# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. New York · February 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319826

## Case

- **Full name:** Trustees of the Plumbers Local Union No. 1 Welfare Fund, Trade Education Fund, and 401(K) Savings Plan, Trustees of the United Association National Pension Fund, and Trustees of the International Training Fund v. LG Elite Plumbing, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** February 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319826

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that in light of a defendant’s default, a court is required to accept all of plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor
- noting that courts must “supervise default judgments with extreme care to avoid miscarriages of justice.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

X
TRUSTEES OF THE PLUMBERS LOCAL
UNION NO. 1 WELFARE FUND, TRADE
EDUCATION FUND, AND 401(K) SAVINGS
PLAN, TRUSTEES OF THE UNITED REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
ASSOCIATION NATIONAL PENSION FUND,
and TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL 24-cv-4273 (LDH) (LKE)
TRAINING FUND,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LG ELITE PLUMBING, INC.,

Defendant.
X

LARA K. ESHKENAZI, United States Magistrate Judge:
Before the Court, on referral from the Honorable LeShann DeArcy Hall, is the motion of
Plaintiffs, Trustees of the Plumbers Local Union No. 1 Welfare Fund, Trade Education Fund, and
401(K) Savings Plan, Trustees of the United Association National Pension Fund, and Trustees of
the International Training Fund (collectively “Plaintiffs” or the “Funds”), for default judgment
against Defendant LG Elite Plumbing, Inc. (“Defendant” or “LG”). For the reasons set forth below,
the Court respectfully recommends that the motion be granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Complaint (ECF 1) and Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Default Judgment (Mot. for Default Judgment (“Mot. for Default J.”), ECFs 18-23), and they are
assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion. See Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d
Cir. 2009) (holding that in light of a defendant’s default, a court is required to accept all of
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor).
A. Factual Allegations
Plaintiffs Trustees of the Plumbers Local Union No. 1 Welfare Fund, Trade Education
Fund, and 401(K) Savings Plan (collectively the “Local 1 Funds”), are employer and employee
trustees of multiemployer labor-management trust funds organized and operated in accordance

with Section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. §
186(c). (Compl. ¶ 4.) Local 1 Funds administer employee benefit plans under Section 3(3) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). (Id.)
Plaintiffs Trustees of the United Association National Pension Fund (“UANPF”) and Trustees of
the International Training Fund (“ITF,” and collectively the “National Funds”) are employer and
employee trustees of a multiemployer employee pension benefit plan within the meaning of
Sections 3(2) and 3(37) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(2) and (37). (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.)
Defendant is a domestic business corporation, organized under the laws of the State of New
York, and constitutes an employer pursuant to ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 602(5), 1145, and the Taft-
Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. (Id. ¶ 8.) On May 10, 2022, Defendant entered into a collective

bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the Local Union No. 1 of the United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and
Canada (the “Union”), covering the period from October 1, 2019, through December 31, 2022.
(Mot. for Default J., Decl. of Wendy Salvatierra (“Salvatierra Decl.”), ECF 19; Exs. A and B, ECF
19-1, 19-2.) The Trust Agreements establishing the Funds are incorporated into the CBA. (Compl.
¶¶ 13, 15-16; Salvatierra Decl. ¶ 13.)
Pursuant to the CBA, Trust Agreements, and Collection Policies, Defendant had payment
and recordkeeping obligations. (Compl. ¶16-17.) Defendant was required to remit specified benefit
contributions to the Funds and related entities, based on the number of hours worked by Union
employees performed within the trade and geographical jurisdiction of the Union. (Id. ¶ 19;
Salvatierra ¶ 16.) Defendant was also required to submit remittance reports detailing the number
of hours worked by each employee (“Covered Work”) and forward specified contributions to the
Funds on or before the 20th day following the close of the month in which the hours were worked.

(Compl. ¶ 20; Salvatierra Decl. ¶ 17.) Pursuant to the Trust Agreements, the Funds established
collection policies for delinquent fringe benefit contributions. (Compl. ¶ 17-18; Salvatierra Decl.
¶ 15; Decl. of Toni C. Inscoe (“Inscoe Decl.”) ¶ 14). Under the Funds’ Collection Policies, if
Defendant is delinquent in making contributions or submitting remittance reports for two or more
months, Plaintiffs may estimate the amount of Defendant’s delinquent contributions as a
determination of payments for each delinquent month. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-22; Salvatierra Decl. ¶ 20,
Ex. H, Art. IV. ¶ 9, ECF 19-8; Inscoe Decl. ¶¶ 13-14.) If Defendant does not timely remit
contributions to the Funds, Plaintiffs are entitled to unpaid contributions, liquidated damages on
the amount of unpaid contributions, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Compl. ¶¶ 23-26; Mem.
L. at 4, ECF 22.)

When Defendant failed to report the number of hours of Covered Work for the period of
January 2024 through April 2024, Plaintiffs brought the instant action, alleging claims of unpaid
contributions and violations of the CBA. (Compl. ¶¶ 37, 40-44.) Subsequently, Defendant provided
Plaintiffs with “unfunded remittance reports … detailing the number of hours of Covered Work
performed by its employees for the period February through April 2024.” (Mem. L. at 4;
Salvatierra Decl. ¶ 25, Ex. J, ECF 19-10; Inscoe Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. S, ECF 20-5.) The reports
demonstrate that Defendant owes contributions of $33,885.11 to Local 1 Funds, and $6,376.82 to
National Funds for the work performed from February 2024 through April 2024. (Mem. L. at 4;
Salvatierra Decl. ¶ 25, Ex. J; Inscoe Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. S.) Because Defendant did not provide
remittance reports for January 2024, pursuant to the Collection Policies, Plaintiffs used the
estimation protocol to calculate Defendant’s January contributions, and determined that Defendant
owes $10,897.71 to Local 1 Funds, and $2,139.43 to National Funds. (Mem. L. at 4; Salvatierra
Decl. ¶ 27-31, Exs. L, K, ECFs 19-12, 19-11; Inscoe Decl. ¶¶ 19-23; Exs. T-V, ECFs 20-6, 20-7,

20-8.) Plaintiffs also seek to recover liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs.
(Mem. L. at 15-16.)
B. Procedural History
On June 17, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendant and Ohio Casualty
Insurance Company. (See Compl.) Defendant was properly served and Plaintiffs filed proof of
service on June 25, 2024. (Aff. of Serv., ECF 7.) When Defendant did not appear or otherwise
respond, Plaintiffs filed an application for a Clerk’s Certificate of Default on August 13, 2024.
(ECF 10.) The Clerk of Court entered default against Defendant on August 14, 2024. (ECF 13.)
Plaintiffs filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal with prejudice as to their claims against The
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company on December 16, 2024, which Judge DeArcy Hall entered on

January 10, 2025. (ECF 17; Jan. 10, 2025, Order.) On April 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant
motion for default judgment against Defendant. (ECFs 18-23.) Judge DeArcy Hall referred the
motion to the undersigned for a report and recommendation. (Apr. 10, 2025, Order.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction and Venue
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Here, Plaintiffs assert claims
under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq, and Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. (Compl.
¶ 1.) Given that this action arises under the laws of the United States, the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over this action. See, e.g., Rocha v. Bakhter Afghan Halal Kababs, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d
337, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
“For a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the plaintiff’s service
of process upon the defendant must have been procedurally proper.” Windward Bora LLC v.

Valencia, No. 19-cv-4147 (NGG) (RER), 2020 WL 6470293, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2020), R. &
R. adopted, 2020 WL 6450286 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2020). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(h)(1)(A) provides that a corporate defendant must be served “in the manner prescribed by Rule
4(e)(1) for serving an individual[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A). Moreover, under subsection (B),
the summons and complaint may be served by delivering a copy to “an officer, a managing or
general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process
and—if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires—by also mailing a copy
of each to the defendant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Rule 4(e)(1) states that an individual may be
served by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general
jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made[.]” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 4(e)(1).
The New York Business Corporation Law (“NYBCL”) mandates that “[t]he secretary of
state shall be the agent of every domestic corporation and every authorized foreign corporation
upon whom process against the corporation may be served.” N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 304(a). Indeed,
“[n]o domestic or foreign corporation may be formed or authorized to do business in this state
under this chapter unless in its certificate of incorporation or application for authority it designates
the secretary of state as such agent.” Id. § 304(b). Lastly, NYBCL section 306 provides that:
Service of process on the secretary of state as agent of a domestic
… corporation shall be made … [by] [p]ersonally delivering to and
leaving with the secretary of state or a deputy, or with any person
authorized by the secretary of state to receive such service, at the
office of the department of state in the city of Albany, duplicate
copies of such process together with the statutory fee…. Service of
process on such corporation shall be complete when the secretary of
state is so served.

Id. § 306(b)(1).
Here, Plaintiff has properly served Defendant in this action. Defendant is a New York
limited liability company, so service of process of the Summons and Complaint upon the New
York Secretary of State constitutes proper service on Defendant. (Compl. ¶ 8; Aff. of Serv., ECF
7.) On June 20, 2024, Plaintiff’s process server personally delivered and left two copies of the
Summons and Complaint, along with the statutory fee, with Amy Lesch, the Authorized Agent in
the Office of the Secretary of State of New York. (ECF 7.) Ms. Lesch was served at the Office of
the Secretary. (Id.) Plaintiff subsequently filed the proof of service with the court on June 25, 2024.
(See id.) Moreover, Plaintiffs also served Defendant at its business addresses via certified and
electronic mail and filed proof of service. (Aff. of Serv., ECF 6.) Therefore, this Court has personal
jurisdiction over Defendant.
“[A] civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1); see
also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (providing that an action brought by an employee benefit plan “may
be brought in the district where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a
defendant resides or may be found”). A corporation is deemed to be a resident of “any district” in
“a state which has more than one judicial district and in which . . . [that] corporation is subject to
personal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d). As alleged,
Defendant is a New York LLC with a principal place of business in Ozone Park, New York, and a
business address in Jamaica, New York. (Compl. ¶ 8, 10.) Therefore, venue in the Eastern District
of New York is proper. See 28 U.S.C § 1391(b)(1).
B. Default Judgment Standard
Under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are two steps to entering a
default judgment. See Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1993). First, the
Clerk of Court enters the default pursuant to Rule 55(a) by notation of the party’s default on the

Clerk’s record of the case. Fed R. Civ. P. 55(a) (providing that “[w]hen a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is
shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.”). This first step is
nondiscretionary. See United States v. Conolly, 694 Fed. App’x 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2017). Second, after
the Clerk of the Court enters a defendant’s default, the court may enter a default judgment. See
Fed R. Civ. P. 55(b).
Whether or not a default judgment is issued is up to the discretion of the court. When
evaluating a plaintiff’s application for a default judgment, “a court is required to accept all …
factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [plaintiff’s] favor.” Romanowicz,
577 F.3d at 84. “Nevertheless, it remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts

constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit conclusions of law.”
La Barbera v. ASTC Labs., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 263, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotations
and citations omitted); see TAGC Mgmt., LLC v. Lehman, Lee & Xu Ltd., 536 Fed. App’x 45, 46
(2d Cir. 2013) (“[P]rior to entering default judgment, a district court is required to determine
whether the plaintiff’s allegations establish the defendant’s liability as a matter of law.”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
“Default judgments ‘are generally disfavored and are reserved for rare occasions.’” State
St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting
Enron Oil Corp., 10 F.3d at 96). While the Second Circuit has recognized the “push on a trial court
to dispose of cases that, in disregard of the rules, are not processed expeditiously [and] ... delay
and clog its calendar,” it has held that a district court must balance that interest with its
responsibility to “afford[] litigants a reasonable chance to be heard.” Enron Oil Corp., 10 F.3d at
96. Thus, considering the “oft-stated preference for resolving disputes on the merits,” doubts

should be resolved in favor of the defaulting party. See id. at 95-96. Accordingly, a plaintiff is not
entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right simply because defendants are in default. See
Erwin DeMarino Trucking Co. v. Jackson, 838 F. Supp. 160, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that
courts must “supervise default judgments with extreme care to avoid miscarriages of justice.”).
“In determining whether to enter a default judgment, the Court is guided by the same
factors that apply to a motion to set aside entry of a default.” Double Green Produce, Inc. v. Forum
Supermarket Inc., No. 18-cv-2660 (MKB) (SJB), 2019 WL 1387538, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29,
2019) (citing Enron Oil Corp., 10 F.3d at 96); Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com Ltd., 249 F.3d 167,
170-71 (2d Cir. 2001)). “These factors are 1) whether the defendant’s default was willful; 2)
whether the defendant has a meritorious defense to plaintiff’s claims; and 3) the level of prejudice

the non-defaulting party would suffer as a result of the denial of the motion for default judgment.”
Id. at *2 (quoting Mason Tenders Dist. Council v. Duce Constr. Corp., No. 02-cv-9044, 2003 WL
1960584, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As to the first factor, “a defendant’s nonappearance and failure to respond sufficiently
demonstrates willfulness.” Luna v. Gon Way Constr., Inc., No. 16-cv-1411 (ARR) (VMS), 2017
WL 835321, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2017) (collecting cases), R. & R. adopted, 2017 WL 835174
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2017). Here, Defendant has not responded to the Complaint or the motion for
default judgment despite proper service. (See Affs. of Serv., ECFs 6-7; Cert. of Serv., ECF 23.)
Defendant’s failure to respond to the Complaint or the instant motion demonstrates that
Defendant’s default is willful. See Traffic Sports USA v. Modelos Restaurante, Inc., No. 11-cv-
1454 (ADS) (AKT), 2012 WL 3637585, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2012), R. & R. adopted, 2012 WL
3626824 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2012) (finding the defendant’s failure to respond “in any way” to the
Complaint, combined with the affidavits demonstrating proper service, confirmed beyond “any

doubt” that the defendant’s failure to respond was willful).
As to the second factor, Defendant’s failure to appear in this action has left the Court unable
to assess whether it has a meritorious defense. “Where a defendant fails to answer the complaint,
courts are unable to make a determination whether the defendant has a meritorious defense to the
plaintiff’s allegations[.]” See Joseph v. HDMJ Rest., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 131, 143 (E.D.N.Y.
2013). This factor therefore weighs in favor of granting a default judgment.
With respect to the third factor, Plaintiffs will be prejudiced if the motion for default
judgment is denied because “[w]ithout the entry of a default judgment, Plaintiffs would be unable
to recover for the claims adequately set forth in the Complaint.” Korzeniewski v. Sapa Pho
Vietnamese Rest. Inc., No. 17-cv-5721 (MKB) (SJB), 2019 WL 312149, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3,

2019) (quoting Sola Franchise Corp. v. Solo Salon Studios Inc., No. 14-cv-946 (JS) (AKT), 2015
WL 1299259, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2015)).
Accordingly, the Court recommends finding that Defendant’s failure to answer or
otherwise appear in this matter constitutes an admission of the factual allegations therein. The
Court now assesses the propriety of a default judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claims under
ERISA and LMRA.
C. Liability
1. Violation of Section 515 of ERISA
“ERISA is a comprehensive federal law that sets standards for private retirement and health
plans, governs their administration, and generally preempts state regulation of benefits plans.”
Annuity, Pension, Welfare, Training & Lab. Mgmt. Coop. Tr. Funds of Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs Loc. 14-14B, AFL-CIO v. C.M. Ashland Constr., 714 F. Supp. 3d 167, 176 (E.D.N.Y.

2024) (citing ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). Under ERISA, “[e]very employer who is
obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the
terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make
such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement.”
29 U.S.C. § 1145. Trustees of a plan may, pursuant to Section 502, bring an action to enforce this
requirement. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3); Benson v. Brower’s Moving & Storage, Inc., 907 F.2d
310, 313-14 (2d Cir. 1990).
To establish a violation of Section 515, Plaintiffs must show that Defendant (1) is an
employer; (2) is bound by a CBA that required payment of contributions; and (3) failed to make
those contributions. Trs. of Pavers & Rd. Builders Dist. Council Welfare, Pension, & Annuity

Funds v. Rici Corp., No. 23-cv-5856 (DLI) (SJB), 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177831, at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2024), R. & R. adopted, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177831 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 26,
2024). “An ‘employer’ is ‘any person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest
of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan ... and includes a group or association of
employers acting for an employer in such capacity.’” Annuity, Welfare & Apprenticeship Skill
Improvement & Safety Funds of Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Loc. 15, 15A, 15C & 15D, AFL-
CIO by Callahan v. Baymen Indus. Ltd., No. 22-cv-703 (VMS), 2024 WL 4274949, at *7 n.16
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2024) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5)). Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that
Defendant is an employer that bound itself to the CBA and benefit plan. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 12 (alleging
that “LG Elite was a party to, and/or manifested its intention to be bound by, a collective bargaining
agreement, project labor agreement and/or participation agreement with the Union.”).)
Plaintiffs have also sufficiently alleged that Defendant was bound by a CBA requiring it to
make benefit contributions to the Funds and that Defendant failed to do so, in violation of the CBA

and Collection Policies from January through April 2024. (Id. ¶¶ 19-22, 27-31.) The Complaint
alleges that Defendant “failed to report to the number of hours of Covered Work performed by
each of its employees to the Local 1 Funds” and “the National Funds for the period January through
April 2024,” (id. ¶ 27, 30), which is sufficient to state a claim under Section 515. See, e.g., Annuity,
Welfare & Apprenticeship Skill Improvement & Safety Funds of Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs.,
Loc. 15, 15A, 15C & 15D, AFL-CIO v. Trac Constr. Grp., Inc., No. 22-cv-1935 (ENV) (RER),
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181901, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2022) (“At the pleading stage, allegations
in a complaint that an employer failed to remit contributions to an ERISA plan are sufficient to
establish the employer’s liability under ERISA.” (citation omitted)), R. & R. adopted, 2022 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 230934 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2022). The Court therefore recommends granting

Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment as to liability under ERISA.
2. Violation of Section 301 of the LMRA
Section 301 of the LMRA provides a federal cause of action for breaches of contracts
between employers and labor organizations representing employees in industries engaged in or
affecting commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); Annuity, Welfare & Apprenticeship Skill Improvement &
Safety Funds of Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Loc. 15, 15A, 15C & 15D, AFL-CIO by Callahan
v. Regal USA Concrete, Inc., No. 23-cv-1209 (MKB) (SJB), 2024 WL 79671, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
8, 2024), R. & R. adopted, 2024 WL 748399 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2024) (“[A] breach of a CBA is a
claim under Section 301 of the LMRA. And as such, a breach of a CBA based on a failure to make
employee benefit contributions is actionable under Section 301.”). Unions and employee benefit
plans have standing to sue under the LMRA. See Loc. 355 United Serv. Workers Union, Int’l Union
of Journeymen & Allied Trades v. Airtech NYC-LI, Inc., No. 22-cv-5225 (ENV) (VMS), 2023 WL
7000886, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2023); Legal Aid Society v. City of New York, 114 F. Supp. 2d

204, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Under the CBA and Collection Policies, Defendant was required to remit its contributions
to the Funds on or before the 20th day following the close of the month in which the hours were
worked. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant breached the CBA by failing to remit
specified benefit contributions and reports detailing the number of hours of Covered Work
performed by its employees from the period January through April 2024. (Id. ¶¶ 18-22, 27-31; see
Salvatierra Decl. ¶ 24; Inscoe Decl. ¶ 16.) Therefore, by alleging that Defendant failed to remit
employee benefit contributions, as mandated by the CBA, Plaintiffs have established Defendant’s
liability under the LMRA. See Sullivan v. Marble Unique Corp., No. 10-cv-3582 (NGG) (LB),
2011 WL 5401987, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011), R. & R. adopted, 2011 WL 5402898 (E.D.N.Y.

Nov. 4, 2011) (holding that Defendant breached Section 301 of the LMRA when it failed to make
required contributions under the CBA); Brown v. C. Volante Corp., 194 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir.
1999);Trs. of the Plumbers Loc. Union No. 1 Welfare Fund, Additional Sec. Ben. Fund, Vacation
& Holiday Fund, Trade Educ. Fund & 401(k) Sav. Plan v. Philip Gen. Const., No. 05-cv-1665
(NG) (RLM), 2007 WL 3124612, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2007).
Defendant was properly served with the Summons and Complaint, as well as the motion
for default judgment, but has failed to respond and therefore does not contest liability. Accordingly,
this Court finds that Plaintiff has established Defendant’s liability under ERISA and the LMRA.
D. Damages
A default constitutes an admission of well-pleaded factual allegations except those relating
to damages. See Credit Lyonnais Secs. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“Even when a default judgment is warranted based on a party’s failure to defend, the allegations

in the complaint, with respect to the amount of the damages are not deemed true.”) Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) provides courts discretion to determine whether an evidentiary hearing
is necessary or whether to rely on detailed affidavits or documentary evidence. Action S.A. v. Marc
Rich & Co., Inc., 951 F.2d 504, 508 (2d Cir. 1991). “The court may determine damages without
an in-person hearing based on the plaintiff’s affidavits so long as it can ensure a basis for the
damages specified in the default judgment.” Zabrodin v. Silk 222, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 3d 102, 113
(E.D.N.Y. 2023). The moving party is “entitled to all reasonable inferences from the evidence
offered.” Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981).
Here, to support their claim for damages, Plaintiffs provide affidavits from Adrianna R.
Grancio, Plaintiffs’ counsel, containing contemporaneous time records and receipts, and Wendy

Salvatierra, Administrator of the Local 1 Funds, and Toni C. Inscoe, Custodian of Records for
UANPF, describing the method used to calculate the amount of delinquent funds. (ECF 19-21.) A
evidentiary hearing is therefore unnecessary as the Court can ensure a basis for the requested
damages based on the submitted affidavits.
After establishing liability under Section 515 of ERISA, a plaintiff is entitled to an award
of: “(1) the amount of unpaid contributions, (2) interest on the unpaid contributions, (3) liquidated
damages, (4) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, and (5) such other legal and equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate.” Lanzafame v. Toquir Contracting, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 255, 259
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)); see also Iron Workers Dist. Council of W.N.Y. &
Vicinity Welfare & Pension Funds v. Hudson Steel Fabricators & Erectors, Inc., 68 F.3d 1502,
1505-08 (2d Cir. 1995).
1. Unpaid Contributions
a. Local 1 Funds

Plaintiffs seek a judgment awarding Local 1 Funds $10,897.71 in estimated contributions
for January 2024, and $33,885.11 in actual contributions. (Salvatierra Decl. ¶ 27-31; Mem. L. at
9.) Defendant submitted unfunded remittance reports to the Local 1 Funds detailing the number of
hours of covered work performed by its employees for February through April 2024.
(See Salvatierra Decl. ¶ 26.) Based on those unfunded remittance reports, the Local 1 Funds
determined that Defendant failed to remit contributions totaling $33,885.11 for that period. (Id.)
In addition, Local 1 Funds estimates that Defendant owes $10,897.71 in estimated contributions.
(Id. ¶ 31.) Per the Collection Policy, Local 1 Funds relied on reports for the last three months for
which reports and payments were submitted to estimate the amount owed for Covered Work
performed in January 2024. (Id. ¶ 30.)

Having reviewed Local 1 Funds’ supporting documentation, this Court respectfully
recommends that the Local 1 Funds be awarded $44,782.82 in unpaid employee benefit
contributions from Defendant. See Annuity, Welfare & Apprenticeship Skill Improvement & Safety
Funds of Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Loc. 15 , 15A, 15C & 15D, AFL-CIO by Callahan v.
PETK, Inc., No. 22-cv-3559 (LDH) (LB), 2022 WL 19520880, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2022) (“In
ERISA cases seeking an award of damages after a finding of liability, Courts frequently rely on
the affidavits, reports, and other documentary evidence filed by plaintiffs.”)
b. National Funds
As to National Funds, Plaintiffs seek a judgment awarding them $2,139.43 in estimated
contributions for January 2024, and $6,376.82 in actual contributions. (See Inscoe Decl. ¶ 18, Ex.
T.) Defendant also submitted unfunded remittance reports to the National Funds detailing the

number of hours of covered work performed by its employees for February through April 2024.
(See id. ¶ 17, Ex. S.) Based on those unfunded remittance reports, the National Funds determined
that Defendant failed to remit contributions totaling $6,376.82 for that period, with $6,188.52 owed
to UANPF, and $188.30 to ITF. (Id.) National Funds also estimates that Defendant owes $2,139.43
in estimated contributions for January 2024. (Id. ¶ 22.) Per the Collection Policy, National Funds
relied on reports for the last three months for which reports and payments were submitted to
estimate the amount owed for Covered Work performed in January 2024. (Id. ¶ 22.)
Having reviewed National Funds’ supporting documentation, this Court finds that there is
a clerical error in the contribution calculations. According to the remittance reports, Defendant
owes UANPF $2,489.72 for February, $2549.67 for March, and $1,070.73 for April 2024, for a

total of $6,110.12. (Inscoe Decl., Ex. S, ECF 20-5 (showing the “Amount Owed” to “National
Pension” for each month).) ITF is owed $76.20 for February, $78.40 for March, and $33.70 for
April 2024, for a total of $188.30. (Id. (showing the “Amount Owed” to “International Training”
for each month).) National Funds appears to have inadvertently included ITF’s amount owed when
calculating the contributions that only UANPF is owed for March 2024. (Inscoe Decl., Ex. T, ECF
20-6 (showing that UANPF is owed $2,628.07, instead of $2,549.67 as provided on the remittance
reports).) As this error affects National Funds’ interest and liquidated damages calculations, this
Court respectfully recommends that National Funds’ request for damages be denied, with leave to
submit documentation amending the contribution calculations.
2. Interest, Liquidated Damages, and Administrative Fees
Under ERISA, “interest on unpaid contributions shall be determined by using the rate
provided under the plan, or, if none, the rate prescribed under section 6621 of Title 26.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g)(2). “Under the LMRA, it is within the court’s discretion to award prejudgment interest.”

Finkel v. INS Elec. Servs. Inc., No. 06-cv-4862, 2008 WL 941482 at*7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2008). In
addition, the court may award “liquidated damages provided for under the plan in an amount not
in excess of 20 percent” of the unpaid contributions. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(C)(ii).
Under the documents and instruments governing the Funds—including the CBAs, Trust
Agreements, and Collection Policies—employers whose contributions are delinquent, such as
Defendant, are liable to the Funds for the amount of delinquent contributions, interest calculated
from the twentieth day following the due date and compounded annually, plus liquidated damages.
(See Salvatierra Decl. ¶ 21, Exs. B-C, Art. VI; Exs. E-G, Art. VI, Sec. 6; Ex. H, ¶ 6; Ex. I, Art.
III.B.2.) The Local 1 Fund Collection Policies also allow the Funds to assess a $100 administrative
fee for every month for which the employer failed to pay contributions. (See Salvatierra Decl. ¶

23, Ex. H, Art. II, ¶ 6.)
Per the CBAs, Trust Agreements, and Collection Policies, interest is charged at the annual
rate of ten percent for the Local 1 Funds. (Id. ¶ 21.) Accordingly, Defendant is liable to the Local
1 Funds for interest on the delinquent contributions for the period of January through April 2024,
at the rate of ten percent per annum, compounded annually, through the date of judgment.1

1 Interest is calculated by multiplying the contributions due per month by the annual interest rate of ten percent, as
provided for in the CBA and Local 1 Fund Collection Policies, and then dividing that figure by 365 to yield the daily
interest rate. For example, for January 2024, the estimated contributions of $10,897.71 are multiplied by ten percent
interest rate to yield a total yearly interest of $1,089.77. That figure is then divided by 365 to render the daily interest
rate of $2.99. The daily interest rate is then multiplied by the number of days the contributions are late or have been
paid late. January 2024 contributions were due on February 20, 2024. Since the January 2024 contributions remain
outstanding, interest on those contributions must be calculated through the date of judgment. (See Salvatierra Decl.
Ex. K.)
Additionally, the Company remitted contributions for October and November 2023 beyond their
respective due dates, resulting in the accrual of late payment interest of $430.94. (See id. ¶ 38, Exs.
K, M.)
Liquidated damages are calculated as twenty percent of the principal delinquency, totaling

$8,956.56 ($44,782.82 x .2). (See id., Ex. K.) Defendant also owes Local 1 Funds lost earnings
from October 3, 2023, through March 12, 2024, totaling $31.51. (See id., Ex. M.) Finally, since
the Company has failed to submit contributions to the Local 1 Funds from January through April
2024, the administrative fees total $400. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 37.)
3. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Pursuant to Section 502 of ERISA, where an action is brought by a fiduciary to
enforce section 515 of ERISA, the court “shall award … reasonable attorney’s fees … to be paid
by the defendant.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D); see also Finkel v. Triple A Grp., Inc., 708 F. Supp.
2d 277, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[u]pon a finding that defendants have been delinquent in paying
contributions, liability for attorney’s fees under § 1132(g)(2) is mandatory.”); Guidice v. All

Reliable Servs., Inc., No. 23-cv-7575 (NJC) (JMW), 2025 WL 521144, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18,
2025) (awarding attorneys’ fees); Durso v. Casa Bella Contracting, Inc., No. 23-cv-7107 (EK)
(AYS), 2025 WL 2496082, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2025), R. & R. adopted, 2025 WL 2494317
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2025) (noting that “[p]ursuant to ERISA Section 502(g)(2)(D), 29 U.S.C. §
1132(g)(2)(D), plaintiffs are typically entitled to payment of their reasonable attorneys’ fees and
costs incurred in a successful action to obtain withdrawal liability.”); Trs. Of Loc. 813 Pension Tr.
Fund v. Rizzo Env’t Servs. Corp., No. 19-cv-6622 (RPK (CLP), 2020 WL 7249289, at *9
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2020), R. & R. adopted, 2020 WL 7021595 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020)
(awarding attorneys’ fees in an ERISA action seeking withdrawal liability). Plaintiffs seek to
recover $8,585 in attorney’s fees and $582.09 in costs.2
a. Hourly Rate
First, the Court must determine the reasonableness of the hourly rate charged. Attorney

Grancio charged her normal hourly rate of $410.00. (Grancio Decl. ¶¶ 12.) Ms. Grancio attests
that attorney Marlena Smith also worked on the matter, and her time was billed at a rate of $310
per hour. (Id. ¶ 13.) These hourly rates are reasonable. See, e.g., Rubin v. HSBC Bank USA, NA,
763 F. Supp. 3d 233, 243-44 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (finding hourly rates of up to $650 for partners and
$450 for senior associates reasonable).
Plaintiff’s counsel also billed for the time that two paralegals, Ms. Keating and Ms.
Frankel, spent on the matter at a rate of $155.00 per hour. (Grancio Decl. ¶¶ 52, 53.) This fee is on
the higher end of rates typically awarded in this district. See Restrepo v. Dynamic Fire, Inc., No.
25-cv-2079 (NCM) (JAM), 2025 WL 3057385, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2025), R. & R.
adopted, 2026 WL 363526 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2026). As in other recent decisions in this District,

this Court finds it incongruous that Ms. Keating and Ms. Frankel would be billed at the same
rate. See id. (discounting the rates of Ms. Keating and Ms. Frankel to $120.00 per hour where Ms.
Keating graduated from college in 2014, Ms. Frankel graduated in 2021, and both were billed at
$155.00 per hour). Recent precedent in this District has found that, “[c]onsidering the updated

2 This action was initially commenced against both Defendant and The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. (See
generally Compl.) Although Plaintiffs ultimately entered into a stipulation of dismissal against The Ohio Casualty
Insurance Company on December 16, 2024 (ECF 17), Plaintiffs incurred attorneys’ fees and costs bringing the action
against The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, who was named because it issued a surety bond “guaranteeing
payment of all fringe benefits and deferred wages owed by [Defendant] in connection with all Covered Work
performed by its employees.” (Compl. ¶ 32.) Because the “injury was principally perpetuated” by Defendant, this
Court respectfully recommends that Defendant be assessed the entire amount owed in attorneys’ fees and costs,
including those related to The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. See Trs. of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l Pension
Fund v. Daniel Weintraub & Assocs., No. 04-cv-2611 (FB) (CLP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99437, at *31 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 14, 2007), R. & R. adopted, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84955 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2007).
hourly rates in this District… the Court now considers [a paralegal’s] hourly rate of $125 to be
reasonable.” Rubin, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 245. As such, this Court respectfully recommends
discounting Ms. Keating and Ms. Frankel’s hourly rates to $125.00.
b. Hours Billed

Attorneys Grancio and Smith worked on this matter for a total of 13 and 8.6 hours each,
and paralegals Keating and Frankel worked on this matter for a total of 3.8 hours. (Grancio Decl.
¶ 17, Ex. AA, ECF 21-5.) A party seeking to recover attorneys’ fees “bears the burden of
establishing that the number of hours for which compensation is sought is reasonable.” Stratakos
v. Nassau County, 574 F. Supp. 3d 154, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (internal quotations and citation
omitted). An application for attorneys’ fees must be supported “by accurate, detailed, and
contemporaneous time records.” Lin v. DJ’s Int’l Buffet Inc., No. 17-cv-4994 (JS) (AYS), 2025
WL 2409784, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2015) (quoting La Barbera, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 277); see
also Gesualdi v. Gen. Concrete, Inc., No. 11-cv-1866 (CBA) (JO), 2013 WL 1192967, at *9
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2013) (“The absence of contemporaneous records precludes any fee award in all

but the most extraordinary of circumstances.” (citing Scott v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 130, 133-
34 (2d Cir. 2010)). Contemporaneous time records submitted in support of an application need not
contain great detail so long as they identify the general subject matter of time
expenditures. See Perdue v. City Univ. of N.Y., 13 F. Supp. 2d 326, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
Here, Ms. Grancio has submitted detailed contemporaneous time records to support
Plaintiffs’ request for fees. The entries are clear and substantive, and show that Ms. Grancio, Ms.
Smith, and the paralegals spent a reasonable amount of time (25.4 hours) working on this matter,
including preparing the Summons and Complaint, requesting the Clerk’s Certificate of Default,
and preparing this motion. (See Grancio Decl. Ex. AA.) The total amount of time reflected in the
billing records does not appear to be outside the norm for a default judgment action
under ERISA. Indeed, these hours are well within the range of hours expended in similar default
judgment cases involving claims brought under ERISA. See Trs. of Plumbers Loc. Union No. 1
Welfare Fund v. Temperini Mech. Inc., No. 18-cv-2596 (AMD) (LB), 2020 WL 571680, at *6

(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2020), R. & R. adopted, 2020 WL 565410 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2020) (finding
49.8 hours of work on an ERISA default in which Ms. Grancio contributed reasonable); Gesualdi
v. Seacoast Petroleum Prods., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 87, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“recommend[ing] [in
a case involving a claim for withdrawal liability] to Judge Spatt that, under the circumstances, a
40 percent reduction in Plaintiff's counsel's billed hours, from 39.55 to 23.73 is both reasonable
and warranted.”); Bakery & Confectionery Union v. Mrs. Maxwell’s Bakery, Inc., No. 21-cv-
308 (RPK) (SJB), 2022 WL 18107257, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2022) (finding that 34.25 hours
expended in a similar case, though higher than average, was still reasonable); Trs. Of Pavers &
Rd. Builders Dist. Council Welfare, Pension, & Annuity Funds v. Atl. Steel Sols., LLC, No. 21-cv-
2518 (CBA) (JRC), 2022 WL 4642735, at *11 (finding Ms. Grancio’s 22.9 hours spent on ERISA

default reasonable); Trs. Of Pavers & Rd. Builders Dist. Council Welfare, Pension, & Annuity
Funds v. IKNA Constr. LLC, No. 24-cv-0561 (CBA) (JAM), 2025 WL 447731, at *19 (finding
25.4 hours worked on an ERISA default case by Ms. Grancio and another attorney
reasonable); Gesualdi v. Interstate Masonry Corp., No. 12-cv-0383 (NGG) (VMS), 2014 WL
1311709, *13 (E.D.N.Y. March 25, 2014) (finding 23 hours spent on an ERISA default reasonable
and collecting cases).
Accordingly, this Court respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs be awarded attorneys’ fees
in the amount of $8,471 ((13 hours at an hourly rate of $410.00) + (8.9 hours at an hourly rate
of $310.00) + (3.8 hours at a discounted rate of $125) = $8,471).
c. Costs
Finally, Plaintiffs requests an award of $582.09 for litigation costs. (See Grancio Decl ¶
18, Ex. AA.) Reasonable and identifiable out-of-pocket disbursements ordinarily charged to clients
are recoverable. See LeBlanc–Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Cir. 1998). However,

the party seeking to recover costs “bears the burden of adequately documenting and itemizing the
costs requested.” Ganci v. U.S. Limousine Svc. Ltd., No. 10-cv-3027 (JFB) (AKT), 2015 WL
1529772, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. April 2, 2015) (quoting Pennacchio v. Powers, No. 05-cv-985 (RRM)
(RML), 2011 WL 2945825, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2011)). Here, Plaintiffs support their request
for an award of costs with an itemized accounting of costs incurred. (See Grancio Decl. Ex. AA.)
The costs listed appear reasonable and customary, and include filing fees, process service costs,
and online research charges. As such, this Court respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs be
awarded costs in the amount of $582.09.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that the District Court: (1) grant

Plaintiffs’ motion as to liability; (2) grant Local 1 Funds’ request for damages in the amount of
$10,897.71 in estimated delinquent contributions, $1,198.99 in interest, and $2,179.54 in
liquidated damages for January 2024; $33,885.11 in actual contributions, $3,232.15 in interest,
and $6,777.02 in liquidated damages for February through April 2024; $400 in administrative fees;
$31.51 in lost earnings and $430.94 in interest; and additional interest on the delinquent
contributions at the rate of 10% per annum from March 29, 2025 through the date of judgment,
plus mandatory post-judgment interest at the statutory rate; (3) deny National Funds’ request for
damages, with leave to submit an amended declaration correcting the contribution calculations;
(4) and grant Plaintiffs $582.09 in costs, but reduce Plaintiffs’ award of attorneys’ fees to $8,471.
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being served on Plaintiffs via ECF. The
Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to
Defendant LG Elite Plumbing, Inc. at the following address forthwith: (1) 99 Washington Avenue,
Albany, NY 12231; and (2) 103-02 Rockaway Blvd, Ozone Park, NY 11417. Plaintiffs are also
directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to Defendant and to file proof of
service of mailing by February 20, 2026.
Within 14 days of service, any party may serve and file specific written objections to this
Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Any requests for an
extension of time to file objections shall be directed to Judge DeArcy Hall. Ifa party fails to object
timely to this Report and Recommendation, it waives any right to further judicial review of this
decision. See Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43 F.4th 112, 120 (2d Cir. 2022).
SO ORDERED.
Brooklyn, New York
February 17, 2026

LARA K. ESHKENAZI
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319826. Public record. Not legal advice.