# Lyons

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · May 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319508

## Case

- **Full name:** Ronny Jose Viloria Campos v. Christopher Bullock, Acting Director of the New Orleans Field Office of ICE, in his official capacity
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** May 1, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

RONNY JOSE VILORIA CAMPOS, )
)
Petitioner, )
) No. 2:26-cv-02318-TLP-atc
v. )
)
CHRISTOPHER BULLOCK, Acting )
Director of the New Orleans Field Office of )
ICE, in his official capacity, )
)
Respondent. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Pro se Petitioner Ronny Jose Viloria Campos, a noncitizen detained in the West
Tennessee Detention Facility in Mason, Tennessee, petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 2.) The Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the Writ
should not be granted. (ECF No. 8.) Respondent responded. (ECF No. 10.) Petitioner replied.
(ECF No. 14.) And for the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a Venezuelan citizen, entered the United States in June 2023. (ECF No. 10-1.)
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) then served him with a Notice to Appear
charging him with being “an arriving alien.” (Id.) Petitioner alleges that the Government
granted him Temporary Certification Status and that he has a pending asylum case before an
immigration court. (ECF No. 2 at PageID 3.) He also alleges that he has no criminal history.
(Id.)
The United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained Petitioner on
December 17, 2025, after he reported for an Alternatives to Detention check-in.1 (Id.) He
remains in ICE custody at the Western Tennessee Detention Center in Mason, Tennessee. (ECF
No. 10 at PageID 29.)

And Petitioner alleges that the Government has not given him an individualized bond
hearing since they detained him in December 2025. (See ECF No. 2 at PageID 2.) Instead, DHS
and EOIR determined that he is subject to mandatory detention, a change from the decades-long
practice of affording noncitizens in Petitioner’s position with bond hearings before their removal
proceedings. The Government changed its practice in July 2025, when DHS, the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”), and ICE issued a new policy. See, e.g., Monge-Nunez v. Ladwig, No. 25-3043,
2025 WL 3565348, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2025).
According to the new policy, noncitizens who have resided in the United States for over
two years and who are apprehended in the interior of the country are subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. But before July 2025, DHS afforded those same

persons bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id.; Godinez-Lopez v. Ladwig, No. 25-2962,
2025 WL 3047889, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2025). The Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) upheld this new policy in the case of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216
(BIA 2025).
And for Petitioner, this means that he now faces continued detention without the
possibility of bond. Petitioner alleges that his continued detention under § 1225(b) violates the
INA and his Fifth Amendment right to due process. (ECF No. 2 at PageID 3–4.) He asks the

1 He describes this as a “ISSAP reporting obligation.” (Id.) But see U.S. Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement, Alternatives to Detention, https://www.ice.gov/features/atd (last visited Apr.
15, 2026) (“ATD consists of the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP).”).
Court to grant his Petition and order Respondent to release him or provide him an individualized
bond hearing. (Id. at PageID 4.)
This is not an issue of first impression before the Court. And Respondent detaining
Petitioner under § 1225(b) instead of § 1226(a) is not an isolated event. Indeed, the Court has

recently considered this same legal question many times and consistently held that Ҥ 1226
governs the arrest and detention of a noncitizen without an apparent criminal history who has
been residing in the United States for over a year.” Padilla-Ugsha v. Ladwig, No. 25-3045, 2025
WL 3638007, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 2025); see, e.g., Monge-Nunez, 2025 WL 3565348, at
*6; Cordova v. Ladwig, No. 25-3037, 2025 WL 3679764, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 18, 2025);
Rios Pena v. Ladwig, No. 25-3082, 2025 WL 3679766, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 18, 2025);
Moreno-Espinoza v. Ladwig, No. 25-3093, 2025 WL 3691452, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 19,
2025); Urrutia-Diaz v. Ladwig, No. 25-3098, 2025 WL 3689158, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 19,
2025) (“So even though Petitioner here has resided in the United States for less than a year, §
1226 governs because he is not seeking admission but is already in this country.”)..

Because of the increasing frequency of these habeas petitions, other courts in this circuit
and across the country have also been asked to consider which statutory provision governs.
Many have determined that § 1226(a) fits in this scenario. See, e.g., Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL
3047889; Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 784; Barco Mercado v. Francis, 811 F. Supp. 3d
487 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); Cunha v. Freden, -- F.4th --, 2026 WL1146044 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026).
Others have not. See Gonzalez v. Ladwig, No. 2:26-2017, 2026 WL 413602 (W.D. Tenn. Feb.
13, 2026); Oropeza-Higareda v. Bullock, 26-2285, ECF No. 20 (W.D. Tenn.); see also
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Avila v. Bondi, -- F.4th --, 2026 WL
819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026). The Sixth Circuit has heard arguments on this issue but has yet
to rule.
LEGAL STANDARD
A petition for habeas corpus enables a person to challenge the legality of their custody.

See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
484 (1973)). And its traditional function “is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser,
411 U.S. at 484; see 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(3) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States[.]”). Petitioner here asserts that his custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is
unlawful.
Sections 1225 and 1226 of the INA typically govern the detention of noncitizens during
removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) governs the
mandatory detention of an “applicant for admission” after an immigration officer has determined
that the applicant is not entitled to admission in the United States.

(b) Inspection of applicants for admission
. . .
(2) Inspection of other aliens
(A) In general
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an
alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under
section 1229a of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as an alien “present in
the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(1). And “admission” and “admitted” are defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A). Again, detention is mandatory under this section. See 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A).
Section 1226(a) provides for discretionary detention:
(a) Arrest, detention, and release
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from
the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such
decision, the Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General .
. . .
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). But § 1226(c), known as the Laken Riley Act, provides for the mandatory
detention of aliens found inadmissible or deportable under specific provisions and who have
been “charged with,” “arrested for,” “convicted of,” or admit to “having committed” certain
listed crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Aliens arrested and detained under this section “have a right
to request a custody redetermination (i.e., bond hearing) before an Immigration Judge.” Lopez-
Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 777 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8),
(d)(1)). That immigration judge “evaluates whether there is a risk of nonappearance or danger to
the community.” Id. (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006)). With those
provisions in mind, the Court now turns to the Petition.
ANALYSIS
The issue here is whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention.
These facts are not distinguishable from those the Court has decided in the past. This remains
true even though Respondent argues that “Petitioner in this case, unlike the petitioners in most of
the other habeas cases that have been filed recently in this district, is charged as an ‘arriving
alien,’ not an ‘alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.’” (ECF
No. 10 at PageID 28.) See Guzman-Hernandez v. Harper, No. 26-2072, ECF No. 14 at PageID
79 (W.D. Tenn.) (citing cases and stating that “courts in the Western District of Tennessee have
already held that noncitizens apprehended in the interior of the country placed in full § 1229a
proceedings must be detained under § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)”). So in the interest of judicial

economy, the Court addresses the main arguments at issue here—administrative exhaustion,
statutory interpretation, and procedural due process—in a more succinct manner than before.
I. Administrative Exhaustion
Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (See ECF No. 10 at PageID 29–
31.) To do so, he would need to appeal his denial of a bond hearing to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”). Respondent argues that the Court should require Petitioner to go through that
process before considering his Petition. (Id.)
When Congress mandates it, courts require petitioners to exhaust their administrative
remedies. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). But when, as here, Congress
has not imposed a statutory exhaustion requirement, the decision whether to require a petitioner

to exhaust lies within “sound judicial discretion.” Id. In exercising that discretion, the Supreme
Court has explained that “federal courts must balance the interest of the individual in retaining
prompt access to a federal judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring
exhaustion.” Id. at 146. Those institutional interests are “protecting administrative agency
authority and promoting judicial efficiency.” Id. at 145.
The Supreme Court also identified situations in which the interest of the individual
weighs heavily against the institutional interests. See id. at 146–49. Relevant here, “an
administrative remedy may be inadequate where the administrative body . . . has otherwise
predetermined the issue before it.” Id. at 148 (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575, n.
14 (1973); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968) (in view of Attorney General's
submission that the challenged rules of the prison were “validly and correctly applied to
petitioner,” requiring administrative review through a process culminating with the Attorney
General “would be to demand a futile act”); see also Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 822–23

(6th Cir. 2015) (“If administrative review would come to naught, if any efforts before the agency
would be pointless, the courts do not insist that litigants go through the motions of exhausting the
claim anyway.”) (internal quotations omitted).
The BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (2025) makes
requesting a bond hearing from an immigration court futile. That is because the BIA’s
decision—which is binding on immigration judges—upholds the very policy Petitioner is
challenging here. See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 228 (holding that aliens
“who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and unless
they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer” because “[r]emaining in the
United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not

constitute an ‘admission”’); see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 778 (E.D.
Mich. 2025) (reasoning that “administrative review is not likely to change Respondents’ position
that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies in this context”). What is more, the BIA lacks authority to review
constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). This
means that Petitioner can only bring his constitutional claims in federal court.
It follows that requiring exhaustion in this case would not further the ends of judicial
efficiency and protecting administrative authority because it would only delay the resolution of
Petitioner’s legal questions. His individual interest in having prompt access to this forum
outweighs any institutional interests at stake. Requiring Petitioner to wait for the BIA to address
an issue it has already decided creates hardship for hardship’s sake. The Court declines to
impose such a result here.2
II. Statutory Interpretation
The Parties disagree about whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) controls Petitioner’s

detention here. Although not a statutory-interpretation argument, Petitioner contends § 1226
applies because “[p]rior to his arrest, the government itself treated Petitioner as a § 1226(a) case
by placing him on ISSAP, an alternative-to-detention supervision program.” (ECF No. 2 at
PageID 4.) And in short, Respondent argues that § 1225 applies to Petitioner because he
“applied for admission at a port of entry and thus was and remains an ‘applicant for admission’
who is treated, for constitutional purposes, as if stopped at the border.” (ECF No. 10 at PageID
29; see also id. at PageID 31–34.)
Familiar principles of statutory interpretation control the analysis. Courts construe
statutory text “so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting

Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)); see Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) (“If possible, every word and every provision
is to be given effect.”). To apply this approach, courts give each word within the statute “‘its
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ while keeping in mind that ‘statutory language has
meaning only in context.’” Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation
modified) (citing Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010, (2017)).

2 Respondent points the Court to a line of cases out of the Ohio’s district courts that require
immigration habeas petitioners to exhaust their bond-related administrative remedies before
considering their habeas claims. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 30 (collecting cases).) Respectfully,
the Court has reviewed those cases and finds the reasoning unpersuasive for the reasons
discussed above.
This includes the presumption “that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in
a statute what it says.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). For
the reasons below, these principles resolve the dispute in Petitioner’s favor.
Detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for

admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is
not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). This means
that the alien must be an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” and one who is
“not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”
1225(a)’s “seeking admission” language does not apply to Petitioner under these facts.
“Seeking,” of course, implies “some sort of present-tense action.” Barco Mercado, -- F. Supp.
3d. --, 2025 WL 3295903, at *5. And “seeking” suggests action. With that in mind, to fall under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the alien must be actively seeking admission, not simply residing in the country
after entering it unlawfully. Because Petitioner’s unlawful entry occurred years ago, the Court is
not persuaded that he was actively seeking admission when ICE re-detained him.3

The plain meaning of § 1226 better captures Petitioner’s situation. For example, it
applies to the “apprehension and detention of aliens,” providing that, upon “a warrant issued by
the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested or detained pending a decision on whether the
alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Again, ICE detained
Petitioner in the interior of the country where he had already resided. So the Attorney General
has the discretion under this section to “continue to detain [him]” or he “may release [him] on

3 The INA recognizes two classes of aliens who are not seeking admission, but that does not
preclude the existence of other alien classes that do not fall under § 1225. See, e.g., Padilla-
Ugsha, 2025 WL 3638007.
bond.” (Id.) He may not, though, deny him the bond hearing to which he is entitled. See 8
C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1).
The titles of the statutory provisions also supports this distinction. See Godinez-Lopez,
2025 WL 3047889, at *4. “[T]he title of a statute in the heading of a section [is a] tool[]

available for the resolution of a doubt” about a statute’s meaning. Dubin v. United States, 599
U.S. 110, 121 (2023). Section 1225’s title is “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited
removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. §1225 (emphasis added).
Section 1225’s title then envisions arriving aliens placed in expedited removal. But again,
Petitioner was detained far from the border. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287
(2018). Meanwhile, § 1226’s title is “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
That title fits here. Petitioner was apprehended, not while arriving in the United States, but years
later. And he is now detained. Section 1225’s therefore seems inapplicable to aliens in
Petitioner’s shoes, but § 1226’s title seems spot on.
That is not all. Respondent’s interpretation of § 1225(b) makes § 1226(c)’s mandatory

detention provision superfluous. To be sure, subsections 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii) provide for
mandatory detention of certain aliens. But it applies only to those aliens who both entered the
country without inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), (C), and (7) and who are also
“charged with, . . . arrested for, . . . convicted of . . .” certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). And so to interpret § 1225(b)(2)(A) as Respondent argues would subject
mandatory detention to every alien who did not lawfully enter the country. This reading would
strip 1226(c) of meaning. What is more, Congress only recently added subsection 1226(c)(1)(E)
when it passed the Laken Riley Act. Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). The Court declines
to presume that Congress pointlessly amended the statute with a redundant provision when it
most recently considered it. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08 (2019) (“This would
violate the cannon against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that would render
another provision superfluous.”).
At bottom, §§ 1225 and 1226 are different statutory provisions that apply to different

contexts. And the Supreme Court has already distinguished the two. In Jennings, the Court
determined that the government may “detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country”
and that the § 1225 process “generally begins at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where
the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible.”
583 U.S. at 287, 289. Or as the Second Circuit recently put it: “Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to
those noncitizens who present themselves at a port of entry for admission, or who cross the
physical border into the United States but are apprehended at the ‘threshold of initial entry.’”
Cunha, -- F.4th --, 2026 WL 1146044 at *6 (citations omitted). Whereas § 1226 “authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal
proceedings.” 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added). Respondent has articulated no

compelling reason to stray from this commonsense understanding.
So the Court finds § 1226 governs the detention of an alien like Petitioner, who has no
known criminal history and who has been residing in the interior of the United States. Petitioner
is therefore subject to the discretionary bond process under § 1226.
III. Due Process
Because the Court has found that § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention, he is owed
the process given to him under the statute. See, e.g. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (“[A]n alien in [Petitioner’s] position has only the rights . . . that
Congress has provided by statute.”). Petitioner alleges that Respondent violates his due process
rights by continuing to detain him. (ECF No. 2 at PageID 4.) Respondent counters that because
Petitioner complains that he is detained under the wrong statute, even if his detention is
unlawful, it is not unconstitutional. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 36.) Or put another way,
Respondent asserts that § 1225 has already afforded Petitioner the due process that Congress

chose to provide him. (See id. at PageID 34–35 (citing Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139–40 (2020); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982);
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).)
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects every person from being
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. And
to evaluate the level of process owed to a noncitizen, the Sixth Circuit generally “applies the
balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).” Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL
3047889, at *6 (citing United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020)).
Matthews considers (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action” (2) “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including

the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335.
All three factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor here. He has a strong liberty interest in being
free from physical detention. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The risk of erroneous deprivation is high here considering that
Respondent and the BIA’s current position is to afford him no bond hearing whatsoever. And
bond hearings are a significant procedural safeguard to balance the Government’s interest in
immigration enforcement against individual liberties. So the Court finds that the Government’s
interest in detaining Petitioner without that procedural safeguard does not outweigh Petitioner’s
liberty interest or the risk of erroneous deprivation. In fact, as it stands, Petitioner has no
meaningful opportunity for an immigration judge to consider whether he is a danger to society or
a flight risk. And the fact that Petitioner has been residing in the United States with no known
criminal history further tips the scales in his favor.

This all makes clear that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration
judge. And not only that, but his continued detention without that bond hearing violates his due
process rights. The Court therefore GRANTS the Petition.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS the Petition and ORDERS Respondent to
release Petitioner. See Rodriguez v. Woosley, No. 4:25-CV-168-RGJ, 2026 WL 36345, at *11–
12 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 6, 2026) (collecting cases and finding immediate release as a remedy). And
the Court further ENJOINS Respondent from pursuing Petitioner’s detention under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A). If DHS later re-detains Petitioner under § 1226(a), it shall provide him with the
bond hearing he is entitled to under that provision.

SO ORDERED, this 1st day of May, 2026.
s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319508. Public record. Not legal advice.