# Webb

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · April 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11321953

## Case

- **Full name:** Christopher E. Webb v. City of Bridgeton and Bradley Cash
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** April 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER E. WEBB,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:25-cv-00455 MAL

CITY OF BRIDGETON, and BRADLEY
CASH,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant City of Bridgeton’s and Defendant Officer Cash’s
Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13). For the following reasons the motion is
GRANTED.
I. Facts & Background
Plaintiff Webb brought this suit against the City of Bridgeton (“City”) and
Officer Cash for violation of his First, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights
(Doc. 11, p. 1–3). The following facts make up almost the entirety of Webb’s
Complaint. Webb alleges Officer Cash attacked him multiple times, told him to “shut
the Fuck up” while Webb was protesting, chest bumped him to start a physical fight,
and attacked Webb with an open hand at his throat. Id. at 6. Webb also alleges Cash
grabbed his chains and ripped them off his neck while he was being held by a few
officers from behind. Id. Webb alleges that the City failed to protect him from Officer
Cash and allowed Officer Cash to make a false arrest and “tighten[] and retighten[]
the cuffs while officers watched.” Id. Defendants now move for partial dismissal of
Webb’s Second Amended Complaint.
II. Webb’s Untimely Response
Webb filed an opposition motion over a month out of time (Doc. 15). Defendants
urge the Court not to consider the motion because it is untimely (Doc. 16). The Court
construes Webb to argue that the motion should be considered because his delay
should be excused for “good cause.” (Doc. 17, p. 1). Webb argues he has physical and
emotional conditions that precluded him from filing on time, in addition to not
receiving notification from Defendants of their motion until the deadline to respond
had passed. Id. at 1–2. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), the Court may,
for good cause, extend time on a party’s motion after the time has expired. This
determination is “an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances.”
Chorosevic v. MetLife Choices, 600 F.3d 934, 946 (8th Cir. 2010). The Court will
consider Webb’s opposition brief in light of Webb’s pro se status and physical and
emotional conditions. However, the Court warns Webb that he is now on notice of all
filing deadlines, and the Court will more scrupulously consider future motions to
extend time.
III. Legal Standard
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what
the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). To survive a motion to
dismiss under 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (2007)). This standard
requires a plaintiff to show at the pleading stage that success on the merits is more
than a “sheer possibility.” Id. It is not, however, a “probability requirement.” Id. A
plaintiff need not provide specific facts in support of his allegations, Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007), but “must include sufficient factual information to
provide the ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests, and to raise a right to relief above a
speculative level.” Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir.
2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3). This obligation requires a plaintiff to
plead “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint “must contain
either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary
to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Id. at 562 (quoted case omitted).
This standard “simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim or element].” Id. at 556. At this stage, the
Court accepts as true the factual allegations in the complaint. Id.
Determining if well-pled factual allegations state a “plausible claim for relief”
is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The well-pled facts must
establish more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id.
A “pro se document is to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (quotation and
citation omitted). While pro se complaints are to be liberally construed, “they still
must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d
912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
IV. Application of Law to Facts
A. First, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment Violations Against
the City
The City of Bridgeton argues that Webb’s First, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendment claims should be dismissed because (1) the facts in the Complaint do not
amount to a constitutional violation, and (2) even if Webb adequately alleged
constitutional violations, he does not adequately plead a Monell claim against the
City because he has not stated a basis for liability resulting from an official policy,
custom, or failure to train or supervise (Doc. 14, p. 3).
i. Legal Standard
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State or Territory…subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States…to the deprivation of any
rights…secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law….

The Monell doctrine states that municipalities count as “person[s]” who may be held
liable under § 1983 for unconstitutional actions. Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). But “Congress did not intend municipalities
to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature
caused a constitutional tort.” Id. at 691. “[S]ection 1983 liability for a constitutional
violation may attach to a municipality if the violation resulted from (1) an ‘official
municipal policy,’ (2) an unofficial ‘custom,’ or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to
train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018).
ii. Application of Law to Facts
The Court agrees that Webb has not adequately alleged a Monell violation.
Even assuming that Webb adequately alleged constitutional violations, he does not
allege that the violations were a result of an official municipal policy, an unofficial
custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. See Mick, 883 F.3d
at 1079; Doc. 11 at 6.
Webb’s Memorandum in Opposition states that he adequately alleged a Monell
claim and cites two news articles (Doc. 17, p. 4). One of the news articles from 2011
describes a lawsuit brought after a physical altercation between Officer Cash and a
detainee. Id. The other is a news article about a 14-year-old boy having a mental
health crisis who Bridgeton police arrested. Id.
Even with reference to the news articles, Webb still does not identify whether
his Monell claim is grounded in an official municipal policy, an unofficial municipal
custom, or a deliberate indifference to train or supervise. Webb makes no reference
to an official policy, which requires “a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or
procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority regarding such
matters.” Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999). He also makes
no reference to an unofficial custom demonstrated by “a continuing, widespread,
persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s
employees.” Ware v. Jackson Cnty., Mo., 150 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 1998). Webb
likewise does not allege a “municipal action was taken with deliberate indifference as
to its known or obvious consequences.” Board of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl.
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because
Webb does not state an adequate Monell claim, the Court dismisses his § 1983 claims
against the City.
B. First, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment Official Capacity
Violations Against Officer Cash

Officer Cash asks this Court to dismiss the official capacity claims1 against
him because official capacity claims against employees are really claims against the
employee’s employers, and Webb has not pled a viable claim against the City (see
supra). (Doc. 14, p. 4).
i. Legal Standard
Official capacity suits are “another way of pleading an action against an entity
of which an officer is an agent.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (internal citation
omitted). See also Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir.
1999) (“A suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit
against the public employer.”). “Although state officials literally are persons, a suit

1 It is unclear what Officer Cash wishes the Court to do with respect to the individual capacity
claims against him. Officer Cash’s Motion for Partial Dismissal asks the Court to dismiss
Webb’s Second Amended Complaint against the City and Officer Cash in his official capacity
(Doc. 13 ¶ 2). Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Partial Motion to Dismiss asks
for dismissal of Webb’s First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment claims because Webb does not
plead any underlying constitutional violations, but the Memorandum does not specify
whether the Complaint should be dismissed against Officer Cash in his official capacity,
individual capacity, both, or just against the City (Doc. 14, p. 2). Further, Defendants’
conclusion in their Memorandum asks for relief “against Defendant Cash in his official
capacity,” but not in his individual capacity. Id. at 6. Additionally, the parties do not explain
why they believe that Defendant’s allegations do not plead underlying constitutional
violations, e.g. what element is missing. Under the principle of party presentation, the Court
“rel[ies] on the parties to frame the issues for decision” while the “court[] [plays] the role of
neutral arbiter of matters the parties presented.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S.
371, 375 (2020); Ivey v. Audrain Cnty., Missouri, 968 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2020). This
Court only “call[s] balls and strikes; [it] do[esn’t] get a turn at bat.” Clark v. Sweeney, 607
U.S. 7, 9 (2025). Thus, the Court will not create reasoning for why the First, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendment claims (much less the Fourth Amendment, which is mentioned even less)
do not plead any underlying constitutional violations.
against a state official in his official capacity is no different from a suit against the
State itself.” Association for Gov’t Accountability v. Simon, 128 F.4th 976, 978 (8th
Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because here the municipality is the
real party in interest, the municipality’s policy or custom must have played a part in
the constitutional violation. See Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075
(8th Cir. 2016).
ii. Application of Law to Facts
Webb’s official capacity claim fails for the same reason his Monell claim fails.
See supra. The Court therefore dismisses his official capacity claims against Officer
Cash.
C. State Law Claims
Defendants argue that—to the extent any of Webb’s Second Amended
Complaint alleges violations of Missouri law—it fails to state a claim because
(1) Missouri does not have a law similar to 42 U.S.C § 1983 giving citizens a private
right of action to sue state actors, and (2) the City of Bridgeton and Officer Cash have
sovereign immunity from any Missouri common law tort.
i. Legal Standard
“The Missouri General Assembly has not enacted similar language” to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Moody v. Hicks, 956 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). As such,
“[t]he law is well-settled that an individual cannot maintain a common law tort action
for damages for violations of [] rights guaranteed under the Missouri constitution.”
Chen v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Missouri, 2008 WL 11429382, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Mar.
17, 2008). See Collins-Camden P’ship, L.P. v. Cnty. of Jefferson, 425 S.W.3d 210, 214
(Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (“No Missouri precedent exists permitting suits for monetary
damages by private individuals resulting from violations of the Missouri
Constitution.”).
Sovereign immunity bars suit against a government or public entity, Allen v.
32nd Jud. Cir., 638 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Mo. 2022), “unless waived or abrogated or the
sovereign consents to suit.” Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine
Neighbors, 476 S.W.3d 913, 921 (Mo. 2016). In Missouri, “sovereign or governmental
tort immunity as existed at common law in this state prior to September 12, 1977,
except to the extent … modified by statutes in effect prior to that date, shall remain
in full force and effect; [except where expressly waived].” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600.1.
“Missouri courts have routinely held that sovereign immunity is not an affirmative
defense and that the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading with specificity facts
giving rise to an exception to sovereign immunity when suing a public entity.”
Richardson v. City of St. Louis, 293 S.W.3d 133, 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
Along with sovereign immunity, Missouri also applies the doctrine of official
immunity. Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. banc 2008).
“This judicially-created doctrine protects public employees from liability for alleged
acts of negligence committed during the course of their official duties for the
performance of discretionary acts.” Id.
ii. Application of Law to Facts
The Court does not believe that Webb’s Complaint alleges any state law claims,
see Doc. 11 at 3 (expressly listing only federal claims), but to the extent it does, these
claims fail. To the extent Webb’s allegations are made pursuant to rights protected
by the Missouri Constitution, there is no mechanism for individuals to maintain a
common law tort claim for damages for constitutional violations.
Further, because the City is a “public entity entitled to sovereign immunity
within the meaning of Section 537.600,” and Webb has not pled any facts giving rise
to an exception to sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity bars these counts.
Richardson v. City of St. Louis, 293 S.W.3d 133, 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).

CONCLUSION
Defendants City of Bridgeton and Officer Cash’s Partial Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED (Doc. 13).
SO ORDERED,

This 10th day of April, 2026. ,

MARIA A. LANAHAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11321953. Public record. Not legal advice.