# BUNNELL

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · May 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11327741

## Case

- **Full name:** Malcolm Bunnell individually and on behalf of their minor child A.B. v. Caitlin White individually and on behalf of their minor child A.B., et al. v. City of Fishers
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** May 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

MALCOLM BUNNELL individually and on )
behalf of their minor child A.B., )
CAITLIN WHITE individually and on )
behalf of their minor child A.B., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) No. 1:23-cv-02113-JPH-TAB
)
CITY OF FISHERS, et al. )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs Malcolm Bunnell and Caitlin White, individually and on behalf
of their minor child A.B., brought this action against the City of Fishers and
four Fishers police officers, alleging that the officers' conduct violated their
Fourth Amendment rights and state tort law. Plaintiffs' claims are based on
an incident where the officers stopped their vehicle, detained them, and
searched the vehicle. Shortly before this happened, one of the officers had
been told that Mr. Bunnell had a gun and had just been involved in an
altercation with another man in a nearby parking lot. It turned out that Mr.
Bunnell did not have a gun, and the person who told the officers otherwise was
criminally charged for false reporting. Defendants have filed a motion for
summary judgment. Dkt. [40]. For the reasons below, that motion is
GRANTED.
I.
Facts and Background
Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule
56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence "in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's
favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

On April 21, 2023, a woman called 911 to report an altercation near a
Wal-Mart in Fishers, Indiana. Dkt. 44 Ex. 15 (911 recording). The woman
reported that a black man in a beige-colored SUV and a white man were
"yelling and screaming at each other." Id. at 0:29–0:37. Officer Robert
Thompson, of the Fishers Police Department ("FPD"), responded. Dkt. 44 Ex.
17 (Thompson body cam). Officer Thompson had been told by dispatch that
there was a "fight in progress at the Walmart, with individuals possibly on the
ground," dkt. 41-4 at 11:13-16 (Thompson Dep.), but no mention was made of

a gun, id. at 14:7-11.
Upon arrival, Officer Thompson approached the white man—later
identified as Dustin Martin—and asked if he was arguing with someone. Dkt.
44 Ex. 17 at 15:19:49. Mr. Martin responded, "yeah, the guy in the Escalade
with a gun." Id. at 15:19:53. Officer Thompson asked what was going on, and
Mr. Martin said, "the guy in that Escalade, he's got a gun. I told him, I said,
why don't you leave me the f**k alone. He just won't leave me the f**k alone."

Id. at 15:20:00–15:20:05. The man in the Escalade—later identified as
Malcolm Bunnell—had pulled away from the scene. Dkt. 44 Ex. 18 at 19:20:58
(Thompson dash cam).1 So, at that point, Officer Thompson "had the dispatch
call of two men fighting, and possibly one on the ground, and then [he] had
information about a weapon." Dkt. 41-4 at 15:3-5 (Thompson Dep.). Based on
Mr. Martin's statement, Officer Thompson assumed that Mr. Bunnell had

displayed a gun during the altercation. Id. at 38:9-22–39:1.
Officer Thompson then located the beige-colored SUV at an intersection
near the Wal-Mart and initiated a stop. Dkts. 41-4 at 39:11–15. He drew his
firearm and instructed Mr. Bunnell, the driver, to show his hands. Dkt. 44 Ex.
17 at 15:21:02–15:21:45. Officer Shawn Wynn then arrived on the scene, and
Officer Thompson commanded Mr. Bunnell to exit the vehicle and walk
backwards. Dkts. 44 Ex. 19 at 15:22:51 (Wynn body cam); 44 Ex. 17
15:23:06–15:23:38. Officer Wynn applied restraints to Mr. Bunnell. Dkt. 44

Ex. 19 at 15:25:15–15:25:52. Officer Thompson then told Caitlin White—Mr.
Bunnell's spouse, who was in the vehicle with their baby—to get out of the
vehicle. Dkt. 44 Ex. 17 at 15:26:25–15:26:47; dkt. 44 Ex. 19 at 15:26:13–
15:26:16.
Sgt. Ben Colling and Officer Cody Weaver then arrived on the scene.
Dkts. 44 Ex. 21 at 15:26:32 (Colling body cam); 44-22 at 15:26:38 (Weaver
body cam). Sgt. Colling drew his firearm and instructed Ms. White to walk

backwards toward the patrol vehicles. Dkt. 44 Ex. 21 at 15:26:52. Officer
Weaver placed her in handcuffs. Dkt. 44 Ex. 22 at 15:27:16.

1 As Defendants note, the time stamp on Officer Thompson's dash camera is about
four hours ahead of the other time stamps, but no party disputes the accuracy or
admissibility of the video.
Officer Thompson then asked to search the vehicle. Dkt. 44 Ex. 17 at
15:32:50.2 Mr. Bunnell said there was not a gun in the vehicle, but he could
search. Id. at 15:32:54. Near the end of the search, Officer Thompson lifted a
blanket that was on the baby before shutting the door. Id. at 15:34:26. Sgt.

Colling removed Ms. White's handcuffs during the search, and she returned to
the vehicle. Dkt. 44 Ex. 21 at 15:33:38–15:44:30.
After searching the vehicle, Officer Thompson removed Mr. Bunnell's
restraints. Dkt. 44 Ex. 17 at 15:35:09. Officer Thompson then gave Mr.
Bunnell a business card with a case number on it, id. at 15:44:10, and Mr.
Bunnell and Ms. White drove away. Dkt. 44 Ex. 18 at 19:45:51. The stop
lasted about 25 minutes. Id. at 19:21:57–19:45:51.
Mr. Martin was later charged with misdemeanor false informing and

misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Dkt. 41-14. The charges were
supported by an affidavit sworn by Officer Thompson, stating that Mr. Martin
"reported a false commission of a crime stating [Mr. Bunnell] had a gun and
failed to stay at the scene after being told to stay while I was conducting my
investigation." Dkt. 41-13 at 2.

2 Plaintiffs state that Officer Thompson told Mr. Bunnell that Wal-Mart security had
told him to "Get the black guy." Dkt. 47 at 3, 12, 17, 26. The designated video
evidence, however, is clear that Mr. Bunnell interjected the words "Get the black guy,"
which Officer Thomson immediately disagreed with. Dkt. 44 Ex. 17 at 15:30:52. The
Court does not credit Plaintiffs' alleged factual dispute because it is contradicted by
reliable video evidence. See United States v. Norville, 43 F.4th 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2022)
("[A] video record of the events at issue can evaporate any factual dispute that would
otherwise exist." (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007)).
Plaintiffs filed this action against the City of Fishers, Officer Thompson,
Officer Wynn, Sgt. Colling, and Officer Weaver. Dkt. 1 at 1.3 They allege:
• Count I: Officer Thompson unlawfully seized Plaintiffs;

• Count II: Officers Thompson and Wynn falsely arrested Mr. Bunnell and
violated the Second Amendment by arresting him based on their belief
that he had a gun;
• Count III: Officer Weaver and Sgt. Colling falsely arrested Ms. White;
• Count IV: Officer Thompson and Sgt. Colling used excessive force against
Plaintiffs;
• Count V: Defendants detained Mr. Bunnell and Ms. White for an

unreasonable length of time;
• Count VI: The City of Fishers has a "policy, custom, pattern, and practice
of biased based profiling"; and
• Count VII: Defendants were negligent by leaving A.B. alone in the vehicle
for an extended period of time. Id. at 4–11.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 40.
II.
Applicable Law
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must

3 Plaintiffs also alleged a count against Wal-Mart, but Wal-Mart has been voluntarily
dismissed. Dkt. 38.
inform the court "of the basis for its motion" and specify evidence
demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets this
burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and identify

"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante, 555 F.3d at 584 (citation
omitted). A court only has to consider the materials cited by the parties, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); it need not "scour the record" for evidence that might be
relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573–74 (7th Cir. 2017).
III.
Analysis
A. Abandoned claims
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Count
VI (FPD biased profiling), Count VII (negligence), the Second Amendment claim

embedded in Count II, and any state-law analogues of the false arrest, unlawful
detention, and excessive force claims. Dkt. 43 at 22, 24–29. Plaintiffs'
response does not address those arguments, see dkt. 47, so they have
"abandoned the claim[s]." See Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520 F.3d 781, 788 (7th
Cir. 2008). The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary
judgment on these abandoned claims.
B. Fourth Amendment claims
Plaintiffs' remaining claims arise under the Fourth Amendment: unlawful
seizure (Count I), false arrest (Counts II, III), excessive force (Count IV), and
unreasonable length of detention (Count V). Under the Fourth Amendment,
individuals have a "right . . . to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Defendants argue that they did not violate Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights,
dkt. 43 at 16–22, and that they are entitled to qualified immunity because
there was no "clearly established law that would have put the officers on notice
that their conduct was unlawful." Dkts. 43 at 17–20; 53 at 12–13. The
qualified immunity defense is dispositive, so that is where the Court's analysis
begins and ends.
1. Qualified immunity standard

"Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from suit under § 1983
unless their conduct violates clearly established law." Zorn v. Linton, 146 S. Ct.
926, 930 (2026). This means that "officers are entitled to qualified immunity . .
. unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the
unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time." District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018). The district court has
discretion to "consider first whether the right is clearly established if doing so

will conserve judicial resources." Findlay v. Lendermon, 722 F.3d 895, 899 (7th
Cir. 2013).
"A right is clearly established when it is sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right." Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at 930. In other words, existing precedent must place
the constitutional question "beyond debate." Id. (Finding a clearly established
right generally requires "a case where an officer acting under similar
circumstances was held to have violated the Constitution."). The relevant

precedent must define the right with a "high degree of specificity," so that
"every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the
plaintiff seeks to apply." Id. "In short, officers receive qualified immunity
unless they could have "read" the relevant precedent beforehand and "know[n]"
that it proscribed their specific conduct. Id.4
Qualified immunity is analyzed defendant-by-defendant and claim-by-
claim. Mabes v. Thompson, 136 F.4th 697, 705 (7th Cir. 2025). The plaintiff
bears the burden of showing "clearly established law . . . particularized to the

facts of the case." Id. Meeting that burden "is a 'do or die' requirement for the
plaintiff's suit. If a plaintiff fails to identify analogous precedent clearly
establishing the law, the district court must grant summary judgment for the
defendant." Villalobos v. Picicco, 168 F.4th 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 2026); accord
Thomas v. Carmichael, 164 F.4th 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2026).
2. Unreasonable seizure (Count I)
Plaintiffs argue that Officer Thompson lacked reasonable suspicion that

Mr. Bunnell had a gun, and that even if he had such reasonable suspicion, he

4 Even in the absence of specific, controlling precedent, officials may not be entitled to
qualified immunity in "rare cases" when the "alleged conduct is so egregious that it is
an obvious violation of a constitutional right." Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th
Cir. 2019). Plaintiffs do not argue that this exception applies here.
had no reason to suspect unlawful possession or that Mr. Bunnell committed
any other crime. Dkts. 1 at 4; 47 at 11–15, 25–27. Officer Thompson argues
that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Count I because the initial stop did
not violate Plaintiffs' clearly established rights. Dkts. 43 at 16–24. Plaintiffs

respond that Officer Thompson's "conduct violated Plaintiffs' clearly established
constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure." Dkt. 47
at 21–22.
The parties agree that the Terry standard applies to Officer Thompson's
initial stop. Dkt. 43 at 17; dkt. 47 at 10–11. "Under Terry v. Ohio, law
enforcement officers may conduct brief investigatory stops if they have
reasonable suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal activity." United
States v. Smith, 32 F.4th 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2022). "Reasonable suspicion must

account for the totality of the circumstances and requires more than a hunch
but less than probable cause and considerably less than preponderance of the
evidence." Id. And in assessing reasonable suspicion, "[courts] must permit
officers to make commonsense judgments and inferences about human
behavior," Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380–81 (2020).
To overcome qualified immunity on this claim, plaintiffs "must show not
only that the stop was unlawful, but also that the unlawfulness of the stop was

clearly established at the time that it occurred." Torry v. City of Chicago, 932
F.3d 579, 587 (7th Cir. 2019). The uncontested designated evidence is that
Officer Thompson stopped Plaintiffs based on a police dispatch telling him that
a 911 caller reported an altercation and Mr. Martin telling him that Mr.
Bunnell was "f*cking with [Mr. Martin]" and had a gun. Dkts. 41-4 at 15:3-5
(Thompson Dep.); 44 Ex. 17 at 15:19:49–15:19:54 (Thompson body cam).5
Plaintiffs have not overcome the qualified immunity defense because they
do not cite "squarely govern[ing]" precedent showing that every reasonable

police officer would have known that stopping Mr. Bunnell under these
circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment. See dkt. 47 at 21–22, 25;
Zorn, 146 S Ct. at 930; Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 15 (2015). Instead, they
cite only Jacobs v. City of Chicago, for the general principle "that a citizen may
not be detained by law enforcement officials without probable cause." 215 F.3d
758, 773 (7th Cir. 2000).6 Jacobs does not squarely govern this situation.
First, Jacobs involved a different and higher legal standard, probable cause
instead of reasonable suspicion. Second, Jacobs is not factually similar

because there, the police detained the plaintiff for three hours during an
apartment search. Id. at 772–73. That case therefore does not place the
constitutional question here "beyond debate." Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at 930.
Plaintiffs have therefore not carried their burden to show that Officer
Thompson's initial stop violated a clearly established right. See Villalobos, 168
F.4th at 1063.

5 Plaintiffs argue that there is a genuine dispute of material fact about what offense
Officer Thompson was investigating. Dkt. 47 at 3. But whether articulable facts
existed to support reasonable suspicion is a question of law, regardless of an officer's
subjective intent. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).

6 If Plaintiffs intended to cite Cox v. City of Indianapolis to overcome qualified
immunity for the initial stop, dkt. 47 at 22, it does not help them because Cox held
that reasonable suspicion did exist for the initial stop there. No. 1:19-cv-01393-JMS-
DLP, 2021 WL 734265 at *9 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 25, 2021).
3. False arrest and prolonged detention (Counts II, III, and V)
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants arrested them without probable cause
by holding them at gunpoint, placing them in restraints, and searching their
vehicle, which unlawfully extended their detention. Dkt. 1 at 15–21.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because "there is
no factually-similar case that establishes that the stop, handcuffing, or brief
pointing of the weapon were unlawful," and the stop continued no longer than
necessary. Dkt. 43 at 23–24; dkt. 53 at 14, 16. Plaintiffs respond that the "30-
minute detention of the entire family" was unsupported by probable cause and
therefore violated Plaintiffs' clearly established rights. Dkt. 47 at 25–27.
The designated evidence shows that after Officer Thompson stopped the
vehicle, he instructed Mr. Bunnell at gunpoint to exit the vehicle, and then

Officer Wynn detained him, applying restraints on his wrists. Dkts. 41-17 at
15:21:02–15:21:45; 44 Ex. 19 at 15:25:15–15:25:52. Sgt. Colling then
instructed Ms. White at gunpoint to exit the vehicle, and Officer Weaver
detained her, applying handcuffs on her wrists. Dkts. 44 Ex. 21 at 15:26:52;
44 Ex. 22 at 15:27:16. Officer Thompson then searched Plaintiffs' vehicle with
Mr. Bunnell's consent. Dkt. 44 Ex. 17 at 15:32:50–15:32:54. Sgt. Colling
removed Ms. White's handcuffs during the search, and she was permitted to

return to the vehicle. Dkt. 44 Ex. 21 at 15:33:38–15:44:30. After the vehicle
search, Officer Thompson removed Mr. Bunnell's restraints. Dkt. 44 Ex. 17 at
15:35:09.
On these undisputed facts, the initial stop did not become a de facto
arrest. See Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517, 524–25 (7th Cir. 2014) (A Terry stop
may "become a de facto arrest if the detention continues longer than necessary
to accomplish the purpose of the stop or becomes unreasonably intrusive.").

The brief use of restraints is permissible in the context of a Terry stop that
involves "the possibility of the presence of a weapon." Howell v. Smith, 853
F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2017); accord Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 823 (7th
Cir. 2008). Similarly, drawing weapons is permissible in the context of a Terry
stop when officers "may have legitimately believed [it] was necessary to protect
themselves." Matz, 769 F.3d at 526; see Rabin v. Flynn, 725 F.3d 628, 634
(7th Cir. 2013). Indeed, the intrusiveness here is less than in United States v.
Bullock, when officers placed the suspect "in handcuffs and in the squad car

for their safety while they pursued their investigation" and then transported
him to his "residence where other officers were performing a search that could
implicate him in criminal activity"—all without constituting a de facto arrest.
632 F.3d 1004, 1016–17 (7th Cir. 2011); see Matz, 769 F.3d at 526 ("Although
the hallmarks of a formal arrest such as applying handcuffs, drawing weapons,
and placing suspects in police vehicles should not be the norm during an
investigatory detention, all of those measures have been recognized as

appropriate in certain circumstances.").
As for the duration of the detention, there is no "bright-line time limit" for
a Terry stop before it becomes a de facto arrest. United States v. Reedy, 989
F.3d 548, 553 (7th Cir. 2021). Relevant considerations include law-
enforcement's purposes for the stop, the time reasonably needed to accomplish
those purposes, and the officers' diligence in pursuing the investigation. See
Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1015 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, when Defendants spent the
duration of the stop asking Plaintiffs what happened, explaining why they were

stopped, and briefly searching the vehicle for a gun, the Terry stop was not
converted to a de facto arrest. See id. (30- to 40-minute stop was reasonable
when there was no indication that the officers unnecessarily prolonged the
search); Rabin, 725 F.3d at 633–35 (finding 90-minute Terry stop reasonable
when officers spent time verifying a firearm license).
Against those governing legal standards, Plaintiffs don't cite a case
squarely governing this situation. So, they have not shown that Defendants
violated their clearly established rights during the stop, as they must to

overcome qualified immunity. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11. Plaintiffs again
cite Jacobs v. City of Chicago for the general principle "that a citizen may not be
detained by law enforcement officials without probable cause." 215 F.3d at
773; dkt. 47 at 25. But general legal standards do not show that "existing
precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue." Kisela v. Hughes, 584
U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam). And Jacobs does not address the
reasonable suspicion standard applied to Terry stops. See 215 F.3d at 773.

So, Jacobs would not have put every reasonable police officer on notice that
under these circumstances, ordering Plaintiffs out of the car with weapons
drawn, placing them in restraints, and searching the vehicle violated the
Fourth Amendment.
Plaintiffs also cite Cox v. City of Indianapolis, a district court decision
where the court held that a jury could find a constitutional violation when
officers "handcuffed a mother at gunpoint in front of her young daughters and
kept her handcuffed and in the backseat of a police car separated from her

daughters for forty-five minutes." Dkt. 47 at 22 (citing No. 1:19-CV-01393-
JMS-DLP, 2021 WL 734265 at *9–10 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 25, 2021). But the facts in
Cox are different from the facts here, where the officers' use of restraints was
shorter, plaintiffs were never placed in a police car, and the entire encounter
was shorter. Even if Cox were more factually similar, it still would not
overcome qualified immunity because district court decisions "have no weight
as precedents and therefore cannot clearly establish a constitutional right."
Lovett v. Herbert, 907 F.3d 986, 994 (7th Cir. 2018).

Plaintiffs therefore have not carried their burden to show any violation of
their clearly established rights on Counts II, III, and V. See Villalobos, 168
F.4th at 1063 ("If a plaintiff fails to identify analogous precedent clearly
establishing the law, the district court must grant summary judgment for the
defendant.").
4. Excessive force (Count IV)
Plaintiffs allege that Officer Thompson and Sgt. Colling used excessive

force against them by holding them at gunpoint. Dkt. 1 at 6. Officer
Thompson and Sgt. Colling argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Dkts. 43 at 23–24; 53 at 14–15. Plaintiffs respond that it was clearly
established that the threat of deadly force violated Plaintiffs' constitutional
rights. Dkt. 47 at 23–24.
For excessive force claims, "the question is whether the officers' actions
are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting

them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.'" Taylor v. City of
Milford, 10 F.4th 800, 806 (7th Cir. 2021). "Use of excessive force is an area of
the law in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case, and
thus police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent
squarely governs the specific facts at issue." Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104.
Plaintiffs argue that Officer Thompson threatened deadly force when he
"searched A.B. in her car seat and around her baby blankets at gunpoint."
Dkt. 47 at 23. But they designate no evidence in support, and the video of the

vehicle search shows that Officer Thompson was not holding a gun during the
search. Dkt. 44 Ex. 17 at 15:33:17–15:34:30; see Norville, 43 F.4th at 682.
Though Officer Thompson was holding his gun when he initially approached
the vehicle and looked in the backseat after Mr. Bunnell and Ms. White were
detained, dkt. 44 Ex. 17 at 15:27:49–15:27:54, he did not point the gun at the
baby. So, on these facts, Plaintiffs have cited no precedent clearly establishing
that any Defendant violated A.B.'s constitutional right to be free from law

enforcement's threat of excessive force. See Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104.
As for Mr. Bunnell and Ms. White, Officer Thompson instructed Mr.
Bunnell at gunpoint to exit the vehicle, dkt. 41 Ex. 17 at 15:21:02–15:21:45,
and Sgt. Colling then instructed Ms. White at gunpoint to exit the vehicle, dkt.
44 Ex. 21 at 15:26:52. As explained above, however, drawing weapons is
permissible in the context of a Terry stop when officers "may have legitimately
believed [it] was necessary to protect themselves." Matz, 769 F.3d at 526; see
Rabin, 725 F.3d at 634.

Plaintiffs have not cited any precedent where a constitutional violation
was found based on similar facts. They again cite Jacobs v. City of Chicago to
argue that Sgt. Colling is not entitled to qualified immunity for drawing his
weapon on Ms. White because that case "clearly established that pointing a
gun at an individual who presents no danger is unreasonable and violates the
Fourth Amendment." Dkt. 47 at 23 (citing 215 F.3d at 773–74). In Jacobs,
however, the Seventh Circuit found that pointing a gun the plaintiff's head
after realizing he was not the suspect was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 773–

74. That case does not squarely govern this one because when Sgt. Colling
drew his weapon, the officers still suspected the presence of a firearm that had
not been recovered. Dkts. 44 Ex. 15; 44 Ex. 17 at 15:20:01–15:20:04; see
Matz, 769 F.3d at 526.
Plaintiffs next cite Graham v. Connor—which established the factors
typically considered in evaluating the reasonableness of force—to argue that
Officer Thompson used excessive force against Mr. Bunnell by drawing his

weapon. Dkt. 47 at 24 (citing 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)). But simply
applying the Graham factors to the factual record is not enough to overcome a
qualified immunity defense. Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104 ("[T]he general rules set
forth in . . . Graham do not by themselves create clearly established law outside
an ‘obvious case.'"). Instead, to overcome qualified immunity, Plaintiffs must
point to analogous precedent clearly establishing the violation. See Zorn, 146
S. Ct. at 930; Leiser, 933 F.3d at 701.
Because Plaintiffs have not done so, they have not carried their burden
to show any violation of their clearly established rights on Count IV. See
Villalobos, 168 F.4th at 1063.
IV.
Conclusion
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. [40].
Final judgment shall issue by separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 5/14/2026 ars Pat tanbor—
James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
All electronically registered counsel

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11327741. Public record. Not legal advice.