# Vodi

> District Court, D. Maryland · March 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11323997

## Case

- **Full name:** Smith Kwame Oliver Vodi v. University of Maryland – Dept. of Transportation Services, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** March 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11323997

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that official capacity lawsuits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Smith Kwame Oliver Vodi, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil No. 8:24-02879-CDA

University of Maryland – Dept. of *
Transportation Services, et al.,
*
Defendants.
*

* * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BEFORE THE COURT is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants, University of
Maryland—Department of Transportation Services, Brandon Christopher Harrison-
Difranco, Jay Rossello, and Frank Richard Taitano, asserting both lack of jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim. ECF 27. The Court has reviewed all papers, and no hearing is
necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the following reasons, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff Smith Kwame Oliver Vodi (“Plaintiff” or “Vodi”) brought this suit against
his former employer, University of Maryland Department of Transportation Services and
several of its employees in their individual capacities (collectively “Defendants”).
Complaint, ECF 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff alleges that he is a Christian Ghanian-American

1 For the purpose of deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-
pleaded facts in the complaint and construes such facts, as well as reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., Harvey
v. Cable News Network, Inc., 48 F.4th 257, 268 (4th Cir. 2022).
who began working for the University of Maryland Department of Transportation
Services as “Special Event Staff” on July 30, 2023.2 Compl., at 5; First Supplement to
Complaint, ECF 4 (“EEOC Supp.”), at 1. He contends that during his employment, his
supervisors, Brandon Harrison-DeFranco and Frank Taitano, “discriminated, harassed,
retaliated, and defamed against [him.]” Compl., at 7. Plaintiff also claims that his

supervisors overburdened him with work, refused to allow him overtime pay, were
“[c]onfrontational and aggressive[,]” gave him “false evaluations[,]” and put him to work
in “isolation [because of his] [r]eligion, [n]ational origin, etc.” Id.; EEOC Supp., at 1.
Plaintiff further alleges that he was subjected to verbal abuse and “forced [] to perform
tasks beyond the scope of [his] job description, such as cleaning the cage and picking up
trash.” Id., at 2. When he attempted to address these issues with human resources
personnel, his concerns were ignored and he was “unjustly suspended on April 30, 2024,
May 22-24 without pay, and upon [his] return from a three-day suspension on May 28,
2024, [he] was [terminated].” Id. He was told the reason for his suspension was for “not
following supervisors’ directives” and his discharge was “for not adhering to suspension
mandates.” Id. He asserts that this reason is “nothing but hate” and that “the worst”

started when he “reached out to HR that [he] graduated and [informed them that] they
should update his employment record with [his] degree.” Id.
On October 3, 2024, acting pro se, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging violations of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (“ADEA”), and the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). Compl., at 4.

2 Plaintiff notes in his first supplement to the complaint that his termination incorrectly
classified him as “a Parking Enforcement Associate[,]” though he was hired as Special
Events Staff. ECF 4, at 1. This appears to be the basis of his claim under the False Claims
Act, discussed infra.
On October 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed his first “supplement” to the complaint, which appears
to be his “Amended Charge of Discrimination” filed with the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and Prince George’s County Office of
Human Rights. EEOC Supp., at 1. This filing also includes Plaintiff’s EEOC notice of his
right to sue. ECF 4-1, at 1. On March 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a second “supplement” to

his complaint, which adds a new party and cause of action. ECF 16 (“Amend. Compl.”).3
In this filing, Plaintiff added Jay Rosello, University of Maryland Vice President for Legal
Affairs and General Counsel, as a defendant, and a claim under the False Claims Act
(“FCA”) for “discharging an employee from where he never worked.” Amend. Compl. at
5.
On June 13, 2025, Defendants filed the pending Motion to Dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. ECF 27 (“MTD”). Plaintiff filed an opposition on
July 30, 2025. ECF 35 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”). Defendants replied on August 20, 2025. ECF 39
(“MTD Reply”). Although not typically permitted by either the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or the Local Rules, Plaintiff filed a second opposition to the Defendants’
Motion on September 16, 2025.4 ECF 43 (“Pl.’s Surreply”).

3 Although filed as a “supplement,” Defendants’ Motion treats this filing as an amended
complaint and does not contest its timeliness. ECF 27, at 2.
4 On September 2, 2025, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part,
Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time to respond to Defendant’s reply to its Motion to
Dismiss. ECF 42; ECF 40. The Court, “[a]ffording Plaintiff the liberal construction
applied to pro se filings, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), [interpreted] this
filing as a request to file a surreply brief[.]” ECF 42, at 1. Though surreplies are
disfavored, the Court exercised it discretion and allowed Plaintiff to file a surreply to the
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Id., at 2-3.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
a. Rule 12(b)(1) Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of claims or suits
where the Court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss under this
rule “challenges a court’s authority to hear the matter brought by a complaint.”
Medigrow, LLC v. Natalie M. LaPrade Med. Cannabis Comm’n, 487 F. Supp. 3d 364, 370

(D. Md. 2020) (citation omitted). Where a defendant has sovereign immunity, the court
“must dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Cunningham v. Gen.
Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 888 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Where
a defendant challenges subject matter jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds, the
plaintiff must demonstrate “an unequivocal waiver of immunity.” Davis v. Thompson,
367 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299,
304 (4th Cir. 1995)).
b. Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate where the
complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts “accept all factual
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”
Washington v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Columbia, 58 F.4th 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2023)
(citing Singer v. Reali, 883 F.3d 425, 437 (4th Cir. 2018)). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). “The complaint must offer ‘more than labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]’” Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
698 F. App’x 745, 747 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). At the same
time, a “complaint will not be dismissed as long as [it] provides sufficient detail about [the

plaintiff’s] claim to show that [the plaintiff] has more-than-conceivable chance of success
on the merits.” Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir. 2014).
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court
generally does not consider evidence outside the complaint. However, the court may
consider “documents integral to and relied upon in the complaint . . . so long as the
plaintiff does not question their authenticity.” Fairfax v. CBS Corp., 2 F.4th 286, 292
(4th Cir. 2021); see also Wongus v. The Benedictine School for Exceptional Children, Inc.,
No. JRR-24-03635, 2026 WL 795597, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2026). An integral
document is one “that by its very existence, and not the mere information it contains,
gives rise to the legal rights asserted.” Corrigan v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, No. ELH-24-
03497, 2026 WL 73800, *9 (D. Md. Jan. 9, 2026) (quoting Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.

v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F. Supp. 2d 602, 611 (D. Md. 2011)). “In
employment discrimination cases, courts often take judicial notice of EEOC charges and
EEOC decisions.” Id. (citation omitted). “‘[I]n the event of [a] conflict between the bare
allegations of the complaint and any exhibit attached . . . the exhibit prevails.’” Goines v.
Valley Community Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Fayetteville
Inv’rs v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991)).
III. ANALYSIS
In their motion, Defendants assert that Vodi’s complaint must be dismissed
because (1) the FCA does not apply to state agencies or authorize claims by pro se litigants;
(2) state sovereign immunity bars the ADEA and ADA discrimination claims; (3) Vodi
failed to exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing the ADA claim; (4) Vodi fails

to state retaliation and employment discrimination claims under Title VII; and (5) the
claims against individual defendants are not permitted under Title VII, the ADEA, and
the ADA, and, to the extent the individuals are named in their official capacities, are
redundant of the claims against the University. MTD, at 2.
Two preliminary matters guide the Court’s analysis of these contentions and Vodi’s
opposition to the same. First, the Court is mindful that pro se filings “must be construed
. . . so as to do substantial justice” and are held to less stringent standards than filings
drafted by trained lawyers. Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal
quotation omitted). “In practice, this liberal construction allows courts to recognize
claims despite various formal deficiencies, such as incorrect labels or lack of cited legal
authority.” Wall v. Rasnick, 42 F.4th 214, 218 (4th Cir. 2022). “Such liberal construction,

however, does not absolve Plaintiff from pleading a plausible claim, and this court ‘may
not act as an advocate for a self-represented litigant’” by ‘conjur[ing] up” issues not
presented.” Williams v. EEOC Baltimore Field Office, et al., No. JRR-25-0205, 2026 WL
656938, *3 (D. Md. Mar. 9, 2026) (quoting Desgraviers v. PF-Frederick, LLC, 501 F.
Supp. 3d 348, 351 (D. Md. 2020)) (alteration in original).
Second is the matter of what allegations or documents the Court considers to
constitute the pleadings and proper allegations. Courts generally do not consider
evidence outside of the operative complaint, unless documents outside the complaint are
“integral and authentic,” such as EEOC charges attached to employment discrimination
lawsuits. See Wongus, 2026 WL 795597 at *3 (citing Fairfax, 2 F.4th at 292, and then
citing Chesapeake Bay Found., 794 F. Supp. at 611); Corrigan, 2026 WL 73800, at *10.
Guided by these observations and the regular practice in this District, the Court will
consider Plaintiff’s EEOC Supplement filed at docket entry 4. The Court also construes

the second supplement, ECF 16, as an amended complaint for the purposes of this Motion
to Dismiss. The Court notes that Defendants treat the filing similarly, and such
construction is appropriate considering that it does two things commonly accomplished
by amended pleadings: adding a new party (in this instance, a new defendant) and a new
cause of action. However, the Court does not consider the thirty-three exhibits attached
to the Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or any facts alleged for the
first time in his opposition. See S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v.
OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2013) (“It is well-established
that parties cannot amend their complaints through briefing or oral advocacy.”); Wongus,
2026 WL 795597 at *3 (declining to consider “exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s opposition”
because they “are not integral to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint”); Smith v. Mr. Cooper

Grp. Mortg., No. PJM-23-3008, 2024 WL 1179075 at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 2024)
(“Deficiencies in a pleading cannot be cured by identifying new facts or making new
allegations in an opposition to a motion to dismiss.”). Any allegation that does not appear
in the original or amended complaint or the EEOC Supplement does not factor in the
Court’s analysis in resolving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.5

5 Vodi’s Opposition references Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and suggests his
attachment of exhibits relates to that standard. See MTD Opp’n at 8. Of course, that Rule
governs summary judgment, which is not the current posture; Defendants’ Motion
invokes only Rule 12, not Rule 56.
a. The False Claims Act cause of action is dismissed because
Plaintiff, being self-represented, cannot bring this claim.
First, Defendants argue that Vodi’s FCA claim must be dismissed because (1) the
FCA does not apply to state agencies; (2) a pro se plaintiff cannot bring a claim under the
Act; and (3) Vodi has otherwise failed to comply with the FCA. MTD, at 5. Vodi’s response
focuses on a pro se litigant’s ability to pursue claims under Title VII before stating that he
brings an FCA claim because “defendants’ claim is false” and the University of Maryland
is a government institution. Pl.’s Opp’n, at 9-11; Pl.’s Surreply, at 7. The Court agrees
with Defendants and dismisses the claim under the False Claims Act because Vodi, as a
pro se litigant, cannot bring an action under the statute and in his own name.
The False Claims Act “prohibits any person from making false or fraudulent claims
for payment to the United States.” 31 U.S.C. §3729(a). Under the FCA, “private

individuals may bring qui tam actions in the Government’s name for § 3729 violations.”
Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 545 US 409, 411
(2005); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). The private individual, however, cannot be self-
represented in a qui tam action under the FCA. Wojcicki v. SCANA/SCE&G, 947 F.3d
240, 244-45 (4th Cir. 2020); Downey v. U.S.A., No. PX-19-1872, 2019 WL 2921788, *2
(D. Md. Jul. 8, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Downey v. United States, 780 F. App’x 54 (4th Cir.
2019). This is because, in a qui tam action, “the United States is the real party in interest,
and the need for adequate legal representation of the United States counsel against
permitting pro se suits.” Wojcicki, 947 F.3d at 245 (quoting U.S. ex rel. Brooks v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 237 F. App’x 802, 803 (4th Cir. 2007)); see also United States ex
rel. Doe v. Credit Suisse AG, 117 F.4th 155, 158 n.1 (4th Cir. 2024) (“The term derives from

the Latin phrase, qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which
translates to ‘who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.’” (quoting qui tam
action, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)). Accordingly, Vodi, as a pro se plaintiff,
may not pursue a False Claims Act suit. Thus, FCA claim is dismissed.6
b. Sovereign immunity bars the discrimination and retaliation
claims under the ADEA and ADA.
Defendants contend that Vodi’s claims against the University of Maryland
Department of Transportation Services and the individual defendants in their official
capacities are barred by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution. MTD, at 6, 12. The Court agrees.
“The Eleventh Amendment embodies the principle of sovereign immunity and
prohibits suit by private parties against states in federal courts unless a state has waived
its immunity.” Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs. for City of Balt., 901 F.2d 387, 397 (4th Cir.

1990); see also Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (“The
ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be
sued by private individuals in federal court.”). “The doctrine of sovereign immunity is
firmly embedded in Maryland law, long recognized as applicable in actions—contract,
tort, or otherwise—against the State of Maryland, its officers, and its units.” Magnetti v.
Univ. of Md., 402 Md. 548, 556 (Md. 2007). “It is well established that the University is
considered to be an arm of the State Government for the purposes of the sovereign
immunity doctrine.” Magnetti, 402 Md. at 557; see also Md. Code, Educ. § 12-102(a).
Congress, however, “may abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity
when it both unequivocally intends to do so and acts pursuant to a valid grant of

6 Finding dismissal required by binding precedent due to Vodi’s pro se status, the Court
does not address Defendants’ arguments regarding the FCA’s application to state agencies
or whether Vodi’s factual allegations survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny.
constitutional authority. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363. But it has not done so in the ADEA or
the ADA. See Altevogt v. Kirwan, No. WDQ-11-1061, 2012 WL 135283, *4 (D. Md. Jan.
13, 2012) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) and Kimel v.
Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 79 (2000)). And the State of Maryland has not waived its
immunity from suits in federal court, generally, or from claims arising under the ADEA

or ADA. Id. (citing Dixon v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 345 F.Supp. 2d 512, 513 (D. Md.
2003)); see also McCray v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2014). Thus,
there being no waiver of sovereign immunity, Vodi’s ADEA7 and ADA claims against the
University and the individual defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed.8
McCray, 741 F.3d at 483.
c. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for Title VII employment
discrimination but clears the bar for a retaliation claim.
Plaintiff alleges that he was subject to discrimination, retaliation, and harassment
by his supervisors on the basis of his race, national origin, age, disability, and religion in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Pl.’s Opp’n, at 1, 17; MTD, at 1. Defendants
argue that Vodi’s discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. MTD, at 9. The

7 Because the claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court declines
to reach Defendants’ additional argument that the ADEA claim should be dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See MTD, at 8-9.
8 While this opinion finds Vodi’s ADEA and ADA claims barred in federal court, it takes
no position on whether he may have a claim in Maryland state court under Maryland law.
See Laney v. Morgan State Univ., No. CCB-04-1719, 2005 WL 1563437, at *3 (D. Md.
June 30, 2005); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (“Our decision today does not signal the end of the
line for employees who find themselves subject to age discrimination at the hands of their
state employers. We hold only that in terms to the ADEA, Congress did not validly
abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity to suits by private individuals.”).
Court agrees in part, will grant the Motion as to the Title VII discrimination claim, and
will deny the Motion as to the Title VII retaliation claim.
i. Plaintiff fails to state a Title VII discrimination claim.
Defendants argue that Vodi does not plausibly allege facts to suggest that that any
allegedly discriminatory employment action was related to his race, religion, or national
origin, nor does he identify any similarly situated co-workers whose treatment would

“give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” MTD, at 9-10. The essence of
Plaintiff’s response falls beyond the bounds of what the Court can consider. Plaintiff
contends that he has included evidence—in the form of 33 attached exhibits—supporting
his discrimination claim and, in his opposition brief, names two co-workers who he
alleges received more favorable treatment from his supervisors. Pl.’s Opp’n, at 18.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “prohibits an employer, inter alia, from
discriminating against ‘any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.’” Angelini v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 464 F. Supp. 3d 756, 776 (D. Md.
2020) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). “Absent direct evidence,” a prima facie Title VII
discrimination claim contains four elements: “(1) membership in a protected class; (2)

satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment
from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” Coleman v. Md. Ct. of
Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals of
Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012). Though a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case at the
motion to dismiss stage, a “reference to the elements of a claim is helpful to assess
whether the plaintiff has stated a plausible claim.” Allgaier v. Microbiologics, Inc., No.
ELH-22-01900, 2023 WL 2837336, at *8 (D. Md. Apr. 7, 2023) (citations omitted).
Defendants argue that Vodi fails to allege sufficient facts to support the last two
elements of a prima facie discrimination case.9 MTD, at 9-10. Defendants aver that Vodi
lacks facts connecting any alleged adverse treatment to his race, religion, or national
origin, MTD at 9, and fails to sufficiently identify similarly situated comparators outside
his protected classes, the favorable treatment of whom would permit an inference of

unlawful disparate treatment, id., at 10.
The Court agrees with the Defendants, finding an absence of allegations connecting
the alleged disparate treatment to any protected classes. “A plaintiff is not required to
identify a similarly situated [] comparator to prove [his] discrimination claim, so long as
[he] can establish an inference of unlawful discrimination through other means.” Swaso,
698 F. App’x at 748 (citing Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 545-45
(4th Cir. 2003)). We “may infer discriminatory intent from evidence of a general pattern
of racial discrimination in the practices of a defendant.” Id. (quoting Woods v. City of
Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 649 (4th Cir. 2017)). Here, Vodi does not rely on comparator
evidence or a general pattern of alleged discriminatory practices by the Defendants.
Rather, the pleadings and EEOC supplement contain only conclusory statements alleging

that he was harassed, discriminated against, and retaliated against without any mention
of how his race, national origin, or religion related to those actions. His opposition and
attachments—which include allegations regarding his membership in a protected class

9 By asserting that he is a Christian Ghanian-American, Vodi invokes membership in three
potential protected classes based on race, national origin, and religion. Compl. at 5.
Defendants do not contest that these classes have been sufficiently alleged and are
protected for purposes of Title VII. Plaintiff does not offer much on whether his work
performance was satisfactory but notes that he “worked diligently” despite the alleged
grievances. Id. at 7. While there is no other mention of satisfactory job performance in
the pleadings or EEOC charges, Defendants do not challenge the existence of this element.
and certain comparators—cannot cure the deficiencies in his pleadings, even if the
opposition and attachments provide more information about potential comparators. See
Smith, 2024 WL 1179075, at *3. Thus, the Title VII discrimination count is dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
ii. Based on the standards governing the pro se pleadings at this stage,
Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a Title VII retaliation claim.
Turning to the Title VII retaliation claim, Defendants argue that Vodi fails to state
a claim because his complaints “lack any allegation that [Plaintiff] engaged in any Title
VII-protected activity[.]” MTD, at 11. Instead, Defendants aver that Plaintiff only
complained about his workload to his supervisors, not about any unlawful discriminatory
actions, thus his complaints were not a protected activity. Id. As with his other Title VII
claim, Plaintiff responds that he attached exhibits to his opposition supporting his claim

of retaliation. Pl.’s Opp’n, at 20. While Vodi’s opposition and its exhibits cannot patch
any alleged deficiencies, the EEOC Supplement can.
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful “for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. The Fourth Circuit recognizes that a
Title VII plaintiff “may prove a Title VII retaliation claim either through direct evidence
of retaliatory animus or via the application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework.” Roberts v. Glenn Indus. Grp., Inc., 998 F.3d 111, 122 (4th Cir. 2021). To
establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the familiar McDonnell Douglas

framework, a plaintiff must prove that he: (1) was engaged in a protected activity, (2) that
an adverse employment action was taken against him, and (3) that there was a causal link
between his protected activity and the employer’s adverse action. Id.
Defendants contest that Vodi lacks facts supporting any of the three retaliation
elements. MTD, at 10-11. They argue that Vodi’s complaints to his supervisors were about
his workload, not about unlawful discriminatory actions, and thus they were not protected

activity. MTD, at 11 (citing Compl. at 6). While Defendants are correct that the complaint
refers to only his workload, they overlook Plaintiff’s allegations in his EEOC charge, which
is appropriate to consider at this stage. E.g., Wongus, 2026 WL 795597, at *3. In his
EEOC Supplement, Plaintiff alleges that he faced harassment, verbal abuse, and was
forced to perform tasks beyond his job description. EEOC Supp., at 1-2. Plaintiff then
contends that after he attempted to address this treatment verbally and through e-mail
with Colleen Thompson, Assistant Director of Human Resources, he was suspended and
later terminated. Id. at 2.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the claims, the Court accepts the factual allegations
in the complaint and integral documents, such as the EEOC Supplement, as true and
construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. At this early stage of litigation,

the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged a protected activity (reporting alleged
harassment to human resources) and an adverse employment action (suspension and
termination after making such reports). Though Plaintiff has neither detailed his
interactions with Ms. Thompson nor definitively connected the complaints to his
termination, at this stage, a plaintiff does not bear a heavy burden to sufficiently allege
causation. See Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 335 (4th Cir. 2018) (“As this
Court has held, establishing a ‘causal relationship’ at the prima facie stage is not an
onerous burden. Purported victims of retaliation do not have to show at the prima facie
stage that their protected activities were but-for causes of the adverse action.” (citations
omitted)). “[T]emporal proximity is sufficient to establish a causal connection at the
prima facie stage.” Id. at 336-37. While Vodi’s EEOC charge does not indicate the date
of the alleged complaints to human resources, it reflects his employment for a nine-month
period and alleges suspension and termination within six months of several alleged

discriminatory or retaliatory acts. EEOC Supp. at 1-2. Upon affording the complaint the
liberal reading required for pro se pleadings and inferring that complaints to human
resources occurred after at least some of the suspected harassment, the Court finds the
totality of allegations sufficient to allege causation at the motion to dismiss stage. Cf.
Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994) (five-month gap between protected
activity and adverse action was sufficient to establish prima facie case). Of course,
discovery demands and burdens at later stages of this case will require more than is
currently before the Court. But because of the principles governing the motion to dismiss
analysis of a pro se pleading, Defendants’ Motion is denied insofar as it involves
retaliation after Plaintiff’s complaints to Ms. Thompson.
d. Any remaining claims against the individual defendants are
dismissed as either unavailable or duplicative.
As noted above, Vodi brings claims under the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII against
Brandon Harrison-DiFranco, Frank Taitano, and Jay Rosello. Compl., at 1; Amended
Compl., at 4. The Court already concluded that these same claims as alleged against the
University of Maryland are barred by sovereign immunity. As the claims pertain to the
individuals, Defendants argue that the claims are not permitted against these employees
and, in any event, any claims against them in their official capacities are duplicative of the

claims against the University. The Court agrees.
The ADA, ADEA, and Title VII statutes “do not provide for causes of action against
defendants in their individual capacities.” Jones v. Sternheimer, 387 F. App’x 366, 368
(4th Cir. 2010); see also Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999)
(collecting cases holding “that Title VII does not provide a remedy against individual
defendants who do not qualify as ‘employers’”); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30

F.3d 507, 511 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that the “ADEA limits civil liability to the employer”
not allowing liability to extend to an individual employee.). Consistent with this
longstanding principle, numerous decisions of this Court dismiss ADA, ADEA, and Title
VII claims brought against employees in their individual capacity. E.g., Bell v. Medline,
No. GLR-24-3368, 2025 WL 934275, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2025); Scott v. Walmart Inc.,
No. LKG-23-2228, 2025 WL 359059, at *9 (D. Md. Jan. 30, 2025); Davis v. Md. Parole
Comm’n, No. ELH-21-3164, 2022 WL 17833422, at *10 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2022). That
approach continues here, and Vodi’s ADA, ADEA, and Title VII claims against individual
employees in their individual capacity are dismissed.
As an alternative ground, Defendants contend that any claims against the
individuals in their official capacities are duplicative of the (barred) claims against the

University and thus should be dismissed. Plaintiff does not address this argument. “A
suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but
rather is a suit against the official’s office, and as such, it is no different from a suit against
the State itself.” Innes v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Md., 29 F. Supp. 3d 566, 575 (D.
Md. 2014) (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 71) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)
(emphasis in original); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“As long
as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-
capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”);
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978) (noting that
official capacity lawsuits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent”). A lawsuit against the individuals in
their official capacities is in essence a lawsuit against the University of Maryland; for the
purposes of this lawsuit, the individuals and the University are one and the same.

Therefore, permitting Vodi to proceed against the individual defendants is “pointless
[because] a suit brought in that manner would still be, in effect, a suit against [the
University], which is already a defendant under these counts.” Bradley v. Balt. Police
Dep’t, No. JKB-11-1799, 2012 WL 4321738, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 19, 2012) (citations
omitted). Accordingly, for both of these reasons, the claims against Harrison-DiFranco,
Taitiano, and Rosello are dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Claims arising under the FCA, ADEA, and ADA are dismissed without prejudice based on
the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The FCA claim cannot proceed as long as
Plaintiff is self-represented. The ADA and ADEA claims cannot proceed without a waiver

of sovereign immunity. The Title VII discrimination claim is dismissed without prejudice
to re-plead with additional facts that would demonstrate the required elements for such
a claim. Claims under the ADEA, ADA and Title VII against the individual defendants are
dismissed without prejudice because they are not available against the individual
employees here and are otherwise duplicative of the barred claims against the University.
The Motion is denied as to the Title VII retaliation claim. A separate implementing Order
will follow.

Date: March 31, 2026
________/s/
Charles D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11323997. Public record. Not legal advice.