# People v. Brown CA3

> California Court of Appeal · May 19, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11328841

## Case

- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** May 19, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Filed 5/19/26 P. v. Brown CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)

THE PEOPLE, C100991
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 21FE020034)
v.

JULIAN JASON BROWN,
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Julian Jason Brown participated in a drive-by shooting at a birthday
party attended by rival gang members. A bullet struck and killed Joseph Almanza.
At least four others were injured.
The People charged defendant and two codefendants, Anthony Smith and Eddie
Young, all members of the Oak Park Bloods, with one count of first degree murder
and five counts of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle. In a joint trial, a jury
found defendant and codefendant Smith guilty on all counts. The jury could not reach
a unanimous verdict as to codefendant Young, and the trial court declared a mistrial as
to him. Regarding defendant, in a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found various
gang and firearm enhancement allegations to be true, and sentenced him to state prison
for an indeterminate term of 75 years to life consecutive to a determinate term of 15
years.

1
Defendant now contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions
for murder and discharging a firearm, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s
finding that the murder was committed with premeditation and deliberation, (3) the trial
court erred in admitting two Instagram live videos and a separate Instagram post, (4) this
court should review the sealed transcript of an in camera hearing conducted under
Evidence Code1 section 1042, and (5) he is entitled to additional presentence custody
credit.
We conclude substantial evidence supports defendant’s convictions and the
finding of premeditation and deliberation. Defendant’s evidentiary error claims are either
forfeited or fail on the merits. And our review of the sealed transcript does not disclose
an abuse of discretion. However, as the People agree, defendant is entitled to additional
presentence custody credit. We will modify the judgment to award 863 days of
presentence custody credit and affirm the judgment as modified.
BACKGROUND
In the summer of 2020, two groups of Sacramento gangs were at war. A gang
detective described the violence as the worst he had seen in 20 years, “just shooting
after shooting after shooting.” The first group of combatants was the Oak Park Bloods
and various subsets and allies of that gang. The second group was G-Mobb and their
affiliated gangs, including the Del Paso Heights Bloods and the Meadowview Bloods.
In addition to criminal activity, each group claimed the membership of an influential
rapper. On the G-Mobb side was Donald Oliver, who went by Lavish D, and on the Oak
Park Bloods side was Timothy Patterson, who went by Mozzy. The rap music aspect,
which was central to the defense case, will be set forth in greater detail later in this
background.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.

2
On May 25, 2020, about two weeks before the deadly shooting, G-Mobb
affiliated gang members, including Almanza, a Del Paso Heights Bloods member,
were at Discovery Park. At least three Oak Park Bloods came to the park and fought
with them. The fight was captured on video. Almanza stomped on the head of one of
the Oak Park Bloods and the others ran away, but the next day they committed two
retaliatory shootings. The second shooting targeted Khaalis Reid, a member of the
Meadowview Bloods. One of the perpetrators had a cell phone screenshot from the
Discovery Park fight video with Almanza centered in the picture, suggesting Almanza
was also a target.
On June 6, 2020, Almanza and Reid went to a birthday party for Reid’s
younger brother. The party was at Reid’s mother’s duplex on Gardendale Road in
the Meadowview neighborhood (the Gardendale house). Around 40 people were at the
party, including Eugene Williams and Jackson Reed, who went by Quincy. Williams,
a member of the Meadowview Bloods, lived at the Gardendale house. Jermaine Moore,
who lived with the Reid brothers at a different location, was also at the party. He was
a G-Mobb gang member. Almanza arrived at the party with Laquarius Edwards at
around 7 p.m. Like Almanza, Edwards was a member of the Del Paso Heights Bloods.
Tyriq George, an associate of the Meadowview Bloods, arrived around the same time.
Less than 20 minutes later, while Almanza, Edwards, and George were talking outside
the house, a silver Nissan Altima pulled up and opened fire.
A bullet struck Almanza in the abdomen, perforating the iliac artery and
causing him to bleed to death. Bullets struck Edwards in the left thigh and groin area.
George was shot in the right leg. Moore and Quincy were also in front of the house
during the shooting. Moore was shot in the leg. Quincy was shot in the chest and neck.
N.D., who also lived at the Gardendale house, was sitting in the garage with the
garage door open when the gunfire erupted. She estimated that over 20 shots were fired.
The gunfire caused her to fall out of her chair. When she got up, she saw that Quincy had

3
been shot. N.D. did not see Almanza get shot, but knew he was hit because she saw
people grabbing him and screaming his name.
Reid’s mother, who was inside the house when the shots were fired, called 911.
So did a passing motorist, B.B., who saw the shooting as it was happening. B.B. testified
that the shots were fired by a black male, between the ages of 19 and 24, who was in the
back seat behind the driver. The shooter was leaning out of the car as he fired the gun.
Although she could not see his face, B.B. described the shooter as either having a dark
complexion or wearing a dark mask.
Another witness to the shooting, T.G., was in a friend’s driveway on the other side
of the duplex, working on the underside of her car. When she heard the first shot, she ran
inside the house. As she did, she saw a car in the middle of the intersection and the
shooter, wearing a light gray hooded sweatshirt, firing several rounds from the back seat
behind the driver. His arm and entire torso were out of the window as he fired. T.G.
said he had dark skin, lighter than hers, but she could not offer any additional description.
The driver was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt. Two other people were also in the
car, although T.G. could not see anything other than shadow and head movement
indicating their presence.
Police and paramedics arrived within minutes of the shooting. Edwards told
an officer he thought there were two shooters based on how fast the shots were fired.
Police canvassed the area surrounding the shooting and collected surveillance
video from two houses. In the minutes before the shooting, the videos showed three cars
driving back and forth around the block in a seemingly coordinated fashion: the Altima,
a Chevy Malibu, and a Toyota Rav4. At one point, the Altima and Malibu stopped for a
moment and the occupants appeared to interact with each other.
Based on the surveillance videos, a detective searched footage from various
license plate readers within the general area of the shooting. Three minutes after the
shooting, an image of the Rav4 was captured on a license plate reader a short distance

4
away. A records check of the license plate revealed the car belonged to a rental
company. It was rented the previous day by Esperanza Hatch’s mother. Defendant
and Hatch were dating.
The Altima was captured by a different license plate reader about 14 minutes after
the shooting, in an area consistent with the drive time to that location. The image showed
a bullet hole in the rear window. The same car was captured on a different license plate
reader about an hour before the shooting, with no bullet hole in that pre-shooting image.
A records check of the license plate revealed the car belonged to A.V. She briefly dated
Smith and loaned the car to him two or three days before the shooting. Smith kept the car
for four days. He replaced the rear window during that time.
Although the Malibu was not captured on any license plate readers within the
detective’s search parameters, defendant owned a Malibu that matched the description of
the car captured in the surveillance videos. Based on a review of those videos, detectives
identified Cristian Carrillo-Rivera as the driver. He and defendant were close friends.
About a month before the shooting, defendant was pulled over with Carrillo-Rivera in the
same car. During the stop, they told officers they wanted to keep their faces covered
because “they were in rival territory.”
Based on cell phone call detail records, which provided the date and time of cell
phone activity along with cell tower locations, detectives determined that defendant,
Smith, and Carrillo-Rivera were in the general area of the shooting when it occurred.
At 5:36 p.m., Smith called defendant from the general area of the Gardendale house.
The birthday party had started, but Almanza had not yet arrived. A short time later,
defendant made a call to Carrillo-Rivera. Defendant was in the Oak Park area and
Carrillo-Rivera was in South Sacramento. At around 6 p.m., Smith made two calls from
an area just north of the Gardendale house. At 6:10 p.m., defendant called Carrillo-
Rivera. About 10 minutes later, Carrillo-Rivera made two calls to defendant, who was
now in the North Sacramento area, where he lived. Carrillo-Rivera was still at his

5
previous location. At 6:25 p.m., Smith made another call from the same area just south
of the Gardendale house. Around the same time, defendant, still in the area where he
lived, received another call from Carrillo-Rivera.
At around 7 p.m., defendant called Carrillo-Rivera, who called him back three
minutes later. Both defendant and Carrillo-Rivera were now in the general area of the
Gardendale house. This is also about the time that Almanza arrived at the party. About
15 minutes later, within minutes of the shooting, Smith’s phone connected to a cell tower
in the same area. About three minutes after the shooting, defendant called Carrillo-
Rivera again. They were still in the general area of the Gardendale house. At 7:24 p.m.,
about six minutes after the shooting, Smith’s phone was now connecting to a cell tower
north of the Gardendale house. Three minutes later, defendant again called Carrillo-
Rivera. Defendant was now west of the Gardendale house. At 7:40 p.m., about 20
minutes after the shooting, Carrillo-Rivera called defendant from the general area of
the license plate reader where the Altima was photographed. Defendant was now in
the same area. Around that time, Smith’s phone connected to cell towers just south
of that area.
Forty-five expended shell casings were recovered from the shooting scene.
Five firearms fired those rounds. Two 9-millimeter firearms fired a total of 12 rounds
and three .40 caliber firearms fired a total of 33 rounds. Only one of the five firearms
was recovered. A .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun was recovered about two months
after the shooting during a traffic stop of a car driven by Ricardo Hall-Ramirez, a
member of the Strawberry Manor Bloods, a gang allied with the Oak Park Bloods.
Defendant and Hall-Ramirez communicated many times by direct message on social
media during the months leading up to the shooting and afterward. The handgun
recovered during the Hall-Ramirez stop had fired 15 of the shell casings recovered from
the scene. Based on T.G.’s statement, those casings appeared to be the ones fired from
the Altima. Among the casings was a laser sight that apparently fell off the gun while

6
firing. DNA recovered from the laser sight matched a DNA sample taken from
defendant. The sample taken from the laser sight consisted of DNA from four
contributors. The largest contributor, 81 percent of the sample, matched defendant’s
DNA profile. DNA was also recovered from the handgun and the magazine. The results
were inconclusive with respect to whether defendant’s DNA profile matched the samples
taken from those items.
On the afternoon of the drive-by shooting, Smith took a selfie of himself in the
driver’s seat of the Altima and posted it on Instagram. Later that night, about four hours
after the shooting, he sent a direct message to the mother of his children that said, “ ‘if
anything happens to me, I love you all.’ ” Social media interactions between defendant
and Smith revealed their relationship to be very close. They communicated frequently
on Instagram. In one message from Smith to defendant, sent six days after the murder,
Smith wrote, “I’ll do life” with exclamation points and a black heart emoji.
About eight months after Almanza’s murder, defendant engaged with two
rival gang members in separate Instagram live videos that were posted on YouTube.
The videos consisted of an exchange of insults. In the first, defendant said to Williams,
who was a member of the Meadowview Bloods and had been at the birthday party,
“you [expletive] ain’t slide for nobody. You left [Almanza] roll in the grass [expletive].
Dead [expletive].” In the second, defendant smoked a blunt while interacting
with Deandre Franklin, who was a member of the Del Paso Heights Bloods.
Defendant’s ashtray had a picture of Almanza’s face in it. Defendant put the blunt
out in the ashtray and said, “I just put it out on [Almanza’s] face.” Defendant also
posted on Instagram, “pull up point n shoot fuck whoever die that’s a gangmember
point of view.”
The prosecution’s theory of the case was that defendant set up the drive-by
shooting; defendant was the person T.G. and B.B. saw opening fire from the back seat;
Smith drove the car during the shooting; and Young was in the car and also firing shots.

7
But defendant disputed his involvement in the drive-by shooting. His defense case
consisted primarily of expert testimony. Professor Erik Nielson, an expert in rap music,
testified for the defense that Mozzy was “probably the biggest [rap music] artist to come
out of Sacramento.” Mozzy’s branding included merchandise with a “Hellgang” logo.
Defendant was also an aspiring rapper who performed as “Murdagang Juju” and had
merchandise with “Murdagang” branding. Defendant’s Instagram account was similar to
other aspiring rappers, but was “a little bit more advanced than some of the other artists”
the professor had seen. His music videos were also “more advanced and sophisticated”
than a typical aspiring artist and included “cinematography that was often very, very
impressive.” The professor thought defendant might have been on track to be the next
big artist to come out of Sacramento. Mozzy included defendant in a few of his songs,
and at least one of his rap videos, which received “millions and millions of views” online.
Almanza was also an aspiring rapper who performed as “Jody Woah” and had “created
something of a buzz in the Sacramento [hip hop] community.”
Testifying about rap music generally, Professor Nielson explained: “So there are
certain elements to this genre that do correspond with a person’s lived reality. It’s sort of
like . . . historical fiction. The city really exists, some of the things happen, but many of
the things that are layered on top are fictionalized or made up.” Because of that, the
professor opined that it is “dangerous to try to take something that’s so obviously
fictionalized and look for truth in it.” The professor also described “diss tracks” and
“battle rapping,” and explained that “it is not uncommon for rappers to speak ill of fallen
or dead rappers,” although the practice is “controversial within the hip hop community,
whether you ought to be doing that or not, but it is not uncommon.”
Regarding defendant’s “pull up point n shoot” Instagram post, Professor Nielson
testified that it was “consistent with the kind of posturing that you see these artists doing
all the time.” As for the Instagram live videos, the professor testified that the behavior
was consistent with “beefs between rappers” where “artists make rivals or pretend to be

8
rivals and have these exchanges, these heated exchanges, but they are often intended to
be promotional or marketing for both of the artists.” Williams and Franklin were also
aspiring rappers and appeared in the live videos as G-Man and Dre Steez, respectively.
The professor acknowledged that it was possible to be both a rapper and a gang member,
and although the Instagram live videos were consistent with performance or marketing,
it was possible that the things defendant said in the videos were true.
Defendant also adduced testimony from a defense gang expert, who disputed
certain aspects of the prosecution’s expert gang testimony, and a defense expert in
analyzing call detail records, who provided his own interpretation of the movement of the
cell phones following the shooting. In addition, defendant called an investigator who
testified that the gun in a photo on Young’s cell phone appeared to be the same gun
recovered during the Hall-Ramirez stop.
Smith’s defense case consisted primarily of his own testimony. He admitted being
a member of the Oak Park Bloods, but claimed he contributed to the gang by rapping and
supplying girls for prostitution rather than committing violent crime. Although Smith
acknowledged borrowing A.V.’s car before the shooting, he denied driving the car during
the shooting and denied being anywhere near the shooting scene. According to Smith,
about four hours before the shooting, he drove the car to a park to play basketball with
some fellow Oak Park Bloods. When he got there, fellow gang member Keyshawn
Deams walked over to the car. As Smith was getting his basketball gear out of the back,
Deams asked if he wanted to smoke marijuana and got into the driver’s seat. Smith
thought Deams was going to roll a joint in the car and then return to the basketball court,
so Smith walked over to the court, leaving his cell phone in the car, and started playing
basketball. When he looked up, Deams and the car were gone. Two or three hours later,
Deams used Smith’s cell phone to call someone Smith was with to let him know he had
his phone. When Smith met up with Deams, the back window of A.V.’s car had a bullet
hole in it.

9
Deams was shot and killed the day after the birthday party. The prosecution’s
rebuttal case included call detail records showing that Deams’s cell phone was not near
the Gardendale house at the time of the shooting. The prosecution’s gang expert also
testified that although snitching is generally frowned upon in gang culture, implicating
a deceased gang member, such as Deams, in a murder would not be considered snitching.
We omit a recitation of the evidence adduced during the bifurcated trial on the
gang allegations as this appeal does not raise any issues related to that part of the
proceedings.
DISCUSSION
I
Based on the drive-by shooting that ended Almanza’s life and injured four others,
the jury found defendant guilty of one count of murder and five counts of discharging a
firearm from a motor vehicle. Defendant claims the evidence is insufficient to support
any of those convictions.
“When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is challenged on
appeal, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value
from which a trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citation.] Our review must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] Even where,
as here, the evidence of guilt is largely circumstantial, our task is not to resolve
credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts, nor is it to inquire whether the evidence might
reasonably be reconciled with the defendant’s innocence. [Citations.] It is the duty of
the jury to acquit the defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence is susceptible to two
interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence. [Citation.] But the
relevant inquiry on appeal is whether, in light of all the evidence, ‘any reasonable trier of

10
fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 44.)
Murder is “the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought.”
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express or implied. (Pen. Code, § 188.)
“It is express ‘when there is manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the
life of a fellow creature,’ i.e., an intent to kill unlawfully. [Citations.] It is implied ‘when
an unlawful killing results from a willful act, the natural and probable consequences of
which are dangerous to human life, performed with conscious disregard for that danger.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Parker (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1267.)
The crime of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle has the following
elements: willful and malicious discharge of a firearm, from a motor vehicle, at another
person other than an occupant of a motor vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 26100, subd. (c).)
This crime does not require any specific intent, but rather only the general intent
to do the proscribed act, i.e., the discharge of the firearm from the motor vehicle at
another person outside the vehicle. (People v. Rodarte (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1158,
1168.)
Defendant notes that the jury was instructed on three theories of liability for the
crimes: direct perpetrator, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy to commit the charged
crimes. He argues the evidence does not support any of those theories. Of course, if
there is substantial evidence supporting at least one theory, the verdict must be upheld.
(People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 370.) We conclude substantial evidence supports
the aider and abettor theory and therefore need not address the direct perpetrator or
conspiracy theories.
Whoever fired from the Altima, killing Almanza, committed the crimes of murder
and shooting from a motor vehicle. Defendant does not argue otherwise. And if
defendant (1) knew of the shooter’s unlawful purpose, (2) intended to commit,
encourage, or facilitate the crimes, and (3) by act or advice aided, promoted, encouraged,

11
or instigated their commission, then defendant is guilty as an aider and abettor.
(Pen. Code, § 31; People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117-1118.)
“ ‘Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to constitute aiding
and abetting, nor is the failure to take action to prevent a crime, although these are factors
the jury may consider in assessing a defendant’s criminal responsibility. [Citation.]
Likewise, knowledge of another’s criminal purpose is not sufficient for aiding and
abetting; the defendant must also share that purpose or intend to commit, encourage,
or facilitate the commission of the crime.’ ” (People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th
261, 272-273.) In addition to presence at the scene of the crime and failure to prevent it,
the jury may also consider “ ‘companionship, flight, and conduct before and after the
crime.’ ” (Id. at p. 273.) “Motive is another circumstance to be considered in
determining aiding and abetting liability.” (People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
576, 599.)
Here, the evidence supports a reasonable conclusion that defendant, in
communication with Smith and Carrillo-Rivera, participated in orchestrating the
convergence of the three vehicles: the Altima, driven by Smith; defendant’s Malibu,
driven by Carrillo-Rivera; and the Rav4 that had been rented by the mother of
defendant’s girlfriend. Immediately before the shooting, those cars drove back and forth
around the block; the occupants of the Altima briefly conferred with Carrillo-Rivera in
the Malibu; and then the Altima pulled up to the Gardendale house and opened fire. Cell
phone call detail records confirm that defendant, Smith, and Carrillo-Rivera were in the
area of the Gardendale house at the time of the shooting. Defendant, Smith, and Young,
members of the Oak Park Bloods, had a motive for committing the drive-by shooting, as
members of rival G-Mobb gangs were at the house and Almanza in particular had
recently stomped on a fellow Oak Park gang member during a fight at Discovery Park.
Defendant was close friends with Smith and Carrillo-Rivera.

12
The gun that fired 15 rounds from the Altima was recovered during a traffic stop
two months later. Defendant’s DNA was not on the gun, but a picture of the gun was
found on Young’s cell phone. A laser sight was attached. That laser sight was recovered
from the shooting scene among the 15 shell casings fired by the gun. Defendant’s DNA
was on the laser sight. Even if defendant was not the shooter, the jury could have
reasonably concluded that he, at the very least, handled the gun while the laser sight was
attached before the shooter opened fire. A reasonable jury could also have inferred that
even if defendant was not the shooter, he was not in his own car at the time of the
shooting, he had moved instead to be with the shooter who leaned out from the Altima.
Such an inference flows from the evidence that defendant’s DNA was on the laser sight,
his Malibu was on the block that night, Carrillo-Rivera was driving defendant’s Malibu,
and four people were in the Altima.
Defendant fled from the scene. And his subsequent social media activity supports
a reasonable inference that he shared the shooter’s intent to shoot and kill rival gang
members that night. On social media defendant mocked Almanza, put a blunt out on a
picture of Almanza’s face, mocked Williams for letting Almanza “roll in the grass,” and
also posted: “pull up point n shoot fuck whoever die that’s a gangmember point of
view.” The evidence supports a conclusion that defendant is guilty as an aider and
abettor.
Nevertheless, defendant argues “[p]resence at the scene and companionship with
the perpetrator were contradicted by unrefuted expert testimony.” In support of this
argument, defendant points to evidence that Smith’s phone was the first to travel north of
the Gardendale house after the shooting while defendant’s phone (and Carrillo-Rivera’s
phone) remained closer to the shooting scene. Their phones were also not in the same
general area about an hour before the shooting. But all that shows is that Smith and
defendant arrived in the area of the shooting in separate cars and left the area after the
shooting in separate cars. It does not refute the possibility that defendant, after arriving

13
in the area in his Malibu, got into the Altima with Smith and Young, and then afterward,
got back into his Malibu before leaving the area. Defendant argues such an inference
“is implausible, requiring a belief in a high-risk passenger swap without any evidentiary
trace.” However, we have already set forth the evidence supporting a reasonable
inference that defendant was in the Altima when the shooting happened. The fact that he
would have had to get out of his car and into Smith’s car for that to be true does not make
the inference implausible. Indeed, the fact that Carrillo-Rivera was driving defendant’s
car in the surveillance video supports a conclusion that defendant was somewhere else,
i.e., in the Altima, when it pulled up and opened fire.
Defendant characterizes “[t]he theory that [he] orchestrated lookout cars” as
“speculative” because the content of the phone calls between defendant, Smith, and
Carrillo-Rivera “is unknown.” However, the fact of the calls, as well as the movement of
the cell phones, the arrival of the Altima, Malibu, and Rav4 on the block, their seemingly
coordinated movements and interactions between the occupants captured on surveillance
video, all support a reasonable inference that defendant participated in orchestrating their
arrival for the purpose of committing the drive-by shooting. He need not have
specifically told anyone to act as a lookout.
Defendant further asserts that he did not supply the Altima, from which shots were
fired, or the gun that fired those shots. However, defendant need not have supplied either
the car or the gun to have aided and abetted the drive-by shooting. “The ‘act’ required
for aiding and abetting liability need not be a substantial factor in the offense.” (People
v. Swanson-Birabent (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 733, 743.) Indeed, supportive presence can
be enough. (Id. at p. 744.) Here, as we have already explained, the evidence supports a
reasonable inference that defendant was not only present in the Altima and generally
supportive of committing a drive-by shooting as a gang member, but he participated in
orchestrating the convergence of the cars on the block that night, was either the shooter
himself or present in the Altima with the shooter, handled the gun, failed to take action to

14
prevent the shooting, fled from the scene, and mocked Almanza’s death afterwards.
The evidence is sufficient.
Finally, defendant attempts to minimize the importance of his DNA being on the
laser sight by arguing that his handling of the sight is “untethered in time and context
from the crime.” But again, on appeal, it is not enough that a different factual scenario
can be envisioned. For reasons already expressed, we conclude this evidence, in
combination with all of the evidence, supports a finding that defendant aided and abetted
the drive-by shooting and murder.
II
Defendant separately challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jury’s finding that the murder was committed with premeditation and deliberation.
“ ‘A verdict of deliberate and premeditated first degree murder requires more than
a showing of intent to kill. [Citation.] “Deliberation” refers to careful weighing of
considerations in forming a course of action; “premeditation” means thought over in
advance. [Citations.] “The process of premeditation . . . does not require any extended
period of time. ‘The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the
reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated
judgment may be arrived at quickly.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379,
419.) The statute itself states that a finding of deliberation and premeditation does not
require the defendant to have “maturely and meaningfully reflected.” (Pen. Code, § 189,
subd. (d).)
The California Supreme Court has “established ‘guidelines to aid reviewing courts
in analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain findings of premeditation and
deliberation.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Williams (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 396, 409-410
(Williams).) In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 (Anderson), the court noted that
three types of evidence have been held sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and
deliberation: (1) planning activity, (2) motive to kill the victim, and (3) manner of killing

15
indicative of a preconceived design to kill. (Id. at pp. 26-27.) The court explained that
“this court sustains verdicts of first degree murder typically when there is evidence of all
three types and otherwise requires at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of
(2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3).” (Id. at p. 27.)
However, Anderson “did not change the definition of murder or establish elements
that had to be proven in each case . . . . ‘The Anderson factors, while helpful for purposes
of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they
exclusive.’ [Citations.] . . . [T]he factors do not impose a ‘straitjacket on the manner in
which premeditation can be proven adequately at trial.’ [Citation.]” (Williams, supra,
23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 410-411.)
Nevertheless, we find the Anderson framework to be useful in this case. As we
have already explained, there is ample evidence that defendant had a gang-related motive
to kill Almanza. (See People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 401.) The manner of
killing is also indicative of a preconceived design to kill. The Altima pulled up to the
Gardendale house and slowed down, allowing the shooter to open fire on Almanza and
other rival gang members in front of the house. Such a killing is not indicative of a
“ ‘mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed.’ ” (Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d
at p. 27.) There was also evidence of planning activity. There were phone calls between
defendant, Smith, and Carrillo-Rivera leading to the arrival of the Altima, defendant’s
Malibu, and the Rav4 on the block; the cars drove in a coordinated manner around the
block; at least one occupant of the Altima was armed when they arrived; and there was a
consultation between the occupants of the Altima and the Malibu immediately before the
drive-by shooting. (See People v. Ramos (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1208 [evidence
of planning where gang members armed themselves before a party and parked around the
block].) Together, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding of deliberate
and premeditated murder.

16
Defendant argues that “[t]he evidence, at most, supports a finding of a
spontaneous and impulsive act by the shooters, not a carefully weighed plan in which
[defendant] participated.” However, aside from this one line in defendant’s conclusion,
his argument does not specifically dispute that the Anderson factors are satisfied with
respect to anyone who aided and abetted the murder and drive-by shooting. As we have
explained, there is evidence of all three factors. Instead, defendant reasserts that he was
absent from the crime scene, his DNA’s presence on the laser sight was untethered and
ambiguous, and his social media posts and evidence of generalized gang dynamics did
not establish that he personally intended to kill anyone. However, we have already
concluded that defendant aided and abetted Almanza’s murder and the drive-by shooting
that injured four others. We now also conclude the evidence supports a finding that he
did so with a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill.
III
In addition, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the Instagram
live videos and a separate related Instagram post, apparently the “pull up point n shoot”
post. His briefing, however, argues this contention only with respect to the live videos.
Any contention that the separate post was improperly admitted is therefore forfeited.
(See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
A
Prior to trial, the prosecution sought to introduce defendant’s social media posts,
rap videos and lyrics, and two Instagram live videos. The relevant content from the live
videos is the following. In the first video, defendant said to Williams, “you [expletive]
ain’t slide for nobody. You left [Almanza] roll in the grass [expletive]. Dead
[expletive].” Defendant also said: “Went and picked TG up [expletive]” and “took him
to the hospital [expletive].” “TG” refers to Tyriq George, who was shot while talking to
Almanza and taken to the hospital by someone at the party. In the second video, while

17
interacting with Franklin, defendant put a blunt out in an ashtray that had a picture of
Almanza’s face in it. He then said, “I just put it out on [Almanza’s] face.”
Defendant moved to exclude any rap videos, lyrics, and related Instagram live
videos under sections 352 and 352.2. Regarding the live videos, which were described as
“promotional performances” and “battles with other local rappers,” defendant argued
they should be excluded under section 352 because their prejudicial effect outweighed
any probative value. Defendant also argued they should be excluded under section 352.2
as “ ‘a form of creative expression’ ” subject to a “very unique balancing test . . . that
has a much greater balance toward the exclusion of this evidence.”
Addressing the artistic nature of the Instagram live videos, defendant noted that he
appeared under his stage name, as did the other rappers, and the live videos had hundreds
of viewers who interacted with the content by leaving comments that the performers
could respond to in real time. Defendant claimed there was no factual basis to believe
the live videos were anything other than an artistic performance. As for probative value,
he argued the live videos occurred more than six months after the offense and did not
include any statements about the offense that were previously unknown. Although he
mentioned Almanza’s murder in one of the videos, defendant pointed out that other
commenters did too, Almanza was a locally famous rapper, and defendant never took
credit for the shooting or claimed to be responsible. Defendant argued “the verbiage and
imagery utilized in these performances would be highly prejudicial and it would fall
directly into the area of exclusion that has been clearly set out in . . . section 352.2.”
At the hearing on the motions, the trial court noted that the proffered evidence was
relevant to the issues of motive and intent, but its admissibility would be subject to
“measuring probative value against possible prejudice,” including “assessing it
under . . . section 352.2.” The trial court ultimately excluded a rap video depicting
defendant and other Oak Park gang members rapping and acting out a drive-by shooting,
but admitted the two Instagram live videos. The trial court described the live videos as

18
“videotaped yelling matches” and questioned “whether they fall within the borders of
[section] 352.2’s definition of creative expression.” Nevertheless, the trial court ruled
the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice
regardless of whether it was assessed under section 352 alone or with the added
requirements of section 352.2.
B
Section 352 “requires the trial court ‘to weigh the evidence’s probative value
against the dangers of prejudice, confusion, and undue time consumption.’ [Citation.]
The trial court excludes the evidence if these dangers substantially outweigh the
evidence’s probative value.” (People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1154.)
A more recent law, section 352.2, “calls for a particularized inquiry when the
admissibility of a creative expression is challenged under . . . section 352.” (People v.
Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 687 (Aguirre).) Section 352.2 applies in criminal
proceedings “where a party seeks to admit as evidence a form of creative expression,”
and requires the trial court to “consider . . . that: (1) the probative value of such
expression for its literal truth or as a truthful narrative is minimal unless that expression is
created near in time to the charged crime or crimes, bears a sufficient level of similarity
to the charged crime or crimes, or includes factual detail not otherwise publicly available;
and (2) undue prejudice includes, but is not limited to, the possibility that the trier of fact
will . . . treat the expression as evidence of the defendant’s propensity for violence or
general criminal disposition as well as the possibility that the evidence will explicitly
or implicitly inject racial bias into the proceedings.” (§ 352.2, subd. (a).) We review
a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. (People v. Robinson (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1030.)
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by (1) “failing to
recognize that the evidence fell exclusively within the definition of ‘creative
expression,’ ” (2) “finding high probative value where the law presumes it is minimal,”

19
and (3) failing “to properly weigh the undue prejudice,” i.e., “the specific risks of
propensity reasoning and racial bias.”
Section 352.2, subdivision (c) “defines a ‘ “creative expression” ’ as ‘the
expression or application of creativity or imagination in the production or arrangement
of forms, sounds, words, movements, or symbols, including, but not limited to, music,
dance, performance art, visual art, poetry, literature, film, and other such objects or
media.’ [Citation.]” (Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 687.) The trial court questioned
whether the Instagram live videos fit this definition, describing them as “videotaped
yelling matches.” This court has not been provided with the actual exhibits containing
the videos. Without viewing them, we are in no position to question the trial court’s
description. And the transcripts, which we have been provided, support that description.
The relevant statements made by defendant in the live videos do not appear to be a part of
any rap battle. Instead, the transcripts support a conclusion that defendant and two rival
gang members, as well as other unidentified males, exchanged insults over social media,
some of which referred to this particular drive-by shooting and Almanza’s murder. We
accept for purposes of analysis that defendant, Williams, and Franklin, in addition to
being gang members, were also rappers. But that does not make everything they say to
each other creative expression within the meaning of section 352.2.
Nevertheless, because the trial court assessed admissibility under both section 352
and section 352.2, we need not determine whether the Instagram live videos qualify as
creative expression. Even if they do, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence under section 352.2.
Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, section 352.2 does not contain a
general presumption that the probative value of any creative expression will be minimal.
The statute specifically states that “the probative value of such expression for its literal
truth or as a truthful narrative is minimal unless that expression is created near in time
to the charged crime or crimes, bears a sufficient level of similarity to the charged crime

20
or crimes, or includes factual detail not otherwise publicly available.” (§ 352.2, subd. (a),
italics added.) The relevant statements in the Instagram live videos were not admitted for
their literal truth or as a truthful narrative. They were admitted to show a gang-related
motive and intent to kill. “[E]vidence of motive makes the crime understandable and
renders the inferences regarding defendant’s intent more reasonable.” (People v. Roldan
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 707, disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009)
45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) Moreover, defendant’s statements in the first live video
clearly indicate that he was talking about the drive-by shooting and murder, referring to
Almanza by name and also mentioning that George was picked up and taken to the
hospital. But again, defendant’s statements were not admitted for their truth. They were
admitted to prove motive and intent. On those issues, the probative value was high
notwithstanding the existence of other gang evidence.
Turning to the undue prejudice side of the balancing test, “[t]his court has noted
that ‘ “[t]he prejudice which exclusion of evidence under . . . section 352 is designed to
avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant,
highly probative evidence. ‘[A]ll evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or
damaging to the defendant’s case. The stronger the evidence, the more it is “prejudicial.”
The “prejudice” referred to in . . . section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends
to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very
little effect on the issues.’ ” [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
155, 167 (Holford).) The challenged videos were prejudicial both because they were
highly probative of defendant’s motive and intent to kill and because of the potential
for the jury to improperly use propensity reasoning and the sort of racial stereotypes
that section 352.2 was enacted to prevent. However, the latter form of prejudice
requires exclusion only if “the probative value is ‘substantially’ outweighed by the
probability of a ‘substantial danger’ of undue prejudice . . . .” (Holford, at p. 167.)

21
The trial court conducted the required balancing and concluded the probative
value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. That was not
an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Lawson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 990, 1003
[Instagram posts claimed to be rap lyrics were highly relevant to the defendant’s motive
and not inadmissible under section 352.2]; People v. Zepeda (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 25,
35 [admission of rap lyrics written by the defendant to prove his state of mind was not an
abuse of discretion].)
“Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under
section 352 [or section 352.2], we must also reject defendant’s argument that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial. ‘ “The admission of relevant evidence
will not offend due process unless the evidence is so prejudicial as to render the
defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” ’ [Citations.]” (Holford, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th
at p. 180.) Notwithstanding the admittedly prejudicial nature of the challenged evidence,
it was nevertheless highly relevant evidence on a critical issue in this case, defendant’s
motive and intent. Admission of the evidence did not render defendant’s trial
fundamentally unfair.
IV
Defendant also asks this court to review the sealed transcript of an in camera
hearing conducted under section 1042. The People do not object to this request.
Section 1041 “grant[s] the People a privilege not to disclose, and to prevent others,
such as defendant, from disclosing, the identity of a confidential informant. (§ 1041,
subd. (a).) The People may claim this privilege after establishing disclosure ‘is against
the public interest because the necessity for preserving the confidentiality of [the
informer’s] identity outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice.’
(§ 1041, subd. (a)(2).)” (People v. Bradley (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 607, 620 (Bradley).)
“When weighing the necessity to keep an informant’s identity confidential against the
necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice, a trial court must order the prosecution

22
to disclose the informant’s identity and his location, or suffer dismissal of the case,
if the informant is shown to be a material witness. [Citation.] ‘An informant is a
material witness if there appears, from the evidence presented, a reasonable possibility
that he or she could give evidence on the issue of guilt that might exonerate the
defendant. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A trial court does not abuse its discretion denying
the motion to disclose where ‘the record demonstrates, based on a sufficiently
searching inquiry, that the informant could not have provided any evidence that,
to a reasonable possibility, might have exonerated defendant.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 620.)
“The trial court determines an informant’s materiality pursuant to procedures
provided by section 1042. That statute requires a court to convene a hearing outside the
presence of the jury on a party’s demand for disclosure of an informant’s identity. If,
during the hearing, the People claim the nondisclosure privilege or a person authorized to
claim the privilege refuses to answer any questions because the answer might disclose an
informant’s identity, the prosecution may request the court to convene an in camera
hearing. At that hearing, the prosecution may offer evidence that discloses the
informant’s identity ‘to aid the court in its determination whether there is a reasonable
possibility that nondisclosure might deprive the defendant of a fair trial.’ (§ 1042,
subd. (d).)” (Bradley, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 620-621.)
Here, the prosecution’s gang expert testified generally about drive-by shootings
based on his conversations with gang members. During cross-examination, he was
asked whether he spoke to any gang members who had participated in a drive-by
shooting. The detective said he had. Asked who, the detective responded: “I’m not
going to put their name out on the record.” The matter was discussed outside the
presence of the jury. Following a break in the proceedings, the trial court stated that it
would conduct an in camera hearing under section 1042. The detective was then brought
back into the courtroom, still outside the presence of the jury, and asked the question

23
again. He invoked the foregoing privilege. The trial court held the required in camera
hearing, after which it denied the request for disclosure. The jury was brought into the
courtroom and instructed that the detective’s refusal to answer was consistent with a
privilege of nondisclosure and that the jury could not consider the refusal for any
purpose.
“We review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion.” (Bradley, supra,
7 Cal.App.5th at p. 621.) Having reviewed the sealed transcript, we conclude the trial
court engaged in a sufficiently searching inquiry, from which it reasonably concluded
that two informants, who provided the detective with general information about how
drive-by shootings are carried out, could not have provided any evidence that, to a
reasonable possibility, might have exonerated any of the defendants. There was no abuse
of discretion.
V
Defendant’s final claim is that he is entitled to additional presentence custody
credit. The People agree, and we do too. Defendant was entitled to credit against his
sentence for all actual days of presentence custody, beginning on the day of his arrest and
continuing through the day of sentencing. (Pen. Code, § 2900.5; People v. Rajanayagam
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48.) Defendant was taken into custody in Nevada on
December 9, 2021, held there until December 21, 2021, after which he was transported to
Sacramento County, where he was held until sentenced on April 19, 2024. The total time
was 863 days. The trial court awarded 851, apparently omitting the days spent in custody
in Nevada. We will modify the judgment to reflect an award of 863 days.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to award defendant 863 days of presentence custody
credit. The judgment is affirmed as modified. The trial court is directed to amend
the abstract of judgment to reflect the modification and to forward a certified copy

24
of the amended abstract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.

/S/
MAURO, J.

We concur:

/S/
EARL, P. J.

/S/
KRAUSE, J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11328841. Public record. Not legal advice.