# Shaw

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · April 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11321999

## Case

- **Full name:** Simin Nicholas Shaw v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** April 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11321999

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that temporary restraining orders are “extraordinary relief and rarely issued.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION

SIMIN NICHOLAS SHAW CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-0587

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES
ENFORCEMENT

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion to Terminate Mandatory ICE Detention (Record
Document 3) filed by the pro se habeas petitioner in this case, Simin Nicholas Shaw
(“Petitioner”). A final order of removal was entered as to Petitioner on February 18, 2014.
See Record Document 1 at 4. She was taken into custody on July 13, 2025. See id.
Petitioner is presently detained at the South Louisiana ICE Processing Center in Basile,
Louisiana. See Record Document 3 at 1.
On February 24, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Record
Document 1) along with the instant Motion. In the Habeas Petition, Petitioner challenges
the legality of her continued detention and seeks immediate release from custody. See
Record Document 1-2 at 8. Likewise, in the instant Motion, Petitioner seeks substantially
identical relief—namely, immediate release from mandatory ICE detention. See Record
Document 3 at 1.
Petitioner’s request in the instant Motion is one for injunctive relief. An applicant
for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) must demonstrate each of the following: (1) a
substantial likelihood his cause will succeed on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) the threatened injury outweighs the
threatened harm the injunction may do to the opposing party, and (4) granting the
injunction will not disserve the public interest. See Misquitta v. Warden Pine Prairie ICE
Processing Center, 353 F. Supp. 518, 521 (W.D. La. Nov. 16, 2018) (citing Piedmont
Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1981)). The decision of
whether to grant or deny a TRO lies in the district court’s discretion. See Moore v. Brown,

868 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2017). Courts should deny such motions more often than not.
See Albright v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.Supp.2d 523, 532 (E.D. La. 1999) (explaining
that temporary restraining orders are “extraordinary relief and rarely issued.”); see also
Suburban Propane, L.P. v. D & S GCTX LLC, 2025 WL 2429087, at *2 (W.D. Tex. 2025)
(holding that the extraordinary relief under Rule 65 must be “unequivocally show[n].”); see
also Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Only under
‘extraordinary circumstances’ will this court reverse the denial of a preliminary
injunction.”).
In this case, Petitioner seeks injunctive relief that mirrors the relief requested in her
Habeas Petition, that is, immediate release. In Pema Sherpa v. Judith Almodovar, et al.,

another judge within this District decided a similarly situated case, stating:
The Supreme Court, very recently, reminded lower courts that
preliminary injunctions are, as their name suggests, preliminary and should
“not conclusively resolve legal disputes.” Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192,
200 (2025). In other words, they should not be used to rule on the final,
merits question.
Rather, TROs and preliminary injunctions help “preserve the status
quo until a trial” or other final disposition is rendered. Id. at 193. That begs
the question: what does it mean to preserve the status quo? While the
words “status quo” do not appear within Rule 65 . . . , it is implicit in the
“irreparable harm” prong. . . . Irreparable harm must also take away “the
court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits.” Canal Auth. of
the State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1974); see also
Samuel L. Bray, The Purposes of the Preliminary Injunction, 78 Vand. L.
Rev. 809, 823–26 (2025) (concluding the same after probing Founding-era
sources). Put differently, “[t]here is always a status quo. There should not
be a preliminary injunction to protect it, however, unless the court’s ability to
render a meaningful decision on the merits would otherwise be in jeopardy.”
Callaway, 489 F.2d at 573.
No. 3:25-CV-01718 SEC P, 2026 WL 74401, at *2 (W.D. La. Jan. 9, 2026). A ruling on
the instant Motion should not resolve the legal disputes in this case. Thus, to the extent
Petitioner asks for an order of immediate release from custody, the Court views this
request as an effort to obtain a ruling on the merits of her Habeas Petition through
injunctive relief. Petitioner's motion for injunctive relief is essentially a motion to decide
the habeas petition now. See Garcia-Aleman v. Thompson, No. SA-25-CV-00886-OLG-
HJB, 2025 WL 3769302, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2025).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Terminate Mandatory ICE Detention
(Record Document 3) is hereby DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 9th day of April, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11321999. Public record. Not legal advice.