# Szostak

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · May 7, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11323921

## Case

- **Full name:** Joseph Anthony Szostak, III v. Rutherford County Adult Detention Center, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** May 7, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOSEPH ANTHONY SZOSTAK, III,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:25-cv-01187
v.
Chief Judge William L. Campbell, Jr.
RUTHERFORD COUNTY ADULT Magistrate Judge Luke A. Evans
DEENTION CENTER, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pending before the Court are the following eight motions, including: (i) “Motion for
Enlargement of Time to Respond to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint” (Doc. No. 73, “Motion for
Extension”), (ii) “Motion for Case Status and, if Needed, Extension to File Amended Complaint”
(Doc. No 74, “Motion for Case Status”), (iii) “Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint”
(Doc. No. 75, “Motion to Amend”), (iv) “Order Directing Clerk to Enter Default Judgment” (Doc.
No. 79, “Motion for Entry of Default”), (v) “Motion to Object to Defendants’ Notice of
Appearance” (Doc. No. 80, “Motion to Disqualify”), (vi) “Motion to Object Defendants’ Request
for Enlargement of Time to Respond” (Doc. No. 81, “Motion to Object”), (vii) “Plaintiff’s
Renewed Motion for Appointment of Counsel” (Doc. No. 82, “Motion to Appoint Counsel”), and
(viii) “Motion to Strike Amendments Filed, DE 75” (Doc. No. 83, “Motion to Strike”).
For the reasons described herein, the Motion for Extension is DENIED AS MOOT (Doc.
No. 73), the Motion for Case Status is GRANTED (Doc. No. 74), the Motion to Amend is
GRANTED (Doc. No. 75), the Motion for Entry of Default is DENIED AS MOOT (Doc. No. 79),
the Motion to Disqualify is DENIED (Doc. No. 80), the Motion to Object is DENIED AS MOOT
(Doc. No. 81), the Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED (Doc. No. 82), and the Motion to Strike
is DENIED AS MOOT (Doc. No. 83).
1. Background
a. The Instant Matter
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pro se Plaintiff, Joseph Anthony Szostak, III, filed the instant
matter on October 14, 2025 (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff has since filed four Amended Complaints (Doc.

Nos. 34, 69, 70, and 75), nine motions to amend his Complaint (Doc. Nos. 6, 7, 9, 10, 28, 43, 56,
62, and 74), and eight supplements to his Amended Complaints (Doc. Nos. 8, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17,
31, 63). To date, the remaining Defendants are Deputy Jennifer Parker and Deputy Bryan Layhew,
each in their individual and official capacities (Doc. Nos. 70 at p. 2-3 and 75 at p. 2-3).
Plaintiff is an inmate of the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center (“RCADC”) (Doc.
No. 70 at p. 2). Contrary to protocol described in the RCADC inmate handbook, Plaintiff alleges
that (i) inmate legal mail is no longer opened and inspected for contraband in the inmate’s presence
and (ii) original versions of inmate legal mail are no longer accessible to the inmate (Doc. No. 70
at p. 3-4). Due to a change in mail policy at RCADC, inmate legal mail is now opened, copied,
and scanned before delivery to the inmate—with whom only copies are left—if delivery is made

to the inmate at all (Id. at p. 4-5). From June to July 2025, Plaintiff’s then defense attorney, Joe
Agee, sent him seven letters, none of which were delivered to Plaintiff (Id.). Plaintiff, believing
his letters were being ignored, filed a complaint against Mr. Agee with the Tennessee Board of
Professional Responsibility (Id. at 5). Mr. Agee subsequently withdrew his representation of
Plaintiff (Id. at 6). Plaintiff states that Mr. Agee’s withdrawal “ruined” his bond reduction hearing
and delayed his criminal trial by seven months (Id. at p. 11). Plaintiff now seeks monetary damages
and injunctive relief (Id. at p. 12).
b. Pending Motions
i. Motion for Extension and Motion to Object
Defendants requested an extension of time to June 1, 2026 to respond to Plaintiff’s second
Amended Complaint (Doc. Nos. 69 and 73 at p. 1).1 In support, Defendants point to Plaintiff’s

various filings and argue that additional time is thus needed to prepare their response or pre-answer
motion because each Amended Complaint “asserts claims spanning an extended time period
involving institutional practices at [RCADC]” (Doc. No. 73 at p. 2). Defendants also argue that
the Motion to Extend will neither unnecessarily delay the litigation, nor prejudice Plaintiff (Id.).
Plaintiff’s Motion to Object (Doc. No. 81) is effectively a responsive pleading to
Defendants’ Motion for Extension (Doc. No. 73). Therein, Plaintiff repeatedly contends that any
extension should be denied because Defendants were made aware of the instant matter by
Plaintiff—through grievances, internal communications, or statements that he intended to file
suit—and through service of process (Doc. No. 81 at p. 2, 4, 5, and 6).
ii. Motion for Case Status and Motion to Amend

Plaintiff’s prior motions to amend were denied (Doc. Nos. 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 28,
and 33). However, the Court previously afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to file an Amended
Complaint to serve as his singular, operative pleading (Doc. No. 33 at p. 3-4 (emphasis added)).
Therein, the Court also clarified for Plaintiff that a “piecemeal approach . . . to change (not
supplement) particular portions of the Complaint rather than amending in its entirety,” was not
appropriate (Id. at p. 3). Plaintiff was also previously granted an opportunity to make changes to

1 Defendants also note that Plaintiff’s third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 70) was filed
without leave of Court (Doc. No. 73 at p. 1).
existing named Defendants and add a new Defendant (Doc. No. 48), as well as a second
opportunity to amend (Doc. No. 57).
Plaintiff now seeks leave to file a fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 75).2 Additionally,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Case Status seeks to confirm whether the Court received three or four

amended complaints, sent in April 2026 and, if not, seeks leave to file yet another amended
complaint (Doc. No. 74).
In opposition, Defendants offer three arguments. First, Defendants maintain that further
amendment is neither warranted nor consistent with Rule 15 because Plaintiff’s repeated filings
have yielded “substantial confusion” as to which pleading is intended to be operative and what
specific allegations or claims are intended (Doc. No. 78 at p. 1-3). Next, Defendants state that
Plaintiff’s successive amendments “materially prejudiced” their ability to respond or prepare an
appropriate Rule 12 motion (Id. at p. 1-2). Finally, Defendants argue that “new and inconsistent
pleadings effectively reset[] the litigation . . . and delay[] resolution” (Id. at p. 3).
iii. Motion for Entry of Default

Next, Plaintiff requests this Court direct the Clerk of Court to enter default against
Defendants (Doc. No. 79 at p. 1). In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request is both
procedurally improper and premature (Doc. No. 84 at p. 1). In support, Defendants note their
Notices of Appearance (Doc. Nos. 71 and 72) and pending Motion for Extension (Doc. No. 73).
Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s serial filings remain subject to ongoing dispute and
clarification (Doc. No. 84 at p. 2).

2 Plaintiff’s fourth Amended Complaint is captioned as a motion for “Leave to File Amended
Complaint” (Doc. No. 75).
iv. Motion to Disqualify
While fashioned as an objection to Defendants’ notice of appearance, the Court construes
Plaintiff’s objection as a Motion to Disqualify (Doc. No. 80). See Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384,
387 (6th Cir. 1999) (Courts liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings and filings); see also

Gaston v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll. Chapter, No. 1:23-cv-00850, 2024 WL 167092, at *8 (Jan. 16,
2024). Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ counsel are “possible co-conspirators” and “creat[e] a
conflict of interest” because partners and associates of “Hudson, Reed & Christiansen PLLC []
will be called to testify and to give a deposition” at a later stage in the proceedings (Id. at p. 3).
In opposition, Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s request is procedurally improper and
without legal basis (Doc. No. 85). In support, Defendants contend that “Plaintiff cannot
manufacture a conflict of interest by objecting to opposing counsel’s representation where no
attorney-client relationship exists and no legally cognizable conflict is present” (Id. at p. 2).
Further, Defendants assert that “Plaintiff’s contention that defense counsel should be disqualified
based on alleged involvement in the development or approval of jail policies is speculative,

unsupported, and legally insufficient” (Id. at p. 3).
v. Motion to Appoint Counsel
Plaintiff has previously filed six motions for appointment of counsel (Doc. Nos. 5, 11, 13,
22, 35, and 37). Such motions have all been denied as premature because this case is in the pleading
stage (Doc. Nos. 33 and 48).
Plaintiff now files his seventh motion seeking appointment of counsel because his
“imprisonment greatly limits his ability to litigate[] and has limited access to the law library and
limited knowledge of the law” (Doc. No. 82 at p. 2). In support, Plaintiff claims Defendants’
counsel “agrees . . . that this case is complex and will require significant research” (Id.). In
opposition, Defendants argue that no extraordinary circumstances exist (Doc. No. 87).
vi. Motion to Stike
Finally, Plaintiff requests this Court strike his Motion to Amend (Doc. No. 75) and rely on

his Third Amended Complaint (Doc. Nos. 70 and 83 at p. 1). In support, Plaintiff states that his
Third Amended Complaint should be the operative complaint “until such time the Court files an
answer on Plaintiff’s Motion to Defendants’ Counsel, as the Defendants have alleged and
implicated Defendants’ counsel [sic] as co-defendants to the [] violation of Plaintiff’s First
Amendment [sic] rights, or, at the very least, as witnesses called to testify or give deposition in a
trial” (Id.).3
2. Legal Standard
a. Motion to Amend
Federal Rule 15(a)(2) allows a party to amend a pleading with the written consent of the
opposing party or leave of Court, which the Court “should freely give . . . when justice so requires.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “In determining whether to grant leave to amend, district courts should
consider several factors, including ‘undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad
faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendment, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of the amendment.’” Hopkins v. Chartrand, 566 Fed.
Appx. 445, 449 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, under Local Rule 15.01,
a motion to amend must describe the substance of the amendments sought and include as an exhibit
the signed proposed amended pleading. M.D. Tenn. L.R. 15.01(a)(1).

3 The Court notes that none of Plaintiff’s five Complaints name Defendants’ counsel as co-
defendant(s) in the instant matter (Doc. Nos. 1, 34, 69, 70, and 75).
b. Motion to Disqualify
While a district court has inherent authority to disqualify an attorney to aid the fair
administration of justice, this remedy is not to be used lightly; that is, courts must be sensitive to
the parties’ choice of counsel and weigh that interest against the public’s interest in fair judicial

process. See Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir.1988);
Cavender v. U.S. Xpress Enters. Inc., 191 F.Supp.2d 962, 965 (E.D. Tenn. 2002) (referring to
motions to disqualify as “very sensitive” and requiring the court to “exercise judgment with an eye
toward upholding the highest ethical standards of the profession, protecting the interest of the
litigants in being represented by the attorney of their choosing, protecting the loyalty and
confidences a prior client may have placed in a law firm or an attorney, and the overriding societal
interests in the integrity of the judicial process”).
c. Motion to Appoint Counsel
In civil actions, unlike criminal proceedings, there is no constitutional right to counsel.
Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605-06 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169,

1174 (11th Cir. 1985)); Hollis v. Perry, No. 3:17-cv-00626, 2018 WL 3572391, at *2 (M.D. Tenn.
July 24, 2018) (citing Willett v. Wells, 469 F. Supp. 748, 751 (E.D. Tenn. 1977)). District courts
have discretion to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), but
there must be exceptional circumstances justifying such an appointment. See Lavado, 992 F.2d at
606-07 (quoting Wahl, 773 F.2d at 1174); Miles v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 19-2218, 2020 WL
6121438, at *4 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir. 2003). To
determine “whether exceptional circumstances exist, a district court considers the type of case, the
ability of the pro se litigant to represent himself or herself, and the nature of the factual and legal
issues involved.” Hollis, 2018 WL 3572391, at *2.
3. Analysis
a. Motion to Amend
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. No. 75) appropriately conforms to this Court’s prior
Order in part by refraining from “piecemeal amendments” (Doc. No. 33 at p. 3). However, Plaintiff

has otherwise failed to comply with the second instruction that he file one “operative pleading
rendering all previous iterations void” (Doc. No. 33 at p. 3). See Burford v. Brun, No. 3:20-CV-
00549, 2020 WL 5893822, at *2 n. 1 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2020). Instead, Plaintiff has filed no less
than five additional filings (Doc. Nos. 34, 63, 69, 70, and 75), sought to confirm whether the Court
received three or four amended complaints in April 2026 alone (Doc. No. 74), and intermittingly
failed to seek leave of the Court prior to filing (See, e.g., Doc. No. 70). From these actions, it is
clear that Plaintiff misunderstands basic procedural requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Local Rules as well as prior directives from this Court.
To prevail in an opposition to a motion to amend, Defendants may show repeated failure
to cure or undue prejudice. See Hopkins v. Chartrand, 566 Fed. Appx. 445, 449. Such party must

“make some significant showing of prejudice,” namely “whether [the amendment] would require
[the] opposing party to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare
for trial [or] significantly delay resolution of [the] dispute.” Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Tucker
& Assoc., Inc., 64 F.3d 1001, 1009 (6th Cir. 1995); see Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 663 (6th
Cir. 1994). Defendants contend that successive amendments “materially prejudiced” their ability
to respond or prepare an appropriate Rule 12 motion (Doc. No. 78 at p. 1-2). Notably, Defendants
also structure their Motion to Extend as needing additional time to prepare a response or
appropriate Rule 12 motion because the pleadings are unclear (Doc. Nos. 69 and 73 at p. 1). This
is significant because Defendants cannot succeed in claiming that they need additional time to
respond to unclear successive pleadings while also claiming one additional amendment, which
would supersede all previous filings, would also result in additional significant resources or further
delays in resolution of the dispute. Id. Indeed, one operative, amended pleading would result in
less resources expended and a quicker resolution because all other pleadings would be superseded.

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has repeatedly filed various Amended
Complaints, motions to amend, and related supplements (Doc. No. 78 at p. 1-3). However, despite
certain limitations, curing deficiencies in a pleading by way of amendment conserves the Court’s
resources and “is an accepted and expeditious way to more quickly reach the merits of a dispute.”
Vision Real Est. Inv. Corp. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 3:18-cv-0014,
2018 WL 10228378, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2018) (quoting Nichols v. Vill. of Minerva, No.
5:14-cv-613, 2015 WL 845714, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2015)). While Defendants argue that
inconsistent pleadings reset the action and delay resolution (Doc. No. 78 at p. 3), the Court in part
disagrees. Allowance of a singular amendment, superseding all others, would expedite resolution and
serve as a better alternative to construing his fourth Amended Complaint in conjunction with all

past pleadings. Id.; see also Taylor-Merideth v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No.
3:16-cv-00612, 2017 WL 1164583, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 28, 2017).
Finally, because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court construes his filings liberally and holds
his pleadings “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]’” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). While
lenient treatment is generally accorded to pro se litigants, such treatment has limits and does not
entirely exempt such litigants from basic pleading essentials. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591,
594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir.1991). Limited to the
specific circumstances of this case, considerations of undue prejudice and repeated failure to cure
do not overcome the lenient treatment afforded to pro se litigants. For purposes of clarity, however,
Plaintiff is instructed that he is granted one amendment, superseding all previous iterations,
including his other amendments, motions to amend, and supplements. Plaintiff will have 14 days
from the entry of this Memorandum Order to file his amendment. Additionally, Plaintiff is advised
that any further practice of serial filings seeking to amend without leave of the Court and a showing

of good cause will be denied. Wells, 891 F.2d at 594; see also Jourdan, 951 F.2d at 110.
b. Motion to Disqualify
Plaintiff concludes that there is a conflict of interest with Defendants’ counsel because he
intends to depose and call them to testify at trial (Doc. No. 80 at p. 3). Disqualification, however,
is not a remedy to be used lightly. Manning, 849 F.2d at 224. This is especially so where Plaintiff
has failed to either explain what deposition or testimony would lend to material or contested issues
or offer any legal support for his argument, for e.g., Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7. See, e.g.,
Boyle v. Evolve Bank & Trust, No. 16-02171, 2017 WL 11236962, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 20,
2017); See also, e.g., G.D. & R.D. obo G.D. v. Utica Cmty. Sch., No. 20-12864, 2022 WL 2975821,
at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 27, 2022) (stating the party seeking disqualification has the burden of

“demonstrating specifically how and as to what issues in the case the likelihood of prejudice will
result”). Further, disqualification for deposition or testimony, potentially to be provided at a
different stage, is premature. See G.D. obo G.D., 2022 WL 2975821, at *3. As a result, there is not
enough before the Court at this stage to disqualify Defendants’ counsel.
c. Motion to Appoint Counsel
As previously instructed by this Court, appointment of counsel is inappropriate at this
stage. Plaintiff’s serial filings demonstrate that he is capable of representing his own legal interests.
Lavado, 992 F.2d at 604, 606; see Stewart v. United States, 2017 WL 939197, at n.1 (W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 7, 2017) (“Nothing distinguishes this case from the numerous other petitions filed by indigent
prisoners and Petitioner has been able to proceed proficiently on his own at all stages of this
litigation” (citation omitted)). Further, while Plaintiff contends that Defendants agree that this case
is complex (Doc. No. 82 at p. 2), Defendants’ Motion for Extension is better understood as taking
issue with the delicate complexity in responding to multiple, inconsistent filings, rather than the
type of case or nature of the factual and legal issues involved (Doc. No. 73 at p. 2). /d.; Hollis,
2018 WL 3572391, at *2. For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances to justify appointment of counsel.
4, Conclusion
Accordingly, considering the foregoing analysis, Defendants’ Motion for Extension (Doc.
No. 73) is DENIED AS MOOT, Plaintiff's Motion for Case Status (Doc. No. 74) is GRANTED,
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (Doc. No. 75) is GRANTED, Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default
is DENIED AS MOOT (Doc. No. 79), Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify (Doc. No. 80) is DENIED
without prejudice to renewal at a subsequent stage, if appropriate, Plaintiff's Motion to Object
(Doc. No. 81) is DENIED AS MOOT, Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 82) is DENIED,
without prejudice to renewal at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, if appropriate, and
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Doc. No. 83) is DENIED AS MOOT.*
The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff 20 copies of the pleading forms.
It is so ORDERED. oY _
i Ko
eee FLA
United States Magistrate Judge

4 Pursuant to Local Rule 7.01(b), the Court “may act on the motion prior to the time allowed
for response.” M.D. Tenn. 7.01(b).

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11323921. Public record. Not legal advice.