# Brandt

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · March 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319952

## Case

- **Full name:** Kiel Brendan Brandt v. Warden Jessica Sage
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319952

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding, in exercising its discretion to make halfway house placement decisions, the BOP must consider the factors set forth in § 3621(b); “[hlowever, that the BOP may assign a prisoner to a CCC does not mean that it must’

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KIEL BRENDAN BRANDT, Civil No. 3:26-cv-271
Petitioner . (Judge Mariani)
v .
WARDEN JESSICA SAGE, .
Respondent .
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Kiel Brendan Brandt (“Brandt”), a federal inmate confined at the Federal
Correctional Institution, Lewisburg, Satellite Camp, initiated the above-captioned action by
filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Brandt
alleges that officials at the Lewisburg Satellite Camp are not properly affording him enough
prerelease placement time under the Second Chance Act. (/d.). Brandt also challenges the
procedure by which officials at the Lewisburg Satellite Camp complete the five-factor review
of the Second Chance Act. (/d.).
For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the habeas petition without
prejudice because Brandt has not properly exhausted his claims.
I. Background
A. — Brandt's Criminal History
Brandt is serving a 27-month term of imprisonment imposed by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for his conviction of wire fraud. (Doc. 8-2,

Declaration of BOP Case Manager Joshua Moyer (“Moyer Decl.”), at 2 J 3; Doc. 8-3, Public
Information Inmate Data). According to BOP documentation submitted by Respondent,
Brandt's projected release date, via First Step Act release, is March 3, 2027. (Doc. 8-2,
Moyer Decl., at 1 ] 3; Doc. 8-3). However, a review of the BOP’s inmate locator indicates
that Brandt's projected release date is now February 16, 2027.1
B. Administrative Remedy History
The Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval reveals that, while in BOP
custody, Brandt filed the following two administrative remedies. (Doc. 8-2, Moyer Decl. at 2
1 5; Doc. 8-4, Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval).
On August 28, 2025, Brandt filed administrative remedy 1252532-F1 with the
institution, requesting a review of his residential reentry center (“RRC”) placement time.
(Doc. 8-4, at 2). The institution denied the remedy on September 23, 2025. (/d.). Brandt
appealed to the Regional Director, and, on December 8, 2025, the Regional Director denied
his appeal. (/d.). Brandt did not appeal to the Central Office. (See Doc. 8-4).
C. Facts Related to the Second Chance Act
Brandt's Unit Team conducted an Individualized Needs Plan-Program Review. (Doc.
8-2, Moyer Decl. at 2 JJ 6-7; Doc. 8-5, Institutional Referral for Community Corrections
Center (“CCC”) Placement). The Unit Team reviewed Brandt for prerelease placement

1 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ INMATE LOCATOR, https:/Awww.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (searching
Inmate Number 52132-51 1) (last visited March 16, 2026).

under the five factors of the Second Chance Act of 2007, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621 and
3624.2 (Id.). The Unit Team considered and evaluated the five factors as follows: (1) there

are available RRCs in Brandt's release area; (2) there are no extenuating circumstances
that would preclude placement; (3) Brandt has an established residence and community
ties; (4) the sentencing court’s Judgment and Commitment Order does not contain any
statements regarding RRC placement; and (5) there are no pertinent policies from the
United States Sentencing Commission. (Doc. 8-5, at 2; see also 18 U.S.C. 3621(b)). As a
result of the review, the Unit Team recommended a placement date of August 30, 2026.
(Doc. 8-5, at 2).
D. Claims Raised in the Habeas Petition
In his Section 2241 petition, Brandt alleges that the BOP failed to award him enough
prerelease placement time under the Second Chance Act. (Doc. 1). He also challenges the
procedure by which officials at the Lewisburg Satellite Camp complete the five-factor review
of the Second Chance Act. (/d.). Respondent contends that the Section 2241 petition must
be dismissed because Brandt failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Doc. 8).

2 The Second Chance Act states in pertinent part as follows:
The [BOP] shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that a prisoner serving a term of
imprisonment spends a portion of the final months of that term (not to exceed 12 months),
under conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and
prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the community. Such conditions may include a
community correctional facility.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).

Alternatively, Respondent argues that the petition must be denied because the Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear Brand’s claims, Brandt has no right to prerelease placement, no right to
credits under the Second Chance Act, and Brandt has been properly reviewed under the
five factors of the Second Chance Act. (/d.). Because the uncontroverted record confirms
that Brandt has not exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court does not reach
Respondent's alternative arguments.
Il. Discussion
While there is no statutory exhaustion requirement for habeas corpus petitions
brought pursuant to Section 2241, the Third Circuit has recognized that “[flederal prisoners
are ordinarily required to exhaust their administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to [Section] 2241.” Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98
F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d
Cir. 2000). Exhaustion is required because: “(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop
a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to
grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the
opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.” Moscato, 98 F.3d
at 761-62 (citations omitted); Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981).
However, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where these
underlying reasons for exhaustion would not be served. See Coleman v. U.S. Parole
Comm'n, 644 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished). For example, exhaustion is

unnecessary if the issue presented is one that involves only statutory construction. See
Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Bradshaw, 682 F.2d at
1052). Exhaustion is also excused when it would be futile. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509, 516 n.7 (1982); see also Brown v. Warden Canaan USP, 763 F. App’x 296, 297 (3d
Cir. 2019). “In order to invoke the futility exception to exhaustion, a party must ‘provide a
clear and positive showing’ of futility before the District Court.” Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475
F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting D’Amico v. CBS Corp., 297 F.3d 287 293 (3d Cir.
2002)).
To exhaust administrative remedies, a federal inmate must comply with the
procedural requirements of the BOP’s administrative remedy process, which are set forth in
the Code of Federal Regulations. See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19. Under these
regulations, an inmate shall first attempt informal resolution of his complaint with staff and, if
the inmate is unable to resolve his complaint informally, he shall submit a formal, written
request on the proper form to the designated staff member. See id. §§ 542.13-542.14. If
the inmate is not satisfied with the Warden’s response, the inmate shall then submit an
appeal to the Regional Director, using the appropriate form. See id. § 542.15(a). And,
finally, if the inmate is not satisfied with the Regional Director's response, then the inmate
shall submit an appeal to the Office of the Gerieral Counsel, located in the BOP Central
Office, using the appropriate form. See id. An inmate is not deemed to have exhausted his

administrative remedies until his complaint has been pursued at all levels. See id.
(explaining that an “[a]ppeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal’).
Here, the record reflects that, although Brandt filed an administrative remedy
concerning RRC placement—number 1252532—he undisputably failed to properly exhaust
that remedy. (Doc. 8-4, at 2). Brandt filed administrative remedy 1252532-F1 at the
institution level. (/d.). Upon review, the institution denied the remedy. (/d.). Brandt
appealed to the Regional Director, and, on December 8, 2025, the Regional Director denied
his appeal. (/d.; Doc. 11-4). The record confirms that Brandt did not appeal to the Central
Office—the necessary step to fully exhaust his administrative remedy. (/d.). Rather than
comply with the Administrative Remedy process, Brandt bypassed the statutorily mandated
procedures and, instead, filed the instant habeas petition in federal court.
Brandt mistakenly claims that he fully exhausted his administrative remedies. (Doc.
1, at 5). Without providing any evidentiary support for his claim, Brandt simply states that
‘[tlo the best of [his] knowledge, the BP-11 was delivered to the Bureau of Prisons’ Central
Office.” (Doc. 11-3). He has not presented any evidence that he appealed administrative
remedy 1252532 to the Central Office. As stated, if the Regional Director denies a
grievance appeal and the inmate remains dissatisfied, the inmate must lodge a final appeal
to the BOP’s Central Office within 20 days of the denial. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). Only if the
grievance is denied by the Central Office has exhaustion been completed and the inmate

may then file a civil action. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10, 542.15. Brandt's argument that he fully

exhausted administrative remedy 1252532 based on his belief that the Central Office should
have received his BP-11 is unavailing. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 542.18, “a Request or
Appeal is considered filed on the date it is logged into the Administrative Remedy Index as
received.” The “statutory or regulatory scheme ]” applicable to BOP administrative appeals
“clearly require[s] actual receipt by a specific date.” Longenette v. Krusing, 322 F.3d 758,
764 (3d Cir. 2003). Brandt failed to submit any competent evidence that the Central Office
actually received his final appeal or that he received a final decision from the Central Office.
Brandt has not identified any BOP actions that would clearly and unambiguously
violate statutory or constitutional rights, and he has not set forth any facts or advanced any
argument that would permit this Court to find that exhaustion of administrative remedies
would subject him to irreparable injury. (See Docs. 1, 11). Additionally, the fact that
Brandt's sentence currently falls within the 12-month period that the BOP could place him in
pretrial release is not a basis to excuse exhaustion.®
The Court finds that Brandt's claim must first be presented to BOP officials and fully
exhausted. Because Brandt failed to fully and properly exhaust his administrative remedies
before petitioning this Court, and because no exception to the exhaustion requirement
applies here, his Section 2241 petition must be dismissed. See, e.g., Vasquez, 684 F.3d at

3 The Court notes that the Second Chance Act does not entitle a federal inmate to any
guaranteed placement in prerelease custody. See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 244-
51 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding, in exercising its discretion to make halfway house placement decisions, the BOP
must consider the factors set forth in § 3621(b); “[hlowever, that the BOP may assign a prisoner to a CCC
does not mean that it must’).

434 (district court properly dismissed federal prisoner's Section 2241 petition because he
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies)
ill. © Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss without prejudice the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1).
A separate Order shall issue.

Sq
Kel, 4
obert D:
United States District Judge
Dated: March , 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319952. Public record. Not legal advice.