# Pastures

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11317386

## Case

- **Full name:** Tyrone John Pastures v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11317386

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting “that Boerckel applies to the state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”
- noting “that Boerckel applies to the state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

TYRONE JOHN PASTURES,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-1383-TJC-LLL

SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,

Respondents.
________________________________

ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action by
filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
raising two grounds for relief (Grounds One and Two). Doc. 1. He challenges a
state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for attempted second
degree murder. He is serving a thirty-year term of incarceration. Respondents
filed a Response to the Petition. See Doc. 7; Resp.1 And Petitioner replied. See
Doc. 8. In June 2025, after obtaining the Court’s approval, Petitioner filed a
Supplement to his Petition that raised an additional two grounds (Grounds

1 Attached to the Response are several exhibits. See Docs.7-1 to 7-15. The Court
cites the exhibits as “Resp. Ex.”
Three and Four). Doc. 14. Respondents filed a Supplemental Response. See Doc.
16. And Petitioner filed a Supplemental Reply. See Doc. 18. This case is ripe for

review.2
II. Governing Legal Principles
A. Standard Under AEDPA
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure
that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in

the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.’” Id.
(quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court
decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits. See

Marshall v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The

2 “In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish
the need for an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299,
1318 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060
(11th Cir. 2011)). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court
must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s
factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). “It follows that if the
record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief,
a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The Court finds that
“further factual development” is unnecessary. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275
(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court’s
decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). When the state court’s adjudication on the merits is
unaccompanied by an explanation,
the federal court should “look through” the unexplained
decision to the last related state-court decision that
does provide a relevant rationale. It should then
presume that the unexplained decision adopted the
same reasoning. But the State may rebut the
presumption by showing that the unexplained
affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different
grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as
alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or
argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the
record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a
federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of
the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted
“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).
AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for
evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes
federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could
disagree on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears
repeating that even a strong case for relief does not
mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was
unreasonable.” Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an
unreasonable application of law requires more than
mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at
75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper
deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear
error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable
application of federal law is different from an incorrect
application of federal law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal
citations modified).
B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a § 2254
habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court
remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present[]”
every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court, either on
direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351
(1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, “state prisoners
must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional
issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate

review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see also Pope
v. Rich, 358 F.3d 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting “that Boerckel applies to the
state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”).
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state
prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the
“‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged
violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’” Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d
865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To
provide the State with the necessary “opportunity,” the
prisoner must “fairly present” his claim in each
appropriate state court (including a state supreme
court with powers of discretionary review), thereby
alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.
Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O’Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144
L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies
results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas
review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of
procedural default as follows:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality
of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided
by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments
are accorded the finality and respect necessary to
preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our
system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine
of procedural default, under which a federal court will
not review the merits of claims, including
constitutional claims, that a state court declined to
hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state
procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman,[3] supra, at 747–
748, 111 S. Ct. 2546; Sykes,[4] supra, at 84–85, 97 S. Ct.
2497. A state court’s invocation of a procedural rule to
deny a prisoner’s claims precludes federal review of the
claims if, among other requisites, the state procedural
rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to support the
judgment and the rule is firmly established and
consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562
U.S. --, --, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127–1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62
(2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. --, --, 130 S. Ct. 612,
617–618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). The doctrine barring
procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not
without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal
review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the
default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.
See Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults may be
excused under certain circumstances. Notwithstanding that a claim has been
procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a state
habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from the
default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d

3 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).

4 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). In order for a petitioner to establish cause and
prejudice,

the procedural default “must result from some objective
factor external to the defense that prevented [him] from
raising the claim and which cannot be fairly
attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy v. Newsome,
953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Carrier,
477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639).[5] Under the prejudice
prong, [a petitioner] must show that “the errors at trial
actually and substantially disadvantaged his defense
so that he was denied fundamental fairness.” Id. at
1261 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).
In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may
receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the
petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the
continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would result.
The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice, there
remains yet another avenue for him to receive
consideration on the merits of his procedurally
defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of
a showing of cause for the procedural default.” Carrier,
477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This exception is
exceedingly narrow in scope,” however, and requires
proof of actual innocence, not just legal innocence.

5 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.
2001).

Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that it
is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’ of
the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.
2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally, “‘[t]o be
credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not
presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in most cases,

allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily rejected. Schlup, 513
U.S. at 324.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective

assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel’s
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby
prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam)
(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a
person must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of
reasonable, professional assistance; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s deficient
performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Notably, there is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong
of the Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th
Cir. 2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied
to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the

performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-
versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As
stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that

course should be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697.
“The question is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s
determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold.” Knowles

v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If there is
“any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential
standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state-court decision denying
the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high

bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
“Reviewing courts apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation
was ‘within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Daniel v.
Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “When this presumption is combined with §

2254(d), the result is double deference to the state court ruling on counsel’s
performance.” Id. (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t
of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Jordan, J.,
concurring); Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. Factual and Procedural History
On direct appeal, Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed an initial brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The following procedural
and factual history is taken from that initial brief.

On April 26, 2017, Christopher Gilbert was shot inside a
Jacksonville Popeyes Chicken while working the night shift. At
trial, Mr. Gilbert and a number of his coworkers identified
Appellant as the assailant. Appellant’s defense was one of
misidentification.

Antonio Jones, a cook at Popeyes, testified that around 9 p.m.,
he went outside the restaurant with Mr. Gilbert and two other
coworkers. While outside, Mr. Jones saw a person driving a blue
Ford or Dodge go through the drive-thru. He identified Appellant
in court as the person he saw driving the truck. According to Mr.
Jones, Appellant seemed angry and he yelled at Mr. Jones and the
others, who went back inside the restaurant, which was closed to
customers. Mr. Jones said Appellant then came inside the
restaurant and physically attacked Mr. Gilbert before shooting
him. Appellant then got back into his truck, where an older
passenger was seated, and left.

On cross-examination Mr. Jones testified that in addition to
being a convicted felon, he was a marijuana user who smoked every
day. He also testified that he was sure Appellant was driving a blue
Ford. Jones was also asked about the features of the person he saw.
According to him, the shooter was shorter than 5’10” and was
between 27-30 years old. Prior to looking at a photospread compiled
by law enforcement, Jones and two other witnesses met with a
forensic sketch artist. Jones testified that the three did not agree
on the suspect’s features during that meeting. After the sketch was
complete, Jones signed it, saying that the person in the sketch was
the shooter.

Jerrica Lundy, the general manager on duty the night Mr.
Gilbert was shot, testified next. Ms. Lundy said that the shooter,
who she spoke to while outside the restaurant, was driving a dark,
older model tr[u]ck with a toolbox in the back. She described the
driver as a brown, slender male with dreadlocks, between 25-30
years old. Ms. Lundy identified Appellant in court as the man she
saw.

According to Ms. Lundy, Appellant entered the Popeyes, said
a few words and started hitting Mr. Gilbert. He then pulled out a
gun, shot Mr. Gilbert, and left. Ms. Lundy was shown a photospread
by law enforcement and picked out a person who she said “favored”
Appellant but appeared to be younger than him. Ms. Lundy
admitted to questioning her decision to pick that particular
photograph. Ms. Lundy was also present when a sketch was done
of the suspect and testified that the sketch was “a pretty close
drawing of the shooter.” She did not think there was a big difference
between being 21 years old and 35 years old, nor did she think there
was a big difference between being 5’8” and 6 feet tall.

Earlexia Jackson was working the drive-thru when a dark
green truck came through. There were two people in the truck and
the driver had dreadlocks. The driver of the truck ordered and when
he was told the total, said it was too expensive. The driver then
pulled forward and came inside the restaurant. Ms. Jackson then
saw the driver take a swing at Mr. Gilbert and heard a gunshot, at
which point she dropped to the ground. She too was shown a
photospread by law enforcement but was unable to positively
identify anybody.

Following the testimony of his coworkers, Christopher
Gilbert took the stand. According to Mr. Gilbert, he was outside the
restaurant when a green truck with front and side dents pulled up
and the driver tried to go inside. Mr. Gilbert and his coworkers told
the man that the inside of the restaurant was closed and directed
him to the drive thru. After Mr. Gilbert went back inside the
Popeyes, the driver, who Gilbert identified as Appellant, entered
the restaurant and said[,] “What did you say?” before punching him.
Appellant then shot Mr. Gilbert. Mr. Gilbert was shown a
photospread by law enforcement on July 6, 2017 and was unable to
identify anybody. However[,] he did identify Appellant at a later
court proceeding.

During cross-examination Mr. Gilbert was questioned
regarding his varied descriptions of the suspect’s vehicle. He also
testified that his only opportunity to see Appellant was during the
short attack inside the restaurant and described him as being a
male in [his] 30s who was 5’8” – 5’9” and stocky with a goatee.

No forensic evidence was developed in the case. Detective
Cory Williams, the lead detective on the case, testified that he
obtained and reviewed all the surveillance video from Popeyes
except footage from the kitchen and manager’s office. Law
enforcement developed Appellant as a suspect and Detective
Williams went to Appellant’s house in July of 2017. According to
Detective Williams, the vehicle that was seen on the video was
parked outside Appellant’s house. Detective Williams spoke to
Appellant via telephone sometime between July 6, 2017 and July
26, 2017. He then conducted a videotaped interview with Appellant
on July 26, 2017, which was played for the jury. In the interview,
Appellant denied any involvement in the incident and said he would
have been at his girlfriend’s house on the day Mr. Gilbert was shot.
Appellant’s girlfriend, Hannah Stebbins testified and echoed
Appellant’s testimony. Ms. Stebbins said she was at work from 3-
11 p.m. on the day in question but that Appellant would have been
at her house even if she was not there.

The State presented cell phone evidence through special
agent Robert Simmonds of the FBI. Agent Simmonds analyzed cell
phone records for phone number 904-713-1244, specifically
transactions that took place between 3:00 and 10:00 p.m. He plotted
cell tower information on a map, along with the locations of the
Popeyes restaurant, Ms. Stebbins[’s] house and Appellant’s
father[’]s house. During cross-examination Agent Simmonds
conceded that he was unable to triangulate the exact location of the
handset and that the phone records do not show how far a handset
is away from a particular tower. He also conceded that towers can
get overloaded and that the strongest and clearest signal, which a
handset utilizes, does not always come from the closest tower.

After the State rested its case, Appellant entered into
evidence the forensic sketch compiled based on the descriptions of
Mr. Jones, Ms. Lundy and Ms. Jackson. Appellant declined to
testify. In rebuttal, the state presented the testimony of James
McMillan, a forensic artist employed by the State Attorney’s Office.
Mr. McMillian testified to the process he utilized when completing
the sketch in Appellant’s case.

Following closing arguments and deliberation, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty as charged.

Resp. Ex. E (record citations omitted).
IV. The Petition
a. Ground One
Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for disregarding
Petitioner’s desire to admit his involvement and testify in his own defense. Doc.
1 at 7. He maintains he would “admit what happened, and express his regret
for shooting the victim.” Id. He also contends that he asked trial counsel to
obtain the best plea offer she could from the state, but trial counsel refused to
negotiate a plea on his behalf. Id.
Petitioner raised this claim in ground one of his Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. I at 12-21. The trial court summarily denied
the claim as follows:
Defendant alleges he asked counsel to “obtain the best plea
from the State,” but counsel told him that “none had been made and
she wasn’t going to ask.” He further alleges that although he had
denied guilt during his videotaped interview with law enforcement,
he subsequently told counsel he wanted to “come clean,” admit what
happened, and express his regret for shooting the victim. He states:

Defendant wanted to explain that in the heat [of] the
argument, which he admittedly instigated, he had
attracted others whose numbers Defendant did not
know and that at the time, he felt the sudden need to
act to avoid further escalation, and to escape the
potential that he would himself be outnumbered and
accosted.

He argues that he wanted to take the stand at trial, admit he
overreacted, and apologize to the victim, but counsel told him that
was “not happening” and that he would be crazy to confess in light
of the videotaped interview.

Defendant further alleges that counsel stated she would
maintain his innocence, let the jury hear the interview, and
challenge the identification evidence, which she described as “really
weak.” Defendant asserts he questioned this advice because there
was a video from Popeye’s, where the incident occurred, which was
clear enough for him to recognize himself, and the truck shown in
the video, which had distinctive dents and a tool box, was clearly
his father’s truck. He also knew that two witnesses had identified
him from photo arrays and a tipster had identified him as the driver
of the truck. He asserts that the law enforcement video, in which
he claimed he was innocent, showed him displaying an arrogant
attitude that sealed his fate.

Defendant concludes that at sentencing, he made a “good and
sincere presentation of contrition, confession, and apology to the
victim and the Court,” while the State argued for a life sentence,
which he describes as unreasonable in light of his mitigation and
lack of criminal record. He states:

Had Defendant “come clean” as he intended to,
acknowledged being intimidated by “evil” detectives
into his video statement, and expressed the same
contrition and apology as he did at sentencing during
the trial, there is a reasonable probability that the jury
would have arrived at a lesser charge of manslaughter.

He argues counsel knew the interview with law enforcement was
“replete with falsehoods” but “still urged the jury to accept as true
what she knew to be false,” suggesting that she violated the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar.

Thus, his position in the instant Motion is that counsel’s only
reasonable strategy was to allow him to admit the crime, express
his contrition, and challenge the interview with police.

This claim lacks merit.

“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be
highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Appellant is not entitled to perfect or error-free counsel,
only reasonably effective counsel. Waterhouse v. State,
522 So. 2d 341, 343 (Fla. 1988). Just because trial
counsel’s strategy is unsuccessful, does not mean that
their representation is automatically inadequate.
Sireci v. State, 469 So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. 1985).

Black v. State, 304 So. 3d 45, 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

Prior to the start of jury selection, the Court asked Defendant
whether he was prepared to proceed to trial, whether he had
enough time to confer with counsel, and whether he was aware that
the State would consider any defense plea offers.[FN1] Defendant
responded affirmatively and did not express any dissatisfaction
with counsel. After the State rested its case, the Court advised him
that he had a constitutional right to testify and that it was his
decision to make. He asked to speak with counsel, then replied that
he would like to remain silent. Therefore, Defendant had
opportunities to tell the Court that he wanted to admit guilt or that
he wanted to take the stand and tell the truth, but he did not do so
during these inquiries or at any other point before or during trial.
Furthermore, on page[s] 16-17 of his Motion, Defendant
acknowledges “[t]he evidence of guilt was overwhelming and
extremely inflammatory,” citing several portions of the testimony
presented by the State. [FN2] The State’s evidence established that
Defendant exited his truck after going through the drive-through
lane at a Popeye’s restaurant, entered the store, began beating the
victim, and then shot the victim.

If Defendant had then taken the stand to admit that he
instigated the encounter, after which he “felt the sudden need to act
to avoid further escalation, and to escape the potential that he
would himself be outnumbered and accosted,” there is no
reasonable probability that the jury would have convicted him of a
lesser offense such as manslaughter. The version of events the
Defendant now says he wanted to tell the jury still satisfies the
elements of the crime he was convicted of. Fla. Stat. § 782,04(2).
Thus, Defendant cannot establish that counsel’s actions prejudiced
him with regard to the conviction or that no reasonably competent
attorney would have pursued the same strategy, given the facts and
circumstances of this case.

In addition, he cannot establish that counsel’s actions
prejudiced the outcome of the sentencing hearing. While the State
requested a life sentence, counsel asked the Court not to exceed the
25-year minimum mandatory term. The State suggested that if
Defendant really felt sorry, “responsibility could have been taken
at the very beginning,” but counsel promptly argued that Defendant
had the right to a trial, and the Court could not hold that against
him in making a decision regarding sentencing. The Court agreed
and ultimately imposed the statutory maximum of 30 years.

Defendant finds it “perplexing” that counsel allowed him “to
tell the truth anyway at sentencing and to do so under oath,” which
“forever prejudiced Defendant’s right to a new and fair trial” should
he succeed in his postconviction proceedings. However, it would
have been prejudicial for him to “tell the truth” during trial, as he
alleges counsel should have allowed him to do, because he would
have been under oath then, as well, and there is no reasonable
probability that taking responsibility would have absolved him of
guilt or resulted in a conviction for a lesser offense.
[FN1] The prosecutor confirmed that the State had not extended any
offers.

[FN2] In his Motion, Defendant cites certain specific pages of the trial
transcript; however, the exhibits attached to [the trial court order]
include additional pages where the most incriminating testimony
appears . . . .

Resp. Ex. I at 39-41 (record citations omitted). Petitioner filed a motion for
rehearing. Id. at 177-88. The trial court denied the motion, but clarified that as
to ground one, it found counsel’s advice was not deficient and that “other
reasonable attorneys could and potentially would have discouraged [Petitioner]
from taking the stand.” Id. at 194. Petitioner appealed, and the First District
Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed without a written opinion. Resp. Ex. L.
The Court addresses Petitioner’s claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. A defendant’s
right to testify at a criminal trial is a fundamental and personal right that
defense counsel cannot waive. See United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532
(11th Cir. 1992). In Teague, the Eleventh Circuit held that it is defense counsel’s
responsibility to advise the defendant of this right and the strategic
implications and “that the appropriate vehicle for claims that the defendant’s
right to testify was violated by defense counsel is a claim of ineffective

assistance [under Strickland].” Id. at 1534. Teague reasoned that an attorney’s
performance would be deficient under the first prong of the Strickland test if
counsel refused to accept the defendant’s decision to testify and would not call
him to the stand or if defense counsel never informed the defendant of the right
to testify and that the ultimate decision belonged to the defendant. Id. The

Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
because the trial court found that counsel had advised the defendant of his right
to testify and that he should not exercise that right, and the defendant did not
protest. Teague, 953 F.2d at 1535.

Here, the record shows that following the state’s case, the trial court
conducted a colloquy with Petitioner, under oath, about his decision to testify.
THE COURT: I must also advise you that you have a
constitutional right to testify. It is your right to testify or not
testify. And no one can make that decision except for you.
Miss Wright, for the record, have you had time to
communicate with your client about the decision of whether
or not he is going to testify?

MS. WRIGHT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: To the State, does the defendant have any prior
felony convictions or crimes of dishonesty or anything like
that that could be used for cross examination?

MS. WHEELER-SANCHEZ: Not to my knowledge, Your
Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And at this time, do you believe your
client is ready to tell me if I ask him what his decision is?

MS. WRIGHT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Pastures, have you had enough time to
consult with your attorney, Miss Wright, regarding this
decision of whether or not you are going to testify? Have you
had enough time?
[PETITIONER]: I would ask for a few more minutes.

THE COURT: You can speak to her for a few more minutes.
That’s fine. Okay.

So we’ll technically go into a recess so Mr. Pastures can talk
to her.

(Conferring with co-counsel.)

(Short recess.)

(Defendant present.)

THE COURT: We’re back on the record. All the attorneys are
here. Mr. Pastures is here.

Sir, did you have enough additional time to speak with your
attorney?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: And are you ready at this time to state in open
court of your decision?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, ma’am. I would like to remain silent.

THE COURT: Very well. You have a constitutional right to
remain silent.

Resp. Ex. B at 639-41. This evidence shows that after thoughtfully considering
his right to testify, and conferring with counsel about that decision, Petitioner
voluntarily and knowingly made the decision to not testify. Petitioner now
asserts that had he testified at trial, he would have admitted to shooting the
victim and expressed regret, but his recorded interview with police contradicted
this new proposed line of defense. And Petitioner’s argument that such
testimony would have produced a different outcome at trial is speculative and,

honestly, doubtful. Likewise, Petitioner’s proposed testimony would not have
likely resulted in a favorable plea offer because the record shows the state
refused to offer a plea deal.
To that end, the Court finds that the state court’s adjudication of this

claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not involve an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented in
the state court proceedings. Ground One is denied.

b. Ground Two
Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge the admissibility of Petitioner’s videotaped statement. Doc. 1 at 11.
According to Petitioner, he made the statement to police after police “lured”

Petitioner to Florida from New York to “induce” him into giving the statement.
Id. He contends that the statement ultimately led to his arrest, and trial counsel
was also ineffective for failing to challenge the arrest. Id.
Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. I at 22-

29. The trial court summarily denied the claim as follows:
Defendant alleges counsel failed to challenge his videotaped
statement, which he argues was obtained by law enforcement under
false pretenses after detectives lured him to Florida from New York
in order to induce him to give a statement that led to his arrest. He
acknowledges he “sought refuge in New York shortly after the
crime” and intended to remain there until he received “pretextual”
phone calls indicating that he·needed to sign probation forms. He
argues the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office already had an arrest
warrant, but Detective Williams admitted that he gave Defendant
no indication of what was going on as he ushered a handcuffed
Defendant to sit in front of the camera.

This claim lacks merit. It is irrelevant whether law
enforcement lured Defendant back to Florida under false pretenses.
“Deception does not negate consent. Absent coercion, threats or
misrepresentation of authority, the courts have long recognized
deception as a viable and proper tool of police investigation.” Wyche
v. State, 906 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), approved, 987
So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2008). Defendant’s allegations establish, at most,
that law enforcement agents induced him to return to the State of
Florida, but do not establish that they exercised coercion, threats,
or misrepresented their authority. There is also nothing to indicate
that they induced him to make any incriminating statements
during the interview that followed.

Detective Williams testified that he called Defendant to say
that he needed to speak with Defendant but admitted that he did
not say what it was about. The State introduced the videotaped
interview, which demonstrates that the detective read Miranda[6]
rights and Defendant indicated that he understood. The fact that
Defendant was not informed of the arrest warrant is not sufficient
to find that his waiver was involuntary. State v. Manning, 506 So.
2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 347,
361 (Fla. 2005). The record demonstrates that Defendant was not
coerced into making the videotaped statement. Therefore, counsel
had no basis to move to suppress the video or to challenge the
arrest, and there is no reasonable probability that such motions
would have been granted.

6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Resp. Ex. I at 43-45 (record citations omitted). Petitioner appealed, and the
First DCA per curiam affirmed the denial without a written opinion. Resp. Ex.

L.
The Court addresses Petitioner’s claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. In doing so, the
Court notes that the Supreme Court has explained that “it seems self-evident

that one who is told he is free to refuse to answer questions is in a curious
posture to later complain that his answers were compelled.” Colorado v. Spring,
479 U.S. 564, 859 (1987) (quotation omitted). Notably, Miranda requires police
to inform a petitioner, without qualification, that “anything he says may be used

against him.” Id. at 577 (emphasis added). As such, a petitioner’s “awareness of
all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not
relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege.” Id. Also, the Eleventh

Circuit has rejected a per se rule that statements obtained by police deception
must be suppressed. See United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1327 (11th Cir.
2010); see also United States v. Castaneda–Castaneda, 729 F.2d 1360, 1363
(11th Cir.1984) (“[T]he police’s use of a trick alone will not render a confession

involuntary.”). “Unlike physical violence or the threat of it, which makes any
resulting statement per se involuntary, the effect of psychological pressure or
deception on the voluntariness of a statement depends on the particular
circumstances in each case.” Farley, 607 F.3d at 1328.

Here, Petitioner contends that his statements should have been
suppressed because police tricked him into coming back to Florida, telling him
that he needed to sign some probation paperwork when really police already
had an arrest warrant for the subject shooting. But even if police did trick him

into coming back to Florida, that fact, under the totality of the circumstances,
had no impact on the constitutional validity of his Miranda waiver and decision
to speak to police. Any motion to suppress the interview or arrest would have
been meritless. And, thus, the Court finds that the state court’s adjudication of

this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not involve
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence
presented in the state court proceedings. Ground Two is denied.

V. Supplement

Ground Three and Ground Four
In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to file a motion in limine to strike portions of his police interrogation
where Detective Williams made statements indicating officers already
determined Petitioner’s guilt. Doc. 14 at 8. According to Petitioner, during the
interview, Williams discussed with Petitioner aspects of the investigation that
led police to identifying Petitioner as a suspect, such as footage of Petitioner’s
father’s truck and that the employees of the restaurant identified Petitioner as

the assailant. Id. at 8-9. Petitioner contends that Williams also improperly
made comments about his own opinions regarding Petitioner’s guilt, including
that he believed the sketch looked like Petitioner and that the nature of the
crime indicated Petitioner was “cold-blooded.” Id. at 9. He argues that because

officers are deemed more credible witnesses, this testimony contributed to the
jury’s guilty verdict. Id.
In Ground Four, Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to investigate Florida’s stand your ground immunity from

prosecution and for failing to file a pretrial motion to dismiss. Doc. 14 at 12.
Petitioner contends that he advised counsel about the circumstances
surrounding the shooting, notably that while Petitioner was going through the
drive-thru, the victim and Jones were “pointing, laughing, and saying

something in his direction.” Id. at 12. In response, Petitioner asserts he parked
his truck, went inside the Popeyes, and asked the victim and Jones what they
had said. Id. The victim then purportedly stated, “F*ck you broke a@s n*****,”
before “readying himself to punch” Petitioner. Id. According to Petitioner, he

advised counsel that he then punched the victim several times to defend
himself. Id. at 12-13. But when Petitioner turned to leave, he looked behind him
and noticed both the victim and Jones advancing and trying to attack
Petitioner. Id. Petitioner states he was outnumbered and in fear for his life, so
he pulled out his gun and shot the victim to stop their advance. Id.

Respondents assert that both Grounds Three and Four are untimely
because they fail to relate back to any claim that was timely asserted in the
Petition. Doc. 16 at 4-9. Alternatively, they contend that even if these claims
are timely filed, they are still due to be dismissed because Petitioner failed to

exhaust the claims in state court. Id. at 9.
Petitioner argues that Ground Three relates back to Ground Two as both
claims challenge police conduct “centered in time and type around the
videotaped interrogation.” Doc. 18 at 4. He also contends that Ground Four

relates back to Ground One as trial counsel’s failure to seek immunity based on
Florida’s stand your ground law relates to trial counsel’s failure to allow
Petitioner to testify at trial about his involvement in the incident. Id.
Federal habeas petitions are civil in nature and are governed by the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Habeas Corpus Rule 11; Fed. R. Civ. P.
81(a)(4). As such, a habeas petition may be amended as provided in the rules of
procedure applicable to civil actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242. Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, pleading amendments relate back to the date of the

original pleading when “the claim . . . asserted in the amended pleading arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2). An amendment to a
habeas petition may relate back “[s]o long as the original and amended petitions
state claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts.” Mayle v. Felix,

545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005). A new claim, however, does not meet the standard
and thus does not relate back “when it asserts a new ground for relief supported
by facts that differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set
forth.” Id. at 650. The terms “conduct, transaction, and occurrence” are to be

narrowly construed and are not synonymous with “trial, conviction or sentence.”
Id. at 664.
Upon review, the Court finds that neither Ground Three nor Ground Four
relate back to the timely raised claims in the Petition. As to Ground Three,

Petitioner challenges police conduct that occurred during the actual interview
with Detective Williams, while Ground Two challenges the tactics police used
to get Petitioner to come back to Florida from New York and agree to speak to
police. While both claims may involve the underlying police interrogation, the

claims differ in both time (during the interrogation versus prior to
interrogation) and type (purported biased and prejudicial questioning during
interrogation versus deceptive police tactics to get Petitioner to agree to police
interview). Likewise, the allegations of Ground Four do not relate back to the

claim in Ground One because they also differ in both time (failure to file a
pretrial motion to dismiss based on immunity from prosecution versus failure
to allow Petitioner to testify at trial) and type (complete immunity from
prosecution versus going to trial and raising a self-defense theory). As such, the
Court finds that Grounds Three and Four do not relate back to any timely claim

raised in the Petition and thus they are untimely filed.
In any event, assuming Grounds Three and Four relate back to the claims
raised in the Petition, they are still due to be dismissed because they are
unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Petitioner admits he failed to present

these issues to the state court, but he seeks to overcome this procedural bar by
relying on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and arguing that he can show
“cause” to excuse his default because he did not have counsel when he filed his
Rule 3.850 motion. Doc. 18 at 6-11.

Under Martinez, Petitioner must prove more than the general assertion
that the trial court did not appoint counsel in the initial-review collateral
proceeding. 566 U.S. at 14. Petitioner must “also demonstrate that the
underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one,

which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some
merit.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Lambrix v. Sec’y Fla. Dept. of Corr., 851
F.3d 1158, 1164 (11th Cir. 2017). Conversely, his claim is “insubstantial” if “it
does not have any merit or . . . is wholly without factual support.” Id. at 16. For

the reasons that follow, the Court finds that even if Petitioner shows that his
lack of postconviction counsel caused his procedural default, he cannot show
that his underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claims are substantial.
In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that the jury relied heavily on
Detective Williams’s statements indicating his opinion of Petitioner’s guilt

during the interview, and had counsel moved to suppress those statements, the
outcome of his case would have been different. But during trial, before
Petitioner’s recorded interview with Detective Williams was played, the trial
court read this instruction to the jury:

THE COURT: Members of the jury, at some point fairly
shortly, I expect that you will be listening to and viewing an
audio/video recording. The Court instructs you that the recording
has been edited to eliminate irrelevant portions that would not add
to your understanding of the case. The fact that the recording has
been edited should not concern you in any way and must not impact
the way that you view or listen to or consider this evidence.

Another instruction is as follows: Members of the jury, I
anticipate that shortly, you’re about to hear and watch a recorded
interview that contains opinions and statements by law
enforcement officers to the defendant, Mr. Pastures. These opinions
and statements are pertinent only to explain the reactions and
responses they elicit. You are not to consider these opinions and
statements by the police officer as true but only to establish the
context of Mr. Pastures’ reactions and responses.

Resp. Ex. B at 477-78. The state then entered into evidence, without objection,
the recorded interview. Id. at 481. As the interview played for the jury, the state
paused the recording and asked Detective Williams about any methods he used
in questioning Petitioner, to which Williams explained the following:
Q: Detective, are you about to use an investigative technique here?

A: Yes.
Q: And is that an interview technique?

A: Yes.

Q: What is that?

A: I’m about to minimize in the interview. In other words, I’m
minimizing the actual act of the crime so that I can get on that level
with the person I’m interviewing. And I can say, hey, was this an
accident? Did you mean to do this?

And typically, when we minimize that, people tend to start to tell
us the truth because we minimize the act. I’m not calling it a
“shooting.” Just calling it an “accident.”

Q: And so that doesn’t mean you believe it’s an accident. This is
just –

A: That is correct.

Q: This is part of your interview technique.

A: Correct.

Q: And you’re trained to do this?

A: Yes. I’ve taken interview classes.

Resp. Ex. B at 497-98. Considering the trial court’s instruction, as well as
Detective Williams’s testimony explaining his interview techniques, Petitioner
cannot demonstrate that any statements that may have portrayed Detective
Williams’s “opinion” affected his case. Indeed, absent this evidence, the jury was
still presented with the surveillance footage of Petitioner driving his father’s
truck and entering the restaurant and shooting the victim. Resp. Ex. B at 250-
57. And as the footage played for the jury, Jones provided eyewitness testimony
describing the events depicted in the footage. Id. Based on this evidence,
Petitioner cannot show that but for trial counsel’s alleged error, the outcome of

his trial would have been different. Because Petitioner cannot satisfy the
prejudice prong of Strickland, he cannot rely on Martinez to excuse the
procedural default of this claim. Likewise, Petitioner has not demonstrated that
failure to consider this claim on the merits will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Ground Three is denied.
In Ground Four, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to file a pretrial motion to dismiss based on Florida’s stand your ground
law. Doc. 14 at 12-13. According to Petitioner, he punched the victim because

he was defending himself, and then when he turned to leave the restaurant, he
noticed the victim and Jones “advancing on him, trying to attack,” so he shot
the victim “to stop their advance.” Id. at 13. He contends that trial counsel knew
about this information and had enough evidence to file a motion seeking

immunity from prosecution. Id.
Section 776.012(2), Florida Statutes, defines Florida’s general self-
defense as follows: “A person is justified in using . . . deadly force if he []
reasonably believes that using . . . such force is necessary to prevent imminent

death or great bodily harm to himself . . . . A person who uses . . . deadly force
in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the
right to stand his or her ground if the person using . . . the deadly force is not
engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to
be.” Fla. Stat. § 776.012(2). On the other hand, “stand your ground” immunity

refers to Florida Statutes § 776.032(1), which provides that “[a] person who uses
. . . force as permitted in § 776.012, . . . is justified in such conduct and is immune
from criminal prosecution . . . for the use . . . of such force . . . .” Fla. Stat. §
776.032. When a defendant seeks immunity under § 776.032, the trial court

must conduct a non-jury, pretrial hearing to determine whether the defendant
is immune from criminal prosecution. Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla.
1st DCA 2008). At that pretrial hearing, the court “confront[s] and weigh[s] only
factual disputes,” and determines “whether the defendant has shown by a

preponderance of the evidence that the immunity attaches.” Id. at 30.
Here, neither Petitioner’s actions nor statements suggest that he was
justified in using deadly force. Instead, Petitioner’s conduct was indicative of
his culpability and desire to separate himself from the incident. The evidence

shows that Petitioner entered the Popeyes even though it was closed to
customers and initiated the confrontation. Even assuming that the victim was
willing and able to physically fight Petitioner after Petitioner punched the
victim, Petitioner does not allege and there is no record evidence that anyone

other than Petitioner had a deadly weapon on his or her person. Also, upon
Petitioner’s first contact with police, he denied all participation in the crime. He
left Florida and went to New York, and when speaking to Detective Williams,
he adamantly denied being at the Popeyes the night of the shooting.

Indeed, likely because of his statements to police and his decision to leave
the state following the shooting, trial counsel set forth a misidentification
defense at trial as an attempt to explain Petitioner’s conduct. But after
reviewing the state’s evidence, including surveillance footage of Petitioner in

his father’s truck and Petitioner committing the crime, the jury found Petitioner
guilty of attempted second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
Considering this evidence, the Court finds it is unlikely that a trial judge would
have rendered a different judgment at a stand your ground hearing under a

lower standard of proof. To that end, Petitioner cannot establish prejudice
under Strickland, and thus he cannot rely on Martinez to excuse the procedural
default of this claim. Likewise, Petitioner has not demonstrated that failure to
consider this claim on the merits will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice. Ground Four is denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Petition (Doc. 1) and Supplement (Doc. 14) are DENIED, and

this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with
prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
3. If Petitioner appeals this Order, the Court denies a certificate of
appealability. Because this Court has determined that a certificate of
appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending
motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed
in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.’
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 10th day of
February, 2026.

Cimotbeg g. Corrig on
Wy. TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN
Senior United States District Judge

Jax-7
C: Tyrone John Pastures, #J14131
Counsel of record

7 The Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the Petitioner
makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were
‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).
Here, after consideration of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of
appealability.
33

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11317386. Public record. Not legal advice.