# CURTIN

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · May 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11329983

## Case

- **Full name:** James Curtin v. Chuck Watts, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** May 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JAMES CURTIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:25CV782
)
CHUCK WATTS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
In this case, Plaintiff James Curtin, who proceeds pro se,
asserts claims against Defendants Chuck Watts (“Watts”), his law
firm, Watts Law PLC (“Watts Law”)1, Cyberlux Corporation
(“Cyberlux”), and HII Mission Technologies Corporation (“HII”),
alleging various acts of misconduct relating to federal defense
contracts, as well as a conspiracy to retaliate against Curtin for
exposing the alleged misconduct on his blog. Before the court are
motions by Defendants HII (Doc. 20), Watts (Doc. 32), and Cyberlux
(Doc. 44) to dismiss the claims against them in the amended
complaint (Doc. 7)(the “complaint”) pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). All three motions are fully
briefed and ready for decision. (Docs. 21, 29, 34; Docs. 32, 35,
40; Docs. 45, 48, 51.) For the reasons set forth below, the

1 The complaint does not allege any conduct by Watts Law separate from
Watts. Therefore, the court will construe Watts’s pro se motion to
dismiss (Doc. 32) as a motion on behalf of both Watts and Watts Law.
motions will be granted and the complaint dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
The well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, viewed in the

light most favorable to Curtin as the non-moving party, show the
following:
Curtin is the owner and principal of Carotank Road Holdings
Inc, a Virginia corporation engaged in consulting and technology
development, as well as an author publishing under the pen name
“Jackson Holt.” (Doc. 7 at 6.) In 2023, executives of Defendant
Cyberlux approached Curtin “for joint ventures and technical
partnerships involving one of [Curtin’s] clients.” (Id. at 10.)
While conducting diligence on Cyberlux for his client, Curtin
uncovered “legal, regulatory, and financial red flags including
judgments, liens, lawsuits, and questionable public
representations.” (Id.) Curtin communicated his findings to his

client as well as Cyberlux executive Bill Maadarani and Cyberlux
principal Denis Kalenja.2 (Id.) In November 2024, Curtin began
publishing a series of articles under his “Jackson Holt” alias,
accusing Cyberlux of “compliance irregularities” and misuse of
foreign military financing (“FMF”) funds. (Id. at 8.)
Curtin alleges that he “observed an individual photographing
him” On May 10, 2025, around the same time that he received a

2 Neither Kalenja nor Maadarani is named as a Defendant in the present
action.
message from Maadarani. (Id. at 11.) On May 27, 2025, an anonymous
X (formerly Twitter) account published tweets “doxxing and
harassing [Curtin] and his family” as well as “referencing

investigators”, once again around the same time that he received
a message from Maadarani. (Id.) In June 2025, Maadarani contacted
one of Curtin’s clients. (Id.) Curtin alleges without elaboration
that in May 2025 and June 2025, “[m]ultiple partners withdrew from
negotiations or cancelled deals [presumably with Curtin’s company]
tied to the harassment campaign [against him].” (Id.)
Based on the foregoing, Curtin asserts claims against
Defendants Cyberlux, Watts, and Watts Law for “tortious
interference with business expectancy” (Count 1) and civil
conspiracy (Count 2), claims against all Defendants for “breach of
fiduciary duty/misuse of public office” (Count 3), and claims
against HII and Cyberlux for negligent supervision (Count 4).
II. ANALYSIS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
(8)(a)(2). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, (2007)). A claim is plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam), and all reasonable inferences must be drawn
in the plaintiff’s favor, Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472,
474 (4th Cir. 1997). However, mere legal conclusions are not
accepted as true, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief is a ‘context-specific task.’ ” Langford v. Joyner, 62
F.4th 122, 126 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
There is no categorical rule that a complaint cannot make

allegations collectively against multiple defendants. Id.
However, if a plaintiff employs a “global manner of pleading,” he
must still allege “sufficient facts to allow the court to infer
liability as to each defendant.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Defendants have identified myriad problems with Curtin’s
lawsuit. Relevant to the motions to dismiss, Curtin’s complaint
fails to state a claim because the federal statutory violations he
alleges do not give rise to a private right of action, he has not
alleged any legally cognizable duty that the Defendants breached,
and his claims are not otherwise cognizable under Virginia law.
A. No Federal Private Right of Action
HII, Cyberlux, and Watts all argue that Curtin’s claims rest
on federal statutes that do not create a private right of action.3

(Doc. 21 at 8-9; Doc. 45 at 11-15; Doc. 32 at 2-3.) In Count 1,
Curtin alleges that Defendants Watts and Cyberlux violated 18
U.S.C. §§ 2261A, 875(c)¸and 1030 in a way that interfered with his
“business expectancy.” (Doc. 7 at 15.) In Count 2, he alleges
that Watts and Cyberlux conspired to commit violations of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1343, 2261A, 875(c), and 1512. (Id. at 17.) In Count 3, he
alleges that all Defendants breached “fiduciary duties” in ways
that implicate 41 U.S.C. § 4712 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1343 as
well as unspecified “provisions of the [Federal Acquisition
Regulations (“FAR”)], [Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations
Supplement (“DFARS”)], and [International Traffic in Arms

Regulations (“ITAR”)] governing the allowability of costs, ethical
conduct, and contractor responsibility.” (Id. at 22.). In Count
4, he likewise alleges that HII and Cyberlux were negligent in
their supervision of Watts in ways that implicate 41 U.S.C. § 4712,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1512, and “applicable FAR, DFARS, and ITAR
provisions.” (Id. at 24.)

3 HII and Cyberlux also argue that this deficiency deprives the court of
subject matter jurisdiction as to Counts 3 and 4. (See Doc. 45 at 13-
15.) However, a statute may support federal question jurisdiction
without creating a private right of action. See Grable & Sons Metal
Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 317 (2005).
As Cyberlux notes, none of these federal statutes or
regulations provides a right of action for plaintiffs in Curtin’s
position. (Doc. 45 at 11.) As for Defendants’ alleged violations

of FAR, DFARS, and ITAR, these cannot provide a private right of
action unsupported by statute. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 291 (2001)(“Language in a regulation may invoke a private
right of action that Congress through statutory text created, but
it may not create a right that Congress has not.”). Curtin’s
complaint does not identify which specific regulatory provisions
Defendants allegedly violated, much less any underlying statutes
that would authorize him to bring a private suit. As for the
alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A, 875(c), 1343, and 1001,
these are all criminal statues whose enforcement “has been
entrusted exclusively to the federal government.” State of Ga. v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945).

Only two of the federal statutes cited by Curtin contain any
private right of action. First, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (the “CFAA”), creates a limited civil cause of
action, but the plaintiff must plead a qualifying loss “by reason
of a violation of this section.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). But as
Cyberlux notes, Curtin has not alleged any particular violation of
§ 1030. (Doc. 45 at 12.) Second, 41 U.S.C. § 4172 provides a cause
of action for employees of government contractors, subcontractors,
grantees, subgrantees, or personal service contractors who have
suffered retaliation for protected disclosures and exhausted
administrative remedies. See 41 U.S.C. § 4172(a) and (c)(2).
Curtin represents in his brief that he filed whistleblower

disclosures with the General Services Administration and
Department of Defense in 2024, and that 210 days have elapsed
without a determination, which he contends “satisf[ies] the
exhaustion requirement under 41 U.S.C. § 4712.” (Doc. 48 at 11.)
But as Cyberlux points out, Curtin does not allege that he is or
ever was an employee of any Defendant, and thus the anti-
retaliation protections of § 4712 simply do not apply to him.
(Doc. 45 at 14.)
In sum, Defendants are correct that none of the federal
statutes or regulations in the complaint provides Curtin with a
private right of action for his claims. Thus, Defendants’ motion
to dismiss these claims will be granted.
B. Failure to State a Claim under Virginia Law

The court next considers whether Curtin has stated a claim
under applicable state law. “A federal court sitting in diversity
is required to apply the substantive law of the forum state,
including its choice-of-law rules.” Francis v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
709 F.3d 362, 369 (4th Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court of North
Carolina’s “jurisprudence favors the use of the lex loci test in
cases involving tort or tort-like claims.” SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae,
838 S.E.2d 334, 343 (N.C. 2020). Pursuant to the lex loci test,
the court should apply the substantive law of the state “where the
injury or harm was sustained or
suffered.” Id. (quoting Harco Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Grant Thornton

LLP, 698 S.E.2d 719, 724 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010)). HII and Cyberlux
both contend, and Curtin does not dispute, that Curtin suffered
his alleged injuries in Virginia, where his company is located.
(Doc. 21 at 12-13; Doc. 45 at 9 n.8; see Doc. 7 at 4-6.) Thus,
Virginia substantive law governs his claims.
1. Tortious Interference (Count 1)
Watts argues that Count 1 fails to state a claim because the
complaint fails to allege that he engaged in any conduct that would
be actionable in Virginia under a recognized theory of tort
liability. (Doc. 32 at 4-5.) Meanwhile, Cyberlux argues that
Carotank Road Holdings, Inc., and not Curtin, is the true party in
interest for this claim.4 (Doc. 45 at 2.) Responding to Watts,

Curtin argues that unspecified Cyberlux officers “circulated false
espionage claims and disclosed [his] private information,” and
that this occurred “while Watts directed legal affairs,” which he
contends is sufficient conduct to support tort liability. (Doc.
35 at 16.) To Cyberlux, Curtin responds that he is willing to
stipulate to the joinder of Carotank Road Holdings, Inc., but only

4 Curtin’s complaint and accompanying declaration do indeed suggest that
Carotank Road Holdings, Inc., is the true party in interest for any claim
pertaining to Curtin’s “business.” (See Doc. 7 at 6; Doc. 7-1.) The
court need not reach this issue, however, because the claim suffers from
more fundamental defects.
if certain Cyberlux shareholders will consent to be joined in their
individual capacities because they “are the company’s largest
Series B shareholders, control insiders, and beneficiaries of the

conduct at issue.” (Doc. 48 at 2.)
In Virginia, the elements of a prima facie case of tortious
interference with business expectancy are (1) the existence of a
valid business expectancy; (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the
part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing or
causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy;
and (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship or
expectancy has been disrupted. Dunlap v. Cottman Transmission
Systems, LLC, 754 S.E.2d 313, 318, (Va. 2014). Defendants argue
that Curtin’s allegations fail to state a plausible claim. (Doc.
45 at 5-9; Doc. 32 at 4-5.)
Here, Defendants are correct. While a complaint need not

make out a prima facie case, it must still “allege facts to satisfy
the elements of a cause of action.” McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep't
of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015). A “formulaic
recitation” of the necessary elements does not suffice to render
a claim plausible. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79).
Here, the complaint fails to state a plausible claim of intentional
interference. It alleges generally that “Defendants,” acting
“individually and in concert,” committed the following acts of
interference:
(a) Public “doxxing” of [Curtin] by releasing personal
identifying information without consent;

(b) Retaliatory statements;

(c) Direct, inappropriate contact by Cyberlux officer
Bill Maadarani with one of [Curtin’s] clients, intended
to disrupt that business relationship;

(d) False accusations and reputational attacks
communicated to third parties with the intent and
knowledge they would damage [Curtin’s] credibility;
[and]

(e) Threats, both explicit and implicit, designed to
deter third parties from associating with [Curtin.]

(Doc. 7 at 14.) Because Curtin employs a “global manner of
pleading,” he must allege “sufficient facts to allow the court to
infer liability as to each defendant.” Langford, 62 F.4th at 126.
The only conduct attributed to a specific Defendant is the
“[d]irect, inappropriate contact” between Cyberlux officer
Maadarani and one of the clients of Curtin’s business (which is
not a party). But the record is devoid of any facts to support
the conclusory allegations that this conduct was “inappropriate”
or “intended to disrupt [Curtin’s] business relationship.” On the
contrary, the screenshot of the communication (Doc. 7-12), which
Curtin attached to his complaint,5 shows that Maadarani was merely
asking if the client (with whom he was evidently already
acquainted) knew why Curtin had been posting anonymous criticisms

5 In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court may consider documents
attached to the complaint without converting the motion to one for
summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ .P. 10(c); see Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l
Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
of Maadarani as “Jackson Holt,” and noting his intention to seek
legal advice regarding the posts. (See id. at 2.) It does not,
contrary to Curtin’s allegation, contain anything that could be

described as a “veiled threat.” (Doc. 7 at 11.)
Because Curtin’s allegations fail to set forth specific facts
to support a claim of interference by any Defendant, Count 1 fails
to plausibly state a claim against any specific Defendant and will
be dismissed without prejudice.
2. Civil Conspiracy (Count 2)
Cyberlux argues that Curtin has failed to state a claim for
civil conspiracy because he offers only a conclusory allegation
that the Defendants conspired for purpose of “[i]njuring Plaintiff
in his business, reputation, and creative work.” (Doc. 45 at 9-
10; see Doc. 7 at 16.) Curtin does not respond to this argument.
In Virginia, civil conspiracy is a statutory claim that arises

when “two or more persons . . . combine, associate, agree, mutually
undertake or concert together . . . for the purpose of willfully
and maliciously injuring another in his reputation, trade,
business or profession by any means whatever.” Va. Stat. Ann.
§§ 18.2-499 and 18.2-500; see Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666,
676-77 (Va. 2001.) “To recover in a civil conspiracy action both
under the common law and under Virginia Code § 18.2-499, a
plaintiff must establish that at least one member of the
conspiracy, in agreement with another member, committed an act
that was itself wrongful or tortious, and that such act damaged
the plaintiff.” L-3 Commc'ns Corp. v. Serco, Inc., 926 F.3d 85,
92 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Gelber v. Glock, 800 S.E.2d 800, 821

(Va. 2017)). For a statutory business conspiracy claim, a
plaintiff must also plausibly allege legal malice, or that one of
the conspiracy's purposes was to injure “Plaintiff's reputation,
trade, or business.” Schlegel v. Bank of America, N.A., 505 F.
Supp. 2d 321, 326 (W.D. Va. 2007) (citing Simmons, 544 S.E.2d at
677).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the requirements
for pleading “in all civil actions and proceedings in the United
States district courts.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; see Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 684. Rule 9(b) provides that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and
other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). However, because a civil conspiracy claim

in Virginia requires proof of some underlying unlawful conduct, a
plaintiff must still adequately plead the underlying act or acts.
Aimbridge Hospitality, LLC v. Provident Group – Radford
Properties, LLC, No. 7:24-cv-00262, 2024 WL 3534150, at *8 (W.D.
Va. July 24, 2024). Here, the complaint fails to allege sufficient
facts to make plausible that any Defendant committed a wrongful or
tortious act in furtherance of the conspiracy. It alleges that
undifferentiated “Defendants” engaged in various acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy, but the only act attributed to a
specific Defendant is the same communication from Count 1 between
Cyberlux’s Maadarani and the “client” of Curtin’s business. (Doc.
7 at 16-17.) As discussed above, this communication is innocuous

on its face. It is not a wrongful or tortious act that can support
the civil conspiracy claim. Thus, Defendants’ motion will be
granted and Count 2 will be dismissed without prejudice.
3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count 3)
HII, Watts, and Cyberlux all argue that Count 3 must be
dismissed because Curtin does not allege that Defendants owed any
fiduciary duty to him specifically. (Doc. 21 at 14-15; Doc. 32 at
3; Doc. 45 at 10.) In response, Curtin reiterates that Defendants
had a general duty to comply with federal laws and regulations.
(Doc. 29 at 8-9.)
To state a plausible breach of fiduciary duty claim under
Virginia law, a plaintiff must allege facts to show (1) the

existence of a fiduciary duty, (2) the breach of that duty, and
(3) resulting damages. Carstensen v. Chrisland Corp., 442 S.E.2d
660, 666–67 (Va. 1994); Broadhead v. Watterson, No. 5:15-cv-00020,
2016 WL 742127, at *6 (W.D. Va. Feb. 24, 2016) (applying Virginia
law). Here, the complaint alleges that Defendants breached duties
owing to “the public,” “the U.S. government,” and “foreseeable
persons impacted by non-compliance” with various federal and state
laws and regulations. (Doc. 7 at 18-22.) As Cyberlux notes, none
of these allegations describes a fiduciary duty owed to Curtin.
(Doc. 45 at 10.) Thus, Count 3 fails to state a claim under
Virginia law, and it will be dismissed.
4. Negligent Supervision (Count 4)

As HII and Cyberlux both note, Virginia courts do not
recognize an independent cause of action for negligent
supervision. See Elrod v. Busch Entertainment Corp., Nos.
4:09cv164, 4:09cv165, 4:09cv166, 2010 WL 5620918, at *6 (E.D. Va.
Dec. 14, 2010) (collecting cases), report and recommendation
adopted 2011 WL 166636 (E.D. Va. Jan 19, 2011). Curtin appears to
concede this, as his briefs in opposition do not address the
negligent supervision claim in Count 4. It will thus be dismissed.
C. Rule 11(b) and Fabrication of Legal Authority
Finally, Curtin points to reprimands issued against Cyberlux
in other litigation, specifically an order to pay attorneys’ fees
and a show-cause order for fabricating or misrepresenting legal

authorities. (Doc. 48 at 9.) He contends that Cyberlux has
engaged in a “persistent pattern of deception and obstruction”
that undermines Cyberlux's argument that the complaint’s “well-
documented facts” are implausible. (Id.)
There is a certain irony in all of this. Curtin’s brief
contains fabricated quotations that directly contradict the actual
holdings of the cited cases – the same misconduct he invokes to
discredit Cyberlux. Cyberlux’s conduct has already been addressed
by those courts.6 Meanwhile, this court must address Curtin’s
conduct in the present case.
Curtin represents that in Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v.

Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007),
the United States Supreme Court held that “[a] court lacking
jurisdiction . . . must dismiss, it cannot transfer.” (See Doc.
29 at 7.) This quotation is a fabrication. On the contrary, the
court in Sinochem reaffirmed that a case may be transferred
“whether the court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction
over the defendants or not.” 549 U.S. at 430 (quoting Goldlawr,
Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962)). Similarly, in
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817
(1988), the Supreme Court never stated that a transferee court
“should not revisit a jurisdictional ruling made by a coordinate
court unless it is clearly erroneous,” as Curtin represents. (See

Doc. 29 at 7.) Rather, it noted that a court “has the power to
revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any
circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so
in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the
initial decision was ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest
injustice.’” Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817 (quoting Arizona v.

6 See Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC v. Cyberlux Corporation, No. 25-1689,
2025 WL 3493221 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2025); HII Mission Technologies Corp.
v. Cyberlux Corp., No. 3:25-cv-483-JAG, Doc. 118 (E.D. Va. December 15,
2025).
California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, n.8 (1983)).
All litigants, whether pro se or represented, are bound by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., McNeil v. United

States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, (1993); Hansan v. Fairfax Cty. Sch.
Bd., 405 F. App'x 793, 794 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Rule 11(b)(2) states that by signing a filing, an attorney or
unrepresented party certifies that, to the best of his knowledge
and after a reasonable inquiry, “the claims, defenses, and other
legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law.” The rule permits courts
to sanction litigants for citations to non-existent case law,
misrepresentations of case law, or frivolous legal arguments,
regardless of the filer’s pro se status. See, e.g., Ferris v.
Amazon.com Services, LLC, 778 F. Supp. 3d 879, 881-82 (N.D. Miss.

2025) (ordering a pro se plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs
incurred in responding to fabricated citations). “Courts across
the country have issued sanctions against attorneys and pro se
parties for submitting fictitious case citations, fictitious
quotations, and related misrepresentations to the court.” United
States v. Hayes, 763 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2025)
(collecting cases) (emphasis added).
It is not clear whether Curtin’s complaint and briefs are the
product of artificial intelligence. To be sure, this court has
seen an uptick in the use of artificial intelligence in complaints
and briefs, especially by pro se filers. Whether or not Curtin
used such tools, he is admonished that every filer, including a

pro se filer, is “obligated to read the legal authority he intends
to rely upon, confirm its existence and validity, and confirm that
it supports his legal contentions, before citing to that authority
in any submission to this Court.” Allen v. Western Governors
University, No. 2:25-cv-00325-RFB-NJK, 2026 WL 893368, at *1 (D.
Nev. Mar. 31, 2026). Obviously, Curtin did not do that. Curtin
is thus warned that any future filings containing fabricated legal
authority may result in sanctions under Rule 11.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant HII’s motion to dismiss (Doc.
20) is GRANTED, Defendant Watts’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 32) is

GRANTED as to both Defendant Watts and co-Defendant Watts Law, and
Defendant Cyberlux’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 44) is GRANTED, and
the complaint is dismissed: all claims founded on violation of
statutes for which the court has held there is no private right of
action are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, Counts 3 and 4 are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE, and the remaining claims in Counts 1 and 2 are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Curtin is hereby WARNED that any future filings containing
fabricated legal authority may result in sanctions under Rule 11.
/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
May 20, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11329983. Public record. Not legal advice.