# Khalil

> District Court, N.D. New York · March 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11318056

## Case

- **Full name:** Ahmed Khalil v. Scott Salisbury, Corr. Officer, St. Lawrence Cnty. Jail
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** March 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11318056

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a district court considering a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________

AHMED KHALIL,

Plaintiff,

v. 5:22-CV-0312
(GTS/MJK)
SCOTT SALISBURY, Corr. Officer, St. Lawrence
Cnty. Jail,

Defendant.
_____________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

AHMED KHALIL
Pro Se Plaintiff
272 Central Avenue, Apt. 6
Albany, NY 12206

ST. LAWRENCE COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE STEPHEN D. BUTTON, ESQ.
Counsel for Defendant County Attorney
48 Court Street
Canton, NY 13617

GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this civil rights action filed pro se by Ahmed Khalil
(“Plaintiff”) against St. Lawrence County Jail Corrections Officer Scott Salisbury (“Defendant”),
is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 106.) For the reasons set forth below,
Defendant’s motion is granted.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Summary of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
Generally, in his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated
Plaintiff’s right to freely exercise his religion under the First Amendment based on the following
factual allegations:
On or around April 19th 2020 between 4:00 AM and 4:30 AM officer
Salsiburu who was John Doe #8 deprive [sic] me from [sic] my prescribed
medicine, [sic] as the night shift he was in possession of my medicine to
give it [sic] to me before I start my Muslim fasting, [sic] he has a clear
instructions [sic] to do that, he attentionally [sic] called me after I started
testing so I cannot [sic] take my medicine, memorialized in grievance
#1151.

(Dkt. No. 41, at ¶ 46.) Grievance No. 1151 is not attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff’ Second
Amended Complaint, Defendant’s motion to dismiss, or anywhere else on the docket sheet. (See
generally Docket Sheet.)
B. Summary of Parties’ Briefing on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
1. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law
Generally, in his motion to dismiss, Defendant asserts five alternative arguments. (Dkt.
No. 106, Attach. 1.) First, Defendant argues that, even when it is construed with the utmost of
special leniency, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting
that Defendant substantially burdened Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs for purposes of
Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003). (Id. at 13-15 [attaching pages “7” through
“9” of Def.’s Memo. of Law].)
Second, Defendant argues, even assuming that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
has alleged facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant substantially burdened Plaintiff’s sincerely
held religious beliefs, it has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant acted in a
manner that was unreasonable in light of legitimate penological interests for purposes of Turner
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v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), because it does not address (a) the connection between the
alleged conduct and the correctional facility’s legitimate institutional interests (such as in its core
operational functions regarding security, staffing, and medical judgment), (b) the availability of
alternative means of religious practice, (c) the impact accommodation would have on staff,

inmates, or facility operations, or (d) the absence of ready alternatives. (Id. at 14, 16-17.)
Third, in the alternative, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant was personally involved in the alleged
First Amendment violation, because (a) as the Second Circuit held in McEachin v. McGuinnis,
357 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 2004), temporary inconveniences, scheduling conflicts, or isolated
disruptions do not rise to the level of a Free Exercise violation, and (b) indeed, Defendant’s
alleged misconduct “[o]n or around April 19th 2020” is not even actionable given that, according
to international publications, Ramadan did not commence until on or about April 23, 2020. (Id.
at 15-16.)
Fourth, in the alternative, Defendant argues that, based on the factual allegations of

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter
of law, because a First Amendment right to routine meal or medication scheduling during
Ramadan was not clearly established during the time in question. (Id. at 17-18.)
Fifth and finally, in the alternative, Defendant argues that, based on the factual
allegations of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available
administrative remedies before filing this action, and he cannot invoke any exhaustion-
requirement exception pursuant to Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016). (Id. at 18-22.)
2. Plaintiff’s Response

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After receiving two extensions of time in which to do so, Plaintiff failed to file a response
to Defendant’s motion to dismiss his Second Amended Complaint, which has been pending since
December 22, 2025, in an action that has been pending since April 1, 2022. (See generally
Docket Sheet.) Instead, Plaintiff has filed a third motion for an extension of time in which to

respond to Defendant’s motion, along with a fourth motion to amend his Second Amended
Complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 97, 110, 111, 114, 115 118, 119.) Both motions are denied as
procedurally improper and unsupported by a showing of cause.
In addition to the reasons stated in the Court’s prior Text Orders (Dkt. No. 101, 112), the
Court relies on the fact that, rather than use his available time to respond to the substance of
Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff spent his available time preparing the two above-described lengthy
motions. (See generally Dkt. No. 118 [totaling 253 pages]; Dkt. No. 119 [totaling 52 pages].)
Having said that, out of special solicitude to Plaintiff, the Court will treat Defendant’s motion as
opposed, and will not apply the lightened burden (requiring only facial merit) appropriate for an
uncontested motion under this District’s Local Rules of Practice.

II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
It has long been understood that a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), can be based on one or both of two grounds:
(1) a challenge to the “sufficiency of the pleading” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); or (2) a
challenge to the legal cognizability of the claim. Jackson v. Onondaga Cty., 549 F. Supp.2d 204,
211 nn. 15-16 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J.) (adopting Report-Recommendation on de novo
review).

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Because such dismissals are often based on the first ground, some elaboration regarding
that ground is appropriate. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a
pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) [emphasis added]. In the Court’s view, this tension between

permitting a “short and plain statement” and requiring that the statement “show[]” an entitlement
to relief is often at the heart of misunderstandings that occur regarding the pleading standard
established by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has long characterized the “short and plain”
pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) as “simplified” and “liberal.” Jackson, 549 F.
Supp. 2d at 212 n.20 (citing Supreme Court case). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
held that, by requiring the above-described “showing,” the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2) requires that the pleading contain a statement that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at
212 n.17 (citing Supreme Court cases) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court has explained that such fair notice has the important purpose of
“enabl[ing] the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial” and “facilitat[ing] a proper decision
on the merits” by the court. Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 212 n.18 (citing Supreme Court cases);
Rusyniak v. Gensini, 629 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 & n.32 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (citing
Second Circuit cases). For this reason, as one commentator has correctly observed, the “liberal”
notice pleading standard “has its limits.” 2 Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.34[1][b] at 12-61 (3d
ed. 2003). For example, numerous Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions exist holding
that a pleading has failed to meet the “liberal” notice pleading standard. Rusyniak, 629 F. Supp.

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2d at 213 n.22 (citing Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009).
Most notably, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court reversed an
appellate decision holding that a complaint had stated an actionable antitrust claim under 15

U.S.C. § 1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). In doing so, the Court
“retire[d]” the famous statement by the Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),
that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 560-61, 577. Rather than turn on the conceivability of an
actionable claim, the Court clarified, the “fair notice” standard turns on the plausibility of an
actionable claim. Id. at 555-70. The Court explained that, while this does not mean that a
pleading need “set out in detail the facts upon which [the claim is based],” it does mean that the
pleading must contain at least “some factual allegation[s].” Id. at 555. More specifically, the
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level [to a

plausible level],” assuming (of course) that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Id.
As for the nature of what is “plausible,” the Supreme Court explained that “[a] claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not

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show[n]–that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). However, while the plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” id., it “does not impose a probability
requirement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Because of this requirement of factual allegations plausibly suggesting an entitlement to
relief, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint
is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by merely conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Similarly, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement”
will not suffice. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citations and alterations omitted). Rule 8
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
Finally, a few words are appropriate regarding what documents are considered when a
dismissal for failure to state a claim is contemplated. Generally, when contemplating a dismissal
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the following matters outside the

four corners of the complaint may be considered without triggering the standard governing a
motion for summary judgment: (1) documents attached as an exhibit to the complaint or answer,
(2) documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and provided by the parties), (3)
documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the complaint, or (4)
any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.1

1 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a
pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.”); L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, No. 10-573,
2011 WL 2135734, at *1 (2d Cir. June 1, 2011) (explaining that conversion from a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim to a motion for summary judgment is not necessary under Fed.
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III. ANALYSIS

After carefully considering the matter, the Court grant’s Defendant’s motion for the first
four alternative reasons stated in his memorandum of law. See, supra, Part I.B.1. of this
Decision and Order. To those reasons, the Court adds only three brief points.
First, under the circumstances alleged, the Court finds that being deprived of prescribed
medication for a single day (before fasting) during Ramadan does not give rise to a First
Amendment violation. See Salaam v. Adams, 03-CV-0517, 2006 WL 2827687, at *6 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2006) (report-recommendation of Lowe, M.J., adopted by Kahn, J.).

R. Civ. P. 12[d] if the “matters outside the pleadings” in consist of [1] documents attached to the
complaint or answer, [2] documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and provided by
the parties), [3] documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the
complaint, or [4] any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual
background of the case); DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010)
(explaining that a district court considering a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6) “may
consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and
documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. . . . Where a document is not
incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint relies
heavily upon its terms and effect, thereby rendering the document ‘integral’ to the complaint. . . .
However, even if a document is ‘integral’ to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no
dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document. It must also be clear that
there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.”)
[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147,
152 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as
an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.”) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72
(2d Cir.1995) (per curiam) (“[W]hen a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or
incorporate by reference a [document] upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the
complaint,” the court may nevertheless take the document into consideration in deciding [a]
defendant's motion to dismiss, without converting the proceeding to one for summary
judgment.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Second, in any event, given the specificity of dates provided throughout Plaintiff’s
lengthy Second Amended Complaint (which spans 152 pages), the Court cannot liberally
construe the phrase “[o]n or around April 19th 2020” as plausibly suggesting April 24, 2020
(which is when fasting for Ramadan began in 2020). See, e.g., Wiley v. Baker, 20-CV-0154,

2022 WL 3045042, at *1 (D. Vt. June 10, 2022), report-recommendation adopted, 2022 WL
3042140 (D. Vt. Aug. 2, 2022); Lane v. Lay, 20-CV-0148, 2023 WL 2609072, at *3 (E.D. Ark.
Feb. 22, 2023), report-recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2603972 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 22, 2023);
see also “Start of Ramadan 2020,” IslamiCity, https://www.islamicity.org/25330/start-of-
ramadan-2020-1441-ah/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2026); see also, infra, note 2 of this Decision and
Order.
Third, the Court does not rely on the fifth reason stated in Defendant’s memorandum of
law (regarding exhaustion), because the Amended Complaint expressly references a grievance
(i.e., Grievance No. 1151), which has not been filed on the docket.2 As a result, the issue of
exhaustion may be decided only on a motion for summary judgment and/or after a pre-trial

exhaustion hearing. Because the Court need not do so to decide his motion, it does not grant
Defendant’s alternative request to permit limited discovery on the issue of exhaustion and
convert his motion to one for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 106, Attach. 1, at 21.)
ACCORDINGLY, it is

2 The Court notes that, while a JPEG image of this grievance was submitted by Plaintiff
through MFT, that submission did not cause a filing of the document on the docket because the
submission was procedurally improper in that it was unattached to any motion or pleading, in
violation of MFT-filing requirements. In any event, the Court notes that the grievance states
both that the date of the wrongdoing and date of receipt of the grievance were April 19, 2020,
rendering his claim not actionable.
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ORDERED that Plaintiffs third motion for an extension of time in which to respond to
Defendant’s motion (Dkt. No. 118), and a fourth motion to amend his Second Amended
Complaint (Dkt. No. 119), are DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 106) is GRANTED; and it is
further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 41) is DISMISSED.
The Court certifies that an appeal from this Decision and Order would not be taken in
good faith.
Dated: March 30, 2026
Syracuse, New York Jgtiio—
U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11318056. Public record. Not legal advice.