# Fuhr v. City of Seattle

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 7, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11323177

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** May 7, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE 1

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JASON FUHR, individually, and as No. 24-5618
Executor of estate of Shaun Fuhr;
D.C. No.
DAVONTA TANIYA FUHR,
2:23-cv-00600-
BJR
Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. OPINION

CITY OF SEATTLE; NOAH ZECH,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 19, 2025
Seattle, Washington

Filed May 7, 2026

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, William A. Fletcher, and
Roopali H. Desai, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown;
Dissent by Judge W. Fletcher
2 FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE

SUMMARY*

Qualified Immunity

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of Noah Zech, a Seattle Police Department
officer, in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Zech used
excessive force when he shot and killed Shaun Fuhr, who
was fleeing police while holding his infant daughter.
Fuhr threatened the mother of his infant daughter, fired
his handgun in a public park, and then grabbed his daughter
and fled on foot. He dodged authorities for over thirty
minutes, and the search grew to encompass a helicopter and
Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”) officers, including
Zech. Despite warnings to stop, Fuhr continued to evade the
officers while holding the child. Eventually, Zech and
another SWAT officer encountered Fuhr in a residential
alley. As Fuhr appeared from behind a bush and proceeded
toward the officers with the baby in his arms, Zech fired,
killing Fuhr.
The panel agreed with the district court’s dismissal of the
excessive force claim on qualified immunity grounds. The
panel did not decide whether, viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to Fuhr, a Fourth Amendment violation
occurred. Instead, the panel held only that Zech’s conduct
did not violate clearly established law. Fuhr’s continued
possession of the baby after firing a gun, fleeing from law
enforcement, and ignoring commands to stop are factors
that, when combined, distinguish this case from clearly

*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE 3

established law that sets out a constitutional violation.
Because no case clearly established a Fourth Amendment
right violated by Zech, he was entitled to qualified
immunity.
The panel further held that plaintiffs’ remaining claims
failed.
Dissenting, Judge W. Fletcher wrote that the undisputed
facts make clear that Fuhr was shot in violation of clearly
established law where he presented no immediate threat to
either the officers or his daughter at the time of the shooting.
He was walking slowly, holding his daughter tightly against
his chest, and could not have used a firearm to harm the
officers even if he had one. Moreover, Fuhr was never
warned that deadly force would be used, and the officer who
yelled for him to stop testified that he was not given adequate
time to comply before being killed.

COUNSEL

Jesse Valdez (argued), James Bible Jr., and Errin Loyal,
James Bible Law Group, Bellevue, Washington, for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Rebecca S. Widen (argued), Catherine E. Riedo, Carson W.
Canonie, and Alexandra Nica, Assistant City Attorneys; Ann
Davidson, Seattle City Attorney; Seattle City Attorney's
Office, Seattle, Washington; for Defendants-Appellees.
4 FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

Noah Zech, a Seattle Police Department officer, shot and
killed Shaun Fuhr with a single bullet. The scene arose out
of chaos generated by Fuhr’s dangerous actions and flight
from police. After threatening the mother of his infant
daughter and firing his handgun in a public park, Fuhr
grabbed the baby and fled on foot. For over thirty minutes,
Fuhr dodged authorities, with the search swelling to
encompass a helicopter and Special Weapons and Tactics
(“SWAT”) officers, including Zech. Despite warnings to
stop, Fuhr continued to evade the officers whilst haphazardly
dangling the baby. Eventually, Zech and another SWAT
officer encountered Fuhr in a residential alley. As Fuhr
appeared from behind a bush and proceeded toward the
officers with the baby in his arms, Zech fired.
We affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity
because Zech’s actions within the unique facts of this case
were not so beyond the bounds of permissible as “to make it
obvious to all reasonable government actors, in [Zech’s]
place, that what he [was] doing violate[d]” a clearly
established right. Shafer v. County of Santa Barbara, 868
F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017).
Background
At 2:13 PM on April 29, 2020, the mother of Fuhr’s one-
year-old daughter (referred to here as “AT” to protect her
privacy and that of the child) called 911 from a public
playfield in south Seattle. AT told dispatch that the father of
her child—against whom she had a no-contact order and
who had beaten her up the day before—was in the park and
FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE 5

had just fired a gun. She had run away in fear, and he had
left the park with their one-year-old daughter. AT was
frantic and begged the dispatcher for help:

Dispatcher: Did he have any weapons?
AT: He has a gun. I know he has it, he just
shot it in the park, my ear is ringing. He just
shot it in Skyway, today, he shot it in
Skyway.
Dispatcher: Ok, ok, we have a call in—
AT: Please help! Please not fast enough,
please not fast enough, please. My baby—
Dispatcher: What’s his name?
AT: His name is Shaun Fuhr. We already
have a no-contact order, please, I want my
daughter, please! She’s only one. Please,
I’m scared for her!

Two minutes earlier, a witness had called to report a man
and woman arguing. According to the caller, a Black male
had pulled out a gun, told the woman to run, and then taken
the child. The caller said the man had placed the handgun in
the back of his pants and left the area.
Seattle Police Department officers arrived at the park by
2:17 PM. AT was upset and had visible bruises. An officer
radioed to dispatch that Fuhr had fired a gun and that he had
located a shell casing. The officer further informed dispatch
that Fuhr was “incredibly intoxicated” and had the child with
him, and that the child’s mother “believe[d] the child [was]
in grave danger.” AT emphasized to the officer that her
daughter was “in danger, like danger.”
6 FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE

Various police units responded, including a helicopter,
canine tracking unit, and SWAT team. Among the SWAT
officers was Officer Noah Zech, who integrated with the
canine tracking team’s search. Dispatch advised that
someone was breaking into a nearby building that was under
construction. Zech twice spotted Fuhr fleeing. During the
second sighting, Zech observed that Fuhr was “carrying a
small baby on his right side down near his hip,” gripping the
child’s torso. He recalled that the infant’s “head and arms
[were] flopping around pretty violently.” When the search
team spotted Fuhr, multiple officers repeatedly yelled at him
to stop, but he continued to flee and disappeared from view.
The pursuit ended seconds later, at 2:49 PM, when Zech
and another SWAT officer encountered Fuhr in an alley
beside a multi-story townhome. As captured on bodycam,
as Zech and the other officer ran into the alleyway, Fuhr
emerged from behind bushes and advanced down a slope
towards them. There was a wooden fence of varying height
to one side and behind Fuhr, and the officers did not know
what lay beyond the bushes from where Fuhr had emerged.
Fuhr held his daughter in front of his chest. Less than two
seconds after entering the alley and encountering Fuhr, Zech
fired a single round, which struck Fuhr in the face.
Zech testified in his deposition that, when he fired, he
believed Fuhr was still armed, although he did not see the
weapon. Zech recalled knowing Fuhr “was now cornered”
but “believ[ing] that [Fuhr] was using this child as a hostage
to gain whatever it was he was after that day.” In Zech’s
view, Fuhr presented a grave and immediate threat to the life
of the baby, who was at risk as a human shield, bargaining
chip, or shooting victim. As a SWAT officer, Zech was
trained to intervene when given a window of opportunity and
saw the baby’s life and safety as his priority. To protect the
FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE 7

baby, Zech’s target was Fuhr’s forehead, a precision shot
that Zech was trained to make. When Fuhr fell to the ground,
officers retrieved the baby, who was uninjured. Although
Fuhr did not have a firearm on him when he was shot, the
gun was recovered in the vicinity.
Fuhr’s estate sued Zech and the Seattle Police
Department on multiple grounds.1 The district court granted
Zech’s summary judgment motion in full.
Analysis
Reviewing de novo both the district court’s qualified
immunity decision and its grant of summary judgment,
Vazquez v. County of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.
2020), we affirm.
I. Qualified Immunity
We agree with the district court’s dismissal of the
excessive force claim on qualified immunity grounds. Our
qualified immunity inquiry has two prongs, which can be
addressed in either order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236 (2009). Under the first prong, the court must
consider whether the facts demonstrate violation of a
constitutional right. Id. at 232. The second prong asks
whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of
Zech’s conduct. Id.
We do not decide whether, viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to Fuhr, a Fourth Amendment violation
occurred. Instead, we hold only that Fuhr’s conduct did not
violate clearly established law. See Kisela v. Hughes, 584

1
We refer collectively to the plaintiffs as “Fuhr” and the defendants as
“Zech.”
8 FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE

U.S. 100, 103–04 (2018) (per curiam). Fuhr’s claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 thus fails.
In undertaking a qualified immunity analysis, we must
grapple with the level of generality that defines the claimed
constitutional right. The Supreme Court has emphasized
that a clearly established right “should not be defined ‘at a
high level of generality’” and must be “‘particularized’ to the
facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)
(per curiam) (first quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,
742 (2011); and then quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Most recently the Supreme Court
reiterated that, in defining a clearly established right,
“[p]rinciples stated generally, such as that ‘an officer may
not use unreasonable and excessive force’ do not suffice.”
Zorn v. Linton, 146 S. Ct. 926, 930 (2026) (per curiam)
(quoting Kisela, 584 U.S. at 105). In order “[t]o find that a
right is clearly established,” we must “‘identify a case where
an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to
have violated’ the Constitution.” Id. (citation modified)
(quoting City of Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 43
(2019) (per curiam)).
Accordingly, we look for precedent that encompasses a
noncompliant, fleeing, potentially armed suspect holding a
child or potential hostage, and we find none. Fuhr’s
continued possession of the baby after firing a gun, fleeing
from law enforcement, and ignoring commands to stop are
factors that, when combined, distinguish this case from
clearly established law that sets out a constitutional
violation.
Fuhr urges us to draw upon Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d
1189 (9th Cir. 1997). But the rule pronounced in Harris that
“officers may not shoot to kill” includes an exception for
FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE 9

when “the suspect presents an immediate threat to the officer
or others.” Id. at 1201. Indeed, “[t]he ‘most important’
factor” in the excessive force context “is whether the suspect
posed an ‘immediate threat’” to officers or third parties.
Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 702 (9th Cir.
2005) (en banc)).
In Harris, officers were instructed to shoot any armed
suspects on sight, without evaluating whether they posed
harm to others, and they did so without a warning to the
suspect. 126 F.3d at 1202–04. Here, not only do we have
an immediate threat to the baby, but we also have a suspect
who ignored warnings. That Zech did not give a final
warning does not bring this case within the ambit of Harris.
Additionally, there are no allegations regarding a shoot-on-
sight or similarly unconstitutional policy in this case.
Viewed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989), it was
reasonable for Zech to believe that Fuhr posed an immediate
threat to his baby daughter based on his threatening of AT,
firing of his gun, lack of compliance with repeated warnings,
and prolonged flight throughout which he endangered his
child.
The other case relied upon by Fuhr, George v. Morris,
stresses that the Fourth Amendment does not always require
officers to hold their fire until a suspect points his weapon at
them or others. 736 F.3d 829, 838 (9th Cir. 2013); see also
Napouk v. L.V. Metro. Police Dep’t, 123 F.4th 906, 917–18
(9th Cir. 2024) (highlighting that George does not stand for
the proposition that a subject must threateningly wield a
weapon to pose an immediate threat). And the
circumstances in George could not be more different from
10 FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE

our case—George was a sixty-four-year-old man with
terminal cancer whose wife called 911 because she had seen
him load a pistol with ammunition. 736 F.3d at 832, 839.
When law enforcement arrived, George was on the balcony
with a walker, and his gun was aimed at the ground. Id. at
832–33. He had committed no crime, engaged in no flight,
and posed no immediate threat to officers or others. Id. at
838.
In George, we clearly established that it is a
constitutional violation to use deadly force on an armed
person when that person did not “objectively threaten[]” law
enforcement officers or others. 736 F.3d at 838. But that
right is not at issue in this case. Unlike in George, where the
husband had not taken any “objective[ly] provocati[ve]”
actions, id. at 839, Fuhr had posed a threat to others
throughout the thirty-eight-minute saga, beginning in the
park, where he fired a gun near AT and the baby, and
continuing until Zech shot him. Zech did not know that Fuhr
no longer possessed the firearm, and thirteen seconds before
the shooting, several officers encountered Fuhr and ordered
him to stop, a command he ignored. Throughout the pursuit,
Fuhr showed no intentions of complying with multiple
orders, and he continued carrying the baby with little
apparent regard for her safety. Confronted with this situation
and Fuhr’s sudden appearance coming toward the officers,
Zech made a split-second decision to fire. These facts place
this case about as far as possible from George, and we are
aware of no case clearly establishing a suspect’s right to be
free of excessive force in the face of these facts and when his
FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE 11

actions are “objectively threatening” to others.2 736 F.3d at
838.
Because no case clearly established a Fourth
Amendment right violated by Zech, he is entitled to qualified
immunity.
II. Other Claims
Fuhr’s other claims also fail. To begin, Fuhr does not
directly challenge the dismissal of his stand-alone Fourth
Amendment claim (Claim I), wrongful death and survival
claim (Claim III), and claim under Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (Claim VIII).
Regarding the negligence claim (Claim II), we agree with
the district court that the complaint’s allegations as well as
Fuhr’s summary judgment opposition were impermissibly
conclusory as to breach and causation. Fuhr’s claim under
the Washington Law Against Discrimination (Claim VI)
fails for lack of any evidentiary support.3 The outrage claim
(Claim V) fails because it depends on the Section 1983

2
At oral argument, Fuhr also cited to Estate of Aguirre v. County of
Riverside, 131 F.4th 702 (9th Cir. 2025). The opinion in Aguirre,
however, was not published until five years after the shooting at issue
occurred, and thus could not have put Zech on notice that his actions
would violate Fuhr’s rights. Apart from the timing issue, Aguirre’s
immediate threat analysis is inapposite here because it recognized a
clearly established right in a situation in which the threat posed “was
certainly no greater than that posed by the suspect with a gun in
[George].” Id. at 709.
3
Fuhr argues for the first time on appeal that implicit bias supports
revival of Claim VI under the Washington Law Against Discrimination.
But this argument was not raised in the district court, and we see no
reason to make an exception to our general rule barring parties from
raising an argument for the first time on appeal. See Momox-Caselis v.
Donohue, 987 F.3d 835, 841–42 (9th Cir. 2021).
12 FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE

claim. Finally, the respondeat superior and indemnification
claim (Claim IV) must be dismissed because all other claims
fail.
AFFIRMED

W. FLETCHER Dissent
Shaun Fuhr, a 24-year-old Black man, was shot and
killed by a Seattle police officer while holding his infant
daughter in his arms. My colleagues conclude that Fuhr
posed such a danger to his daughter when the officer shot
him that the officer is protected from suit by qualified
immunity. My colleagues describe in detail the events that
preceded the shooting, but provide only an abbreviated
account of the shooting itself. The lead-up to the shooting,
and the shooting itself, were clearly captured on several
video cameras worn by the officers.
Thirteen or fourteen seconds before the shooting,
officers standing at the edge of a residential sidewalk saw
Fuhr on the other side of a low-rise apartment building,
moving toward their right and disappearing from view
behind another building. They yelled at him to stop. The
officers ran to their right, entering an area between that
building and a wooden fence. Fuhr emerged onto a narrow,
gently sloping path ahead of them, walking slowly down the
path toward the officers. Fuhr was surrounded on all sides.
On his immediate left and behind him was a high wooden
fence. On his immediate right was a rockery with plantings.
Fuhr was holding his daughter tightly against his chest. Both
of his hands were clearly visible. His right hand held his
daughter’s back from beneath. His left hand held his
FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE 13

daughter’s right leg, reaching over her leg from above. The
video clearly shows that neither hand held a weapon.
Fuhr was about fifteen feet away from the officers. One
of the officers yelled, “You better stop right now.” While
that officer was speaking and before Fuhr had a chance to
comply, Officer Zech shot Fuhr in the head. About two
seconds had passed since Fuhr had come into view. He had
taken only three steps down the path. Fuhr slumped to the
ground, releasing his baby daughter, unharmed, as he did so.
The officer who yelled for Fuhr to stop testified in a sworn
deposition that Fuhr had not been given adequate time to
comply before being killed.
When he was shot, Fuhr posed no immediate threat to the
officers. Though the officers did not know it at the time,
Fuhr did not have a firearm. When he emerged on the
narrow path carrying his daughter, Officer Zech already had
his assault rifle at his shoulder, trained on the path. If Fuhr
had had a firearm and had tried to use it, he would have had
to release his daughter with one of his hands, reach for the
firearm, pull it out, and aim it at the officers. If Fuhr had
taken any of these steps, Officer Zech, whose rifle was
already pointed at Fuhr, would have had ample time to
respond. But Fuhr took none of those steps. Officer Zech
acknowledged under oath in his deposition that both of
Fuhr’s hands were visible in the footage taken by his own
body camera. A reasonable fact finder could conclude not
only that Fuhr posed no immediate threat to the officers, but
also that he was giving up and attempting to surrender as he
walked slowly toward them.
Fuhr also posed no immediate threat to his daughter. He
had been carrying her for approximately forty minutes.
When he was shot, Fuhr was holding her close to his chest
14 FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE

and walking slowly toward the officers. Officer Zech
testified in his deposition that when he shot Fuhr, “I knew
that he was now cornered, and I believed that he was using
this child as a hostage to gain whatever it was he was after
that day.” There is no evidence to support Officer Zech’s
belief that Fuhr was holding his daughter as a “hostage.” A
hostage is a person taken and held to extract a ransom in
return for the person’s release. Fuhr had taken his daughter
and had sought to escape with her. He sought no ransom.
To use Officer Zech’s words, “whatever [Fuhr] was after that
day” was not a ransom but rather his own daughter.
Even if Fuhr had been holding his daughter as a hostage
(which, to be clear, he was not), that would not have justified
his killing. A hostage taker has a strong interest in keeping
his hostage alive and well, in order successfully to extract a
ransom. If (counterfactually) Fuhr had been holding his
daughter as a hostage, there is nothing in the record to
suggest that she was in imminent danger because she was a
hostage.
Twenty-nine years ago in Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d
1189, 1201 (9th Cir. 1997), we held, “Certain principles are
clearly established”—among them, that “[l]aw enforcement
officers may not shoot to kill unless, at a minimum, the
suspect presents an immediate threat to the officer or others.”
We reaffirmed in Cruz v. City of Anaheim, 765 F.3d 1076,
1079 (9th Cir. 2014), that “deadly force is not justified”
where “the suspect no longer poses an immediate threat to
the police or the public.” See also Calonge v. City of San
Jose, 104 F.4th 39, 46 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Harris, 126
F.3d at 1204). We have moreover held it “clearly
established” that “whenever practicable, a warning must be
given before deadly force is employed.” Harris, 126 F.3d at
1201 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12
FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE 15

(1985)); see also Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 747 F.3d 789,
794 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Harris, 126 F.3d at 1201). With
respect to such clearly established rights, “[w]e do not
require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per
curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741
(2011)).
The undisputed facts make clear that when he was shot
Fuhr presented no immediate threat to either the officers or
his daughter. To use Officer Zech’s words, he was
“cornered” and could not escape. Even if he had had a
firearm, he could not have used it to harm the officers. He
was walking slowly, holding his daughter tightly against his
chest. He was never warned that deadly force would be used,
and the officer who yelled for him to stop testified that he
was not given adequate time to comply before being killed.
I respectfully but strongly dissent.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11323177. Public record. Not legal advice.