# Opinion

> District Court, C.D. California · January 22, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319773

## Case

- **Full name:** Maria D. G. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** January 22, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 MARIA D. G., Case No. 5:25-cv-01189-KES

12 Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
13 v.
AND ORDER

14 FRANK BISIGNANO,

15 Commissioner of Social Security,
16 Defendant.

17

18 I.

19 INTRODUCTION

20 On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff Maria D. G. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint for
21 review of the denial of her widow’s Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under
22 Title II of the Social Security Act. (Dkt. 1.) On August 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed a
23 Plaintiff’s Brief in accordance with Rule 6 of the Supplemental Rules for Social
24 Security Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (“PB” at Dkt. 12.) After a stay caused
25 by the lapse of appropriations to fund the federal government (Dkt. 16, 18), on
26 December 3, 2025, Defendant Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security
27 (“Commissioner”), filed a responding Commissioner’s Brief under Rule 7. (“CB”
28 at Dkt. 19.) Plaintiff declined to file a Reply. For the reasons stated below, the
1 Commissioner’s decision denying benefits is AFFIRMED.
2 II.
3 BACKGROUND
4 In April 2022, Plaintiff filed an application for widow’s DIB, alleging a
5 disability onset date of July 7, 2020. Administrative Record (“AR”) 274.
6 On April 16, 2024, Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified at an
7 in-person hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) with the assistance
8 of a Spanish interpreter. AR 38-63. A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified. AR
9 58.
10 On May 9, 2024, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. AR 17-37. The
11 ALJ found that Plaintiff potentially qualified for widow’s DIB as of January 14,
12 2022, the date her wage-earner spouse died. AR 23-25. The ALJ determined that
13 Plaintiff suffered from one severe medically determinable impairment (“MDI”):
14 breast cancer. AR 25. The ALJ did not find that Plaintiff’s other MDIs, including
15 long COVID-19, temporomandibular joint (“TMJ”) disorder, and depression, were
16 severe, but she nevertheless considered any functional limitations caused by these
17 MDIs when assessing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). AR 26.
18 Ultimately, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work with
19 some additional limitations on postural activities and overhead reaching. AR 27-28.
20 Based on these RFC findings, the VE’s testimony, and other evidence, the
21 ALJ determined that Plaintiff could work as a (1) marking clerk (Dictionary of
22 Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 209.587-034); (2) cleaner (DOT 323.687-014); and
23 (3) solderer (DOT 813.684-022). AR 31-32. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was
24 not disabled. AR 32.
25 III.
26 ISSUES PRESENTED
27 This appeal raises the sole issue of whether the ALJ erred by failing to give
28 clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting
1 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (PB at 2, 7-14.) Plaintiff asks the Court to apply
2 the credit-as-true doctrine and remand for an award of benefits. (PB at 14-15.)
3 IV.
4 DISCUSSION
5 A. Relevant Law.
6 The ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to evaluate a claimant’s subjective
7 symptom testimony. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007).
8 “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective
9 medical evidence of an underlying impairment [that] could reasonably be expected
10 to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. at 1036. If so, the ALJ may
11 not reject a claimant’s testimony “simply because there is no showing that the
12 impairment can reasonably produce the degree of symptom alleged.” Smolen v.
13 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996).
14 Second, if the claimant meets the first test, the ALJ may discredit the
15 claimant’s subjective symptom testimony only by making specific findings that
16 support the conclusion. Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010);
17 Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2014). Unless an ALJ finds that a
18 claimant is malingering or has failed to provide objective medical evidence in
19 support of his or her testimony, an ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons
20 for rejecting a claimant’s subjective testimony about the severity of experienced
21 symptoms. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015). While
22 an ALJ’s findings must be properly supported and sufficiently specific to assure a
23 reviewing court that the ALJ did not “arbitrarily discredit” a claimant’s subjective
24 statements, an ALJ is not “required to believe every allegation” of disability. Fair
25 v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989).
26 The ALJ’s reasons for rejecting a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony
27 must be supported by substantial evidence. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 674
28 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “Substantial” means “more than a mere scintilla”
1 but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
2 support a conclusion.” Id.; Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting
3 Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “Where evidence is
4 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that
5 must be upheld.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).
6 B. Relevant Administrative Proceedings.
7 The ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s April 2024 testimony. AR 28. Plaintiff
8 testified “that she had stage II breast cancer and underwent a bilateral mastectomy”
9 in March 2021. AR 28; see AR 47, 566-68. She also “underwent chemotherapy
10 treatment ending in January 2021.” AR 28; see AR 48-49. Plaintiff testified that
11 she continued to have functional limitations in 2024 from her cancer treatment.
12 Her chemotherapy affected her by causing pain in her feet, such that she could no
13 longer “walk properly because of the pain.” AR 28; see AR 48.
14 Plaintiff testified, “After the mastectomy surgery, she still experiences pain
15 under her arms which causes difficulty to lift them.” AR 28; see also AR 49 (“I
16 cannot lift up my hands because it’s very painful.”). She also testified that “the
17 cancer has caused her ongoing fatigue, even in remission.” AR 28; see AR 50. As
18 a result, she could only “be on her feet up to 5 to 10 minutes before having difficulty,
19 pain in her feet, dizziness, and ankle pain.” AR 28; see AR 53. She also testified
20 that “lifting her arms is hard, [which affects activities] such as lifting things, doing
21 laundry, cooking, and performing household chores.” AR 28; see AR 55. It was “a
22 challenge” to dress herself because she had difficulty stretching her arms to put on a
23 shirt. AR 28; see AR 56 (testifying that she “cannot lift up [her] hands”). She
24 could not wash her own hair. AR 28; see AR 56.
25 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s MDIs “could reasonably be expected to cause
26 the alleged symptoms; however, [her] statements concerning the intensity, persistence
27 and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical
28 evidence and other evidence in the record ....” AR 29. As reasons, the ALJ found
1 that (1) the extent of Plaintiff’s claimed limitations was not supported by the
2 objective medical evidence, and (2) Plaintiff engaged in inconsistent symptom
3 reporting. AR 29-30.
4 C. Analysis of Claimed Error.
5 Plaintiff argues, “Beyond a discussion of the objective medical evidence, it
6 does not appear that the ALJ actually offered any rationale to reject [Plaintiff’s]
7 testimony ....” (PB at 10.) But the ALJ’s decision sufficiently identifies the two
8 above-stated reasons. ALJs need not label their reasons in any particular way or
9 include them in any particular section of the decision. See Danny Lee F. v. Saul,
10 No. 2:19-cv-09099-KES, 2020 WL 4368097, at *10 n.9, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11 135544, at *29 n.9 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) (“ALJs, however, need not organize
12 their decisions in any particular way so long as the reviewing Court can understand
13 their reasoning.”); Glenn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 2:16-cv-04268-PHX-
14 DGC, 2017 WL 4349394, at *3, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161949, at *7 (D. Ariz.
15 Oct. 2, 2017) (“Although the ALJ’s opinion could have been organized more clearly
16 to highlight its specific reasons, they are identified in the decision ....”).
17 Plaintiff next cites law for the premise that lack of support from objective
18 medical evidence cannot be the only reason for rejecting subjective symptom
19 testimony. (PB at 10.) While this is true, a lack of objective support is different
20 from inconsistent symptom reporting. For example, if a claimant has back pain, an
21 ALJ might cite imaging studies showing only mild degenerative changes to support
22 finding a lack of objective support. The same ALJ, however, might cite appointments
23 at which the claimant denied back pain to support a finding of inconsistent symptom
24 reporting. Inconsistent symptom reporting occurs when claimants tell the Social
25 Security Administration that their functional limitations are more serious than
26 those they describe to their treating doctors. Inconsistent symptom reporting can
27 be a clear and convincing reason to discount a claimant’s testimony. See Social
28 Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, at
1 *16 (explaining that the claimant’s symptom information provided to treating
2 sources “may be compared with [their] other statements in the case record”);
3 Medina v. Saul, 840 F. App’x 71, 73 (9th Cir. 2020) (inconsistent symptom
4 reporting as a clear and convincing reason for discounting claimant’s testimony);
5 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996) (ALJ properly considering
6 claimant’s “prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms” in evaluating
7 their testimony).
8 Here, the ALJ cited numerous medical records in which Plaintiff did not
9 report to her treating doctors any fatigue, pain limiting her ability to walk, pain
10 limiting her ability to raise her arms, or other disabling symptoms, as follows:
11 By August 2021, [Plaintiff] reported that she was feeling well with
12 minor complaints. She indicated her appetite and sleep were normal
13 and she was exercising 2 days per week. The doctor noted a normal
14 physical examination as well as a normal mental status examination
15 (Exhibit 10F, pp. 17-19 [AR 1252-54]). In the following month, the
16 evidence does include treatment notes where [Plaintiff] complained
17 of left axillary [arm pit] discomfort. Nevertheless, the physical
18 examination was normal (Exhibit 3F, pp. 212-217 [AR 704-09]). In
19 January and February 2022, the record shows [Plaintiff] reported that
20 the left chest wall tenderness was improving, and physical examination
21 findings were unremarkable (Exhibit 3F, pp. 322-324 [AR 814-16];
22 4F, pp. 37-38 [AR 872-73]). [Plaintiff] stated she was doing very
23 well overall with good appetite, good energy level, and staying busy
24 with activities throughout the day with no problems. [Plaintiff] also
25 denied any pain, discomfort, burning sensation, or any other problems
26 in her treated breast (Exhibit 4F, pp. 39-41 [AR 874-76]).
27 AR 29. “Other records through 2022 and 2023 show [Plaintiff] sought treatment
28 for other symptoms not entirely related to [her] treatment for breast cancer, including
1 bilateral heel tenderness, ankle pain and right ear pain (Exhibit 8F, pp. 30-31; 16F,
2 pp. 55-56).” AR 29; see AR 1153-54, 1419-20. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s
3 cancer treatment was successful “and by February 2022, [she] complained of only
4 residual left chest tenderness ....” AR 30.
5 The ALJ provided another specific example of inconsistent symptom
6 reporting: “[Plaintiff’s] statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting
7 effects of her symptoms are inconsistent with the record as a whole. For example,
8 [she] testified that the cancer has caused her ongoing fatigue and she needs to take
9 a break after washing dishes for 15 to 30 minutes at a time. However, recent
10 treatment records from 2023 and 2024 note [that Plaintiff] was doing well overall
11 and she was busy during the day performing activities without problems (Exhibit
12 4F, pp. 37-38).” AR 30; see AR 872-73. In the cited records, on February 15,
13 2022, when questioned by Carolyn Barnes, M.D., about her progress after radiation
14 treatment, Plaintiff “denie[d] chest pain, weight loss or cough. She has left axilla
15 [armpit] tightness intermittently but no other complaints.” AR 872. She rated her
16 pain at zero and her fatigue at zero. AR 872. She did not complain about difficulty
17 raising her arms to do basic tasks like washing her hair or getting dressed. Instead,
18 she had a normal range of motion. AR 873.
19 In August 2022, another doctor recorded Plaintiff’s subjective reports of her
20 symptoms, as follows:
21 Patient states that she is doing very well overall. She has good
22 appetite and good energy level and is busy with her day-to-day
23 activities without any problems. Patient denies any pain, discomfort,
24 burning sensation, itching or any other problems in the treated breast.
25 … Patient states that she does not have any difficulty, pain or
26 discomfort with use of ipsilateral arm and has full range of motion.
27 Patient also denies any bony or muscular discomfort in any other part
28 of the body as well. Overall patient is doing well with no complaints
1 or problems at this time.
2 | AR 874 (cited by ALJ at AR 30).
3 Thus, the ALJ identified a clear and well-supported inconsistency between
4 | Plaintiff's 2024 testimony that her cancer treatment still caused so much residual
5 || fatigue that she could not wash dishes for more than 15 or 30 minutes without
6 | taking a break (AR 56-57) and her statements to treating doctors in 2022 that she
7 | had good energy levels and could do her daily activities without any problems
8 | (AR 874). While Plaintiff testified that her 2021 chemotherapy caused residual
9 | pain that prevented her from being on her feet more than five or ten minutes in
10 | 2024 (AR 48, 53), the ALJ cited these 2022 records wherein Plaintiff denied pain
11 | and denied difficulty with normal daily activities, such as walking. AR 30; see
12 | AR 872, 874. While Plaintiff testified that she had so much difficulty lifting her
13 | arms that she could not wash her own hair (AR 56), again the ALJ cited these 2022
14 || records wherein Plaintiff reported a full range of motion, no difficulty with daily
15 | activities, and only intermittent armpit tightness (AR 874).
16 In sum, the ALJ’s finding of inconsistent symptom reporting is supported by
17 | substantial evidence, and it provides a clear and convincing reason for discounting
18 | Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony.
19 V.
20 CONCLUSION
21 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that judgment shall be entered
22 | AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits.
23
24 af
55 | DATED: January 22, 2026 Mand 6. Sestt?
KAREN E. SCOTT
26 United States Magistrate Judge
27
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319773. Public record. Not legal advice.