# Morton

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · April 29, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11318042

## Case

- **Full name:** Kurt Morton v. The Pennsylvania State University Board of Trustees, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** April 29, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION

KURT MORTON, ]
]
Plaintiff, ]
]
v. ] Case No. 7:25-cv-1812-ACA
]
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE ]
UNIVERSITY BOARD OF ]
TRUSTEES, et al., ]
]
Defendants. ]

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Abigail Morton1 applied for a remote position with
Pennsylvania State University (“Penn State”) but was denied because of her
residence in Alabama. She sues the Penn State Board of Trustees, Penn State
President Neeli Bendapudi, and Penn State Vice President of Human Resources and
Chief Human Resources Officer Jennifer Wilkes, asserting that they violated the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution.
(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 9–11, 22). Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal

1 When this litigation began, the complaint identified Plaintiff as named Kurt Morton.
(Doc. 1 at 1). Plaintiff emailed the court a notice of legal name change to Abigal Morton. However,
she did not file the notice on the docket, and thus, the Clerk has not changed the caption of the
case to reflect her legal name. (Cf. doc. 26). For purposes of this opinion, the court will refer to
Ms. Morton by her legal name.
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 14). Because Defendants have not purposefully

availed themselves of the forum, the court WILL GRANT the motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction and WILL DISMISS the complaint WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND
A plaintiff defending against a pretrial Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss “bears
the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima
facie case of jurisdiction.” United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th

Cir. 2009); see also AcryliCon USA, LLC v. Silikal GmbH, 985 F.3d 1350, 1364
(11th Cir. 2021). But the defendant may submit evidence in support of its position.
See United Techs. Corp., 556 F.3d at 1274 (quotation marks omitted). In that

situation, “the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence
supporting jurisdiction.” Id. The court must accept as true any allegations in the
complaint that are uncontroverted by the defendant’s evidence. Morris v. SSE, Inc.,
843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir. 1988). And where the plaintiff’s and defendants’

evidence conflicts, the court must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. Id. Defendants have submitted affidavits in support of their motion (docs.
16–18), and Ms. Morton rests on her complaint (see doc. 20 at 2–5). Accordingly,
the court’s description of the facts draws from the uncontroverted allegations in the
complaint and the uncontroverted evidence submitted by Defendants.

Penn State is a higher education institution with a principal place of business
in Pennsylvania. (Doc. 16 ¶¶ 2–3). The Board of Trustees is the governing body of
Penn State and holds its meetings in University Park, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶¶ 4–5). The

Board of Trustees “possesses ultimate authority to approve, adopt, and maintain
University-wide policies, including . . . residency restriction[s]” on hiring. (Doc. 1
¶ 9). Penn State’s administrative policies are primarily developed and maintained
out of the University Park campus. (Doc. 17 ¶ 5).

Ms. Bendapudi, as President of Penn State, serves as a non-voting member of
the Board of Trustees and generally oversees the mission of the University. (Id. ¶ 1).
This includes “approving and enforcing University-wide policies, including . . .

residency restriction[s]” on hiring. (Doc. 1 ¶ 10). Ms. Wilkes “lead[s] [Penn State’s
human resources’] efforts in the areas of recruitment, compensation, labor and
employee relations, benefits, and talent management.” (Doc. 18 ¶ 1; see also doc. 1
¶ 11).

Penn State’s human resources website includes a “Notice to Out of State
Applicants.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 16; see doc. 1-4). The notice states that Penn State will not
consider full-time or part-time remote work from twenty-three States, including

Alabama. (Doc. 1-4 at 2). Ms. Morton, a resident of Alabama, applied for an open
“remote-eligible” position with Penn State. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 8, 13). Ms. Morton quickly
received an automated email declining to advance her in the hiring process. (Id.

¶ 15).
II. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to

state a claim. (Docs. 14, 15). “[A] federal court generally may not rule on the merits
of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim
in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction).” Sinochem
Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007).

Accordingly, the court addresses the jurisdictional argument first; and because this
argument resolves the case, the court does not address the merits arguments.
Determining the existence of personal jurisdiction involves a two-step

analysis: “the exercise of jurisdiction must (1) be appropriate under the state long-
arm statute and (2) not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.” United Techs. Corp., 556 F.3d at 1274. In
Alabama, “the two inquiries merge, because Alabama’s long-arm statute permits the

exercise of personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent constitutionally permissible.”
Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 925 (11th Cir. 2007).
A court must have either general or specific jurisdiction over a defendant. See

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021).
Ms. Morton concedes that the court does not have general jurisdiction over
Defendants. (Doc. 20 at 2). So the court turns to specific jurisdiction.

Specific jurisdiction arises when a defendant has “minimum contacts” with
the forum state. ECB USA, Inc. v. Savencia Cheese USA, LLC, 148 F.4th 1332,
1340–41 (11th Cir. 2025). Minimum contacts exist when (1) the claims “arise out of

or relate to” the defendant’s forum contacts; (2) the defendant “purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of conducting activities” in the forum; and (3) personal
jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). Defendants maintain that Ms. Morton has not made a

prima facie showing of any element. (Doc. 15 at 23–30). Because the court agrees
that Ms. Morton has not shown that Defendants purposefully availed themselves of
the forum, the court does not discuss the other two elements.

Defendants avail themselves of a forum when they “purposefully direct their
activities toward forum residents or purposefully derive benefit from their in-forum
activities.” Jekyll Island-State Park Auth. v. Polygroup Macau Ltd., 140 F.4th 1304,
1317 (11th Cir. 2025) (alteration accepted; quotation marks omitted). The “analysis

looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s
contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014).
Exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate when a defendant has “reached out beyond

their State and into another,” including by entering a contract, deliberately exploiting
a market through sales, or physically entering the forum state. Id. (alteration
accepted; quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a defendant must answer in a

forum state’s courts if the defendant “enjoys the benefits and protection of a forum’s
laws.” Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 140 F.4th at 1317 (alteration accepted;
quotation marks omitted).

Ms. Morton argues that Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the
forum by creating a “written policy that singles out Alabama residents for adverse
treatment.” (Doc. 20 at 3). The only alleged contacts are that Defendants created,
approved, and adopted the policy that excluded Alabama residents from

consideration of remote positions, and then enforced that policy against Ms. Morton.
(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 9–11, 16–17). But the creation, approval, and adoption of the policy
occurred in Pennsylvania. (Doc. 16 ¶ 7; doc. 17 ¶ 5; doc. 18 ¶ 4). And even though

the policy was enforced against Ms. Morton, “a plaintiff cannot be the only link
between the defendant and the forum.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 285; see also id. at 286
(“[A] defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an
insufficient basis for jurisdiction.”).

Moreover, the specific facts of this case indicate that Defendants intentionally
avoided availing themselves of “the benefits and protections of [the] forum’s laws.”
Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 140 F.4th at 1317 (one alteration accepted).

Defendants did not “reach out” beyond their State into this forum; quite the opposite,
they expressly refused to exploit a market, enter a contract, or otherwise avail
themselves of the laws of Alabama by employing an Alabama resident. See Walden,
571 U.S. at 285. Moreover, Defendants’ refusal to hire remote applicants from
roughly half of the States in this country cannot mean that Defendants directed their
activities towards residents in all those States and thus could reasonably anticipate
litigation there. See Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 140 F.4th at 1316 (“[T]he Due
Process Clause requires that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum
State be such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”’)
(quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, the court WILL GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction.
If. CONCLUSION
The court WILL GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2)
and WILL DISMISS the complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
DONE and ORDERED this April 29, 2026.
fo
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11318042. Public record. Not legal advice.