# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · May 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11328444

## Case

- **Full name:** LAD SERVICES OF LOUISIANA, LLC v. DRAGADOS/HAWAIIAN DREDGING/ORION JOINT VENTURE, ET AL.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** May 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11328444

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting court may sanction dishonest discovery responses
- stating that generally listing software, data processing algorithms, and processes that a plaintiff developed, owned, or licensed is insufficient as such disclosures only reveal the end results of, or functions performed by, the claimed trade secrets
- stating “trade secret law does not protect information that is publicly available, including information that can be discerned with reasonable effort by inspecting a product available for purchase on the market.” (citations omitted)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAD SERVICES OF LOUISIANA, LLC * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 24-2446

DRAGADOS/HAWAIIAN DREDGING/ * SECTION “D” (2)
ORION JOINT VENTURE, ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Pending before me is a Motion to Compel filed by Defendant Dragados/Hawaiian
Dredging/Orion, Joint Venture. ECF No. 98. Plaintiff LAD Services of Louisiana, LLC timely
filed an Opposition Memorandum, and Defendant timely filed a Reply Memorandum. ECF Nos.
101, 102. No party requested oral argument in accordance with Local Rule 78.1, and the Court
agrees that oral argument is unnecessary.
Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the
applicable law, Defendant’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART
for the reasons stated herein.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 10, 2024, Plaintiff LAD Services of Louisiana, LLC filed this diversity action
against Defendant Dragados/Hawaiian Dredging/Orion, Joint Venture asserting claims for breach
of contract, detrimental reliance, unjust enrichment, and deceptive trade practices relating to a
contract to build a floating dry dock for the U.S. Navy’s use and placement in Pearl Harbor,
Honolulu, Hawaii. ECF No. 1 §§ I, III ¶ 7, VI ¶¶ 34-57. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint
on October 25, 2024, a Second Amended Complaint on February 19, 2024, and a Fourth Amended
Complaint on December 31, 2025, with its request to file a Third Amended Complaint being
denied as a result of the request to file the Fourth Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 8, 23, 43, 51,
56, 79. The Fourth Amended Complaint added a sixth cause of action for Misappropriation of
Trade Secrets. ECF No. 80 ¶¶ 53-79.
The Court issued a Scheduling Order on April 23, 2025, and later continued certain dates.
ECF Nos. 35, 41, 42, 95. The current discovery deadline is July 21, 2026, with Plaintiff’s expert

reports due May 22, 2026, Defendant’s expert reports due June 24, 2026, and Plaintiff’s rebuttal
reports due July 7, 2026. ECF No. 95.
II. THE PENDING MOTION
Defendant has filed this Motion to Compel requesting that the Court order Plaintiff to
produce, within 7 days, (a) all discoverable documents and electronically stored information not
yet produced in this litigation in response to Defendant’s initial discovery requests propounded in
July 2025, and (b) comply with Local Rule 26.3’s initial disclosures requirements to produce the
information, documents, materials, and electronically stored information concerning the Fourth
Amended Complaint’s “Misappropriation of Trade Secrets” claim, requested through Defendant’s
second set of discovery requests propounded in February 2026. ECF No. 98. Defendant asserts

that Plaintiff’s production omitted internal communications (specifically Mr. Dragna’s texts and
messaging applications), has failed to preserve and maintain all electronically stored information,
failed to deliver a Trade Secret Identification Statement as required by Local Rule 26.3, and
provided only cursory responses to discovery directed to the trade secret claim. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 11, 15.
Defendant’s supporting memorandum repeats the history recited in its motion and argues
that Plaintiff’s failure to produce all responsive information is evidenced by the discrepancies
between its initial pdf production versus its later native format production, with the native format
version containing over 800 documents with only 30-40 overlapping documents, and the failure to
produce “routine and standard internal documents that can be expected” from any organization.
ECF No. 98-1 at 1-7, 10-11. Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff gathered files in
support of its claim and then produced its “claim file” rather than produce all responsive
information. Id. at 11. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s failures relate to First Set of RFP Nos. 1-
2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15-21 and Second Set of RFP No. 13. Id. at 8-9. Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s

failure to deliver the Rule 26.3 identification statement as well as its ambiguous discovery
responses identifying a category of documents, asserting Plaintiff’s alleged trade secret is
“undefined and nondescript.” Id. at 12-15.
In Opposition, Plaintiff asserts that it has produced all responsive, non-privileged
documents and ESI in its possession, custody and control, including both pdf and native format
productions, and supplemented when concerns were raised, and Defendant mischaracterizes the
discovery history, overstates the alleged deficiencies, and conflates ESI production with Rule
26.3’s identification statement requirement. ECF No. 101 at 1. Plaintiff argues that a 7-day
response deadline is unreasonable because Defendant does not identify, with specificity, what
categories of documents it believes exist but were not produced. Id. at 8. Plaintiff asserts the

parties’ waiver of initial disclosures included the Rule 26.3 statement and, in any event, it
sufficiently identified its trade secrets by specifying categories of (a) proprietary conceptual design
for constructing and transporting concrete floor units and (b) proprietary structural design and
engineering specifications for floating dry dock pontoon system, including but not limited to the
dimensional layout, freeboard calculations, ballast system configurations, and load distribution
methodology developed by Plaintiff, and producing engineering data and design documents. Id.
at 8-10. Plaintiff asks that, if a Rule 26.3 statement is required, it should be allowed 21 days to
provide same. Id. at 11.
Plaintiff contends that its native format production was not simply a “claim file” but
included all emails, documents and ESI dating back to 2009, including external communications
relevant to the dispute, engineering documents, design materials and related correspondence. Id.
at 4. It also asserts that the alleged “discrepancies” between the native format and pdf productions

resulted from predictable differences from converting the documents, not deliberate omissions. Id.
at 5. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not identified any omitted material, and a motion to
compel based on suspicion and inference is improper. Id. However, Plaintiff appears to concede
it has not searched for and produced all electronic communications (e.g., texts or messaging app
communications), stating only that it produced all internal emails and later asserting that a search
for text messages and other communications from personal devices would entail lengthy forensic
efforts and a review that could not be accomplished in 7 days. Id. at 6, 8. Plaintiff also asserts
that it has not deleted or failed to preserve ESI, only that its vendor did not retain the search terms
it ran to gather the information. Id. at 6-7.
In Reply, Defendant asserts that the requests properly seek relevant evidence (i.e., internal

communications about the project, lawsuit, claims and defenses) proportional to the needs of the
case, and Plaintiff’s relevance and proportionality objections must fail. ECF No. 102. Defendant
disputes Plaintiff’s assertion that file formatting differences explain the inconsistent productions
because the initial production only covered July 2022 forward, whereas the second production
went back to 2009 and included 350 more documents. Id. at 3. Defendant reiterates that the
requests sought all communications but Plaintiff continues to limit its discussion to emails, that
there was no waiver of the Rule 26.3 trade secret identification statement because that claim had
not been urged when they agreed to waive initial disclosures required by Rule 26, and Plaintiff’s
responses to the second set of discovery directed to trade secrets are insufficient. Id. at 4-7.
III. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
The parties appear to agree that the requests at issue seek relevant information within the
scope of permissible discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). The dispute revolves around whether
Plaintiff has produced all information responsive to the requests with regard to electronically

stored communications other than emails and the alleged trade secrets.
A. Motion to Compel Production of Responsive Documents
The Court cannot compel a party to produce documents that do not exist.1 While Defendant
relies on discrepancies between the pdf production and native format production, Defendant fails
to demonstrate the particular discrepancies or how they suggest other failures to produce
responsive information beyond the date differences of the productions. Defendant does, however,
sufficiently establish (and Plaintiff appears to concede) that Plaintiff’s production was limited to
email communications rather than other electronic communications (texts, messaging applications,

1 Henderson v. Compdent of Tenn., Inc., No. 97-617, 1997 WL 756600, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 1997) (denying motion
to compel based on representation that documents that do not exist and noting other remedies are available if
representation is untrue); Goosehead Ins. Agency, LLC v. Guillory, No. 24-2146, 2025 WL 1397166, at *5 (E.D. La.
May 14, 2025) (court cannot compel party to produce documents that do not exist); Solorzano v. Shell Chem. Co.,
No. 99-2831, 2000 WL 1145766, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2000) (“[A party or non-party] cannot produce what it does
not have.”); Rhyce v. Martin, No. 00-2623, 2002 WL 31496375, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 6, 2002) (denying motion to
compel where party did not have control of documents); Fernandez v. McDaniel Controls, Inc., No. 98-1040, 1998
WL 840014, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 3, 1998) (“Plaintiff cannot be compelled to produce what he certifies in a response
signed pursuant to Rule 26(g) he does not possess.”); Frught v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 07-5069, 2009
WL 10679979, at *1 (E.D. La. May 27, 2009) (defendant could not be compelled to produce materials which it certifies
are not in its possession, custody, or control); see also Butler v. La. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., No. 12-420, 2014
WL 3867552, at *1 (M.D. La. Aug. 6, 2014) (“[The court] cannot compel Defendants to produce documents that do
not exist.”); Payne v. Forest River, Inc., No. 13-679, 2015 WL 1912851, at *4 (M.D. La. Apr. 22, 2015) (“The court
cannot order the production of documents that no longer exist or, despite a diligent search, cannot be found in the
possession, custody, or control of a party.”); Callais v. United Rentals N. Am., Inc., No. 17-312, 2018 WL 6517446,
at *7 (M.D. La. Dec. 11, 2018) (“The Court cannot order the production of something the producing party suggests
does not exist.”); Terral v. Ducote, No. 15-2366, 2016 WL 5017328, at *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 19, 2016) (“The court
cannot order respondents to produce discovery that does not exist.”); Beth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-1024, 2014
WL 2918674, at *2 (W.D. La. June 26, 2014) (agreeing with proposition that a party cannot be compelled to produce
documents that do not exist); Alvarado v. Air Sys. Components LP, No. 19-2057, 2021 WL 2682870, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
June 29, 2021) (noting that a party is not required to produce any discovery it does not possess); Cardenas v. Dorel
Juv. Grp., Inc., 230 F.R.D. 611, 620 (D. Kan. 2005) (“The Court cannot compel the production of documents that do
not exist or that are not in the possession, custody or control of a party.”).
etc.). Indeed, Plaintiff’s assertion that it would take more than 7 days to search texts and messaging
apps for responsive communications reveals that same were not searched or produced.2
Defendant’s requests were not limited to emails. The requests seek all communications,
not simply emails. Text messages and communications through other applications fall within the

scope of RFP Nos. 9-12 and 40 of the first set and RFP No. 13 of the second set. ECF No. 98-4 at
8-9, 12; No. 98-13 at 9. Plaintiff is obliged to undertake an investigation of all reasonably available
sources for responsive information, which it has not done. Accordingly, it must produce any
responsive communications including electronic messages contained in texts or on other
messaging applications, such as WhatsApp or social media.
Defendant has not, however, established that Plaintiff failed to produce other unspecified
responsive documents. While Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not produced all responsive
documents because it failed to produce documents one would expect (ECF No. 98-1 at 11), a
party's mere disbelief or disagreement with a response is not a recognized ground for compelling
discovery.3 The requesting party's belief or suspicion that the response is incomplete or incorrect
must be supported by evidence that the responding party's production is not complete.4 To

establish a specific or material deficiency in the response necessary to require additional searches
or discovery efforts, or to obtain “discovery on discovery” that is “both relevant and proportional
to the needs of the case” under Rule 26(b)(1), the requesting party must provide evidence,

2 ECF No. 101 at 8 (indicating it would take more than 7 days to search Mr. Dragna’s text messages or other electronic
messaging services).
3 Tingle v. Hebert, No. 15-626, 2018 WL 1726667, at *5 (M.D. La. Apr. 10, 2018) (noting that mere speculation that
documents must exist is insufficient); see also Gordon v. Greenville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 13-178, 2014 WL 6603420,
at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2014) (“Although Plaintiff is not satisfied with this response, he fails to point to anything
that suggests such reports actually exist. The Court cannot compel a [responding party] to produce documents that do
not exist.”); McElwee v. Wallantas, No. 03-172, 2005 WL 2346945, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2005) (“[T]he Court
cannot order the Defendants to produce documentation that does not exist. Therefore, unless the Plaintiff can provide
proof that the documents exist, rather than mere speculation, the Court will not entertain motions to compel the
Defendants to produce documentation whose existence is nothing more than theoretical.”).
4 VeroBlue Farms USA Inc. v. Wulf, 345 F.R.D. 406, 420 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (cleaned up).
including through produced documents, that allows the Court to make “a reasonable deduction that
other documents may exist or did exist and have been destroyed” or must “point to the existence
of additional responsive material.”5 Defendant has failed to carry this burden.
Although Defendant has not established the existence of other unspecified documents that

would justify an order compelling production of anything other than the absent communications
reflected in text messages or other messaging applications, Defendant is entitled to an unequivocal
representation, under oath, that Plaintiff has produced all responsive documents in its actual or
constructive6 possession, custody or control and had not withheld any documents based on an
objection or otherwise rather than an ambiguous response that leaves Defendant guessing as to
whether all responsive documents have been produced.7 Plaintiff is thus required to certify and
confirm that, after undertaking reasonable effort to obtain and locate responsive documents, it has
produced all responsive documents and no additional responsive documents exist.8 In the event
that Defendant acquires additional documents to establish that Plaintiff’s representations were
false, other remedies may be sought,9 including imposition of costs or other appropriate sanctions
for the misconduct and to protect the judicial process.10

5 Id. at 420–21 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (citations omitted).
6 Counsel is reminded that Rule 34 encompasses “constructive” possession and thus imposes the obligation on Plaintiff
to produce documents that it has the legal right to obtain even though it has no copy and even if the documents are
owned or possessed by a nonparty. Becnel v. Salas, No. 17-17965, 2018 WL 691649, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2018)
(citations omitted); Est. of Monroe v. Bottle Rock Power Corp., No. 03-2682, 2004 WL 737463, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr.
2, 2004) (citation omitted).
7 Baker v. Walters, 652 F. Supp. 3d 768, 785 (N.D. Tex. 2023); Beasley v. First Am. Real Est. Info. Servs., Inc., No.
04-1059, 2005 WL 1017818, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2005) (“[D]efendant is entitled to an unequivocal
representation . . . that the documents specified in this request for production do not exist.”).
8 Goosehead, 2025 WL 1397166, at *6 (noting that, if a court has concerns about the reasonableness of a party's efforts
in responding to discovery, it may require a certification or confirmation that the discovery at issue does not exist);
Nguyen v. La. State Bd. of Cosmetology, No. 14-80, 2016 WL 67253, at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 5, 2016) (requiring plaintiff
to “confirm that the requested information does not exist”); see Callais v. United Rentals N. Am., Inc., No. 17-312,
2018 WL 6517446, at *7 (M.D. La. Dec. 11, 2018) (ordering qualified representative to provide a sworn certification
that no responsive documents exist).
9 Henderson, 1997 WL 756600, at *1 (denying motion to compel based on representation that documents that do not
exist and noting other remedies are available if representation is untrue).
10 Snider v. L-3 Commc'ns Vertex Aerospace, L.L.C., 946 F.3d 660, 678-79 (5th Cir. 2019); Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 104-05, 107 (2017) (noting court may sanction dishonest discovery responses).
B. Trade Secret Identification Statement
Unlike cases involving intellectual property on file with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, trade secrets are held by the plaintiff and, by definition, are not publicly
available. To enable the parties to prepare for trial, a particularized identification of trade secrets
more than that required in a complaint is necessary.11 A plaintiff must provide specific notice of

what the defendant is alleged to have misappropriated.12
To prevail on its trade secret claim, Plaintiff “must identify the trade secrets and carry the
burden of showing that they exist.”13 “It is self-evident that the subject matter of a trade secret
must be secret.”14 “Information that is public knowledge . . . or that is generally known in an
industry[ ] cannot qualify as a trade secret.”15 A primary reason for requiring a plaintiff to identify
the alleged trade secret with particularity is to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the
trade or of special persons who are skilled in the trade and to permit the defendant to ascertain the
boundaries within which the secret lies.16

(2017) (noting court may sanction dishonest discovery responses).
11 See Mfg. Automation & Software Sys. v. Hughes, No. 16-8962, 2018 WL 3197696, at *14 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2018);
InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Hldgs. Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2020); StoneEagle Servs., Inc. v. Valentine,
No. 12-1687, 2013 WL 9554563, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2013) (requiring reasonable particularity of alleged trade
secrets at issue so both defendants and courts will have no difficulty evaluating the relevance of discovery requests
and propriety of objections (citations omitted)); Source Prod. & Equip. Co. v. Schehr, No. 16-17528, 2019 WL
4752058, at *5-6 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 2019) (Ashe, J.) (stating trade secret identification with particularity avoids trial
by ambush).
12 Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Next Commc’ns, Inc. v. Viber
Media, Inc., 758 F. App’x 48, 49 (2d Cir. 2018) (stating that plaintiff must identify the trade secret with sufficient
specificity to make the moving party aware of what information it has allegedly misappropriated).
13 Source Prod., 2019 WL 4752058, at *5 (quoting Hughes, 2018 WL 3197696, at *14 (quoting MAI Sys. Corp v.
Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 522 (9th Cir. 1993))).
14 Tewari De-Ox Sys., Inc. v. Mountain States/Rosen, L.L.C., 637 F.3d 604, 611 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
15 Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984)); see also Cajun Servs. Unlimited, LLC v.
Benton Energy Serv. Co., No.17-0491, 2020 WL 3188991, at *38 (E.D. La. June 15, 2020) aff’d, 855 F. App’x 771
(Fed. Cir. 2021); Flotec, Inc. v. S. Rsch., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (stating “trade secret law
does not protect information that is publicly available, including information that can be discerned with reasonable
effort by inspecting a product available for purchase on the market.” (citations omitted)).
16 AlterG, Inc. v. Boost Treadmills LLC, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
Recognizing the importance of specificity when addressing alleged trade secrets, the
Eastern District of Louisiana added Local Rule 26.3, effective January 1, 2024. Local Rule
26.3(A) requires a party asserting a misappropriation of trade secrets claim to include with its Rule
26(a) initial disclosures a trade secret identification statement that contemplates a greater degree

of particularity than the “short and concise” statement required by Rule 8. This statement requires
more than a description of the categories within which the trade secret information may fall, such
as that set forth in the publicly available complaint, and more than simple generalized descriptions,
such as formulas, plans, or drawings.17
The requirement of reasonable particularity serves to limit the permissible scope of
discovery by distinguishing the trade secrets from matters of general knowledge in the trade or of
special knowledge of those persons skilled in the trade.18 To identify a trade secret with reasonable
particularity, the plaintiff must provide concrete information that “clearly refer[s] to tangible trade
secret material.”19 Plaintiff cannot rely on “catchall phrases” or simply identify general categories

17 See DeRubeis v. Witten Techs., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 679 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (stating that generally listing software,
data processing algorithms, and processes that a plaintiff developed, owned, or licensed is insufficient as such
disclosures only reveal the end results of, or functions performed by, the claimed trade secrets); Switch v. Commc’ns
Grp. v. Ballard, No. 11-285, 2012 WL 2342929 at *5 (D. Nev. June 19, 2012) (identifying various concepts, elements,
or components that make up designs are insufficient without a specific description of what particular combination of
components renders each of its designs novel or unique, how the components are combined, and how they operate in
unique combination); Ikon Off. Sols., Inc. v. Konica Minolta Bus. Sols., U.S.A., Inc., No. 08-539, 2009 WL 4429156,
at *3-5 & 3 n.3 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 25, 2009) (holding that lengthy, descriptive, but non-specific, paragraphs are
insufficient).
18 Cf. IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that 43-page description of
software package insufficient because it failed to separate the trade secrets from the other information that goes into
the software package that is known to the trade); Yeiser Rsch. & Dev. LLC v. Teknor Apex Co., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1021,
1044 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (quotation omitted). For additional cases requiring plaintiffs bringing claims of trade secret
misappropriation to identify, with reasonable particularity, the alleged trade secret at issue, see Arconic, Inc. v. Novelis,
Inc., No. 17-1434, 2020 WL 7247112, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2020); AgroFresh Inc. v. Essentiv LLC, No. 16-662,
2019 WL 563900, at *1 (D. Del. Feb. 4, 2019); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Mitek Sys., Inc., 289 F.R.D. 244, 246-
249( W.D. Tex. 2013), aff’d, 2013 WL 1867417 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2013); Switch, 2012 WL 2342929 at *4-6;
Powerweb Energy v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., No. 12–220, 2012 WL 3113162 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012); Ikon, 2009
WL 4429156, at *3-5; DeRubeis, 244 F.R.D. at 681-82; AutoMed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 926 (N.D.
Ill. 2001).
19 InteliClear, 978 F.3d at 658; IDX Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d at 584 (“[P]laintiff must do more than just identify a kind of
technology and then invite the court to hunt through the details in search of items meeting the statutory definition.”).
of trade secrets.20 The details provided in the identification must be more than vague labels, high
level concepts, and rudimentary graphics.21 Further, the attachment of thousands of pages of
documents, while voluminous, does not equate to detail necessary to allow the court and defendant
to understand exactly what the plaintiff is alleging.22 A court should not be asked to wade through
thousands of pages of documents in an effort to ferret out a trade secret like a hidden acorn.23

Courts have been descriptive about what fails the “reasonable particularity” requirement:
a laundry list of general categories of alleged “trade secret” information or lengthy, descriptive,
but non-specific, paragraphs;24 a general list of software, data processing algorithms, and processes
that a plaintiff developed, owned, or licensed or disclosures that only reveal the end results of, or
functions performed by, the claimed trade secrets;25 and various concepts, elements, or
components that make up designs.26 In contrast, a plaintiff identifies its trade secrets with
reasonable particularity when it separately lists each of the individual alleged trade secrets and
identifies each claim so that the reader understands how it differs from public domain filings27 or
provides a specific description of what combination of components renders each of its designs
novel or unique and how the components are combined and operate in unique combination.28

20 InteliClear, 978 F.3d at 658 (internal quotations omitted).
21 Next Comm’cns, 758 F. App’x at 49.
22 InteliClear, 978 F.3d at 658 (“It is inadequate for plaintiffs to ‘cite and incorporate by reference hundreds of
documents that purportedly reference or reflect the trade secret information.’” (citation omitted)); IDX Sys. Corp. v.
Epic Sys. Corp., 165 F. Supp. 2d 812, 819 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (“Long lists of general areas of information containing
unidentified trade secrets are not substitutes for particularized and concrete trade secrets.”); VIA Techs., Inc. v. Asus
Comput. Int’l, No. 14-3586, 2016 WL 5930280, *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016) (noting that a trade secret plaintiff may
not use broad, catch-all language as a tactic to preserve an unrestricted, unilateral right to subsequent amend its trade
secret statement).
23 VIA Techs., 2016 WL 5930280 at *3 (noting that a trade secret plaintiff may not hide its trade secret in plain sight
by including voluminous attachments to its trade secret statement).
24 See Ikon, 2009 WL 4429156, at *3 & n.3.
25See DeRubeis, 244 F.R.D. at 679.
26 See Switch, 2012 WL 2342929, at *5.
27 See Mitek, 289 F.R.D. at 249.
28 See Switch, 2012 WL 2342929, at *5.
Essentially, plaintiff must do more than identify a technology or document containing a
potential trade secret “and then invite the court to hunt through the details in search of items
meeting the statutory definition [of a trade secret].”29 This is especially true in cases where the
trade-secret claim involves sophisticated, highly technical issues that the district court or jury, on

its own, is unlikely to have the expertise required to discern exactly what constitutes a trade
secret.30 Where the alleged trade secret consists of incremental variations or advances in the state
of art in a highly specialized field, a more exacting level of particularity may be required to
distinguish the alleged trade secret from matters already known to persons skilled in the field.31
Vague and overly inclusive descriptions that essentially assert that all information about software
constitutes trade secrets are not plausible.32
The parties dispute whether their early agreement to waive Rule 26 disclosures applied to
the obligation to provide a Rule 26.3 statement when a trade secret claim was asserted after that
agreement. Regardless, even if the parties had agreed to forego the Local Rule 26.3 statement,
Defendant’s second set of interrogatories and requests for production constitute sufficient demand

for Plaintiff’s identification of the trade secrets at issue. See ECF No. 98-12 at 8 (Int. No. 1); No.
98-13 at 7-8 (RFP Nos. 2, 4). Defendant asserts that “LAD failed to identify any trade secret;
failed to provide any information or documents demonstrating the existence of a trade secret
owned by LAD; failed to articulate any protections asserted by LAD at the time; failed to identify
any contemporaneous notice of the misuse issued by LAD; and failed to explain how any alleged
trade secret was supposedly misused by DHO.” ECF No. 98-1 at 14 (addressing Int. Nos. 1-4).

29 Source Prod., 2019 WL 4752058, at *7 (quoting IDX Sys., 285 F.3d at 583–84).
30 Id. (citing Imax, 152 F.3d at 1167).
31 Calendar Rsch. LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 17-04062, 2020 WL 4390391, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2020) (citations
omitted).
32 IDX Sys., 285 F.3d at 583.
Plaintiff's categorical reference*’ is precisely the type of generalized allegation regularly
found insufficient. Just as with a Local Rule 26.3 trade secret identification statement, listing
categories or delivering voluminous documents without specifying what portion of each document
constitutes the alleged trade secrets are insufficient. Plaintiff's response to Defendant’s
interrogatories should be informed by Local Rule 26.3’s explicit requirements regarding
identification of trade secrets, requiring Plaintiff to identify, with specificity, each allegedly
misappropriated trade secret rather than simply identifying categories. Plaintiff's current response,
and the incorporation of documents produced, does not fairly put the Defendant on notice of
precisely what information Plaintiff deems to be a trade secret as necessary to allow Defendant to
determine whether the alleged trade secret information is generally known to those in the industry
or publicly available. Accordingly, Plaintiff must provide supplemental responses to Interrogatory
Nos. 1-4 of the second set of discovery.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART as stated herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff deliver supplemental discovery responses
(including responses to the second set of discovery compliant with Local Rule 26.3) within 14
days.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13th day of lb 2026. }
DO PHILLIPS CURRAULT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

33 See ECF No. 98-19 at 3-4 (response to Interrogatory No. 1 indicating Plaintiff is providing “categories of proprietary
and confidential trade secret information ... .”).
12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11328444. Public record. Not legal advice.