# Hill

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · May 18, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11328421

## Case

- **Full name:** Demeco Hill v. Wexford, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** May 18, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DEMECO HILL, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 25-4219
)
WEXFORD, et al., )
Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Hill Correctional Center (“Hill”),
filed an Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional
rights. (Doc. 10). The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, and through such
process, identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Amended Complaint, the Court accepts the factual
allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. See Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d
645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements and labels are insufficient, however. Enough facts
must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United
States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff files suit against Warden Tyrone Baker, Wexford, Sick Call Nurse Jane Doe(s),
Security Staff John Doe(s), and Healthcare Administrator John Doe. (Doc. 10 at pp. 2-3).
Plaintiff no longer names John Doe (IDOC Administration), Healthcare Administrator
Nelly Boon, and Warden John Doe as Defendants. Therefore, they are dismissed without prejudice.
On an unspecified date, Plaintiff alleges he slipped on ice in the yard at Hill and tore his
front quad muscle. Plaintiff alleges the warden did not ensure the yard walks were salted to melt
the ice and prevent injuries. Plaintiff does not specify when his injury occurred and if Defendant
Baker was the warden.

Plaintiff states he told correctional staff about his injury and asked to go to the Healthcare
Unit for treatment. Nursing staff told Plaintiff he would not be walking if anything was torn.
Plaintiff alleges his pain continued. He submitted numerous sick call slips but was only
given 200 milligrams of ibuprofen.
Plaintiff alleges he was not sent to a professional until October 2023. At that time, Plaintiff
learned his injury was beyond repair due to the amount of time it took Wexford staff to send him
to the hospital. Plaintiff alleges he was prescribed physical therapy. Despite a letter to Defendant
Warden Baker, Defendant Baker allegedly failed to ensure Plaintiff received his prescribed
physical therapy while he was in restrictive housing. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant John Doe
Healthcare Administrator did not ensure he received his prescribed physical therapy. As a result,

Plaintiff alleges he is now disfigured and weaker.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Warden Baker instituted lockdowns that were not reported to
IDOC headquarters. During lockdowns, Plaintiff alleges his call passes to the law library were
cancelled and not rescheduled. Plaintiff alleges this prevented him from being able to file his
lawsuit until now. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Warden Baker stopped law clerks from going
to restrictive housing to help pro se litigants. Plaintiff alleges this prevented him from filing
lawsuits against staff members and restricted his right of access to the courts.
ANALYSIS
It is well established that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is actionable as
a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008). A claim
of deliberate indifference contains both an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, a prisoner must
demonstrate that his medical condition is “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id. An objectively
serious medical condition is one that “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment
or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.”
Hayes, 546 F.3d at 522. To satisfy the subjective component, the inmate must demonstrate that the
prison official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The
official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to the inmate’s health; “the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The prisoner must show that the
defendant engaged in more than negligence and that the defendant’s conduct approached

intentional wrongdoing or criminal recklessness. Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d
1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The Court finds Plaintiff sufficiently
alleged that Defendants Warden Baker and Healthcare Administrator John Doe were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment by denying him his
prescribed physical therapy.
Plaintiff is advised that Defendant Healthcare Administrator John Doe cannot be served.
Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to propound written discovery requests aimed solely
at identifying the name of the Healthcare Administrator John Doe. Under the circumstances, the
Court finds that Defendant Warden Baker is best suited to respond to this discovery. Ultimately,
it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to identify Defendant Healthcare Administrator John Doe and file a
Motion to Substitute with Defendant John Doe’s first and last name.
Plaintiff’s conclusory and threadbare allegations against Defendant Sick Call Nurse Jane
Doe and Security Staff John Doe are insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim. It is unclear how these Defendants were personally involved in any
constitutional deprivations. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983
creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does
not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”);
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Defendants Sick Call Nurse Jane Doe and
Security Staff John Doe are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.
Private corporations, such as Defendant Wexford, have potential liability under Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978), if they perform a
governmental function and, in doing so, injure plaintiff through an unconstitutional policy or

practice. Iskander v. Vill. of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). Since there is no
respondeat superior liability under § 1983, Defendant Wexford cannot be liable for the alleged
misdeeds of its employees, as employees are responsible individually. Lewis v. City of Chicago,
496 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2007). Defendant Wexford has potential liability only if it had an
unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom which caused the constitutional deprivation. Shields v.
Ill. Dep't of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014). “Liability may be based on (1) an express
policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that,
although not authorized by written law or express policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to
constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) a constitutional injury caused by a person
with final policy making authority.” Taylor v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No.15-5190, 2016
WL 3227310, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2016) (citing McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319,
324 (7th Cir. 2000)). Defendant Wexford is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Warden Baker restricted his right of access to the courts
by cancelling his call passes to the law library during lockdowns and preventing law clerks from
providing legal assistance to pro se litigants in restrictive housing. It is unclear if Plaintiff included
these allegations in his Amended Complaint to explain why he did not file this lawsuit until now
or if Plaintiff intends to proceed on a First Amendment claim against Defendant Baker for
allegedly violating his right of access to the courts. If the latter, a First Amendment claim against
Defendant Baker is not properly joined with an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
against Defendant Healthcare Administrator John Doe. Unrelated claims against the same
Defendant may be joined in one action, but different Defendants can be joined in one action only
if the claims against them arise from the same series of transactions or occurrences. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 18, 20; Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 846 (7th Cir. 2013) (court “can require the plaintiff
‘to file separate complaints, each confined to one group of injuries and defendants.’”) (quoted cite
omitted); Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A litigant
cannot throw all of his grievances, against dozens of different parties, into one stewpot. Joinder
that requires the inclusion of extra parties is limited to claims arising from the same transaction or
series of related transactions.”); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Thus
multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be
joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different defendants
belong in different suits . . . .”). If Plaintiff wishes to proceed on a First Amendment claim against
Defendant Baker, he may file a separate Complaint.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [10]

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this case shall proceed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim against Defendants Tyrone Baker and Healthcare Administrator John Doe for allegedly
denying Plaintiff his prescribed physical therapy. Additional claims shall not be included in the
case above, except in the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
2) Defendants Wexford, John Doe (IDOC Administration), Nelly Boon (Healthcare
Administrator), John Doe (Warden), Jane Doe(s) (Sick Call Nurse), and John Doe(s) (Security
Staff) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE Defendants
Wexford, John Doe (IDOC Administration), Nelly Boon, John Doe (Warden), and Jane Doe (Sick

Call Nurse).
3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until
counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant notice and an
opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendant’s counsel has filed an
appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the
Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.
4) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing a waiver of service. If
Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the waiver
is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals
Service on Defendant and will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
5) Defendant shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk sends the waiver
of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses

appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues
and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court
does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore,
no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendant has not filed an answer
or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion
requesting the status of service. After Defendant has been served, the Court will enter a scheduling
order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
6) If Defendant no longer works at the address Plaintiff provided, the entity for whom
Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk Defendant’s current work
address, or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for

effectuating service. Documentation of Defendant’s forwarding address shall be retained only by
the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
7) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s counsel has
filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any
motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to
Defendant’s counsel copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk.
However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and
responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses
directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned
unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin
until Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance and the Court has entered a scheduling order,
which will explain the discovery process in more detail.
8) Defendant’s counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s place

of confinement. Defendant’s counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.
9) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change in his
mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing
address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.
10) Plaintiff shall be provided with a copy of all pertinent medical records upon request.
11) Within 10 days of receiving from defense counsel an authorization to release
medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the authorization to Defendant’s counsel.
The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
12) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of this

Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines.

ENTERED: 5/18/2026
s/ Michael M. Mihm
Michael M. Mihm
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11328421. Public record. Not legal advice.