# WATKINS

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · April 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11318213

## Case

- **Full name:** Greg A. Watkins, II v. Tricia Pretorius Warden Putnamville Correctional Facility, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** April 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11318213

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that absent a nexus between underlying claims and request for injunctive relief, district court has no authority to grant injunctive relief

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

GREG A. WATKINS, II, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00544-JPH-MJD
)
TRICIA PRETORIUS Warden Putnamville )
Correctional Facility, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT, DENYING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION,
AND DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff Greg Watkins, II, is a prisoner currently incarcerated at
Putnamville Correctional Facility ("Putnamville"). He filed this civil action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights in connection
with his removal from a prison program that might have earned him additional
credit time. Because the plaintiff is a "prisoner," this Court must screen the
complaint before service on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). The Court
also addresses and DENIES Mr. Watkins's motion for preliminary injunction.
Dkt. [17].
I. Screening Standard
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To
determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).
Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720
(7th Cir. 2017).
II. The Complaint
The Court accepts Mr. Watkins's factual allegations as true at the pleading

stage but not his legal conclusions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("we must take all
of the factual allegations in the complaint as true," but "we 'are not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation'") (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). The complaint names as defendants (1) Warden
Tricia Pretorius; (2) Unit Custody Officer Griswald; (3) Sgt. D. Foster; and (4) Sgt.
M. Hilliard. Mr. Watkins is seeking compensatory and punitive damages,
injunctive relief, and declaratory relief.
The complaint alleges that on July 7, 2024, Officer Griswald was unhappy

that Mr. Watkins told her to speak more loudly when announcing it was "chow"
time. Dkt. 1 at 7. So, she called a "fake code A-117 over the radio," which led to
Mr. Watkins being restrained. Id. at 5. Thereafter, Sgt. Foster filed a false
disciplinary charge against Mr. Watkins based on this incident. During the
ensuing disciplinary hearing, Sgt. Hilliard did not allow him to have a witness
present to testify for him and then found him guilty of the charge in disregard of
the evidence. Mr. Watkins unsuccessfully appealed the disciplinary finding at

the facility and departmental levels. The finding resulted in Mr. Watkins "being
removed from the program" and losing a six-month time cut. Id.
On March 10, 2025, Mr. Watkins filed a habeas corpus action in this Court
seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in relation to this incident and disciplinary
finding. Watkins v. Pretorius et al., No. 2:25-cv-00123-JMS-MKK, dkt. 1.
Originally, Mr. Watkins only alleged he lost "privileges," lost his commissary
access for 15 days, and was removed from his dormitory. Id. After the
respondents in that case moved to dismiss the action, Mr. Watkins amended his

habeas petition to also allege that he was removed from the "Plus Program" at
Putnamville, which resulted in him potentially losing 163 days of extra credit
time. Id. at dkt. 13-1 at 12. On July 15, 2025, this Court dismissed the habeas
action because Mr. Watkins had not suffered "grievous loss" as a result of the
disciplinary finding. Id. at dkt. 18. Specifically, "the denial of a future opportunity
to earn an earlier release via educational or other programming does not meet
the custody requirement" for a federal habeas corpus action. Id. at dkt. 18 at 5.
In the habeas action, Mr. Watkins also filed a motion requesting that he

be allowed to file a simultaneous lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at dkt. 16.
The Court denied this motion but noted Mr. Watkins was free to file such an
action if he wished, reminding him that a complaint in such an action would be
subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Id. at dkt. 18 at 6.
Mr. Watkins filed this action on October 30, 2025. Dkt. 1. On February
12, 2026, he also filed a motion for an "expedited" preliminary injunction,
requesting that the defendants be required "to reinstate Watkins Case Plan

Credit Time ('CPCT') time cut . . . ." Dkt. 17.
III. Discussion of Claims
Applying the screening standard to the factual allegations in the
complaint, certain claims are dismissed while other claims shall proceed as
submitted.
First, to the extent Mr. Watkins asserts that his procedural due process
rights were violated in connection with his disciplinary proceeding and his
removal from the PLUS or CPCT program(s), the Fourteenth Amendment

provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law . . . ." But "[o]nly statutes or rules attaching
consequences to particular circumstances give prisoners liberty or property
interests." Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243, 246 (7th Cir. 1991). In Wallace,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that inmates have no property or liberty interest
in prison employment. Id. at 248. The same is true for educational programming.
Id.; see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1996)
("[P]articipation in a rehabilitative program is a privilege that the Due Process

Clause does not guarantee."); Bradford, 211 N.E.3d at 39 ("[E]ducational time
credit for those incarcerated in the [IDOC] is not an entitlement or a guarantee.
Simply put, offenders have no constitutional right to receive credit time."). Mr.
Watkins, therefore, has not alleged facts to establish that his procedural due
process rights have been violated in connection with being removed from a
program or programs that could have resulted in extra credit time. See Epperson
v. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:24-CV-28 DRL-AZ, 2025 WL 1432754, at *1 (N.D. Ind.

May 16, 2025) (dismissing, at screening, prisoner's claim that his constitutional
rights were violated based on denial of opportunity to earn additional credit time
through educational programming). All procedural due process claims in this
case are dismissed.1
Second, "[i]ndividual liability under § 1983 . . . requires personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation." Colbert v. City of Chicago,
851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted) (citing Wolf-Lillie
v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Section 1983 creates a cause of

action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault. An individual
cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an
alleged constitutional deprivation. . . . A causal connection, or an affirmative
link, between the misconduct complained of and the official sued is necessary.")).
Mr. Watkins's complaint does not allege any action on the part of Warden
Pretorius that, if true, would allow the Court to infer that she is personally
responsible for any injury Mr. Watkins might have suffered. In fact, there are no
allegations at all regarding what Warden Pretorius did or did not do. Even

1 Although not listed in the caption of Mr. Watkins's complaint, he alleges in the body
of the complaint that Unit Team Manager Mikels and Deborah Reasoner at the Indiana
Department of Correction main office also violated his due process rights by denying his
appeals from the disciplinary finding. The conclusion that Mr. Watkins has no due
process claim with respect to the disciplinary hearing and finding equally applies to
these persons.
"knowledge [alone] of a subordinate's misconduct is not enough for
liability." Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Indeed,
"inaction following receipt of a complaint about someone else's conduct is

[insufficient]." Estate of Miller by Chassie v. Marberry, 847 F. 3d 425, 428 (7th
Cir. 2017); see Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[The
plaintiff's] view that everyone who knows about a prisoner's problem must pay
damages . . . can't be right."). Something more than generalized knowledge and
inaction is required for personal responsibility. All claims against Warden
Pretorius are dismissed.
Third, Mr. Watkins's allegation that Sgt. Foster filed a false disciplinary
charge against him does not by itself state a claim. "Issuing false and unjustified

disciplinary charges can amount to a violation of substantive due process if the
charges were in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right." Black v.
Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994). There are no allegations that Sgt.
Foster in particular was retaliating against Mr. Watkins. All claims against Sgt.
Foster are dismissed.
Mr. Watkins does allege, however, that Officer Griswald retaliated against
him by calling a false signal because he asked her to speak louder when she
announced that it was time to eat. "[O]therwise permissible conduct can become

impermissible when done for retaliatory reasons." Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106,
108–09 (7th Cir. 1987) (district court reversed for dismissing complaint
challenging otherwise permissible prison transfer because of sufficient allegation
of retaliation). A First Amendment retaliation claim shall proceed against Officer
Griswald.2
The claim against Officer Griswald is the only viable claim identified by the

Court. All other claims have been dismissed. If the plaintiff believes that
additional claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court,
he shall have through May 22, 2026, in which to file a motion to reconsider the
screening order.
IV. Preliminary Injunction Motion
"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy that is
available only when the movant shows clear need." Turnell v. Centimark Corp.,
796 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2015). To obtain a preliminary injunction a plaintiff

first must show that: "(1) without this relief, [he] will suffer irreparable harm; (2)
traditional legal remedies would be inadequate; and (3) [he] has some likelihood
of prevailing on the merits of [his] claims." Speech First, Inc. v. Killen, 968 F.3d
628, 637 (7th Cir. 2020).
However, the Court will not address the three threshold elements because,
as a preliminary matter, a request for injunctive relief must necessarily be tied
to the specific claims on which the plaintiff is proceeding. See Benisek v. Lamone,
585 U.S. 155, 161 (2018) ("[T]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to

2 Mr. Watkins's complaint also alleges that he sustained lasting nerve damage to his left
hand when he was seized as a result of Officer Griswald's call. However, he does not
separately allege that this amounted to cruel and unusual punishment (excessive force)
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, nor does the complaint clearly indicate whether
any named defendant directly caused this injury. The injury may become relevant,
however, in assessing damages for the retaliation claim if Mr. Watkins ultimately is
successful in litigating that claim.
preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be
held." (cleaned up)); see also DeBeers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S.
212, 220 (1945) ("A preliminary injunction is always appropriate to grant

intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.").
Mr. Watkins's case is proceeding on a retaliation claim against Officer
Griswald. There are no allegations that Officer Griswald, the sole remaining
defendant in this action, had any control over Mr. Watkins's PLUS or CPTC
placement, nor that she would have the ability to return him to such a
placement. See Maddox v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 528 F. App'x 669, 672
(7th Cir. 2013) ("An injunction, like any 'enforcement action,' may be entered
only against a litigant, that is, a party that has been served and is under the

jurisdiction of the district court") (quoting Lake Shore Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 511 F.3d 762, 767 (7th Cir.
2007)). Accordingly, this Court lacks authority to grant the relief requested, and
the motion must be denied. Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Medical
Center, 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that absent a nexus between
underlying claims and request for injunctive relief, district court has no authority
to grant injunctive relief) (citing DeBeers Consol. Mines, 325 U.S. at 220).
IV. Conclusion and Service of Process

The clerk is directed to terminate Tricia Pretorius, D. Foster, and M.
Hilliard as defendants on the docket.
Mr. Watkins's motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED. Dkt. [17].
The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process
to defendant Officer Griswald in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall
consist of the complaint filed on October 30, 2025, dkt. [1], applicable forms
(Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of
Service of Summons), and this Order.
The clerk is directed to serve the Indiana Department of Correction
employee electronically.
Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.

Date: 4/24/2026 S) ards Patrick banter
James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
Electronic service to Indiana Department of Correction:
Unit Custody Officer Griswald
(At Putnamville Correctional Facility)

GREG A. WATKINS, II
296350
PUTNAMVILLE - CF
PUTNAMVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
1946 West U.S. Hwy 40
Greencastle, IN 46135

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11318213. Public record. Not legal advice.