# Valentine

> District Court, W.D. New York · May 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11325224

## Case

- **Full name:** Eric V. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** May 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11325224

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the Court’s review for legal error ensures “that the claimant has had a full hearing under the regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the Social Security Act.” (citation modified)

## Opinion text

TATES DIST,
COS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT S □□
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MAY 11 2026
LEB Morey ert
S W. MOELLER, CE □□
ERIC V.,} ERN DISTRICL OS
Plaintiff,
v. 24-CV-1118 (JLS)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Eric V. brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social
Security Act, seeking review of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration that he was not disabled. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff moved for
judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 6. The Commissioner responded and cross-moved
for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 8. For the reasons below, the Court denies
Plaintiffs motion and grants the Commissionevr’s cross motion.

Pursuant to the Western District of New York’s November 18, 2020 Standing
Order regarding the naming of plaintiffs in Social Security decisions, this decision
and order identifies Plaintiff by first name and last initial.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action originates from Plaintiffs application for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”), filed on July 22, 2020.2 Tr. 182-86.3 Plaintiffs application was
initially denied, as well as upon reconsideration, and he requested a hearing before
an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Tr. 65-105, 112-28. Following the hearing, at
which Plaintiff was represented by counsel, ALJ Paul Georger issued a decision
finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 17-63. Plaintiffs request for Appeals
Council review was denied. Tr. 1-6.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a district court action, and on September 12,
2023, the Honorable Elizabeth A. Wolford remanded Plaintiffs case for further
administrative proceedings pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation. Tr. 612.
Following a second hearing, ALJ Stephan Bell issued another decision finding that
Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 536-81. Plaintiffs request for Appeals Council
review was denied, after which he commenced this action. Tr. 582-97; Dkt. 1.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. DISTRICT COURT REVIEW
Judicial review of disability claims under the Act is limited to whether the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the

2 Plaintiff applied for DIB, which requires a claimant to show that he or she became
disabled while meeting the Act’s insured status requirements. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A); Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2022).
3 The filing at Dkt. 3 is the transcript of the proceedings before the Social Security
Administration. All references to Dkt. 3 are hereby denoted “Tr. __.”

correct legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cichocki v. Astrue, 729
F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013). The Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 589 U.S. 97, 99
(2019). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla” and “means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation modified).
The Court does not determine de novo whether the claimant is disabled, but
the Commissioner’s conclusions of law are not given the same deferential standard
of review. See Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003). If there is a
reasonable basis of doubt about whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards, then upholding the determination “creates an unacceptable risk that a
claimant will be deprived of the right to have his or her disability determination
made according to correct legal principles.” Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986
(2d Cir. 1987); see Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (explaining that
the Court’s review for legal error ensures “that the claimant has had a full hearing
under the regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the Social
Security Act.” (citation modified)).
I. DISABILITY DETERMINATION
Disability under the Act is determined under a five-step test. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520; see Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1986). First, the
ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). “Substantial gainful activity” is work

activity that involves significant physical or mental activities and is normally done
for pay or profit. Id. § 404.1572. If the ALJ finds that the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity, the claimant cannot claim disability. Id. § 404.1520(b).
Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically
determinable impairment or a combination of impairments that significantly limits
the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). Absent
such impairment, the claimant may not claim disability. Id.
Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s impairments meet or
medically equal the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1. Jd. § 404.1520(d). If such criteria are met, then the claimant is
declared disabled. Id.
Even if the claimant is not declared disabled under the third step, the ALJ
may still find disability under the next two steps of the analysis. The ALJ must
determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Id. § 404.1520¢(e).
The RFC is a holistic assessment of the claimant’s medical impairments, both
severe and non-severe, that evaluates the claimant’s ability to perform physical or
mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for
collective impairments. Id. § 404.1545.
In the fourth step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the
RFC to perform past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant is capable of
performing past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id.

§ 404.1560(b)(3). If the ALJ finds that the claimant is unable to perform past
relevant work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step. Id. § 404.1520(g)(1).
In this final analytical step, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant is
able to perform any other relevant work corresponding with his or her RFC, age,
education, and work experience. Id. § 404.1560(c). Here, the burden of proof shifts
from the claimant to the Commissioner to prove that a significant number of jobs in
the national economy exists that the claimant can perform given his or her RFC,
age, education, and work experience. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c); see Rosa v.
Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).
DISCUSSION
I, THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since June 1, 2020. Tr. 542. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff suffered
from the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar
spine, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), and obesity. Id. The ALJ
concluded, however, that Plaintiffs severe impairments did not meet or medically
equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Tr. 546.
After considering the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the
RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), with the following
additional limitations:
[Plaintiff can] occasionally reach[ ] overhead to the left, and [he
can] occasionally reach[ ] overhead to the right. [He] can climb

ramps and stairs occasionally, never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds, balance occasionally, stoop occasionally, kneel
occasionally, crouch occasionally, [and] crawl occasionally. [He
can function] in humidity and wetness occasionally, in dust,
odors, fumes and pulmonary irritants occasionally, in extreme
cold occasionally, [and] in extreme heat occasionally. Requires a
sit/stand option, changing positions every 45 minutes, with
[Plaintiff] sitting for 45 minutes, standing long enough for
symptoms to resolve, then sitting again, staying on task
throughout the process.
Tr. 547.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work.
Tr. 552. But the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled because his age,
education, work experience, and RFC allowed him to perform jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. Tr. 553. As such, according to the
ALJ, Plaintiff had not been under a disability since June 1, 2020. Tr. 554.
II. PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was unsupported by substantial
evidence for two reasons. See Dkt. 6-1 at 12-23. First, Plaintiff says that the ALJ
improperly found that his mental impairments were not severe at step two of the
disability determination. See id. at 12-20. Second, Plaintiff says that the ALJ
failed to consider adequately the combined effect of his mental impairments when
determining his RFC. See id. at 20-23. For the reasons that follow, this Court
disagrees.

Ill. ANALYSIS
A. Step Two Determination
At step two of the disability determination, “the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is ‘severe’ within
the meaning of the Act, in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant’s
ability to perform basic work activities.” Felix S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 630 F.
Supp. 3d 423, 427 (W.D.N.Y. 2022). Although the claimant bears the burden of
establishing severity, such burden “is de minimis and is meant only to screen out
the weakest of claims.” See id. at 427-28 (citing Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019,
1030 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Regarding a claimant’s alleged mental impairments, “the regulations instruct
the ALJ to apply a ‘special technique’ in determining whether [those] impairments
are severe.” Sharon J. v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 716 F. Supp. 3d 59, 64 (W.D.N.Y.
2024). This special technique “instructs the ALJ to consider [four] broad areas of
mental [work-related] functioning.” See id. Those four areas are: (1)
understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with others;
(3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing
oneself. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). If the ALJ does not find more than a
“mild” limitation in any of those four areas, then the claimant’s medically
determinable mental impairments are non-severe. See id. § 404.1520a(d)(1).
Here, the ALJ considered Plaintiffs schizoaffective disorder and post-
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and concluded that they were non-severe
impairments because they did not “cause more than minimal limitation in

[Plaintiffs] ability to perform basic mental work activities.” See Tr. 542. More
specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had: (1) no limitation in understanding,
remembering, or applying information; (2) a mild limitation in interacting with
others; (3) a mild limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and
(4) a mild limitation in adapting or managing himself. See Tr. 544-45. Those
findings mirrored the opinions of state agency review consultants A. Chapman,
PsyD, and D. Brown, PsyD. See Tr. 69 (relevant portion of Dr. Chapman’s opinion);
Tr. 84 (relevant portion of Dr. Brown’s opinion).
More importantly, however, the ALJ’s findings were supported by the opinion
of consultative examiner Susan Santarpia, PhD, who concluded that Plaintiff only
had mild limitations in regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and maintaining
well-being. See Tr. 868. They also largely were supported by Plaintiffs longitudinal
treatment record and reported activities of daily living. See, e.g., Tr. 510-11, 834—
35, 1065-66 (normal mental status examinations on October 13, 2021, October 12,
2022, and January 24, 2024, respectively); Tr. 868 (acknowledging Plaintiffs reports
that he could dress, bathe, groom himself, cook, clean, do laundry, shop, manage
finances, operate a motor vehicle, and socialize with friends).
Accordingly, the ALJ’s step two determination was supported by substantial
evidence. See, e.g., Angela M.K. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 4591844, at *3 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2022) (concluding that the ALJ’s step two determination was supported by
substantial evidence where it was based on the plaintiffs “largely normal mental
status examinations, [her] symptoms and treatment, the longitudinal record, the

medical opinions, the majority of which reflected no more than mild
limitations, .. . [and her] daily activities, which did not reflect any functional
limitation regarding basic work activities” (citation modified)). Plaintiff
nevertheless argues that this Court should reach the opposite conclusion for two
reasons. See Dkt. 6-1 at 12-20. The Court will address each argument in turn.
First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ applied the wrong severity standard; in
Plaintiffs view, the ALJ’s severity standard “required Plaintiff to be hospitalized for
his mental health, be unable to care for himself and be placed in a residential
facility, or enter a psychiatric treatment facility.” See id. at 14. That argument is
without merit because, as required by the regulations, the ALJ assessed Plaintiffs
degree of limitation in the four areas of mental work-related functioning and found
that Plaintiff had no more than a mild limitation in any of the four areas. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c). What is more, as discussed above, those findings were
supported by substantial evidence. See Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 683 F.3d 443,
448 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The substantial evidence standard means once an ALJ finds
facts, [a reviewing court] can reject those facts only if a reasonable fact finder would
have to conclude otherwise.” (citation modified)).
Second, Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ improperly cherry-picked evidence to
find mild limitations [in his mental work-related functioning].” See Dkt. 6-1 at 19.
Plaintiffs argument is, essentially, a disagreement with the ALJ’s weighing of the
evidence, and it is “not the function of this Court to re-weigh evidence or consider de
novo whether [Plaintiff] is disabled.” See Teena H. 0/b/o N.LK. v. Comm’ of Soc.

Sec., 521 F. Supp. 3d 287, 292 (W.D.N.Y. 2021); see also Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d
122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981) (“We are unwilling to require an ALJ explicitly to reconcile
every conflicting shred of medical testimony[;] [i]t is sufficient that the ALJ noted
that he carefully considered the exhibits presented in evidence in reaching his
conclusion.”); Malcom C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 801 F. Supp. 3d 175, 184 (W.D.N.Y.
2025) (explaining that “an allegation of cherry-picking is seldom successful because
crediting it would require a court to re-weigh record evidence, and what a claimant
may label as cherry-picking can often be described more neutrally as weighing the
evidence.” (citation modified)).
B. RFC Determination
An ALJ must “weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding
that [is] consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56
(2d Cir. 2013); accord Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022). That does
not mean that an RFC must “perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of
medical sources cited in [an ALJ’s] decision,” Matta, 508 F. App’x at 56, or even be
based on opinion evidence, see Rubin v. O’Malley, 116 F.4th 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2024).
So long as an ALJ considers all the medical evidence and appropriately analyzes the
medical opinions, an RFC consistent with the record is not error. See Cichocki, 729
F.3d at 177 (explaining that remand is not necessary “where an ALJ’s analysis at
Step Four regarding a claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions affords an
adequate basis for meaningful judicial review, applies the proper legal standards,
and is supported by substantial evidence” (citation modified)).

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In this case, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not including any mental
limitations in the RFC and failing to explain that omission in his analysis. See Dkt.
6-1 at 20-23. That argument misunderstands Plaintiffs burden. See Smith v.
Berryhill, 740 F. App’x 721, 726 (2d Cir. 2018) (Here, Smith had a duty to prove a
more restrictive RFC, and [he] failed to do so.”).
During the RFC determination, an ALJ “must consider limitations and
restrictions imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not
‘severe.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5 (July 2, 1996). Although a non-severe
impairment “standing alone may not significantly limit an individual’s ability to do
basic work activities, it may—when considered with limitations or restrictions due
to other impairments—be critical to the outcome of a claim.” Jd. Stated differently,
a non-severe impairment may, in combination with one or more severe
impairments, impact an individual’s RFC. See id.
Plaintiff, however, provides no explanation as to how his non-severe mental
impairments—schizoaffective disorder and PTSD—might interact with his severe
physical impairments—degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, COPD, and
obesity—to create a more restrictive RFC than that found by the ALJ. See, e.g.,
Lynette W. v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 868625, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 9,
2021) (“While it is true that nonsevere impairments and ‘mild’ limitations can cause
functional restrictions, Plaintiff does not articulate why the ALJ was compelled to
interpret Dr. Ransom’s [findings of mild mental limitations] in that manner”

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(citation modified)). As such, Plaintiff not entitled to remand based on the ALJ’s
RFC determination.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the Commissioner’s cross motion for
judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 8) and DENIES Plaintiffs motion for judgment on
the pleadings (Dkt. 6). The Clerk of the Court will close this case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 11, 2026
Buffalo, New York

JO L. SINATRA, JR. □
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11325224. Public record. Not legal advice.