# Opinion

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319684

## Case

- **Full name:** Tree Defender, LLC v. Mike Hurst Citrus Service, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

TREE DEFENDER, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2520-VMC-NHA

MIKE HURST CITRUS SERVICE, INC.,

Defendant.
_______________________________/

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court for patent claims
construction. Plaintiff Tree Defender, LLC submitted its
Opening Claim Construction Brief on August 15, 2025. (Doc. #
46). Defendant Mike Hurst Citrus Service, Inc. (“Hurst
Citrus”) filed its Claim Construction Opposition Brief on
September 2, 2025. (Doc. # 47). Tree Defender replied on
September 10, 2025. (Doc. # 48). On October 24, 2025, a claims
construction hearing was held in which both Tree Defender and
Hurst Citrus made arguments to the Court. (Doc. # 49). For
the reasons stated below, the claims are construed as set
forth herein.
I. Background
Tree Defender “designs, manufactures, markets, and sells
protective, breathable individual plant covers (‘IPCs’) that
are placed on young trees for at least their first two years
as they are in a vegetative and growing state.” (Doc. # 32 at
3). According to Tree Defender, the IPCs were developed in
response to a disease commonly referred to as citrus greening
disease, which can devastate citrus crops. (Id. at 4).
Hurst Citrus also produces IPCs and is a direct

competitor of Tree Defender in the IPC market. (Doc. # 36 at
3-4). Tree Defender alleges that the IPCs sold by Hurst Citrus
infringe upon Tree Defender’s patented IPC technology. (Doc.
# 32 at 7-14).
There are two patents at issue in this action, each
possessed by Tree Defender in relation to its IPC: U.S. Patent
Nos. 11,730,092 (“the ‘092 Patent”) and 12,058,965 (“the ‘965
Patent”), both titled “Plant cover with insect resistant bag
for enclosing a plant.” (Doc. ## 46-1, 46-2). The ‘092 and
‘965 Patents were issued on August 22, 2023, and August 13,
2024, respectively. (Id.). Here, there is only one remaining
disputed claim term: “mesh.” See (Doc. # 47 at 6) (indicating

the sole remaining disputed claim term is “mesh”); (Doc. # 48
at 1) (same).
II. Legal Standards
Patent infringement cases involve two distinct phases:
(1) “the proper construction of the asserted claim,” and (2)
“a determination as to whether the accused method or product
infringes the asserted claim as properly construed.”
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581-82
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
“It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted
claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence

of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the
specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.”
Id. at 1582 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52
F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
“Such intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of
the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.”
Id.
“First, [a court considers] the words of the claims
themselves, both asserted and nonasserted, to define the
scope of the patented invention.” Id. (citation omitted).
“Although words in a claim are generally given their ordinary
and customary meaning, a patentee may choose to be his own

lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their
ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition of the
term is clearly stated in the patent specification or file
history.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, “the ordinary and
customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the
term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
question at the time of the invention . . ..” Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted). “[T]he ordinary meaning of claim language as
understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily
apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such

cases involves little more than the application of the widely
accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Id. at 1314.
“[S]econd, it is always necessary to review the
specification to determine whether the inventor has used any
terms in a manner inconsistent with their ordinary meaning.”
Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582. “The specification acts as
a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the
claims or when it defines terms by implication.” Id. (citation
omitted). “[T]he specification may reveal a special
definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs
from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases,
the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at

1316. The specification usually “is dispositive; it is the
single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”
Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582.
Third, “a court ‘should also consider the patent’s
prosecution history, if it is in evidence.’” Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1317 (citations omitted). “This history contains the
complete record of all the proceedings before the Patent and
Trademark Office, including any express representations made
by the applicant regarding the scope of the claims.” Vitronics
Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582. “[T]he prosecution history can often

inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how
the inventor understood the invention and whether the
inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution,
making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.”
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citing Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d
at 1582-83). “The purpose of consulting the prosecution
history in construing a claim is to exclude any interpretation
that was disclaimed during prosecution.” Chimie v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
“In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic
evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim

term.” Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583. “In such
circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.”
Id. (citations omitted). Extrinsic evidence “consists of all
evidence external to the patent and prosecution history,
including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and
learned treatises.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citing
Markman, 52 F.3d at 980).
III. Analysis

Tree Defender’s Hurst Citrus’s
Court’s
Proposed Proposed
Construction
Construction Construction
Mesh material A net-like A net-like
having a mesh size material which material having a
that prevents provides water mesh size which
intrusion by permeability and provides water
insects light permeability and
detrimental to the transmissivity. light
plant while also transmissivity,
allowing for water but prevents
permeability and intrusion by small
light insects such as
transmissivity. psyllids.

Again, this case concerns one disputed term: “mesh.” See
(Doc. # 47 at 6) (indicating the sole remaining disputed claim
term is “mesh”); (Doc. # 48 at 1) (same). The term “mesh”
appears throughout the claims in both the ‘092 and ‘965
Patents. See (Doc. # 46-1 at 16; 46-2 at 16-17).
As shown above, the parties both agree that the
construction of “mesh” in the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents must refer
to a material that provides “water permeability and light
transmissivity.” See (Doc ## 46 at 6; 47 at 6-7). Accordingly,
the sole dispute for the Court to decide is whether the claim
term “mesh” must refer to a material that also prevents
intrusion by insects. Tree Defender seeks a construction of
“mesh” that requires preventing intrusion by insects, whereas
Hurst Citrus seeks a construction of “mesh” without reference
to preventing intrusion by insects. (Id.).
Tree Defender contends that its proposed construction is
“consistent with the specification and with the inventor’s

own statements describing the scope of his invention to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (‘USPTO’).” (Doc.
# 46 at 6). In opposition, Hurst Citrus contends that its
proposed construction is “easily understood, consistent with
the intrinsic evidence, and follows claim construction
principles,” and that Tree Defender’s construction “asks this
Court to violate fundamental claim construction principles.”
(Doc. # 47 at 6-7).
A. The Claims’ Language
The starting point for claims construction is “the words
of the claims themselves.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. Here,
neither Tree Defender nor Hurst Citrus argue that the words

of the claims in the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents provide a
construction of the term “mesh.” See generally (Doc. ## 46,
47, 48). Nor could they, because none of the claims in the
‘092 and ‘965 Patents provide any definition of “mesh.” See
(Doc. ## 46-1 at 16; 46-2 at 16-17). None of the claims in
the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents reference water permeability or
light transmissivity. (Id.). Indeed, none of the claims make
any reference to insects generally, insects specifically
responsible for citrus greening disease, or prevention of
insect intrusion. (Id.).
Because the words of the claims in the ‘092 and ‘965

Patents do not define the term “mesh,” the term is to be given
it ordinary meaning as understood by the person of ordinary
skill in the art. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Here, the person
of ordinary skill in the art would be a citrus farmer using
IPCs to protect plants. “Importantly, the person of ordinary
skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term . . . in
the context of the entire patent, including the
specification.” Id.
B. The Specification
The Court now turns to the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents’
specifications to determine how a person of ordinary skill in
the art would understand the claim term “mesh.”

First, the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents’ titles (which are
identical) explicitly reference preventing the intrusion by
insects. See (Doc. # 46-1) (“PLANT COVER WITH INSECT RESISTANT
BAG FOR ENCLOSING A PLANT”) (emphasis added); (Doc. # 46-2)
(same). Second, the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents’ “technical field”
descriptions (which are identical) also explicitly reference
preventing the intrusion by insects. See (Doc. # 46-1 at 14)
(“The present disclosure relates to the field of plant cover
device, and, more particularly, to insect repelling plant
cover devices and related methods.”) (emphasis added); (Doc.
# 46-2 at 14) (same).

Third, the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents’ “background”
descriptions (which are also identical) explicitly discuss
how citrus greening disease is spread by an insect, the Asian
citrus psyllid. (Doc. ## 46-1 at 14, 46-2 at 14). The
“background” descriptions discuss how the Asian citrus
psyllid is “no bigger than the head of a pin.” (Id.). They
further discuss that citrus greening disease has typically
been managed with insecticides, which may be environmentally
harmful. (Id.). In addition, they discuss that citrus
greening disease is sometimes managed by use of “tree covers
that enclose a tree to prevent insect infiltration,” but that
conventional tree covers suffer from drawbacks. (Id.)

(emphasis added).
The Court finds that titles, “technical field”
descriptions, and “background” descriptions in the ‘092 and
‘965 Patents all support that the specifications define the
claim term “mesh” by implication. See Vitronics Corp., 90
F.3d at 1582 (“The specification acts as a dictionary . . .
when it defines terms by implication.”). Specifically, the
aforementioned parts of the specifications impliedly define
“mesh” to include preventing intrusion by insects.
The specifications do not end there. The specifications’

“detailed description” sections also expressly reference
preventing intrusion by insects. (Doc. ## 46-1 at 14-15, 46-
2 at 15-16). Specifically, the “detailed description”
sections both include the following:
The panels 204, 206 may be made at least partially
or completely of a mesh material, which provides
water permeability and light transmissivity, but
prevents intrusion by small insects such as
psyllids. The mesh size may be, for example, 50
mesh or 50 by 25 threads per square inch. Such a
mesh size will be sufficient to prevent intrusion
by psyllids, aphids, white flies, mealy bugs, leaf
miners, thrips, grasshoppers, ants, and orange
dogs. The bag 200 may also protect the enclosed
foliage from frost, hail, and wind damage.
(Doc. ## 46-1 at 15, 46-2 at 15) (emphasis added). Indeed,
the above description purports to expressly define the term
“mesh” as a material “which provides water permeability and
light transmissivity, but prevents intrusion by small insects
such as psyllids.” However, the specifications also each
contain the following disclaimer at the beginning of the
“detailed description” sections:
This disclosure describes example aspects and
embodiments, but not all possible aspects and
embodiments of the plant cover and related methods.
Where a particular feature is disclosed in the
context of a particular aspect or embodiment, that
feature can also be used, to the extent possible,
in combination with and/or in the context of other
aspects and embodiments. The plant cover may be
embodied in many different forms and should not be
construed as limited to only the embodiments
described here.
(Doc. ## 46-1 at 14, 46-2 at 15) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the specifications also each contain the
following additional disclaimer at the end of the “detailed
description” sections:
The scope of the claims is not limited to the only
the examples described here. The plant cover system
and its components may be embodied in many
different forms.
(Doc. ## 46-1 at 15, 46-2 at 16) (emphasis added).
As discussed below, the Court finds that these explicit
disclaimers negate the purported express definition of “mesh”
in the “detailed description” sections of the specifications.
However, the Court finds that these explicit disclaimers do
not negate the implied definition of “mesh” in the title,
“technical field,” and “background” description sections of
the specifications.
“The specification acts as a dictionary when it
expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines
terms by implication.” Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582.
“[C]laim terms take on their ordinary and accustomed meanings
unless the patentee demonstrated an intent to deviate from
the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by
redefining the term or by characterizing the invention in the

intrinsic record using words or expressions of manifest
exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of
claim scope.” SunRace Roots Enter. Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp.,
336 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Teleflex, Inc.
v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
While the Court “must interpret the claims in light of
the specification,” it must “avoid impermissibly importing
limitations from the specification.” Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l
Trade Com’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted). “That balance turns on how the specification
characterizes the claimed invention.” Id. (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the Court must look “to whether the

specification refers to a limitation only as a part of less
than all possible embodiments or whether the specification
read as a whole suggests that the very character of the
invention requires the limitation be a part of every
embodiment.” Id.
Here, the “detailed description” sections of the ‘092
and ‘965 Patents’ specifications do not use “words or
expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.” SunRace,
336 F.3d at 1304. Indeed, the “detailed description” sections
include exactly the opposite: a disclaimer that explicitly
states that the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents’ claims “should not be

construed as limited to only the embodiments described here”
and are “not limited to the only the examples described here.”
(Doc. ## 46-1 at 14-15, 46-2 at 15-16). Accordingly, the
“detailed description” sections’ description of the claim
term “mesh” as “a mesh material, which provides water
permeability and light transmissivity, but prevents intrusion
by small insects such as psyllids,” is a “part of less than
all possible embodiments.” See Alloc, Inc., 342 F.3d at 1370.
Nevertheless, the title, “technical description,” and
“background” description sections of the specifications all
impliedly define “mesh” to include preventing the intrusion
by insects. Indeed, the specifications characterize the

claimed invention as “insect repelling.” Though the
disclaimers in the “detailed description” sections’ negate
the “example aspects and embodiments” described in those
sections, the specification read as a whole leads to the
conclusion that the claimed inventions must prevent intrusion
by insects. Accordingly, the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents’
specifications, read as a whole, impliedly narrow the
ordinary definition of the term “mesh,” such that the term
must be read as a material that prevents intrusion by insects.
C. The Prosecution History
Finally, the Court turns to the prosecution history of

the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents. The Court notes that “because the
prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between
the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of
that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the
specification and thus is less useful for claim construction
purposes.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citations omitted).
“Nonetheless, the prosecution history can often inform the
meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the
inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor
limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making
the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Id.
(citations omitted). “[A]ny explanation, elaboration, or

qualification presented by the inventor during patent
examination is relevant, for the role of claim construction
is to ‘capture the scope of the actual invention’ that is
disclosed, described, and patented.” Iridescent Networks,
Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 933 F.3d 1345, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir.
2019). “Disclaimers based on disavowing actions or statements
during prosecution, however, must be both clear and
unmistakable.” Sorensen v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 427 F.3d 1375,
1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
i. Related Patent Applications
“When multiple patents derive from the same initial

application, the prosecution history regarding a claim
limitation in any patent that has issued applies with equal
force to subsequently issued patents that contain the same
claim limitation.” Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d
973, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1999). “As long as the same claim
limitation is at issue, prosecution disclaimer made on the
same limitation in an ancestor application will attach.”
Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
Here, Tree Defender has submitted exhibits of the
prosecution history of a related patent application for U.S.
Patent Application No. 15/359,111 (“the ‘111 Application”).

(Doc. ## 46-3, 46-4). Tree Defender represents, and Hurst
Citrus does not dispute, that “[b]oth the ‘092 and ‘965
Patents are in the continuation chain of U.S. Patent
Application No. 15/359,111, which has the identical
specification.” (Doc. ## 46 at 8, n.3); see generally (Doc.
# 47 at 12-14). Indeed, the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents explicitly
disclose the ‘111 Application as a “related application.”
(Doc. ## 46-1 at 1, 46-2 at 1).
However, neither party discusses whether a patent for
the ‘111 Application was actually issued. The Court notes
that Elkay permits consideration of related application

prosecution history of “any patent that has issued.” Elkay
Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d at 980 (emphasis added). However, Omega
permits consideration of prosecution history of patent
applications, but does not make reference to whether a patent
needs to be issued. See Omega Eng’g, Inc., 334 F.3d at 1333
(“Our precedent holds . . . that an interpretation asserted
in the prosecution of a parent application can also affect
continuation applications . . . continuation-in-part
applications . . . and even related continuation-in-part
applications arising from the same parent . . ..” (citing
Id.) (other citations omitted)).
Moreover, Hurst Citrus does not argue that if no patent

was issued for the ‘111 Application then this Court is not
permitted to consider the prosecution history of the ‘111
Application. See generally (Doc. # 47 at 12-14). Instead,
Hurst Citrus argues that (1) the prosecution history of the
‘111 Application provides no evidence of a clear disclaimer
that would support Tree Defender’s construction of “mesh,”
and (2) “even if considered,” the ‘111 Application’s
“prosecution history does not support [Tree Defender’s]
proposed construction.” (Doc. # 47 at 12). While the use of
the phrase “even if considered” might imply that Hurst
Citrus’s first argument rejects consideration of the ‘111

Application’s prosecution history, the Court finds that both
of Hurst Citrus’s arguments actually do consider the
prosecution history, but nonetheless reject it as not
supporting Tree Defender’s construction.
Accordingly, the Court will consider the prosecution
history of the ‘111 Application to determine whether and how
it bears on the construction of the claim term “mesh” in the
‘092 and ‘965 Patents.
ii. Prosecution History of the ‘111 Application
During the prosecution of the ‘111 Application, the
USPTO examiner interpreted the claim term “mesh” as “(1) any
knit, woven or knotted fabric of open texture and (2) an

interwoven or intertwined structure.” (Doc. ## 46-3 at 3-4;
46-4 at 5). In its opposition brief (referred to as a “Reply”)
during the patent prosecution before the USPTO, the ‘111
Application’s applicant (“Applicant”) explicitly argued that:
the Specification defines a mesh as provid[ing]
water permeability art, light transmissivity, but
prevent[ing] intrusion by small insects such as
psyllids.
(Doc. # 46-3 at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alterations in original).
The examiner disagreed with the Applicant’s argument and
concluded that a prior art pertaining to cloth had already
disclosed the ‘111 Application’s claim, reasoning that “cloth
is understood as a material comprising an interlaced
structure i.e., mesh.” (Doc. # 46-4 at 5). Accordingly, the
USPTO examiner rejected the ‘111 Application’s claims as
unpatentable. (Id.).
The Applicant appealed the examiner’s decision to the
UTPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). (Id. at 1).
The PTAB agreed with the Applicant’s argument that “not all
cloth is water permeable, and has light transmissivity,” and
found that the prior art in question “does not appear to have
such properties or characteristics.” (Id. at 6-7).
Accordingly, the PTAB reversed the examiner’s decision of
unpatentability. (Id. at 8).
The Court finds that the PTAB’s decision itself does not
support a construction of the claim term “mesh” to include
preventing intrusion by insects. The PTAB decision makes no
reference to insects at all. Instead, it merely found that
the prior art pertaining to cloth did not negate the
patentability of the mesh at issue because not all cloth is
water permeable and light transmissive. In effect, the PTAB
found that “mesh” must provide water permeability and light
transmissivity, but was silent as to whether it must prevent

insect intrusion.
That said, the Reply filed by the Applicant provides
explicit support for a construction of the claim term “mesh”
to include preventing intrusion by insects. In the Reply, the
Applicant explicitly took the position that the specification
“defines a mesh as ‘provid[ing] water permeability art, light
transmissivity, but prevent[ing] intrusion by small insects
such as psyllids.’” (Doc. # 46-3 at 4) (emphasis added)
(alterations in original).
Hurst Citrus unpersuasively urges that “[m]ere argument
by [Tree Defender’s] attorney in a Reply Brief to the [PTAB]
does not effect a clear disavowal.” (Doc. # 47 at 13). To the

contrary, “explicit statements made by a patent applicant
during prosecution to distinguish a claimed invention over
prior art may serve to narrow the scope of a claim.” Spectrum
Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 1998). “[W]here the patentee has unequivocally disavowed
a certain meaning to obtain his patent, the doctrine of
prosecution disclaimer attaches and narrows the ordinary
meaning of the claim congruent with the scope of the
surrender.” Omega Eng’g, Inc., 334 F.3d at 1324. Here, the
Reply brief filed by the Applicant “unequivocally imparted”
a meaning of “mesh” that includes preventing intrusion by

insects, and thereby “expressly relinquished” any
construction of “mesh” that does not refer to preventing
insects. See Id. at 1323-24.
The Reply’s narrowed definition of “mesh” is not
ambiguous. See Id. at 1324 (discussing that the doctrine of
prosecution disclaimer does not apply where the alleged
disavowal of claim scope is ambiguous). The definition of
“mesh” provided by the Applicant in the Reply unambiguously
requires that “mesh” prevent intrusion by small insects such
as psyllids. This definition is not “amenable to multiple
reasonable interpretations,” Id., as nothing in the Reply
indicates that “mesh” could allow insects to intrude. The

Reply “‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim
term’ [mesh] other than its plain and ordinary meaning.” CCS
Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, the prosecution history of the ‘111
Application shows that the Applicant expressly narrowed the
ordinary definition of the term “mesh,” such that the term
must be read as a material that prevents intrusion by insects.
That narrowed definition attaches to the ‘092 and ‘965
Patents. See Omega Eng’g, Inc., 334 F.3d at 1333.
D. Hurst Citrus’s Other Arguments Fail

The Court now addresses the few remaining arguments
raised by Hurst Citrus for its proposition that Tree
Defender’s construction is improper.
Hurst Citrus contends that Tree Defender’s construction
“adds an unexamined claim limitation.” (Doc. # 47 at 14-15).
This argument fails because the narrowed definition of “mesh”
was explicitly provided in the prosecution history of the
‘111 Application before the USPTO. Under the doctrine of
prosecution disclaimer, that narrowed definition attaches to
the ’092 and ‘965 Patents. See Omega Eng’g, Inc., 334 F.3d at
1333.
Hurst Citrus next contends that Tree Defender’s

construction improperly claims “results” rather than an
apparatus. (Doc. # 47 at 15). According to Hurst Citrus,
“[Tree Defender’s] construction essentially asks to convert
a general term (‘mesh’) into a means-plus-function style
limitation (‘means for preventing insect intrusion’) without
invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) or using any such claim language.”
(Id.). In reply, Tree Defender argues that its proposed
construction “is solely a limitation on the properties or
characteristics of mesh claimed, and specifying size
limitations for the mesh does not render the term either
functional or results based.” (Doc. # 48 at 6).

“A means-plus-function limitation recites a function to
be performed rather than definite structure or materials for
performing that function.” Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space
Sys./Loral, Inc., 324 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
The overall means-plus-function analysis is a two-
step process. The first step is to determine
whether a claim limitation is drafted in means-
plus-function format, which requires [the Court] to
construe the limitation to determine whether it
connotes sufficiently definite structure to a
person of ordinary skill in the art. If the
limitation connotes sufficiently definite
structure, it is not drafted in means-plus-function
format, and § 112[(f)] does not apply. If, . . .
the limitation is in means-plus-function format,
[the Court performs] the second step of determining
‘what structure, if any, disclosed in the
specification corresponds to the claimed function.’
Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp., 28 F.4th 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2022) (citations omitted). If the claim term does not use the
term “means,” there is a rebuttable presumption that the claim
limitation is not drafted in means-plus-function format. Id.
(citations omitted). “The presumption can be overcome if a
challenger demonstrates that the claim term ‘fails to recite
sufficiently definite structure.’” Id. (citations omitted);
see also Id. at 1366 (indicating the challenger must rebut
the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence). “In
addition, because this inquiry turns on the understanding of
a person of ordinary skill in the art, [courts] often look to

extrinsic evidence when determining whether a disputed
limitation would have connoted structure to a person of
ordinary skill.” Id. at 1366.
Here, the Court finds that Tree Defender’s construction
of “mesh” is not in means-plus-function format. First,
because the term “means” does not appear in the construction
of “mesh,” there is a presumption against means-plus-function
format. Second, a person of ordinary skill in the art (i.e.,
a citrus farmer using IPCs) would understand that “mesh”
connotes a sufficiently definite structure. Indeed, Hurst
Citrus itself argues that “mesh” has an ordinary meaning of
“net-like material,” and cites to dictionary definitions

which indicate that “mesh” is commonly understood to be a
“material like a net.” (Doc. # 47 at 6-7). Accordingly, Hurst
Citrus’s argument fails because Tree Defender’s construction
is not in means-plus-function format. See also Hill-Rom
Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1374-75 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (“[D]efining a particular claim term by its
function is not improper and is not sufficient to convert a
claim element containing that term into a ‘means for
performing a specified function’ within the meaning of [§
112].” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
Finally, Hurst Citrus essentially argues that Tree

Defender’s proposed construction is a thinly veiled attempt
to avoid invalidation of the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents by certain
prior art references, namely “Morgan (U.S. Pat. No.
6,088,953) and Japanese Utility Model JP 3131895U.” (Doc. #
47 at 15-18). According to Hurst Citrus, these prior art
references both disclose protective mesh covers for plants,
but do not claim an insect-blocking feature. (Id.). Thus,
Hurst Citrus argues, Tree Defender is attempting to limit the
scope of the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents to “sidestep” the prior
art references and to preserve validity ex post facto. (Id.).
Tree Defender does not address this argument in reply.
Indeed, the matter before the Court is the inverse of a

typical claims construction. Typically, a patentee might
attempt to broaden the scope of its patent claims to preclude
later inventions. Here, however, Tree Defender seeks a
narrower scope of the claim term “mesh.” Hurst Citrus argues
that Tree Defender only seeks this result to avoid invalidity
by earlier inventions. The Court finds that the Federal
Circuit’s guidance is instructive:
This court has frequently alluded to the “familiar
axiom that claims should be so construed, if
possible, as to sustain their validity.” Rhine v.
Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted). At the same
time, however, the court has “admonished against
judicial rewriting of claims to preserve validity.”
Id. Accordingly, unless the court concludes, after
applying all the available tools of claim
construction, that the claim is still ambiguous,
the axiom regarding the construction to preserve
the validity of the claim does not apply.
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed.
Cir. 2004). In other words, where the meaning of a claim term
is clear after applying the tools of claim construction, the
Court should use that definition of the term and should avoid
using another definition, even for the purpose of preserving
validity.
After applying the tools of claim construction, the
Court has concluded that the claim term “mesh” is clearly and
unequivocally defined by the narrowed definition provided in
the prosecution history of the ‘111 Application. Under the
doctrine of prosecution disclaimer, that narrowed definition
attaches to the ‘092 and ‘965 Patents. Thus, by constructing
the term “mesh” in accordance with the prosecution history,
the Court is not “rewriting the claims to preserve validity,”
but rather applying the meaning of the claim term that was
already in place. Hurst Citrus fails to identify any legal
authority that would require the Court to disregard an
unequivocal disavowal in the prosecution history. Thus, Hurst
Citrus’s argument fails.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
The claim language in dispute in this case shall be
construed as set forth in this Order.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
lith day of February, 2026.

VIR IA M. HERNANDEZ#/COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

26

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319684. Public record. Not legal advice.