# Kainz

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · May 7, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11323410

## Case

- **Full name:** Heather Kainz, Sara Bailey, Rebecca Buczkowski, Sabrina Drysdale, and Rebekah McGrath, on Behalf of Themselves and a Class of Similarly Situated Persons v. Illinois Department of Corrections; Latoya Hughes, in her Official Capacity as Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections; Leonta Jackson, former Warden, in his Individual Capacity; Mindi Nurse, in her Official Capacity as the Warden of Pontiac Correctional Center; Teri Kennedy, former Warden, in her Individual Capacity; Emily Ruskin, former Warden, in her Individual Capacity; Kelly Renzi, former IDOC Psychology Administrator, in her Individual Capacity
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** May 7, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11323410

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that “some – maybe many – class members will have had comparable experiences. But the plaintiffs have not proven that for the entire class.”

## Opinion text

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

HEATHER KAINZ, SARA BAILEY,
REBECCA BUCZKOWSKI,
SABRINA DRYSDALE, and
REBEKAH McGRATH, on Behalf of Case No. 1:21-cv-01250-JEH-RLH
Themselves and a Class of Similarly
Situated Persons,
Plaintiffs,

v.

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; LATOYA
HUGHES, in her Official Capacity as
Director of the Illinois Department of
Corrections; LEONTA JACKSON,
former Warden, in his Individual
Capacity; MINDI NURSE, in her
Official Capacity as the Warden of
Pontiac Correctional Center; TERI
KENNEDY, former Warden, in her
Individual Capacity; EMILY
RUSKIN, former Warden, in her
Individual Capacity; KELLY RENZI,
former IDOC Psychology
Administrator, in her Individual
Capacity; JOHN SOKOL, in his
Individual Capacity; and WEXFORD
HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
Defendants.

Order
Now before the Court is the Defendants’ Joint Motion for Reconsideration
(D. 205).1 For the reasons set forth infra, the Motion is DENIED.
I
On March 10, 2026, the Court entered an Order (D. 203) granting the
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (D. 171). The named Plaintiffs, a
collection of mental and medical healthcare workers, employed either jointly by
IDOC and Wexford, by just IDOC, or by one through the other, who worked at
IDOC at varying times between 2015 and the present, filed their lawsuit alleging
the Defendants intentionally subjected them and the class to unequal and
discriminatory treatment in violation of the Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The contours of the
Plaintiffs’ claims – the crux of which is they were/are allegedly being forced to
endure exposure to masturbation and other vulgarities and sexual harassment on
a regular basis as a term and condition of their employment – are set out in the
Court’s Order granting their Motion for Class Certification, and it is unnecessary
to repeat all that here given the parties’ and Court’s familiarity with the procedural
history and the controlling Third Amended Complaint (D. 114). That background
is incorporated herein.
In granting the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, the Court first
refined the proposed Class and Subclass definitions by replacing
“nonsupervisory” with “non-executive.” 3/10/2026 Order (D. 203 at ECF p. 6).
The Court then considered the four requirements for class certification under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), ultimately finding that numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation were all satisfied here.
In doing so, the Court discussed the case both the Wexford and IDOC Defendants

1 Citations to the electronic docket are abbreviated as “D. ___ at ECF p. ___.”
relied heavily upon, Howard v. Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 989 F.3d 587 (7th Cir.
2021), and ultimately rejected the Defendants’ attempt to place this case squarely
within the contours of that case, mentioning it 15 times throughout the Order. The
Court instead relied upon and found as did the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois in granting class certification in Brown v. Cook County, 332 F.R.D.
229 (N.D. Ill. 2019), wherein the plaintiffs alleged the Cook County Public
Defender and the Cook County Sheriff created a hostile work environment for the
women they employed because detainees targeted the plaintiffs for the detainees’
exhibitionist attacks. Id. at 233-34. Among other things, this Court faulted the
Wexford Defendants for making arguments that crossed the line into the territory
of excessive consideration of the merits, the IDOC Defendants spent too much of
their brief identifying the “differences” in this case, and the Defendants made too
much of the supervisor/non-supervisor positions the various class members held.
The Court further found that it was possible to certify the injunctive aspects of the
suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and the damages aspects under
Rule 23(b)(3), and the Plaintiffs, in turn, satisfied the predominance and
superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
In their instant Joint Motion for Reconsideration, all three sets of Defendants
(Wexford, IDOC, and Individual) argue “[t]he Court’s failure to consider the
various different contexts in which potential class members worked and
potentially witnessed inmate sexual misconduct misapplies the lessons of Howard”
insofar as Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality factor is concerned. Defs.’ Mem. (D. 206 at
ECF p. 10). The Defendants similarly argue the Court’s Rule 23(a)(3) typicality
finding “ignores the substantial differences in the type of experiences identified
by the named Plaintiffs as compared to class members in other positions.” Id. at
ECF p. 14. As for Rule 23(b)(2) predominance and superiority, the Defendants
likewise argue the Court’s reasoning is at odds with and rests on a fundamental
misreading of Howard, respectively. Lastly, the Defendants argue the Court’s
continued inclusion of “supervisors” in the class does not make the named
Plaintiffs adequate class members. Id. at ECF p. 16. Ultimately, they argue the
Court’s earlier analysis committed manifest error warranting reconsideration and
reversal of the Court’s decision regarding class certification.2
II
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs motion to reconsider filed
before the entry of final judgment. See Galvan v. Norberg, 678 F.3d 581, 587 n.3 (7th
Cir. 2012) (“Rule 54(b) governs non-final orders and permits revision at any time
prior to the entry of judgment . . . ”.). Rule 54(b) provides in relevant part:
[A]ny order or other decision . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does
not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised
at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims
and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.

FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). “[M]otions to reconsider an order under Rule 54(b) are
judged by largely the same standards as motions to alter or amend a judgment
under Rule 59(e): to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.” Woods v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 827-28 (E.D. Wis.
2010) (citing Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987)).
An order shall be altered or amended where the court: 1) patently misunderstood
a party; 2) made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented; or 3) made an
error not of reasoning but of apprehension. Hutcherson v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut
Corp., 803 F. Supp. 2d 952, 956 (S.D. Ind. 2011). “Because the standards for

2 The Court notes that in the “Standard of Review” section of their brief, the Defendants cite Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(b), while in the “Conclusion” section of their brief, they cite Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). Defs.’ Mem. (D. 206 at ECF pp. 2, 17). The latter is inapplicable as it provides, “A motion
to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 59(e) (emphasis added).
reconsideration are exacting, the Seventh Circuit has stressed that appropriate
issues for reconsideration ‘rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be
equally rare.’” Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 3d 1036,
1044 (C.D. Ill. 2017) (quoting Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906
F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990)). A “manifest error” is “not demonstrated by the
disappointment of the losing party. It is the wholesale disregard, misapplication,
or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d
601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000). Finally, “Motions to reconsider, while permitted, are
generally disfavored.” Birdo v. Dave Gomez, 214 F. Supp. 3d 709, 714 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
17, 2016).
A
As for commonality, the Defendants argue the Court did not directly
dispute there are “two different employers, and 16 different jobs with vastly
different job duties which directly impacted the amount and type of interactions
between an employee and inmates most likely to engage in sexual misconduct.”
Defs.’ Mem. (D. 206 at ECF p. 3). They say that the Court found the differences
“non-material” in contravention of the Seventh Circuit’s admonition in Howard.
Specifically, the Defendants exhaustively attempt to identify the differences
between class members in this case: 16 job classifications; five independent
assignments within Pontiac Correctional Center (Pontiac); the frequency and type
of exposure that was experienced by medical staff versus that experienced by
mental health staff; the type, frequency, and degree of exposure among different
medical staff positions; the type, frequency, and degree of exposure based on
where mental health staff were assigned to work in Pontiac and the prison
population they worked with; the background of the individual inmates engaging
in misconduct; inmates’ SMI versus general population status; the backgrounds,
training, job duties, and experiences of the employee who witnessed inmate sexual
misconduct; and prisons versus jails.
The Plaintiffs highlight the dissimilarities between the facts in Howard and
here, including: the qualitative differences in duties and functions between class
members in Howard (e.g., sworn corrections officers and civilian employees);
inmate populations (6,500 inmates residing in Cook County Jail at any given time
versus 1,000 inmates at Pontiac); male and female detainees charged with a gamut
of offenses at Cook County Jail versus only males already convicted at Pontiac;
and class members in Howard who were geographically disbursed in ways not
present here.
The Court first (again) stresses that the “merits themselves are not on the
table at this early stage.” Howard, 989 F.3d at 597 (quoting Beaton v. SpeedyPC
Software, 907 F.3d 1018, 1025 (7th Cir. 2018)). Also, the Court remains mindful of
the fact that “class claims must depend on a common contention” which is not
simply peripheral to most of the individual class members’ claims. Howard, 989
F.3d at 598 (internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, by merely again
identifying/listing/presenting the alleged differences between class members in
this case and attempting to force the contours of this case into the exact contours
of the Howard case, the Defendants do not demonstrate the misapplication of
Howard; the Defendants instead reveal they simply disagree with the Court’s
analysis and wish to take a second bite at the apple. The Plaintiffs’ emphasis on
the dissimilarities between the facts of Howard and this case, which the Plaintiffs
in their Motion for class certification listed and the Court itself already emphasized
in its March 10th Order, reveals the impropriety of the Defendants’ Motion for
Reconsideration. Each class member here worked in Pontiac’s Programs
Department, all held civilian positions with primary duties that required them to
work directly, face to face with Pontiac’s all-male predominantly maximum-
security population, and there is testimony that class members were required to
rotate and travel throughout the prison’s cellhouses, Health Care Unit, infirmary,
and yards regardless of their positions or whether they worked through Wexford.
The Court’s analysis at pages 10 through 18 of its March 10th Order directly
addresses and rejects the Defendants’ instant, renewed arguments. 3/10/2026
Order (D. 203 at ECF pp. 10-18) (detailing Howard along with Bolden v. Walsh
Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2012), and Brown and, among other things,
contrasting the Howard class members with those here, stating the common
questions the IDOC Defendants demanded distorted the actual test for them as
articulated by the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit, and also explaining this
case’s similarity to Brown in which the plaintiff’s motion for class certification was
granted). With regard to SMI status, the Court already determined, overall, “this
case alleges a singular crisis at a single prison involving a singular inmate population
(albeit SMI and otherwise), alleges a singular portion of prison staffing – mental and
medical healthcare, and alleges a singular environment in which the female mental
and medical non-executive female healthcare employees worked.” 3/10/2026
Order (D. 203 at ECF p. 29) (emphasis added). The Defendants do no more than
argue that SMI status is “potentially” material, yet again revealing simple
disagreement rather than the Court’s manifest error. The Defendants argue
similarly as to the different training employees who witnessed inmate sexual
misconduct received, and so that argument fails for the same reason.
A re-reading of the Howard opinion convinces the Court it did not misapply
that opinion to the facts of this case. Tellingly, the Seventh Circuit stated in Howard
that “[s]ome variation among class claims is inevitable[.]” 989 F.3d at 598. That
exists here – some variation – but not the “significant variation in harassment levels
across different parts of the jail complex” in Howard which the Seventh Circuit said
“render[ed] certain class members’ work environments materially different from
those of others.” Id. (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit further explained that
hostile work environment claims involve “‘worker-specific’ inquiries because they
depend on a class member’s unique experience – which correlates to where she
works.” Id. at 604 (emphasis added).3 As this Court explained in its March 10th
Order, the class members here performed similar job duties to one another and
performed those duties in the same locations in Pontiac, and they traveled throughout
Pontiac. (D. 203 at ECF p. 13). In other words, the “where” in this case is the same
for all of the class members, rendering the class members’ worker-specific
inquiries not so unique as to defeat commonality. Compare Howard, 989 F.3d at 604
(observing that “some – maybe many – class members will have had comparable
experiences. But the plaintiffs have not proven that for the entire class.”).
Ultimately, the particular facts in Howard led to the particular result there,
and the particular facts here, as established by the evidence presented, are not the
same or even similar enough to those in Howard for this Court to reach the same
conclusions as did the Seventh Circuit in Howard pertaining to commonality. Cf.
Howard, 989 F.3d at 605 (“Without a stronger evidentiary showing, the plaintiffs
cannot demonstrate that class members working in disparate parts of the massive
jail complex have experienced the same work environment.”). It bears mentioning
that in Howard, the Seventh Circuit stated, “[W]e do not suggest that none of the
class members here could band together to form a smaller class or classes.
Conceivably, a smaller class comprising a subset of class members who have had
comparable experiences could form a coherent class.” Id. at 605. The facts of this
case more squarely fall into the suggested smaller class of members with
comparable experiences.

3 Notably, unlike in Howard, the Defendants do not argue the reported incidents (via tickets) stemmed from
just one part of the jail or involved just one subset of Pontiac’s inmate population. Compare Howard, 989
F.3d at 604 (“[B]ut the evidence shows that [sexual harassment] is heavily concentrated within a few
residential divisions where a fraction of class members and named plaintiffs work.”
Insofar as the Defendants’ argument that whether they acted negligently is
not a common question under the authority of Howard, their arguments all fail for
the reasons already (again) discussed herein. As the Plaintiffs argue with regard
to the Defendants’ “overstate[ment]” as to the impact of Rasho, the Rasho
settlement agreement imposed some limitations, but those constraints are
common to all class members. The Plaintiffs are also correct that the Defendants
advance no new arguments with regard to the questions the Plaintiffs listed, and
the Court included in its March 10th Order, as both common to the class and as
the majority of factual and legal questions in this case. Lastly, as to whether IDOC
and Wexford are “employers” for purposes of imposing Title VII liability, indeed,
the Defendants ignore that establishing an employment relationship with IDOC is
a predicate to Title VII liability for the Wexford Subclass. See 3/10/2026 Order (D.
203 at ECF p. 8) (“To establish IDOC as the Wexford Subclass’ “joint employer”,
those Plaintiffs must show IDOC exerted significant control over them in order to
succeed on their Title VII claims against IDOC. Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cnty., Wis.,
772 F.3d 802, 810 (7th Cir. 2014).”). The joint employer question is therefore a core
question that would advance the resolution of the litigation. Further, the
Defendants’ (all Defendants) intent in taking the actions they took and did not take
is amenable to collective adjudication where the Plaintiffs allege that one course of
conduct perpetuated the crisis at Pontiac.
B
Again relying on Howard, the Defendants argue the “vast dissimilarities
between potential class members also preclude a finding of typicality,
predominance, and superiority.” Defs.’ Mem. (D. 206 at ECF p. 13). The Court
need not (again) delve into the Defendants’ arguments as to those Rule 23
requirements. The Court has twice now explained why Howard neither neatly nor
obviously nor in fact supports the Defendants’ position that the Court improperly
certified the Class and Subclass defined in its March 10th Order. See Caisse
Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“Reconsideration is not an appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected
arguments.”). It is the Defendants who have vastly overstated the differences
between class members in this case. The Howard court emphasized, “Typicality is
meant to ensure that the named representative’s claims have the same essential
characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” 989 F.3d at 605 (emphasis added)
(quoting Lacy v. Cook Cnty., 897 F.3d 847, 866 (7th Cir. 2018)). The Court’s March
10th Order spells out the “same essential characteristics” that exist in this case.
Those, in turn, compelled the Court’s predominance finding, and the Court bore
in mind that “[e]fficiency is the animating principle” of the predominance
requirement. Howard, 989 F.3d at 607.4
A couple things bear particular mention. First, in a footnote, the Defendants
address the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the potential role of the influx of “Savage Life”
gang members into Pontiac and whether Defendants’ responses to this
phenomena were ineffective and/or deliberately indifferent raises a “common
question” that predominates among other questions. Defs.’ Mem. (D. 206 at ECF
p 15 n.2). The Defendants, of course, reject that assertion. In its March 10th Order,
the Court refrained from probing into the role Savage Life plays in this case,
instead reasoning that “whether the ‘trouble’ at Pontiac has been caused by
introduction of the Savage Life gang or not” was not an appropriate question upon
deciding whether to certify the Class and Subclass. 3/10/2026 Order (D. 203 at

4 Interestingly, the Howard plaintiffs, “[p]erhaps sensing that the certified class [stood] on shaky ground,”
proposed a new common question on appeal: “whether the defendants’ tolerance of the inmates’ sexual
harassment amounts to a pattern or practice of discrimination.” 989 F. 3d at 609. The Seventh Circuit
explained, “The plaintiffs did not raise this common question below, so they have waived appellate review
of it.” Id. Here, on the contrary, the Plaintiffs very much asserted in their Motion for Class Certification
that their “pattern or practice claims [ ] satisfy the commonality requirement.” Pls.’ Class Certification
Mem. (D. 179 at ECF p. 7).
ECF p. 25).5 Second, in arguing “the impact of the conduct on each individual and
resulting damages would require an inherently individualized, person by person,
assessment[,]” the Defendants appear to disregard the Court’s earlier explanation
in that respect. Citing cases, the Court highlighted that the Seventh Circuit has
suggested the propriety of hybrid certification under Rule 23(b) in cases involving
Title VII pattern or practice claims. 3/10/2026 Order (D. 203 at ECF p. 24).
Moreover, “The fact that the plaintiffs might require individualized relief or not
share all questions in common does not preclude certification of a class.” Bell v.
PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 800 F.3d 360, 379 (7th Cir. 2015).
C
Lastly, the Defendants argue the Court, in refining the Class and Subclass
definitions by replacing “nonsupervisory” with “non-executive,” provides no
guidance on the distinction between the two, and therefore presents an
unacceptable ambiguity. The Plaintiffs counter the Court’s March 10th Order
clarified the class excludes executive level managers who had real control and
authority over the work environment. They also argue the recommendations
some class members made in the context of a disciplinary system that was
“irreparably flawed” and the fact that clinical supervision was provided to less
credentialed staff are nowhere near sufficient to undermine the common interest

5 Still, in their Response, the Plaintiffs make a good point:

Common issues relating to liability centering on the totality of the Defendants’
response to the masturbation crisis and Savage Life far override all other issues, as
set forth [in their Response to the Defendants’ Motion to reconsider]. Defendants’
argument that the question of whether Savage Life was a root cause of the crisis
cannot predominate because two Plaintiffs did not know about the gang is a
reflection of Defendants’ nonexistent training regarding the gang which is also
common.

Pls.’ Resp. (D. 208 at ECF pp. 13-14).
the class members have in remediating the “epidemic” at Pontiac. Pls.’ Resp. (D.
208 at ECF p. 15).
The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs confronted the
Defendants’ position head on in reply to the Defendants’ objections to class
certification; the Plaintiffs explained their proposed class definition was not
intended to exclude non-executive employees of IDOC and Wexford who may
have limited supervisory authority such as Nurse Practitioners, RNs, MHPs, and
QMHPs. The Plaintiffs further argued they defined the class to exclude “true
management level employees”. 3/10/2026 Order (D. 203 at ECF p. 5 (quoting Pls.’
Reply to IDOC (D. 202 at ECF p. 11)). Bearing the Plaintiffs’ contentions in mind,
the Court determined refinement of the Class and Subclass definitions to refer to
“non-executive” resolved the parties’ dispute as to overbreadth. Guidance on the
distinction between the two, in order to remove ambiguity, is found within the
Court’s March 10th Order. The Court does not see where the refined class
definitions present disharmony within the Class and Subclass: it is one thing to
have limited supervisory authority and the ability to recommend disciplinary
reductions and quite another to have full supervisory authority and the power to
fully implement or reject recommendations for reasons benign or otherwise.6

6 In Howard, the definition of the originally certified class excepted “women who, during [the stated period],
have held the positions identified in Exhibit A to the complaint or who were employed in supervisory
roles.” 989 F.3d at 595. The district court’s modified class definition similarly excepted “women who,
during [the stated period], have held the positions identified in Exhibit B to the plaintiffs’ Rule 62.1 motion
or who were employed in supervisory roles.” Id. at 597. No one here suggests why such a thing could not
be done in this case. Perhaps, if the Defendants persist in arguing the Class and Subclass definitions present
an ambiguity, the Plaintiffs can provide them with an exhibit such as Exhibits A and B in Howard.
III
For the reasons set forth supra, the Defendants’ Joint Motion for
Reconsideration (D. 205) is DENIED. The Class and Subclass, defined as revised
by the Court in its March 10, 2026 Order (D. 203), remain certified.7
Should a party file a further motion for reconsideration which is
subsequently denied by the Court, the party who filed the motion will be
responsible for the attorney’s fees of the opposing party related to their response
to the additional motion for reconsideration.
This matter is again referred to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Entered on May 7, 2026
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

7 The Court’s following statement in its March 10th Order contains a typographical error: “Here, there is a
two-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims, and so class members who did not work at Pontiac
prior to June 16, 2019 are susceptible to that defense.” (D. 203 at ECF p. 28) (emphasis added). That sentence
is amended to read “. . . who did not work at Pontiac as of June 16, 2019 or later are susceptible to that
defense.”

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11323410. Public record. Not legal advice.