# Clyde v. Mantua

> Ohio Court of Claims · April 15, 2026 · 2026 Ohio 1717

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11324576

## Case

- **Court:** Ohio Court of Claims
- **Decided:** April 15, 2026
- **Citations:** 2026 Ohio 1717
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Sadler
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

[Cite as Clyde v. Village of Mantua, 2026-Ohio-1717.]

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

NATHAN CLYDE Case No. 2025-00938PQ

Requester Judge Lisa L. Sadler

v. DECISION AND ENTY

VILLAGE OF MANTUA

Respondent

{¶1} In this public-records case, respondent partially objects to a special master’s
report and recommendation. Requester has filed a written response in opposition to
respondent’s objections. Requester has not, however, filed objections of his own to the
report and recommendation. After requester filed his written response, respondent
moved the court to strike requester’s response for want of service and to sanction
requester. Because, as discussed below, respondent’s objections and subsequent
motion lack merit, respondent’s objections and motion shall be overruled and the special
master’s report and recommendation shall be adopted.
I. Background and Relevant Procedural History
{¶2} On November 10, 2025, pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(D), requester, a self-
represented litigant, filed a complaint alleging a denial of access to public records in
violation of R.C. 149.43(B).1 After the complaint was filed, the clerk appointed a special

1 In the report and recommendation, the special master described requester’s underlying public-
records request and respondent’s response as follows:

On October 27, 2025, Requester Nathan Clyde submitted the public records
request at issue to Respondent Village of Mantua. Complaint, filed Nov. 11, 2025, p.1.
The request asked for:

[C]opies of all records created or used by members of the Village Council
in preparation for or during the disciplinary hearing of Police Chief Joseph
Urso. Specifically, this request includes but is not limited to: 1. The 3x5
question cards distributed by Council President Steve Thorn prior to the
Case No. 2025-00938PQ -2- DECISION & ENTRY

master. The special master referred the case to mediation and stayed filing deadlines.
After mediation failed to resolve all disputed issues between the parties, the case was
returned to the special master’s docket where a briefing schedule for the presentation of
evidence and argument was issued by the special master.
{¶3} On February 20, 2026, pursuant to Rule 22(D)(2) of this court’s local rules,
respondent, through counsel, moved for an order of dismissal and an award of attorney
fees and expenses, because requester failed to attend two mediation sessions without
excuse. Requester opposed respondent’s L.C.C.R. 22(D)(2) motion.
{¶4} On March 3, 2026, respondent filed an answer to requester’s complaint. That
same day, without leave, respondent moved to strike requester’s evidence for want of
admissible evidence, moved to strike requester’s evidence for want of service, and moved
for a summary judgment in its favor and an award of attorney fees, costs, and expenses.
On March 3, 2026, requester filed a motion for leave with an alternative request.
{¶5} On March 4, 2026, the special master issued an order wherein the special
master advised the parties that, pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(A), the process for resolving
public-records disputes in this forum is designed to be “expeditious” and “economical”
with a streamlined litigation procedure and wherein the special master modified the
schedule for filing of evidence and briefing.
{¶6} On March 4, 2026, without leave, respondent filed another motion to strike;
on March 16, 2026, without leave, respondent filed a motion labeled “Consolidated Motion

hearing, containing questions drafted by council members; 2. Any copies
or versions of those questions that were reviewed, edited, or “vetted” by
Solicitor Bill Mason; 3. Any notes, annotations, or written materials
collected or retained by the Council President, Solicitor, or Clerk pertaining
to these question cards; 4. Any handwritten or typed notes taken by
council members during the proceedings, including personal or informal
notes that document council business, deliberations, or the questioning
process.

Compl., p. 6; Req. Evidence, filed Feb. 27, 2026, p. 5; Resp. Evidence, filed Feb. 27,
2026, p. 4 ¶ 14.

On October 29, 2025, the Village responded that the record responsive to requests
1 and 4 is “a transitory note and not a public record,” and that no records responsive to
requests 2 and 3 exist. Compl., p. 5; Req. Ev., p. 10; Resp. Ev., p. 12 ¶ 19.

(Report and Recommendation, 1-2.)
Case No. 2025-00938PQ -3- DECISION & ENTRY

For Summary Judgment, To Strike, And For An Award of Attorney Fees, Costs, and
Expenses;” and, on March 30, 2026, without leave, respondent moved to strike a reply
filed by requester for want of service.
{¶7} On March 31, 2026, the special master issued a report and recommendation
(R&R) wherein the special master found that requester had not served a preliminary
complaint to respondent as required by R.C. 149.43(C)(1). (R&R, 3.) The special master
“recommend[s] that the court (1) dismiss requester’s complaint pursuant to R.C.
149.43(C), (2) deny respondent’s motion to dismiss for want of prosecution and related
sanctions, (3) deny respondent’s motion to strike, (4) deny as moot respondent’s motion
for summary judgment, (5) deny respondent’s motion for an award of attorney fees, costs,
and expenses, and (6) order requester to bear the costs of this case.” (R&R, 1.)
{¶8} On April 8, 2026, respondent, through counsel, filed written objections, which,

according to an accompanying certificate of service, were served on requester by “email”
and “certified mail, return receipt requested.”2 On April 8, 2026, requester filed a written
response in opposition, which, according to the certificate of service accompanying
requester’s response, was served “in accordance with the Ohio Court of Claims Rules
and applicable provisions of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.” 3

2 Pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(F)(2), either party “may object to the report and recommendation within
seven business days after receiving the report and recommendation by filing a written objection with the
clerk and sending a copy to the other party by certified mail, return receipt requested.”

The procedures established by the General Assembly in R.C. 2743.75(F)(2) apply to litigants
represented by counsel and to litigants who are self-represented. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S.
807, 826 (1980) (“experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the
legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law”).

3 Requester’s service of his response fails to comply with requirements contained in R.C.
2743.75(F)(2). Pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(F)(2), if either party timely objects, the other party “may file with
the clerk a response within seven business days after receiving the objection and send a copy of the
response to the objecting party by certified mail, return receipt requested.”

Recently, in White v. Ross Corr. Inst., 2026-Ohio-1002, ¶ 27-28, (10th Dist.), the Tenth District
Court of Appeals concluded that this court erred by considering objections that were not filed in the
mandatory manner prescribed by R.C. 2743.75(F)(2) Applying the reasoning of White at ¶ 27-28, because
requester failed to serve his response in the manner prescribed by R.C. 2743.75(F)(2), respondent’s
response arguably should not be considered by the court. But see De Hart v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 69 Ohio
St.2d 189, 192 (1982) (re-emphasizing that it “is a fundamental tenet of judicial review in Ohio that courts
should decide cases on the merits”).
Case No. 2025-00938PQ -4- DECISION & ENTRY

{¶9} On April 14, 2026, respondent filed a “Motion To Strike The Response To The
Partial Written Objection To The Special Master’s Report And Recommendation And For
Sanctions.” Respondent asks the court to “both (1) strike the response to the partial
written objection to the Special Master’s report and recommendation filed by [requester]
on April 8, 2026, for want of service as the same was never served upon the Village
pursuant to either R.C. 2743.75(F)(2) or Civ.R. 5 and (2) sanction [requester] pursuant to
Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51 for his habitual refusal to comply with the applicable service
orders of this [court], civil rules, local rules, and statutory requirements.”
{¶10} Respondent’s objections are before the court for a final order in accordance
with R.C. 2743.75(F)(2). See R.C. 2743.75(F)(2) (providing that “[t]he court, within seven
business days after the response to the objection is filed, shall issue a final order that
adopts, modifies, or rejects the report and recommendation”). Since R.C. 2743.75(F)(2)
requires the court to issue a final order within seven business days after requester’s
response was filed in this matter, the court also shall consider respondent’s motion to
strike and request for sanctions filed on April 14, 2026, which, as discussed below, the
court does not find to be well taken.4
II. Law and Analysis
A. Legal standard
{¶11} The General Assembly, as the legislative branch of Ohio government, is the
ultimate arbiter of policy considerations relevant to Ohio public-records laws. Kish v. City
of Akron, 2006-Ohio-1244, ¶ 44. Through the enactment of R.C. 2743.75 the General
Assembly created an alternative means to resolve public-records disputes. Welsh-
Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 2020-Ohio-5371, ¶ 11. See R.C.
2743.75(A).
{¶12} Under Ohio law a requester “must establish entitlement to relief in an action
filed in the Court of Claims under R.C. 2743.75 by clear and convincing evidence.” Viola
v. Cuyahoga Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 2021-Ohio-4210, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing Hurt v.
Liberty Twp., 2017-Ohio-7820, ¶ 27-30 (5th Dist.). See Welsh-Huggins at ¶ 32. It is a

4 Because, even without a response to respondent’s motion of April 14, 2026, respondent’s motion
is not well taken, the court concludes that requester will not suffer material prejudice if the court issues a
ruling on respondent’s motion of April 14, 2026, without waiting for a response from requester.
Case No. 2025-00938PQ -5- DECISION & ENTRY

requester’s burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the requested records
exist and are public records maintained by a respondent. See State ex rel. Cordell v.
Paden, 2019-Ohio-1216, ¶ 8. See also Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954)
(paragraph three of the syllabus) (“[c]lear and convincing evidence is that measure or
degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to
the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases,
and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the
facts sought to be established”); State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Deters, 2016-Ohio-
8195, ¶ 19, quoting State ex rel. McCaffrey v. Mahoning Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 2012-
Ohio-4246, ¶ 16 (“[a]lthough the Public Records Act is accorded liberal construction in
favor of access to public records, ‘the relator must still establish entitlement to the
requested extraordinary relief by clear and convincing evidence’”).
{¶13} A public-records custodian has the burden to establish the applicability of an
exception to disclosure of a public record. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-
Kelley, 2008-Ohio-1770, paragraph two of the syllabus. In Jones-Kelley, the Supreme
Court of Ohio held:
Exceptions to disclosure under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, are
strictly construed against the public-records custodian, and the custodian
has the burden to establish the applicability of an exception. A custodian
does not meet this burden if it has not proven that the requested records fall
squarely within the exception. (State ex rel. Carr v.
Akron, 112 Ohio St.3d 351, 2006-Ohio-6714, 859 N.E.2d 948, ¶ 30,
followed.)
Kelley at paragraph two of the syllabus.
B. Discussion
{¶14} Under R.C. 2743.75(F)(2) a party’s objections to a special master’s report
and recommendation are required to be “specific and state with particularity all grounds
for the objection.” Here, respondent “objects to those portions of the report and
recommendation wherein the Special Master (1) recommends providing [requester] with
special treatment; (2) recommends against striking the evidence and consolidated reply
of [requester]; (3) recommends against dismissal and sanctions pursuant to L.C.C.R. [22];
Case No. 2025-00938PQ -6- DECISION & ENTRY

and (4) recommends against ordering [requester] to pay all reasonable attorney fees,
court costs, and expenses pursuant to Civ.R. 11, R.C. 2323.51, and R.C. 149.43(C)(6).”
{¶15} In response, requester “does not object to dismissal on the narrow
procedural grounds identified,” but requester “requests that any dismissal be entered
without prejudice, as the issue identified is procedural in nature and does not reach the
merits of the underlying public records dispute.” (Emphasis sic.) Additionally, requester
“opposes Respondent’s objections seeking sanctions, attorney fees, and other punitive
measures, as those requests are unsupported by the record and were already properly
rejected by the Special Master.”
{¶16} Upon careful consideration and independent review, the court finds that
respondent’s objections lack merit for several reasons. First, the special master’s
recommendations to which respondent objects are predicated on the ordinary application
of statutory law and case law as they existed at the time of the filing of requester’s
complaint. Thus, the portions of the report and recommendation that respondent’s
objections challenge are in accord with R.C. 2743.75(F)(1). See R.C. 2743.75(F)(1)
(requiring a special master to submit to this court a report and recommendation “based
on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law as they existed at the time of the
filing of the complaint”).
{¶17} Second, respondent’s objections seemingly presume that respondent’s
numerous motions in this matter are permissible under the framework established by the
General Assembly in R.C. 2743.75. See generally Kish v. City of Akron, 2006-Ohio-1244,
¶ 44 (noting that the General Assembly is the ultimate arbiter of policy
considerations relevant to Ohio public-records laws). R.C. 2743.75 “provides for
‘an expeditious and economical procedure that attempts to resolve disputes alleging a
denial of access to public records’ in violation of R.C. 149.43(B).” Kidd v. City of
Wilmington, 2026-Ohio-978, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.); Law Office of Josh Brown, LLC v. Ohio
Secy. of State, 2025-Ohio-2130, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). See R.C. 2743.75(A). To accomplish
this goal, as noted by at least two Ohio appellate courts, R.C. 2743.75 “lays out a
streamlined litigation procedure.” Kidd at ¶ 14; Law Office of Josh Brown, LLC at ¶ 9.
Here, absent leave, respondent’s filing of numerous motions in this case (including the
filing of a motion on April 14, 2026) is inconsistent with the streamlined litigation procedure
Case No. 2025-00938PQ -7- DECISION & ENTRY

envisioned by the General Assembly in R.C. 2743.75, because the special master did not
authorize respondent’s motions that seek, among other things, sanctions and an award
of attorney fees and costs. See, e.g., R.C. 2743.75(E)(2) (providing that, except for a
motion to dismiss, “[n]o further motions or pleadings shall be accepted by the clerk of the
court of claims or by the special master assigned by the clerk under [R.C. 2743.75(D)(2)]
unless the special master directs in writing that a further motion or pleading be filed”).
The special master’s recommendations to deny respondent’s motion to dismiss and
related motions for sanctions, deny respondent’s motion to strike, deny respondent’s
motions for summary judgment, and deny respondent’s motion for an award of attorney
fees, costs, and expenses are wholly consistent with R.C. 2743.75’s streamlined litigation
procedure.
{¶18} Third, respondent’s reliance on the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure in support
of alleged error by the special master is unpersuasive because, according to R.C.
2743.03(D), the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure governs R.C. 2743.75’s practice and
procedure to the extent that the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure are not inconsistent with
R.C. 2743.75. See R.C. 2703.03(D) (“[t]he Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern practice
and procedure in all actions in the court of claims, except insofar as inconsistent with
[R.C. Chapter 2743]”). Here, R.C. 2743.75 establishes a special statutory proceeding
with its own procedures and remedies. See Welsh-Huggins at ¶ 12 (“[r]ecognizing that
disputes over public-records requests can frustrate the law’s essential purpose, the
General Assembly enacted R.C. 2743.75(A) ‘to provide for an expeditious and
economical procedure that attempts to resolve disputes alleging a denial of access to
public records’ in violation of R.C. 149.43(B)”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (12th Ed.
2024) (defining “special proceeding” as a “proceeding involving statutory or civil remedies
or rules rather than the rules or remedies ordinarily available under rules of procedure; a
proceeding providing extraordinary relief”). Pursuant to R.C. 2743.03(D), if an Ohio rule
of civil procedure is inconsistent with a procedure set forth in R.C. 2743.75, such a civil
rule is inapplicable. Under R.C. 2743.75’s statutory framework, a rule of civil procedure
may, or may not, apply.
{¶19} Additionally, respondent’s reliance on L.C.C.R. 4(D) in support of
respondent’s contention that respondent’s filing of summary-judgment motions was
Case No. 2025-00938PQ -8- DECISION & ENTRY

proper fails to persuade because this court’s local rules may not supersede statutory
limitations as to the filing of motions under R.C. 2743.75. See Eckmeyer v. Kent City
School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5123, at *17 (11th Dist. Nov. 3, 2000) (“it
is well-settled in Ohio that a local court rule is invalid if it conflicts with a state statute”).
{¶20} Fourth, R.C. 2743.75 does not authorize this court to award attorney fees as
a remedy to respondent in this matter. R.C. 2743.75(F)(3) provides:
If the court of claims determines that the public office or person
responsible for the public records denied the aggrieved person access to
the public records in violation of [R.C. 149.43(B)] and if no appeal from the
court’s final order is taken under division (G) of this section, both of the
following apply:
(a) The public office or the person responsible for the public records
shall permit the aggrieved person to inspect or receive copies of the public
records that the court requires to be disclosed in its order.
(b) The aggrieved person shall be entitled to recover from the public
office or person responsible for the public records the amount of the filing
fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that
are incurred by the aggrieved person, but shall not be entitled to recover
attorney’s fees, except that division (G)(2) of this section applies if an appeal
is taken under division (G)(1) of this section.
(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(G)(2),
If a court of appeals in any appeal taken under [R.C. 2743.75(G)(1)]
by the public office or person responsible for the public records determines
that the public office or person denied the aggrieved person access to the
public records in violation of [R.C. 149.43(B)] and obviously filed the appeal
with the intent to either delay compliance with the court of claims’ order from
which the appeal is taken for no reasonable cause or unduly harass the
aggrieved person, the court of appeals may award reasonable attorney’s
fees to the aggrieved person in accordance with division (C) of section
149.43 of the Revised Code.
Case No. 2025-00938PQ -9- DECISION & ENTRY

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2743.75(F)(3) expressly sets forth the relief that may be
awarded in R.C. 2743.75’s statutory proceeding. A review of R.C. 2743.75(F)(3) fails to
disclose authority for this court to award attorney fees to a respondent. And based on the
court’s review of R.C. 2743.75, the court finds no reference to R.C. 2323.51 (frivolous
conduct in filing civil claims) or R.C. 149.43(C)(6) to support an award of attorney fees to
respondent in this matter. See generally Welsh-Huggins at ¶ 12 (a person allegedly
aggrieved by a denial of public records may file a mandamus complaint pursuant to R.C.
149.43(C)(1)(b) or a public-records complaint in this court, but the person cannot pursue
both remedies); R.C. 149.43(C)(6).5 Compare R.C. 2743.75(H) (providing that the
powers of the court of claims prescribed in R.C. 2743.05 apply to the proceedings in this
court under R.C. 2743.75); R.C. 2743.05 (“[e]xcept as stated in [R.C. 2743.63], the court
of claims has the same powers to subpoena witnesses, require the production of
evidence, and punish for contempt as the court of common pleas”).
{¶21} Fifth, respondent’s reliance on L.C.C.R. 22(D)(2) in support of his objections
is unpersuasive. L.C.C.R. 22(D)(2) provides:
If a party or an attorney fails to attend the mediation conference
without being excused, the Court of Claims may assess the party or the
attorney reasonable expenses caused by the failure, including reasonable
attorney fees or all or a part of the expenses of the other party. The Court
of Claims may also dismiss the action, strike documents filed by the
offending party, or impose any other appropriate penalty.
(Emphasis added.) L.C.C.R. 22(D)(2)’s use of “may” indicates that the court has
discretion to assess reasonable attorney fees, as well as discretion to dismiss an action
or impose another appropriate penalty. See Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio
St.2d 102 (1971), paragraph one of the syllabus (“[i]n statutory construction, the word

5 R.C. 149.43(C)(6) provides:

If the court does not issue a writ of mandamus under division (C) of this section
and the court determines at that time that the bringing of the mandamus action was
frivolous conduct as defined in [2323.51(A)], the court may award to the public office all
court costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney’s fees, as determined by the court.

See State ex rel. Mahoning Cty. Community Corr. Asso. v. Shoemaker, 12 Ohio App.3d 36, 37
(10th Dist.1983) (stating that the court of claims has no authority to allow writs of mandamus).
Case No. 2025-00938PQ -10- DECISION & ENTRY

‘may’ shall be construed as permissive and the word ‘shall’ shall be construed as
mandatory unless there appears a clear and unequivocal legislative intent that they
receive a construction other than their ordinary usage”). Based on L.C.C.R. 22(D)(2)’s
express language, respondent is not, as a matter of right, entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney fees, dismissal of this action, striking of documents, or any other
appropriate penalty based on L.C.C.R. 22(D)(2).
{¶22} Sixth, respondent’s contention that the special master gave “special
treatment” to requester in this case is unconvincing. It is true, as respondent notes, that
under Ohio law self-represented litigants are required to follow the same procedures as
litigants represented by counsel. State ex rel. Neil v. French, 2018-Ohio-2692, ¶ 10.
However, it is also true that under Ohio law a court may afford some leniency to a self-
represented litigant. See, e.g., Goodrich v. Ohio Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 2012-Ohio-
467, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.), citing Robb v. Smallwood, 2005-Ohio-5863, ¶ 5 (4th Dist.) (“[i]t is
true that a court may, in practice, grant a certain amount of latitude toward pro se
litigants”); Henderson v. Henderson, 2013-Ohio-2820, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.) (“a pro se litigant
is generally afforded leniency, however, there are limits to the court’s leniency”). Here,
the special master gave due consideration to respondent’s concerns and arguments,
noting:
I do not agree that Requester’s failure to appear at mediation
sessions demonstrates bad faith or frivolous conduct. Requester informed
the court that he was unable to meaningfully participate in a mediation
conference because of a mental health condition related to his military
service. Req. Reply, p. 5; see also Req. Memo. Contra, filed Feb. 24, 2026.
Requester acknowledges that he should have notified the court of his need
for accommodation. Id.1 While this conduct caused the Village to appear
for a mediation conference that did not proceed, I do not find that it rises to
the level of sanctionable conduct within the meaning of Civil Rule 11, R.C.
2323.51, or Local Rule 22.
(R&R, 5.) And, with respect to a motion to strike filed by requester, the special master
stated: “Because the Village is not prejudiced by consideration of Requester’s evidence
filing, I recommend that the court deny the Village’s motion to strike.”
Case No. 2025-00938PQ -11- DECISION & ENTRY

{¶23} Such recommendations by the special master are consistent with the
Supreme Court of Ohio’s view that “a fundamental tenet of judicial review in Ohio [is] that
courts should decide cases on the merits,”. De Hart v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St.2d
189, 192 (1982), as well as the Supreme Court of Ohio’s view that R.C. 2743.75 “offers
a forum for those who are schooled in the law as well as those who are not.” Welsh-
Huggins,2020-Ohio-5371 at ¶ 12. Such recommendations by the special master also are
consistent with judicial discretion. See Krupp v. Poor, 24 Ohio St.2d 123 (1970),
paragraph two of the syllabus (holding that judicial discretion “is the option which a judge
may exercise between the doing and not doing of a thing which cannot be demanded as
an absolute legal right, guided by the spirit, principles and analogies of the law, and
founded upon the reason and conscience of the judge, to a just result in the light of the
particular circumstances of the case”); AAAA Ents. v. River Place Community Urban
Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990) (“[a] decision is unreasonable if
there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision”).
{¶24} Accordingly, for reasons discussed above, the court holds that respondent’s
objections lack merit.
III. Disposition
{¶25} After careful consideration and independent review, the court OVERRULES
respondent’s Partial Written Objections To The Special Master’s Report and
Recommendation” filed on April 8, 2026, ADOPTS the special master’s report and
recommendation issued on March 31, 2026, and DISMISSES requester’s complaint
without prejudice.6 In accordance with the special master’s recommendations the court
DENIES
1) Respondent’s “Loc.R. 22(D)(2) Motion To Dismiss And Award Attorney
Fees And Expenses To Respondent” filed on February 20, 2026;
2) Respondent’s “Motion To Strike The Evidence Of Requestor For Want of
Service” filed on March 3, 2026;

6 Accord Elhadj Alpha Mahmoud Souare v. Ohio Dept. of Dev. Disabilities, Ct. of Cl. No. 2025-
00966PQ (Mar. 10, 2026) (dismissing a public-records complaint without prejudice for failing to transmit a
preliminary complaint under R.C. 149.43(C)(1)).
Case No. 2025-00938PQ -12- DECISION & ENTRY

3) Respondent’s “Motion To Strike The Evidence Of Requestor For Want of
Admissible Evidence” filed on March 3, 2026;
4) Respondent’s “Motion For Summary Judgment And An Award of Attorney
Fees, Costs, And Expenses In Favor Of The Village” filed on March 3, 2026;
5) Respondent’s “Motion To Strike ‘The Request For Leave To File
Oppositions To Respondent’s Post-Response Motions; And In The Alternative, Request
For Direction That No Response Is Required’ For Want Of Service And Motion For
Sanctions” filed on March 4, 2026;
6) Respondent’s “Consolidated Motion For Summary Judgment, To Strike,
And For An Award of Attorney Fees, Costs, And Expenses In Favor Of The Village” filed
on March 16, 2026; and
7) Respondent’s “Motion To Strike The Reply To The Consolidated Filing Of
The Village For Want Of Service” filed on March 30, 2026.
The court also DENIES Respondent’s “Motion To Strike The Response To The Partial
Written Objection To The Special Master’s Report And Recommendation And For
Sanctions” filed on April 14, 2026. 7 Court costs are assessed against requester. The
clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the
journal.

LISA L. SADLER
Judge

Filed April 15, 2026
Sent to S.C. Reporter 5/11/26

7 This court’s denial of respondent’s motions to strike for lack of service should not be construed to
mean that a party is excused from a requirement to serve documents in public-records cases in accordance
with Civ.R. 5 and R.C. 2743.75, as applicable. In this instance, since respondent moved to strike based on
a lack of service, it is manifest that respondent had notice of the filings that respondent has asked to be
stricken and, consequently, respondent suffered no material prejudice.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11324576. Public record. Not legal advice.