# KERIEKAN PALMER v. CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, TRAVIS BARRETT, COLLIN HOWELL and CARNEISHA MOORE

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11325261

## Case

- **Full name:** KERIEKAN PALMER v. CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, TRAVIS BARRETT, COLLIN HOWELL and CARNEISHA MOORE
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11325261

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the steps of the Saucier test can be applied in any order the court deems fit
- holding that the victim’s “identification of [Defendant] as the man who had attacked her” gave the officer probable cause “to believe [Defendant] had committed a crime”
- holding that a court may deem facts admitted when they remain unrebutted in response to a motion for summary judgment

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

KERIEKAN PALMER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:24-cv-0989-PGB-NWH

CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH,
TRAVIS BARRETT, COLLIN
HOWELL and CARNEISHA
MOORE,

Defendants.
/
ORDER
This cause is before the Court upon the following filings:
1. Defendant City of Daytona Beach’s (the “City”) Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 44 (the “City’s Motion”)), the City’s Notice of Filing
Exhibits in Support of the City’s Motion (Doc. 45), Plaintiff Keriekan
Palmer’s (“Plaintiff”) Response to the City’s Motion (Doc. 55), and
the City’s Reply (Doc. 59 (the “City’s Reply”));
2. Defendants Travis Barrett (“Barrett”) and Collin Howell’s
(“Howell”)1 Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46 (the

1 Herein, Barrett and Howell will collectively be referred to as the “Defendant Officers.” Further,
the Defendant Officers and the City will collectively be referred to as the “Moving Defendants.”
The Court notes that Defendant Carneisha Moore (“Moore”), who is proceeding pro se, is not
a party to the instant Motions. (Docs. 44, 46).
“Defendant Officers’ Motion”)),2 Plaintiff’s Response to the
Defendant Officers’ Motion (Doc. 56), and the Defendant Officers’
Reply (Doc. 60); and

3. Plaintiff and the Moving Defendants’ Joint Stipulation of Agreed
Material Facts (Doc. 43 (the “Joint Stipulation”)).
Upon consideration, the Motions are due to be granted in part and denied
in part.
I. BACKGROUND

Through this action, Plaintiff sues the Defendant Officers and the City,
asserting federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state law claims arising
from an allegedly unlawful arrest (the “Subject Arrest”). (Doc. 2-1).
Plaintiff was initially arrested on October 6, 2019 (the “Initial Arrest”)
after an alleged incident of domestic violence involving his then-wife, Michele
Howard (“Howard”) and Howard’s daughter, Moore. (Doc. 43, ¶ 1). Plaintiff was

accused of striking Howard and Moore during this incident. (Id.). On the day of
the Initial Arrest, Howard, Moore, and Mariana Albright—a friend of Howard’s
and witness to the underlying incident—each submitted a sworn statement to the
City’s Police Department setting forth Plaintiff’s alleged conduct. (Doc. 45-3).
Following the Initial Arrest, a criminal case was opened against Plaintiff (the

“Domestic Violence Case”) and an Order Regarding Contact Before Trial (Doc.

2 Collectively, the City’s Motion (Doc. 44) and the Defendant Officers’ Motion (Doc. 46) will be
referred to as the “Motions.”
45-4 (the “Restraining Order”)) was entered as a condition of Plaintiff’s release
from custody. The Restraining Order prohibited Plaintiff from having contact with
either Howard or Moore. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 2–3). Among other things, the Restraining

Order prohibited Plaintiff from “communicating [with Howard or Moore] orally or
in written form, either in person, telephonically, electronically, or in any other
manner, either directly or indirectly through a third person.” (Doc. 45-4, p. 1). It
further forbade Plaintiff from going “within 500 feet of” Howard or Moore’s
“current or future residence[s]” or “place[s] of employment,” and prohibited him

from “knowingly go[ing] within 500 feet of [their] automobile[s] at any given
time.” (Id.). The Restraining Order cautioned that, if Moore or Howard
“attempt[ed] to contact” Plaintiff, he would be “violating this Order if [he]
communicate[d]” in response. (Id.). Finally, the Restraining Order contained the
following language regarding the consequences that would be imposed if Plaintiff
violated its terms:

Violation of this Order will subject you to arrest. Upon
probable cause to believe that you violated the terms of this
Order, law enforcement is authorized, pursuant to Sec. 901.15,
Florida Statutes, to conduct a warrantless arrest of you, the
Defendant. A willful violation of the terms of the Order
constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree, pursuant [to]
Sec. 741.29(6), Florida Statutes. This carries a maximum
punishment upon conviction of one (1) year in jail and a fine
of $1,000.00, or may subject [you] to a criminal contempt
charge and/or result in revocation of bond and/or pretrial
release.

(Id.).
One month after Plaintiff’s Initial Arrest, on November 6, 2019, Moore
contacted the City’s police department (the “Police Department”) and alleged
that Plaintiff had violated the Restraining Order. (Doc. 43, ¶ 4). Thus, at

approximately 3:44 p.m., Moore completed a sworn statement (Doc. 45-5
(“Moore’s Sworn Statement”)) at the Police Department setting forth
Plaintiff’s alleged conduct. (Id. ¶ 5; Doc. 45-5). Therein, Moore stated that, despite
the Restraining Order, Plaintiff “was driving today on Orange Ave [and] he through
[sic] up his hands like he was holding a gun and was acting like he was shooting

me yelling out the window at me so I called the police[.] I was going west bound on
MLK he was goin[g] inboud [sic] on Orange Ave.” (Doc. 45-5). Moore stated she
also “called the police because [Plaintiff] has a no contact order and [has] been
calling my uncle[,] went to my dad’s house[, and] keep[s] sne[a]king in my mom[’s]
yard when we[’]re at work.” (Id.).
The next night, on November 7, 2019,3 Plaintiff called the Police Department

and asserted that Moore was following him. (Doc. 43, ¶ 6). According to the
Charging Affidavit for the Subject Arrest (Doc. 46-6 (the “Charging Affidavit”)),
when Plaintiff’s call came in, a sergeant with the Police Department (“Sergeant
Conde”) “reviewed the call and recognized [Plaintiff’s] name” as being the subject

3 Although the Joint Stipulation states that the Subject Arrest occurred the night of November
6, 2019, this conflicts with the evidence submitted by the parties, which reflects that the
Subject Arrest occurred the subsequent night. (E.g., Docs. 46-6, 46-7, 46-10, 46-11).
Consequently, the date provided in the Joint Stipulation appears to be the result of a
scrivener’s error. In any event, the Court’s analysis would remain the same regardless of
whether the Subject Arrest occurred on November 6, 2019 or November 7, 2019.
of Moore’s Sworn Statement from the prior day. (Doc. 46-6, p. 1). Sergeant Conde
thus “contacted the front desk officer” and “confirmed that the complaint affidavit
was still at the front desk” and that Plaintiff “was still wanted.”4 (Id.).

Plaintiff was instructed to wait for the police at the “D Town” store on
Orange Avenue in Daytona Beach, Florida, and Plaintiff did. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 7, 9). The
Defendant Officers were dispatched and were the first to arrive on the scene and
make contact with Plaintiff, who identified himself. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10). Shortly
thereafter, the Defendant Officers were joined by nonparty officers Melanie Cucco

(“Cucco”) and Calvin Yang (“Yang”).5 (Id. ¶ 8). Upon arrival, the Defendant
Officers proceeded to handcuff Plaintiff so that they could take him into custody.
(Id. ¶ 10). However, in the course of Plaintiff’s arrest, he ended up face down on
the ground. (Id. ¶ 11). Further, in the Charging Affidavit, Barrett, who asserts
therein that Plaintiff was resisting arrest, describes that he “struck [Plaintiff] in the
face with a closed fist . . . .” (Doc. 46-6, p. 3).

4 Plaintiff does not rebut these facts contained within the Charging Affidavit. Accordingly, the
Court deems them admitted. Aning v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 663 F. App’x 773, 776 (11th Cir.
2016) (holding that a court may deem facts admitted when they remain unrebutted in
response to a motion for summary judgment); see Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., 487
F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and are
persuasive only insofar as their legal analysis warrants.”). In any event, it is clear from the
body cam footage that the Defendant Officers are aware of the existence of the Moore Sworn
Statement, as upon Plaintiff identifying himself, Howell immediately states, “Hey man, listen,
you’ve got an affidavit out for your arrest right now,” as he grabs Plaintiff’s arm, seemingly to
place him in handcuffs. (Doc. 45-6, 00:30–00:38).

5 Although Yang was initially named as a Defendant in this case, the claims against Yang have
since been dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 75).
As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff was charged with violating the
Restraining Order and with resisting arrest without violence (the “new charges”).
(E.g., Doc. 46-6, pp. 1–2; Doc. 45-8; Doc. 2-1, ¶¶ 69–70). Plaintiff avers that this

led to his bond being revoked in the Domestic Violence Case and he was thus
reincarcerated. (Doc. 2-1, ¶¶ 67–68). Ultimately, Plaintiff entered a plea agreement
wherein he pled nolo contendere to both a misdemeanor battery charge for
domestic violence and a simple battery charge and the new charges were
dismissed. (Doc. 45-8; Doc. 2-1, ¶¶ 71–73).

The Moving Defendants have submitted body cam footage of the Subject
Arrest for the Court’s consideration. (Docs. 45-6, 45-7, 46-14 (collectively, the
“body cam footage”)). The body cam footage conveys that the arrest took
between one and two minutes to effect. (E.g., Doc. 45-6, 00:35–1:43). However,
the body cam footage does not clearly depict the entire course of events
surrounding Plaintiff’s arrest. (E.g., id.). For a material portion of the arrest, the

body cam footage is dark, unclear, or provides a truncated view of the scene,
displaying, for example, the back or right arm of one of the Defendant Officers
without a clear view of Plaintiff beneath him. (See, e.g., id.). Further, while the
Defendant Officers verbally state in the body cam footage that Plaintiff is resisting,
Plaintiff also audibly refutes such statements. (Id.). The body cam footage depicts

a fresh injury to Plaintiff’s forehead following the arrest. (E.g., Doc. 45-7, 4:48).
After the Subject Arrest, Plaintiff was transported to a local hospital, where he was
medically cleared before he was taken to the Volusia County Branch Jail. (Doc. 43,
¶ 13).
As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff filed the instant suit against the City,

Defendant Officers, and Moore. (Doc. 2-1 (the “Complaint”)). In the Complaint,
Plaintiff brings two causes of action against the Defendant Officers individually
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, including for the use of excessive force in effecting the arrest (Count
I), and for unreasonable search and seizure, as Plaintiff asserts his arrest was

unlawful (Count IV). (Id. ¶¶ 9–25, 53–82). Further, Plaintiff brings two causes of
action against the City arising under Florida law, one for battery (Count II) and
one for false imprisonment (Count III). (Id. ¶¶ 26–52). Finally, Plaintiff sues
Moore for malicious prosecution (Count V). (Id. ¶¶ 83–103). Now, in the Motions,
the City and Defendant Officers move for summary judgment as to each of
Plaintiffs’ claims against them. (Docs. 44, 46).

II. LEGAL STANDARD
A court may only “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden
of “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” to support
its position that it is entitled to summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
Alternatively, the movant may meet its burden by “showing that the materials cited
do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” FED. R. CIV. P.

56(c)(1)(B). “The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must go beyond
the pleadings, and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of
material fact exists.” Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
An issue of fact is “genuine” only if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court
must read the evidence and draw all factual inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve any reasonable doubts in the
non-movant’s favor. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007).
But “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will
not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find

for that party.” Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162
(11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990)).
“The court need consider only the cited materials” when resolving a motion
for summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3); see also HRCC, LTD v. Hard Rock
Café Int’l (USA), Inc., 703 F. App’x 814, 816–17 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
III. DISCUSSION
A. § 1983 Excessive Force Claim against the Defendant Officers
(Count I) and Battery Claim against the City (Count II)

The Moving Defendants rest their arguments for summary judgment as to
Counts I and II on their premise that the body cam footage conclusively
demonstrates the absence of excessive force in effecting the Subject Arrest. (See
Doc. 44, pp. 11–13; Doc. 46, pp. 13–14). Because the Court cannot find that the
body cam footage demonstrates the absence of such force as a matter of law, the

Court denies summary judgment as to Counts I and II.
As to Count I, brought under § 1983, the Defendant Officers assert the
defense of qualified immunity applies to shield them from liability. (Doc. 46, pp.
13–14). The Defendant Officers note Plaintiff’s agreement that they were acting in
their discretionary authority at the time of the Subject Arrest. (Id. at pp. 12–13).
The Defendant Officers thus assert that, for Plaintiff to avoid the application of

qualified immunity, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish (1) a violation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and (2) that such rights were clearly established at
the time of the incident. (Id. at pp. 13–14); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200
(2001) (setting forth these requirements); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236 (2009) (holding that the steps of the Saucier test can be applied in any

order the court deems fit). Ultimately, the Defendant Officers argue that Plaintiff
cannot meet this burden, as the body cam footage “clearly demonstrates” that they
“used reasonable and restrained force to subdue” Plaintiff. (Doc. 46, p. 14). The
Defendant Officers thus posit that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a constitutional
violation and cannot avoid the application of qualified immunity as to Count I.6
(Id.).

Similarly, as to Count II, the City notes that Plaintiff must prove that the
Defendant Officers used excessive force during the Subject Arrest to sustain
Plaintiff’s claim for battery. (Doc. 44, p. 11 (citing City of Miami v. Sanders, 672
So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996))). Pointing to the body cam footage, the City argues
the amount of force used initially “was clearly de minimis as the City’s officers

merely grabbed [Plaintiff’s] arms to place them behind his back.” (Id. at p. 12).
Again citing the body cam footage, the City further asserts that “the use of force
only escalated after [Plaintiff] began to actively resist the efforts of the City’s
officers to take [Plaintiff] into custody.” (Id.).
For reasons already described by the Court, the Moving Defendants
overestimate the evidentiary strength of the body cam footage as to the issue of

excessive force. See discussion supra Section I. Simply put, while it is certainly
relevant evidence and appears to weigh in the Defendant Officers’ favor, the Court

6 In the Defendant Officers’ Motion, they rest their argument as to qualified immunity on
Plaintiff’s inability to meet the first step of the Saucier test. (Doc. 46, p. 18 (asserting that,
“[w]hen a constitutional violation is absent there is no need to ‘proceed to the next step of
determining if a constitutional right was clearly established,[’]” and thus declining to apply
the law on this issue to the facts of the instant case)). Defendant Officers do not “specifically
and clearly” identify any arguments regarding the second step of the Saucier test until their
Reply. (Doc. 60, pp. 5–6); see WBY, Inc. v. DeKalb Cnty., 695 F. App’x 486, 491–92 (11th Cir.
2017) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, the Court declines to address that argument here. See
WBY, Inc., 695 F. App’x at 492 (“Because Rutland’s current theory of probable cause was
raised clearly in his reply brief only, it was within the district court’s discretion to decline to
address that theory.”).
cannot say the body cam footage rules out any issue of material fact as to excessive
force when it provides an incomplete picture of the Subject Arrest. Indeed,
although the Charging Affidavit describes that Barrett “struck [Plaintiff] in the face

with a closed fist,” this is not depicted in the body cam footage. (Doc. 46-6, p. 3;
see Docs. 45-6, 45-7, 46-14). In addition, while the Defendant Officers provide
statements by each of the four officers who responded to the scene supporting that
Plaintiff resisted arrest and that the level of force used was appropriate, Plaintiff
provides an affidavit wherein Plaintiff paints a different picture. (See Docs. 46-7

(providing, in a statement by Howell, that Plaintiff “violently jerked his body away
from me, in an apparent attempt to free himself from my grasp” and later “pulled
back his right fist in an apparent attempt to strike me”), 46-6, 46-8, 46-10; but see
Doc. 55, pp. 15–16, ¶¶ 6–8, 17 (stating, in an affidavit signed by Plaintiff, that
Plaintiff “never resisted the police,” that the “police threw him on the ground face
down,” that they “punched him on the left side of his face” and the “right side of

his body” and that “one of the officers stumped [sic] his head on the back down
into the concrete”)).
Thus, even assuming the Moving Defendants met their burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the use of
excessive force, Plaintiff would have met his corresponding burden of going

“beyond the pleadings” to demonstrate the existence of such an issue of material
fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Porter, 461 F.3d at 1320; see also Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255 (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge [when] ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . .”). Thus, “read[ing]
the evidence and draw[ing] all factual inferences therefrom in the light most

favorable to” Plaintiff, and “resolv[ing] any reasonable doubts in [his] favor,” the
Court will deny summary judgment as to Counts I and II.7 Skop, 485 F.3d at 1136.
B. False Imprisonment Claim against the City (Count III) and
§ 1983 Unreasonable Search and Seizure Claim against the
Defendant Officers (Count IV)

Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim against the City (Count III) and § 1983
claim against the Defendant Officers for unreasonable search and seizure (Count
IV) both hinge on whether the Defendant Officers had probable cause for Plaintiff’s
arrest. See Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2023) (“The
existence of probable cause is an absolute bar to a § 1983 claim of false arrest and
to a claim of false arrest under Florida law.” (citations omitted)); see also Rankin

v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating same). Because the Court
finds that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for violating the Restraining

7 The Court notes that, in the facts section of the Defendant Officers’ Motion, the Defendant
Officers describe that they engaged an expert witness, Dr. Richard M. Hough (“Dr. Hough”),
who concluded in a report (Doc. 46-15 (the “Report”)) that their conduct was “objectively
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances” in the case. (Doc. 46, p. 8). The Defendant
Officers further represent that Plaintiff “did not engage an expert and did not depose Dr.
Hough” and thus his qualifications and Report are “undisputed.” (Id.). However, the
Defendant Officers never mention Dr. Hough or his Report in their legal analysis, nor do they
provide any legal authority to describe how the Court may consider this Report in assessing
whether they used excessive force. In the absence of such argument and authority, the Court
declines to consider the Report here.
Order as a matter of law, the Court will grant summary judgment to the Moving
Defendants as to Counts III and IV.
An officer has probable cause for an arrest if, considering the totality of the

circumstances, “a reasonable officer could conclude that there was a substantial
chance of criminal activity.” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th Cir.
2022) (alteration accepted) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48,
61 (2018)).8 “One important principle that the Supreme Court has stressed is:
‘Probable cause is not a high bar.’” Davis, 78 F.4th at 1334 (quoting Wesby, 583

U.S. at 57)). A finding of probable cause “requires less than a preponderance of
evidence,” meaning, “probable cause does not require that it be more likely than
not the person arrested for a crime is actually guilty of it.” Id. Indeed, “[g]iven the
principles applicable to probable cause determinations, it is little wonder that the
Supreme Court has summarized it this way: ‘The probable cause decision, by its
nature, is hard to undermine, and still harder to reverse.’” Id. at 1338 (quoting

Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 339 (2014)).
Further, “in the context of a federal false arrest claim [under § 1983], an
officer does not need to show that he had actual probable cause to obtain qualified
immunity; he only needs to show that he had arguable probable cause.” Johnston
v. Carlson, No. 24-10862, 2025 WL 1927532, at *3 (11th Cir. July 14, 2025). “An

officer has arguable probable cause if ‘a reasonable officer, looking at the entire

8 “The standard for determining probable cause is the same under Florida and federal law.”
Wooden v. Town of Eatonville, No. 22-10649, 2023 WL 5091809, at *7 (11th Cir. Aug. 9, 2023)
(citing Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1433).
legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as
permitting the arrests.’” Id. (quoting Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176, 1186 (11th Cir.
2023)).

Finally, in assessing whether probable cause exists, “we deal with
probabilities which are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Rankin, 133 F.3d
at 1435 (alterations adopted) (quoting Revels v. State of Florida, 666 So. 2d 213,
215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). Moreover, “[d]eference to on-the-spot, reasonable

judgments made by officers ‘may be particularly warranted in domestic disputes’
because they ‘require police to make particularly delicate and difficult judgments
quickly’ and ‘violence may be lurking and explode with little warning.’” Davis, 78
F.4th at 1337 (quoting Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 1999)).
The City contends that the Moore Sworn Statement gave rise to probable
cause to believe that Plaintiff had violated the Restraining Order.9 (Doc. 44, pp. 7–

9). In support, the City argues that “there is no evidence in the record to indicate
that the City’s officers had reason not to believe” Moore’s Sworn Statement. (Doc.
44, p. 9). The City further notes that, as is stated in the Restraining Order, the

9 Because the Court agrees with this argument, it does not consider the City’s other grounds for
seeking summary judgment here. (See Doc. 44, pp. 7–10). Moreover, by finding probable
cause for the Subject Arrest, the Court necessarily finds that the lower standard of arguable
probable cause that is required to establish the Defendant Officers enjoy qualified immunity
from suit has been met. See Toole v. City of Atlanta, 798 F. App’x 381, 385 (11th Cir. 2019)
(per curiam) (noting arguable probable cause represents a “more relaxed standard” than
probable cause). Accordingly, the Court does not separately address such arguable probable
cause here, nor does it consider the Defendant Officers’ argument that there was arguable
probable cause for the Subject Arrest based upon Plaintiff resisting the arrest without
violence.
Defendant Officers were authorized to make a warrantless arrest of Plaintiff
pursuant to Florida Statute § 901.15(13).10 Accordingly, the City seeks entry of
summary judgment as to Count III. (Doc. 44, pp. 7–10).

The Defendant Officers note that the bar is even lower as to Plaintiff’s § 1983
claim for unreasonable search and seizure, as the Defendant Officers enjoy
qualified immunity as to such a claim so long as there was “arguable” probable
cause for an arrest. (Doc. 46, p. 15 (first citing Brown v. City of Hunstville, 608
F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010); and then citing Toole, 798 F. App’x at 385)). The

Defendant Officers contend that such arguable probable cause clearly existed
under the totality of the circumstances in this case, entitling them to qualified
immunity, and thus summary judgment, as to Count IV. (Id. at pp. 15–16).
The Court now considers whether, in light of the totality of the
circumstances at the time of the Subject Arrest, “a reasonable officer could
conclude that there was a substantial chance of criminal activity” by Plaintiff.

Washington, 25 F.4th at 902. Immediately prior to the Subject Arrest, Plaintiff had
called the Police Department to report that Moore was following him. (Doc. 43, ¶
6). The Court pauses to note that such conduct by Moore would not have violated
the terms of the Restraining Order. (See Doc. 45-4). Instead, the Restraining Order

10 Florida Statute § 901.15(13) states, in pertinent part, as follows:
A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant
when: There is probable cause to believe that the person has
committed an act that violates a condition of pretrial release
provided in [Florida Statute §] 903.047 when the original arrest
was for an act of domestic violence as defined in [Florida Statute §]
741.28 . . . .”
directed Plaintiff that, if Moore “attempts to contact you, you are violating this
Order if you communicate with . . . her [in return].” (Id.). Nor does Plaintiff assert
that Moore’s alleged conduct would have violated any law. (See generally Docs. 53,

55).
Next, after receiving Plaintiff’s call, Sergeant Conde recognized Plaintiff as
being the subject of Moore’s Sworn Statement, which had been executed by Moore
at the Police Department the prior day. (Doc. 46-6, p. 1). Accordingly, Sergeant
Conde “confirmed” that Plaintiff “was still wanted.” (Id.). Importantly, Plaintiff

agrees that Moore’s Sworn Statement, if true, described conduct that violated the
Restraining Order. (Doc. 53, p. 12; Doc. 55, p. 9). Plaintiff was instructed to wait at
the D Town store for law enforcement, and the Defendant Officers were
dispatched, made contact with Plaintiff, confirmed his identity, and placed him
under arrest. (Doc. 43, ¶¶ 7–10).
“Generally, an officer is entitled to rely on a victim’s criminal complaint as

support for probable cause.” Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1141 (citing Singer v. Fulton Cnty.
Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1189 (1996)).
Moreover, “[a]n identification or a report from a single credible victim or
eyewitness can provide the basis for probable cause . . . .” Miami-Dade Cnty. v.
Asad, 78 So. 3d 660, 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (quoting City of St. Petersburg v.

Austrino, 898 So. 2d 955, 960 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (emphasis omitted)); United
States v. Smith, 318 F. App’x 780, 792 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the victim’s
“identification of [Defendant] as the man who had attacked her” gave the officer
probable cause “to believe [Defendant] had committed a crime”); Barnett v.
Elsmore, No. 23-12517, 2025 WL 1823113, at *2–*3 (11th Cir. July 2, 2025) (per
curiam) (holding the defendant officer was entitled to qualified immunity because

he had arguable probable cause for an arrest based upon the statements of two
witnesses).
Further, statements of witnesses or victims can suffice to establish the
existence of probable cause as a matter of law. Arnold Rogers v. City of Orlando,
660 F. App’x 819, 824–26 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (affirming a district court’s

grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim after
finding probable cause for the plaintiff’s arrest based solely upon sworn statements
by the victims); Huebner v. Bradshaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1188 (11th Cir. 2019)
(affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to § 1983 claim for
false arrest and finding the victim’s statement describing the alleged battery “gave
[the officer] everything he needed” to support probable cause for the arrest);

Whittington v. Town of Surfside, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1252 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
(granting summary judgment to defendant officers on § 1983 false arrest claim
after finding a single witness’ statement that plaintiff committed a crime
established probable cause for the arrest).
In light of the aforementioned authorities, the Court finds that the Moving

Defendants have met their burden under Rule 56 of establishing entitlement to
summary judgment regarding the existence of probable cause for the Subject
Arrest. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Specifically, the Court agrees that,
considering the totality of the circumstances in the case, the Moving Defendants
have established “a reasonable officer could conclude that there was a substantial
chance” that Plaintiff had violated the Restraining Order. Washington, 25 F.4th at

902. Consequently, the burden shifts to Plaintiff, “who must go beyond the
pleadings, and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of
material fact exists.” Porter, 461 F.3d at 1320.
In attempting to meet this burden, Plaintiff first asserts that Moore’s Sworn
Statement failed to establish probable cause for the Subject Arrest. (Doc. 53, p. 12;

Doc. 55, p. 9). However, Plaintiff’s contention buckles under the weight of the
aforementioned authority. See, e.g., Arnold Rogers, 660 F. App’x at 824–26;
Huebner, 935 F.3d at 1188; Whittington, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 1252; Rankin, 133 F.3d
at 1141; Asad, 78 So. 3d at 670; Smith, 318 F. App’x at 792; Barnett, 2025 WL
1823113, at *2–*3.
Plaintiff next asserts that the Defendant Officers failed to conduct a

reasonable investigation in support of the Subject Arrest. (E.g., Doc. 53, pp. 12, 15;
Doc. 55, p. 10). Plaintiff emphasizes that it was he who called the police on
November 7, 2019. (Doc. 53, p. 9; Doc. 55, p. 7). Yet, Plaintiff notes the lack of
evidence that the Defendant Officers spoke to either Moore or Plaintiff regarding
his allegation that Moore was following him and instead asserts the Defendant

Officers “relied solely on” Moore’s Sworn Statement. (Doc. 53, pp. 9, 12; Doc. 55,
pp. 7, 9).
However, as the Court has noted supra, even if true, it was not a violation of
the Restraining Order for Moore to follow Plaintiff. (Doc. 45-4). As such, it is
difficult to ascertain why the Defendant Officers, who possessed a sworn statement

setting forth a violation of the Restraining Order, would stop to question Plaintiff
and Moore about alleged conduct that clearly does not do so.
Perhaps Plaintiff intends to suggest that, if Moore was following Plaintiff, it
might undermine Moore’s credibility. Yet, Plaintiff’s argument, so construed,
would still be doomed to failure. This is because the Eleventh Circuit has clearly

directed that, while “[a]n officer may not ignore ‘concrete evidence that obviously
and definitively rules out probable cause,’ . . . he is not required to seek out
exculpatory evidence, . . . [n]or is he required to ‘weigh the evidence in such a way
as to conclude that probable cause did not exist.’” Barnett, 2025 WL 1823113 at *3
(first quoting Davis, 78 F.4th at 1344; then citing Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1554, 1551
(11th Cir. 1994); and then quoting Washington, 25 F.4th at 902). “It is not unusual

to find at the scene of a crime evidence pointing in different directions, but a law
enforcement officer is not required to resolve every inconsistency found in the
evidence.” Davis, 78 F.4th at 1335 (alterations accepted and quotation omitted).
As such, officers “simply are not required to ‘rule out a suspect’s innocent
explanation for suspicious facts.’” Id. at 1336 (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61); see,

e.g., Huebner, 935 F.3d at 1185–86 (affirming grant of summary judgment based
upon officer’s probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for battery upon her sister
despite the fact that the plaintiff had called 911 to report her sister for the battery,
the plaintiff claimed she had a cut on her arm from her sister, and the police officer
had immediately arrested the plaintiff, declining to speak with two alleged
witnesses). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s second argument fails.

Finally, Plaintiff highlights that Moore’s deposition testimony (“Moore’s
Deposition”) provided details regarding the purported violation of the
Restraining Order that differed in certain ways from those provided in Moore’s
Sworn Statement. (Doc. 53, p. 10; Doc. 55, p. 7). Plaintiff asserts that, in Moore’s
Sworn Statement, she stated that she was driving when she saw Plaintiff gesture at

her with his hands like they were guns, while in Moore’s Deposition, she stated that
she was standing on the street with her uncle when this incident occurred. (Doc.
53, p. 10; Doc. 55, p. 7). Plaintiff thus posits that, if the Defendant Officers had
conducted further investigation, they could have “returned to question Moore [at]
home,” and “if she testified similar to her deposition,” they “might have . . .
questioned . . . her credibility.” (Doc. 53, p. 12; see Doc. 55, p. 10 (suggesting

same)).
This argument fails for the same reasons stated above, and for at least two
new ones. Moore’s Deposition was taken on May 23, 2025—more than five and a
half years after the Subject Arrest. (Doc. 46-2, p. 1). However, “[p]robable cause
must be judged by the facts that existed at the time of the arrest, not evidence

subsequently learned or provided to the prosecution.” Asad, 78 So. 3d at 670.
Moreover, as is noted in the City’s Reply, Plaintiff’s suggestion that Moore’s
Deposition Testimony sheds light on what the Defendant Officers might have
thought about Moore’s Sworn Statement had they questioned her further five
years earlier is exceedingly speculative. (Doc. 59, pp. 2–5). Far too speculative, in
fact, to defeat summary judgment. See Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169,

1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact; instead,
it creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a primary goal of summary
judgment.” (quoting Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 931–32 (7th Cir.
2005))).
As a result, Plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden of establishing the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to Counts III and IV, and the Moving
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these counts. See Porter,
461 F.3d at 1320.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a result of the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Defendant City of Daytona Beach’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 44) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
a. Defendant City of Daytona Beach’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 44) is GRANTED as to Count III.
b. Defendant City of Daytona Beach’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 44) is DENIED in all other respects.

2. Defendants Travis Barrett and Collin Howell’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 46) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
a. Defendants Travis Barrett and Collin Howell’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) is GRANTED as to Count IV.
b. Defendants Travis Barrett and Collin Howell’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) is DENIED in all other respects.
DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on February 13, 2026.

c.
PAUL G.
UNITED STATES*DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11325261. Public record. Not legal advice.
