.