# Dorn

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · April 22, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11323461

## Case

- **Full name:** James Dorn v. Eric Wangler
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** April 22, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JAMES DORN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 22-CV-02378-SPM

ERIC WANGLER,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McGLYNN, District Judge:
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant Eric Wangler. (Doc. 55). Plaintiff James Dorn responded in opposition.
(Docs. 57, 59). Having been fully informed of the issues presented, Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Dorn, a transgender1 inmate currently incarcerated at Pontiac
Correction Center in Illinois, filed the instant case on October 12, 2022. (See Doc. 1).
Dorn has been continuously housed within the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) since 2001. (See Doc. 55, Ex. A, 8:22–10:4). Over the past five years, Dorn
has been housed at multiple IDOC facilities, including Lawrence Correctional Center
from June 2, 2020 to July 14, 2021; Pinckneyville Correctional Center from July 14,
2021 to June 23, 2022; Hill Correctional Center from June 23, 2022 to March 5, 2023;

1 Plaintiff James Dorn is a biological male who identifies as a transgender woman. Plaintiff will be
addressed by her requested pronouns she/her.
and Menard Correctional Center from March 5, 2023 to October 21, 2025. (See id.,
Ex. B). Dorn alleges that Defendant Wangler, while serving as a lieutenant in
Plaintiff’s housing wing at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, failed to protect her
from assault by another inmate, including from being spat upon. (See Doc. 17).

Specifically, Dorn contends that Wangler was on notice based on prior alleged attacks
against transgender inmates, letters sent to him, and a conversation with Dorn. (See
Doc. 59, pp. 4–5).
This Court screened Plaintiff’s original Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A and dismissed it without prejudice on February 6, 2023. (See Doc. 15). The
operative First Amended Complaint was filed on February 22, 2023. (See Doc. 17).

The First Amended Complaint asserted various claims against officials at both
Pinckneyville Correctional Center and Hill Correctional Center. (See id.). This Court
screened the First Amended Complaint and severed the claims relating to the events
at Hill Correctional Center; these claims were transferred to the United States
District Court for the Central District of Illinois. (Doc. 21 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 93(b),
1391(b), 1404(a))). The only remaining claim in this case is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Eighth
Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendant Eric Wangler, a lieutenant at

Pinckneyville at all relevant times. (Doc. 55, ¶ 6 (citing id., Ex. A, 27:5–20)).
Dorn’s Eighth Amendment allegations stem from several incidents that she
claims warranted protection from Wangler. The material facts surrounding these
incidents are undisputed. (See Docs. 55, 59). The first incident occurred sometime in
April 2022, when Dorn witnessed a fight between Inmate Minor and Inmate Ross,
the latter of whom is another transgender individual and Dorn’s close friend. (See
Doc. 55, Ex. A, 27:19–28–5). Minor allegedly attacked Ross while she was getting her
hair cut. (Id.). The fight lasted approximately sixty seconds, and officers broke it up
after being notified. (Id., 39:14–16). Defendant Wangler was one of the officers
present. (Id., 39:19–24). Dorn did not contact Wangler concerning the alleged

incident. (Id., 38:19–40:3). Put another way, after this first incident, Dorn did not file
correspondence of any kind with Wangler; critically, she did not express concerns
either about perceived threats to her safety or about any specific, impending, and
substantial threat. (See id., 43:7–14). According to Dorn’s Deposition in relation to
the first incident, she “basically did nothing.” (Id.).
The second incident occurred on May 3, 2022. (See Doc. 55, pp. 3–4). According

to Dorn, Minor sexually assaulted Ross and then spat on Ross after she refused his
advances. (See Doc. 55, Ex. A, 45:24–46:6). Dorn did not witness this incident and
learned of it from Ross. (Id., 44:24–45:9). Afterward, Dorn allegedly spoke with
Wangler and asked why Minor remained in the same wing despite his alleged
propensity to assault other transgender inmates. (Id., 46:24–47:1). That same day,
Dorn assisted Ross in writing a letter to Wangler describing the ongoing incidents
involving Minor. (Id., 48:12–20). In Ross’s letter, she alleged that Minor was

harassing transgender inmates, that no action had been taken, and she requested
that Wangler remove Minor from 5 House. (Id., 48:21–49:4). Subsequently, sometime
between May 3 and May 15, 2022, Dorn alleges that she wrote her own letter to
Wangler. (Id., 50:9–19). Dorn placed the letter in her cell door but does not know who
retrieved it. (Id., 50:20–51:12). Dorn did not attach the letter to her Complaint,
recreate its contents, or produce any evidence that Wangler ever read it. (See Doc. 17;
Doc. 55, Ex. A, 31:14–16, 32:25–33:2). Additionally, Dorn never followed up with
Wangler regarding the letter, either in person or otherwise. (Id., 31:17–19). Wangler
never told Dorn that he had ever read or received a letter from her. (Id., 52:8–10).
The third incident involved a direct altercation between Dorn and Minor. On

May 15, 2022, both individuals stood in the chow line outside B Wing while heading
to the lunchroom. (Doc. 55, p. 5; id., Ex. A, 55:1–17). Dorn stood next to Minor and
was speaking with Ross when Dorn felt spit on her arm. (Id., Ex. A, 57:16–18). Dorn
asked Minor whether he had spat on her, to which Minor responded, “Yeah, you a
disgrace to Vice Lord.” (Id., 55:20–56:25). Dorn then grabbed Minor, and the two
began to fight. (Id., 57:16–18; 55:20–56:25). Officers immediately intervened and

broke up the altercation. (Id., 61:25–62:4). Dorn asserted that she had suffered facial
lacerations from her altercation with Minor. (Id., 65:17–20). Wangler was not present
during the incident. (Id., 60:7–14).2
Defendant Wangler’s Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on January 21,
2026. (Doc. 55). Plaintiff initially responded on January 29, 2026. (Doc. 57). This
Court permitted Plaintiff to file a supplemental response because her January 29,
2026 Response did not comply with Local Rule 56.1(b) in that it failed to address

Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts. (See Doc. 58). Plaintiff Dorn’s

2 In Plaintiff’s Response to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, Dorn asserts new facts when
disputing Wangler’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. (See Doc. 59). However, Dorn provides
no evidentiary support for these assertions and instead offers additional facts without citations to
specific portions of the record. See Local Rule 56.1(c) (“The Statement of Additional Material Facts
must contain specific citation(s) to the record, including page number(s).”). As discussed, Dorn
previously failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 and was ordered to provide a supplemental response.
(See Doc. 58). Because Dorn once more failed to comply with the Local Rules, this Court will not
consider her unsupported statements.
Supplemental Response was filed on February 11, 2026. (Doc. 59). Wangler filed a
Reply on March 5, 2026 (Doc. 61).3
APPLICABLE LAW AND LEGAL STANDARDS
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2014)
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). Once the moving party has set forth the basis for
summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go
beyond mere allegations and offer specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
of fact for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–

23 (1986). Stated another way, the nonmoving party must offer more than
“[c]onclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts,” to establish a genuine issue
of material fact. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan v.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).
In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must view the
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.
Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A genuine issue of material fact arises
only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists to permit a jury to
return a verdict for that party.” Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 640–41
(7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2008)).

3 Dorn filed a sur-reply on March 30, 2025 (Doc. 61). This Court ordered it stricken from the record in
accordance with Local Rule 7.1(a)(4). (See Doc. 62).
The nonmovant cannot simply rely on its pleadings; the nonmovant must present
admissible evidence that sufficiently shows the existence of each element of its case
on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Midwest Imps., Ltd. v. Coval, 71
F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 596

(7th Cir. 1995); Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391,
394 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1111 (1994); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24).
ANALYSIS
I. Deliberate Indifference
“It is well settled that the Eighth Amendment requires correctional officials to
protect inmates from certain dangers posed by other inmates.” Hunter v. Mueske, 73

F.4th 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833–34 (1994);
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). “That does not mean, however, that a
constitutional violation occurs every time an inmate gets into a fight.” Id. “Failure to
protect a prisoner from a known risk of harm constitutes an Eighth Amendment
violation only if the defendants act with deliberate indifference—‘something
approaching a total unconcern for inmate safety.’” Gibson v. Fox, No. 24-2055, 2025
WL 586833, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 24, 2025) (citing Hunter, 73 F.4th at 565); see also

Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2012); Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757,
762 (7th Cir. 2006); Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2022).
“A ‘deliberate indifference’ violation has two components, one objective and one
subjective.” Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2020), as amended (July
2, 2020). “The objective component is that the prisoner must have been exposed to a
harm that was objectively serious” and the “[t]he subjective component is that the
prison official must have known of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate’s
health or safety.” Id. at 654–55 (citing Farmer at 834, 837–88; LaBrec v. Walker, 948
F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2020)). In order to send an Eighth Amendment failure to
protect claim to trial, the plaintiff must “marshal sufficient evidence from which a

reasonable jury could find that (1) he was exposed to an ‘excessive’ risk of harm that
actually materialized; (2) the defendants had actual knowledge of that risk; and (3)
the defendants’ response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference
toward the risk.” Gibson, 2025 WL 586833, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 24, 2025) (citing
Hunter, 73 F.4th at 565).
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Wangler asserts that Dorn has failed to

establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to the second element of deliberate
indifference, whether Defendant had actual knowledge of the risk. (See Doc. 55, p.
10–11). Wangler argues that Dorn cannot establish that he possessed actual
knowledge that Dorn feared for her life, either from written or face-to-face
communication. (Id.). Wangler contends that Dorn acknowledged that she cannot
prove he received or read the letter at issue. (Id.). Additionally, Wangler asserts that
Dorn’s conversation with him regarding why Inmate Minor remained housed in 5

House after the altercation with Ross on May 3, 2022 did not sufficiently
communicate any fear for Dorn’s safety. (Id., p. 11). According to Wangler, Dorn’s
complaints about Inmate Minor were generalized and showed only that Dorn disliked
Minor and objected to his alleged harassment of others. (Id.). Wangler, therefore,
maintains that these statements did not place him on actual notice of a substantial
risk of harm and cannot support a finding of deliberate indifference. (Id.). Plaintiff
responds that her conversation with Wangler, together with her identification as a
member of an identifiable group of prisoners frequently singled out for violent
attacks, was sufficient to place Wangler on notice of a substantial threat to her safety.
(Doc. 59, p. 5).

Thus, the parties dispute the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference
claim. See Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)). To succeed on the subjective prong, “the official
must have actual, and not merely constructive, knowledge of the risk in order to be
held liable.” Id. The prison official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must

also draw that inference.” Id. “Although this inquiry focuses on an official’s subjective
knowledge, a prisoner need not present direct evidence of the official’s state of mind:
‘Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a
question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from
circumstantial evidence . . . .’” Id. Therefore, Dorn’s claim turns on whether Wangler
possessed a subjective awareness that a substantial risk of harm existed.
In failure to protect cases, “a prisoner normally proves actual knowledge of

impending harm by showing that he complained to prison official about a specific
threat to his safety.” Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
However, complaints that convey only a generalized, vague, or stale concern about
one’s safety typically will not support an inference that a prison official had actual
knowledge that the prisoner was in danger. See Gevas, 798 F.3d at 480–81 (collecting
cases). Additionally, a prisoner sending communications to a prison official anywhere
in the corrections hierarchy does not constitute adequate notice to the official. Vance
v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff still has the burden of
demonstrating that the communication, in its content and manner of transmission,
gave the prison official sufficient notice to alert him or her to “an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Id. The Seventh Circuit provided the following colorful
example: “picture an inmate with a cobra in his cell. If the prison officials ‘know that
there is a cobra there or at least that there is a high probability of a cobra there, and
do nothing, that is deliberate indifference.’” Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Thus, to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff Dorn must offer some admissible

evidence that Defendant Wangler knew of a constitutional deprivation and approved
it, turned a blind eye to it, failed to remedy it, or in some way personally participated
in it. See Vance, 97 F.3d at 994.
When the Court reviews the summary judgment record as a whole, it becomes
clear that Plaintiff Dorn has not met her burden to show a genuine dispute of material
fact as to Defendant Wangler’s knowledge. (See Doc. 55, Ex. A, 50:20–51:12, 61:2–7).
At her Deposition, Dorn testified that she never told Wangler that there was a specific

threat against her. (See Doc 55, Ex. A, 61:2–7). When asked if Wangler could have
known that Minor would fight Dorn, she replied “[n]ot me, per se, but it was a
possibility that Minor could put his hand on another transgender, yes, because he
had done it already to two others.” (Id., Ex. A, 61:4–7). Dorn insists that she sent
Wangler a letter requesting that Minor be transferred at some point after Minor
assaulted Ross on May 3 and before the altercation between Minor and Dorn on May
15, 2022. (Id., Ex. A,51:1–12). However, Dorn’s Cumulative Counseling Summary
does not list any grievances or communications related to the incident between Ross
and Minor between May 3 and May 15, 2022. (See Doc. 60, Ex. B, p. 23).
Her further assertion that Wangler must have known about her grievances

with Minor and the resulting risk of harm is equally unavailing. Dorn’s contention
that Wangler, as the “lieutenant of the building,” necessarily would have been aware
of the grievance rests on speculation, not evidence. (See id., 33:22–34:7). The Seventh
Circuit has expressly held that “speculation is insufficient to defeat a summary
judgment motion” because it “cannot create a genuine issue of fact.” Flowers v. Kia
Motors Fin., 105 F.4th 939, 946–47 (7th Cir. 2024). This conclusion is consistent with

Vance v. Peters, in which the Seventh Circuit held that an inmate’s claim failed
because she did “not supply, in her description of the purported letter, any detail to
permit the conclusion that the letter sufficiently advised the warden of the situation
to require her intervention.” 97 F.3d 987, 994 (7th Cir. 1996). The same logic applies
here. Dorn has offered no evidence that Wangler actually received, read, or was
otherwise sufficiently alerted by the May 2022 letter such that intervention would be
required. See id. (“The lapses in her own testimony are not cured by other evidentiary

submissions. There is no corroborative evidence with respect to the letters that Ms.
Vance says that she sent to the defendant officials. She had no copy of a letter and no
letter was produced from any other source.”).
That being said, even if we do assume that Wangler received and read the
alleged letter, Dorn has failed to establish that this letter described a threat against
her, specifically. Dorn asserts that the letter was sent and contends that she could
not control the jail’s mailing procedures once she placed the letter on the bars of her
cell for collection. (Doc. 55, Ex. A, 32:14–20). Sending mail via the prison mail system
supports an inference of receipt, even if the recipient denies ever receiving it. See
Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 767 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing

Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018)). However, even making this
inference in Dorn’s favor, Dorn admits that her purported letter contained only vague,
nonspecific concerns that could not have put Defendant Wangler on notice of a specific
threat to Dorn’s safety; rather, she insisted that Minor’s attack on Ross showed that
Minor had demonstrated violent tendencies towards transgender individuals. (See
Doc. 55, Ex. A, 50:20–51:12, 61:2–7).

The same is true of Dorn’s alleged conversation with Wangler regarding
Minor’s presence on B-wing; this alleged interaction amounts to nothing more than a
vague and generalized complaint rather than a specific warning of a threat against
her. The context of this exchange arose after an incident involving Minor and Dorn’s
friend Ross. (See id., 51:22–23). At her Deposition, Dorn explained that Minor had
allegedly been harassing Ross shortly before this conversation occurred. (See id.,
45:22–47:1). According to Dorn, Minor attempted to “sexually touch” Ross, in which

Ross rejected the advance, and Minor responded by spitting on Ross. (Id.). Dorn
learned of this interaction and then approached Wangler about the situation. (Id.).
During that brief encounter, Dorn asked Wangler why Minor was “still on the wing
and steadily doing this to transgenders.” (Id.). However, the conversation was fleeting
and occurred immediately after Dorn returned from group. (See id., 45:10–14). Dorn
did not provide details about the alleged conduct beyond this generalized statement,
nor did she describe any specific threat directed toward her personally. Thus, Dorn’s
statement to Wangler—asking why Minor was still on the wing and complaining that
he was “doing this to transgenders”—did not identify a specific threat directed toward
Dorn herself, nor did it describe any imminent danger. (Id., Ex. A, 46:24–47:1).

Without evidence that Wangler personally knew of and disregarded a substantial risk
of harm, Dorn cannot establish the personal involvement required for § 1983 liability.
As the Seventh Circuit put it, “[a]s it turned out, there was a cobra lurking in the
grass; the objective prong is satisfied. But that’s not dispositive. The focus is on the
defendants’ subjective state of mind, and for all they knew, [the plaintiff] was being
harassed by a garter snake. Irritating, yes. Deadly, no.” Dale, 548 F.3d at 659.

In summary, when considering all of the evidence marshaled by the parties, it
is clear that Dorn has failed to present genuine issues of material fact sufficient to
rebut Wangler’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, Defendant Wangler’s
Motion for Summary Judgment shall be granted.
II. Qualified Immunity
In the alternative, Wangler argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
(See Doc. 55, p. 14). While the Court need not assess Wangler’s qualified immunity

argument by virtue of the fact that Dorn’s Eighth Amendment claim does not survive
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will briefly discuss the
applicability of qualified immunity to the instant facts.
Wangler asserts that government officials performing discretionary functions
are shielded from liability unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. (Id., p. 14
(citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))). He contends that he acted
based on his understanding of the law and that imposing liability under these facts
would require an impermissible expansion of existing law. (Doc. 55, at 14–15). Dorn
responds that her deliberate indifference claim forecloses qualified immunity. (Doc.

59, p. 5–6).
“Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, but once it is raised the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to defeat it.” Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir.
2020) (citing Sparing v. Vill. of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2001)).
“To overcome qualified immunity, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to [the
plaintiff] must ‘show that the defendant[s] violated a constitutional right’ and that

‘the right was clearly established at [that] time.’” Id. (quoting Estate of Clark v.
Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2017)). Notably, “It is not enough that the rule is
suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be clear enough that every
reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff
seeks to apply.” Henry, 969 F.3d at 785 (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583
U.S. 48, 63 (2018)). “The right must be established not as a general proposition but
in a particularized manner so its contours are clear to a reasonable official.” Id. (citing

Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 (2012)).
As assessed supra, even viewed in the light most favorable to her, Dorn’s
Eighth Amendment claim does not survive scrutiny and, thus, fails the first prong in
the qualified immunity analysis. Regarding the second prong, prisoners do have the
clearly established right to be safe from other inmates. See Hunter, 73 F.4th at 65
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833–34; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
However, qualified immunity is a conjunctive test, and failure upon either element
grants qualified immunity to the prison official. See Thomas v. Carmichael, 164 F.4th
1058, 1065 (7th Cir. 2026) (explaining the two-prong test and stating that “[ilf the
answer under either prong is “no,” immunity attaches and bars a claim’). Dorn’s
failure to establish a genuine dispute of a material fact as to Wangler’s actual
knowledge of a substantial risk of harm would have entitled Wangler to qualified
immunity.
Therefore, because Dorn cannot demonstrate a constitutional violation,
Wangler would be entitled to qualified immunity if Dorn’s Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim had survived.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Eric Wangler’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 55) is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The
Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case on the Court’s docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 22, 2026

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11323461. Public record. Not legal advice.