# MCGUINNESS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319418

## Case

- **Full name:** Brendan M. McGuinness v. Department of Corrections for New Jersey & Iowa, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BRENDAN M. MCGUINNESS,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 23-2719 (ZNQ) (RLS)
v.
OPINION
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS FOR
NEW JERSEY & IOWA, et al.

Defendants.

QURAISHI, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Brendan M. McGuinness’s amended
complaint in this prisoner civil rights matter. (ECF No. 8.) As Plaintiff has been granted in forma
pauperis status in this matter, (see ECF No. 4), this Court is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
to screen Plaintiff’s amended complaint and dismiss any claim which is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim for relief, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. For the reasons set forth
below, Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim for which relief may be granted.

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner currently serving a life sentence issued in Iowa for
murder. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) In 2020, pursuant to an interstate compact, Plaintiff was transferred to
New Jersey State Prison. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff has remained detained in New Jersey since that time.
(Id.) While incarcerated in New Jersey, Plaintiff found that the local law library did not have
materials related to Iowa state laws and judicial procedures. (Id.) Plaintiff therefore contacted
officials in Iowa asking to be provided with materials to aid in divorce and state post-conviction
relief proceedings. (Id. at 4-6.) These efforts did not result in his being provided any substantial
amount of aid in pursuing his legal claims in Iowa, and Plaintiff asserts that Iowa officials largely

ignored his requests. (Id. at 6-8.) Plaintiff alleges that this resulted in “actual damage in both his
criminal postconviction action as well as his divorce matter,” but does not allege any specific claim
or case lost as a result of the lack of an Iowa law library in New Jersey. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff seeks
to raise a denial of access to the Courts claim against the Iowa officials based on these allegations.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that he has a history of bipolar disorder and self-harm. (Id.
at 7-8.) Despite this recognized history, he has on several occasions been placed in restrictive
housing for four separate 90-day periods over the last few years because of prison disciplinary
proceedings and repeated attempts at self-harm, each of which was approved by the prison’s
mental health staff. (Id. at 8-12.) Plaintiff was also penalized 200 days’ loss of phone access.
(Id.) Plaintiff states that his four punitive 90-day restrictive housing placements amount to

unconstitutional confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment and seeks to raise this claim
against New Jersey State Prison, the New Jersey Department of Corrections, the prison’s mental
health staff, and the prison officials who entered or affirmed the punitive sanctions in prison
disciplinary proceedings and appeals. (Id.) Plaintiff bases his belief that these separate 90-day
placements violate his Eighth Amendment rights largely on a state statute, New Jersey’s Isolated
Confinement Restriction Act (“ICRA”), which limits the amount of time prisoners are to be held
in solitary confinement.1 (Id. at 11-13.) Plaintiff also asserts that such placements amount to a

1 Plaintiff believes that placements in the prison’s Restorative Housing Unit (RHU) amount to
solitary or isolated confinement subject to regulation under the ICRA. The New Jersey Appellate
Division, however, has recently found that disciplinary placements in the RHU fail to meet the
violation because they did not adequately consider his history of self-harm, though he admits that
mental health staff approved each of the placements. (Id.)
Finally, Plaintiff seeks to raise a number of state law claims including medical malpractice
claims against the New Jersey State Prison mental health doctors, Defendants Drs. Harmin and

Patel, as well as for violations of the ICRA and prison regulations limiting restrictions on telephone
access. (Id. at 14-15.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Because Plaintiff has been granted in forma pauperis status in this matter, this Court is
required to screen his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute,
this Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. Id. “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court is
required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences
from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A complaint need not contain “detailed
factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must contain “more than an unadorned, the-

See, e.g., Patiounga v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr., No. A-1137-24, 2025 WL 3439657, at * 3 (N.J.
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A
complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it provides only “’naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides facts
“merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability it “stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at
557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in conducting such an analysis, pro se
litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown
Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

III. DISCUSSION
In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks to raise two federal claims: that the lack of access to an
Iowa based law library has violated his First Amendment right to access to the courts, and that his
repeat 90-day placements in restrictive housing units violates his rights under the Eighth
Amendment. Initially, the Court notes that, in addition to individual state employees, Plaintiff
names as Defendants in this matter the New Jersey and Iowa Departments of Corrections. As arms
of the state, both Departments are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and are in
any event not proper defendants in a civil rights matter. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State

Pol., 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989); Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013); Walker v. Beard, 244 F. App’x 439, 440-41 (3d
Cir. 2007); Grabow v. S. State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989). Both
Departments must therefore be dismissed from this matter with prejudice.
Turning to Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim, as one court in this District has explained,

the Supreme Court has held that incarcerated individuals have a
right of access to the courts under the First Amendment. See Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). As part of this right,
incarcerated individuals are generally entitled to either law libraries
or adequate assistance from persons with some level of legal
training. Id. The right of access to the Courts, however, is not
unlimited – it requires only that the detained be permitted the ability
to litigate criminal charges or civil rights claims related to their
conditions of confinement – the “[i]mpairment of any other
litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly
constitutional) consequences of . . . incarceration.” Id. at 355. Even
where an individual alleges facts suggesting he has not been
provided sufficient legal assistance in the form of legal aid or a law
library, he will not be able to make out a claim for denial of access
to the courts unless he alleges facts establishing actual in jury – i.e.,
that he has lost some legal claim or case as a result of the inadequate
facilities. Id. at 348-51; Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177-78 (3d
Cir. 1997); see also Bragg v. Ann Klein Forensic Ctr., No. 09-3743,
2010 WL 4366255, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2010).

Lopez v. Morrison, No. 22-6607, 2022 WL 17417120, at * 2 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2022).
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that lack of an Iowa paralegal or Iowa legal
materials in New Jersey has hampered his ability to seek relief in the Iowa courts in his divorce
and post-conviction relief proceedings. To the extent Petitioner has a claim related to divorce
proceedings, he has no right to legal materials in the prison law library addressing that type of
case. Loss or impairment of the ability to litigate a divorce proceeding does not violate a prisoner’s
right of access to the courts. Id. (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355). Likewise, although Plaintiff
asserts he has suffered “actual damage” in criminal post-conviction proceedings, he has not alleged
any facts regarding what claims or cases he may have lost as a result of the limited law library
access. Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff has appointed counsel in those post-conviction relief
proceedings, the requirement of legal aid would be met notwithstanding the lack of Iowa materials
in the New Jersey State Prison law library. Thus, without a clear allegation that Plaintiff’s lack of
Iowa legal materials caused him to lose a specific claim or case to which he has a right to an
adequate law library, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief, and his access to the courts

claim must be dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff next alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by his placement in
pre-hearing detention and his multiple instances of punitive housing placements following prison
disciplinary hearings which he alleges violated state law. The Eighth Amendment does not
mandate comfortable prisons, and a convicted prisoner’s rights under the Eighth Amendment will
therefore only be violated where the conditions of his confinement deprive him of “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (internal
citations omitted, quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S 337 (1981)); see also Watson v. Sec’y Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 567 F. App’x 75, 79 (3d Cir. 2014). A claim under the Eighth Amendment
challenging imposed conditions thus has two elements – that the conditions under which a

petitioner was housed deprived him of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, and that
the defendants each acted with at least deliberate indifference to the conditions in question.
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-303; Watson, 567 F. App’x at 79; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 835 (1994); Stokes v. Lanigan, No. 12-1478, 2012 WL 4662487, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2012).
Sufficiently serious conditions are those which “pos[e] a substantial risk of serious harm” to the
plaintiff. Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 441 (3d Cir. 2020).
Because placement in punitive, segregated housing units during or after a guilty finding in
prison disciplinary proceedings does not present an “atypical and significant hardship on [an]
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” such a placement generally will not

suffice to even implicate a liberty interest sufficient to trigger Due Process protection, let alone
amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-86 (1995);
see also Williams v. Bitner, 307 F. App’x 609, 610-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (90-day disciplinary
segregation placement following an infraction is not an atypical or significant hardship).
Placement in solitary confinement with little to no meaningful contact with other people for truly

prolonged periods of time, however, may amount to a violation in light of all relevant
circumstances. Porter, 973 F.3d at 442-44.
In his complaint, Plaintiff contends that he was placed into two separate restrictive units –
one used to house inmates awaiting disciplinary proceedings and the RHU, which is used for those
placed into punitive segregation as a result of a prison disciplinary infraction. His confinement in
these units was the result of four different prison infractions, involving the possession of
contraband or incidents of self-harm. Plaintiff believes these placements were improper not
because he did not commit infractions, but rather in light of a history of self-harm and bipolar
disorder. By Plaintiff’s own admission, however, he has engaged in self-harm both in and out of
restrictive housing units which do not appear to be clearly tied to restrictive housing so much as

they appear to be a response to Plaintiff’s general dissatisfaction with his circumstances. (See, e.g.
ECF No. 8 at 9-10.) Likewise, Plaintiff alleges that, in each instance in which he was to be
confined to a restrictive housing unit, prison officials consulted the prison’s mental health staff,
who cleared him for placement in those units.
That Plaintiff was placed into punitive housing for four stints related to four separate
disciplinary violations does not in and of itself amount to a violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Likewise,
that Plaintiff believes that these placements violate state regulations or statutes likewise is largely
irrelevant to his federal constitutional claims, and relevant state court decisions suggest that his
interpretation of those state statutes is not correct in any event. See Patiounga, 2025 WL 3439657,

at * 3 (finding that RHU placement did not meet the ICRA’s definition of isolated confinement
and did not implicate the statute’s protections). Although Plaintiff did apparently spend nearly an
entire year in restrictive housing, it was not a result of a single incident, nor was it the result of a
placement without thought, consideration, or protective process – it was instead the result of
Plaintiff’s repeated disciplinary violations. Thus the length or number of placements alone is not

sufficient to permit the inference of an Eighth Amendment violation in this case.
Even if the Court assumes, arguendo, that Plaintiff’s repeated placement in restrictive
housing coupled with his history of mental illness and self-harm sufficiently indicates that
placement in restrictive housing posed a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff, he has not provided
sufficient allegations to indicate that the remaining named Defendants – an Iowa interstate compact
coordinator, several prison administrators, and two prison mental health professionals – were
sufficiently deliberately indifferent to state a plausible claim for relief. As noted above, mental
health was consulted for each of Plaintiff’s placements and approved them, and although Plaintiff
did hurt himself while in restrictive housing, he repeatedly hurt himself in the prison regardless of
whether he was in such a unit or in the general population, and its not clear from the facts provided

that any of the named Defendants, including the two mental health professionals knew or should
have known that Plaintiff’s outbursts were specifically tied to restrictive placements. Without
clearer factual information about what he told those doctors, or what information beyond the mere
disciplinary record the other Defendants possessed which may have put them on notice of the risk
specifically entailed by restrictive placements in light of the approval by mental health staff,
Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts at this time to permit the inference of deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims related to his restrictive housing placements are
therefore dismissed without prejudice at this time.2 Because this Court will dismiss both of the

2 Plaintiff also adds to his Eighth Amendment claim the fact that in one instance he was sanctioned
claims raised in this matter over which the Court has original jurisdiction, this Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. See 28 U.SC. §
1367(c)(3). Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall therefore be dismissed without prejudice in its
entirety. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 8) is dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Plaintiff is granted
leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days. An order consistent with this Opinion will
be entered.

Date: March 2, 2026

s/ Zahid N. Quraishi
ZAHID N. QURAISHI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

however, generally will not amount to a sufficiently “extreme deprivation” to support an Eighth
Amendment claim. See Castillo v. FBOP FCI Fort Dix, 221 F. App’x 172, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2007).
Even if the Court aggregates that loss with the punitive confinement issue, the loss of phone
privileges is not so significant that it would in any way change this Court’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11319418. Public record. Not legal advice.