# Nolan

> District Court, D. Maryland · March 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11317344

## Case

- **Full name:** Stephen D. Nolan v. Chaplain Keith Kitchen, Head Chaplain, Chaplain Kevin Lamp, NBCI Chaplain, Ronald Stotler, NCBI Chief of Security, Jeffrey Nines, Warden of NCBI, Jason Harbaugh, WCI Chief of Security, and Chaplain Jay Atkinson, WCT Chaplain
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** March 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11317344

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that an inmate “must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones”
- concluding that the Declaration does not “create obligations enforceable in the federal courts”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

STEPHEN D. NOLAN,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No,: 24-2838-TDC
CHAPLAIN KEITH KITCHEN,
Head Chaplain,
CHAPLAIN KEVIN LAMP,
NBCI Chaplain,
RONALD STOTLER,
NCBI Chief of Security,
JEFFREY NINES,
Warden of NCBI,
JASON HARBAUGH,
WCI Chief of Security, and
CHAPLAIN JAY ATKINSON,
WCT Chaplain,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Self-represented Plaintiff Stephen D. Nolan, an inmate currently incarcerated at Western
Correctional Institution (“WCI’) in Cumberland, Maryland and formerly incarcerated at North
Branch Correctional Institution (““NBCI’), also in Cumberland, Maryland, has filed a civil action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Maryland Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services (“DPSCS”) Chaplain Keith Kitchen, NBCI Chaplain Kevin Lamp, NBCI
Chief of Security Ronald Stotler, former NBCI Warden Jeffrey Nines, WC] Chief of Security Jason
Harbaugh, and WCI Chaplain Jay Atkinson. Nolan alleges that by prohibiting him from having
an amulet sacred to his religion and failing to provide religiously appropriate food for his religion’s
most sacred ceremonial meal, Defendants have violated his constitutional rights under the First

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc—2000cc-5; the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb—2000bb-4; Article 40 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights; and various provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment, which is fully briefed. Having reviewed the submitted materials. the Court finds that
no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’
Motion will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
Prior to April 19, 2024, Plaintiff Stephen Nolan, a Maryland state inmate, was incarcerated
at NBCI. On that date, Nolan was transferred to WCI. Nolan is a practitioner of Odinism, an
“ancient pre-Christian faith . .. grounded in ancient Icelandic sagas and runic mysticism.” Smith
v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2007). He alleges that at both prisons, he has been denied
two important aspects of his religion: the ability to have a sacred amulet known as Thor’s Hammer
and the provision of religiously appropriate foods on the correct date for the Odinist holiday of
Yule.
I. Thor’s Hammer
Nolan asserts that Thor’s Hammer is the “most sacred religious amulet” in Odinism, it
serves as a form of “protection from evil,” and praying to it is the manner in which he and other
Odinists properly practice and express their religious beliefs. Am. Compl. at 2-3, ECF No. 15.
Thor’s Hammer, however, is banned from Maryland prisons as an item associated with a prison
gang, referred to as a Security Threat Group (“STG”). Jd. at 1-3. Nolan alleges that other religious
symbols have been adopted by various STGs but have not been banned from Maryland prisons.

For example, he asserts that the MS-13 or 18th Street gang uses the crucifix as a symbol, and that
several gangs use the star-and-crescent symbol associated with Islam, but such items are not
banned in Maryland prisons. Nolan further asserts that the STG that adopted Thor’s Hammer, the
Aryan Brotherhood, has now been “depleted” in Maryland and is “not active” in the state. Jd. at
3—4. He also states that although he has been told that the amulet is properly banned as a “racist
item,” id. at 3, such a justification is improper where the prison allows racist videos featuring Louis
Farrakhan to be played in prisons. Under the DPSCS Religious Services Manual, Odinist inmates
are allowed to possess certain other religious items, including an altar cloth, a pendant with the
Helm of Awe, World Tree, or Yggdrasil symbol, an image or statue of a deity, a prayer rug, and a
rune set.
Nolan faults the NBCI Chief of Security, Defendant Ronald Stotler, and the WCI Chief of
Security, Defendant Jason Harbaugh, for not removing Thor’s Hammer from the list of banned
STG items. Nolan also engaged in correspondence with Defendant Keith Kitchen, the DPSCS
Chaplain, that related in part to the ban on possessing Thor’s Hammer in a Maryland prison.
Il. Yule
Nolan also alleges that Defendants do not permit Odinists to engage in a religiously
appropriate celebration of Yule, a major Odinist holiday. Nolan asserts that the celebration of Yule,
which DPSCS observes on December 21 and 22, extends between December 20 through 31, and
that Odinists should be, but are not, permitted to engage in communal prayer on all 12 days of
Yule. He also asserts that the proper celebration of Yule requires a feast on December 31 with a
menu including goat, pork, or oxen, as well as a series of toasts and cakes. Nolan alleges, however,
that Defendants have not provided any of these religiously appropriate foods for that feast. Nolan
further alleges that prisoners of other religions, including Judaism, Islam, and Native American

religions, receive more favorable treatment because they receive “special meals that are not on the
prison menu” on their major religious holidays, and that they are permitted to have a communal
meal such as for Muslims on Ramadan, rather than eat alone in their cells, as has been the case for
Odinists. /d. at 1, 4.
As to this issue, Nolan states that he wrote to Defendant Kevin Lamp, the Chaplain of
NBCI, numerous times about correcting the Yule celebration date and providing appropriate food
for the Yule feast, but that Lamp denied all of his requests. In a March 5, 2020 written response
to one of Nolan’s inquiries, Chaplain Lamp stated that all religious groups are served “the best
meal of the menu cycle,” usually baked chicken for their religious “feast,” and all other inmates
receive the same meal that day. Opp’n Ex. at 37, ECF No. 35-1. Chaplain Lamp also reported
that if the feast falls on a day when there are no “chow lines,” such that everyone is fed in their
cells, then the religious group members also eat their special meal in their cells as well. Jd. Nolan
also alleges that he engaged in correspondence about this issue with Defendant Jay Atkinson, the
WCI Chaplain, but the requested food items were not provided.
Under the DPSCS Religious Services Manual, each faith group may have one ceremonial
meal each year with religious observance. The food service department procures all ceremonial
meal items, but a Managing Official may allow inmates to purchase special ritual food items
through the commissary to supplement the celebratory meal provided. The chaplain is to work
with the food services department and the commissary to ensure that appropriate ritual foods are
available. For ceremonial meals, dietary items not approved or specifically defined are limited to
available items within the food services cyclical menu. A Managing Official may choose to
prepare special meals for religious holidays.

A DPSCS chart provided by WCI Correctional Dietary Manager Robert Herbold lists the
various religions and their major holidays, notes that most receive the DPSCS “best meal” on that
date, but also states that Jewish inmates receive a special kosher meal on Passover and Rosh
Hashanah and that Native American inmates receive a special buffalo meat meal on Summer
Solstice. Mot. Ex. F at 4-6, ECF No. 30-7. The chart notes that Odinists receive a Yule celebration
meal on December 21 of each year at which the DPSCS best meal is served but that pork product
items may be available for sale in the commissary. In a declaration, Herbold as stated that to
accommodate a variety of faith traditions, such as those of Jewish and Muslim inmates, DPSCS
has instituted pork-free kitchens.
On December 21 and 22, 2024, ceremonial services for Yule were held in the chapel at
WCI, and Nolan attended the services on both days. The meal provided for the Odinist Yule
celebration on December 21, 2024 consisted of baked chicken, macaroni and cheese, buttered
vegetables, and banana cake as well as bread, butter, and a beverage.
Ill. Procedural History
Nolan filed the original Complaint in this case on September 30, 2024. Construed liberally,
the presently operative Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants have violated Nolan’s right
to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution; RFRA; RLUIPA;
Article 40 of the. Maryland Declaration of Rights; and Articles 8, 18, and 24 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. As relief, Nolan seeks an order requiring Defendants to remove
Thor’s Hammer from the list of banned STG items, to provide the Yule feast on December 31 with
religiously appropriate foods, and to permit communal prayer over the 12 days of Yule; monetary
damages; and a transfer to Jessup Correctional Institution, which according to Nolan satisfactorily
permits the free exercise of Odinism.

In response to the Amended Complaint, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. After the Motion was fully briefed, Nolan filed a
“Motion to Oppose Defendants’ Dismissal/Summary Judgment,” which is fairly construed as a
Motion for Leave to File a Surreply, ECF No. 51, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s
Surreply, ECF No. 52, and Nolan filed a Motion to Allow a Surreply, ECF No. 53. Upon review,
the Court finds that Nolan is not entitled to file a surreply brief because he does not seek to address
new arguments raised for the first time in Defendants’ reply brief. See EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F.
Supp. 2d 783, 801 (D. Md. 2013), aff'd, 778 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2015). Therefore, Defendants’
Motion to Strike the Surreply will be granted, and Nolan’s Motions for a Surreply will be denied.
Nolan also filed a Motion for Default Judgment, which will be denied because there has
been no failure by Defendants to respond to the Amended Complaint and to defend against the
claims in this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.
DISCUSSION
In their Motion, Defendants seek dismissal of Nolan’s Claims under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) or summary judgment under Rule 56. Defendants argue that (1) Defendants
are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims against them in their official capacities;
(2) Nolan’s claims as to the Yule feast are moot, (3) Nolan’s claims based on events prior to May
6, 2024 are subject to dismissal because Nolan was not registered in prison records as an Odinist
until after that date; (4) Nolan has failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (5) Nolan has not
sufficiently alleged personal participation by Chaplain Lamp, Warden Nines, and Chief Stotler; (6)
the Amended Complaint fails to state plausible claims for relief under any of the identified
constitutional or statutory provisions; and (7) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from
claims against them in their individual capacities.

1. Legal Standards
To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts
to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is
plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. Legal conclusions or conclusory statements
do not suffice. /d. The Court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual
allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of
Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A self-represented party’s complaint must be
construed liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, “liberal construction
does not mean overlooking the pleading requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020).
Defendants have attached affidavits and exhibits to the Motion for the Court’s
consideration. Typically, when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court
considers only the complaint and any attached documents. Sec’y of State for Defence v. Trimble
Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). Rule 12(d) requires courts to treat such a
motion as a motion for summary judgment where matters outside the pleadings are considered and
not excluded. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Before converting a motion to dismiss to one for summary
judgment, courts must give the nonmoving party “a reasonable opportunity to present all the
material that is pertinent to the motion.” /d. “Reasonable opportunity” has two requirements: (1)
the nonmoving party must have some notice that the court is treating the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as
a motion for summary judgment, and (2) the nonmoving party “must be afforded a reasonable

opportunity for discovery” to obtain information essential to oppose the motion. Gay v. Wall, 761
F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
Here, the notice requirement has been satisfied by the title of Defendants’ Motion. To show
that a reasonable opportunity for discovery has not been afforded, the nonmoving party must file
an affidavit or declaration under Rule 56(d), or another filing, explaining why “for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). See
Harrods Ltd. y. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 245 (4th Cir. 2002). Nolan does not
contend that discovery is required before resolution of a summary judgment motion and in fact has
submitted his own exhibits. Under these circumstances, the Court will construe Defendants’
Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment for purposes of the arguments requiring consideration
of the attached exhibits.
Under Rule 56, the Court grants summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In
assessing the Motion, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
with all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986). The Court may rely only on facts supported in the record, not simply assertions in the
pleadings. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003). A fact
is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248. A dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Jd. at 248-49.

Il. Eleventh Amendment
Defendants first argue that they are immune from any claims against them in their official
capacities pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, under which, absent consent, a State, its agencies,
and departments are immune from suits in federal court brought by their citizens or the citizens of
another state. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Claims
against state officials in their official capacities are claims against the State itself. Will v. Mich.
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). There are, however, three exceptions to the Eleventh
Amendment’s prohibition of a suit against a State:
First, Congress may abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it
both unequivocally intends to do so and acts pursuant to a valid grant of
constitutional authority. . . . Second, the Eleventh Amendment permits suits for
prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in violation of federal law.
.... Third, a State remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit in a federal court.
Lee-Thomas v. Prince Georges Cnty. Pub. Schs., 666 F.3d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
citations omitted). The second exception, derived from Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60
(1908), is relevant here. Under that exception, a plaintiff may advance a claim in federal court
against a State to enjoin the State and its officials from “engaging in future conduct that would
violate the Constitution or a federal statute.” Jndus. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Dobson, 68 F.4th 155, 163
(4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 2002)). The exception
applies when the “complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective.’” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645
(2002) (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
Here, the Amended Complaint seeks not only damages, but also prospective injunctive
relief, including requiring Defendants to allow Nolan to possess a Thor’s Hammer amulet and to

provide Nolan and other Odinists with certain specified foods for the celebration of Yule on a
specific date. Thus, while the Court will grant the Motion and dismiss the claims for damages
against Defendants in their official capacities, it will deny the Motion as to the claims for
prospective injunctive relief.
Ill. Mootness
Defendants also argue that Nolan’s claims regarding provision of a ceremonial meal should
be dismissed as moot because he was provided with a special meal for the observance of Yule on
December 21, 2024. A “case ‘becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any
effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.”” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013)
(quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps., 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)).
Defendants’ mootness argument misapprehends Nolan’s claim as to the ceremonial meal.
Nolan does not claim that Defendants failed to provide him with a ceremonial meal to celebrate
Yule, but rather that Defendants failed to provide appropriate meats and foods for the Yule feast
on the correct date in violation of the First Amendment and RLUIPA, see infra part VII, and treated
Odinist prisoners differently than prisoners of other faiths in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra part VIII. Here, Nolan specifically seeks
prospective injunctive relief to require the provision of appropriate foods for the Yule feast going
forward, as well as to allow communal prayer on each of the 12 days of Yule. Where Defendants
argue that the prisons are properly following the relevant DPSCS policy as to the foods provided
for the Yule feast, that policy is still in place, and a change in that policy would grant effectual
relief as to Nolan’s claims relating to Yule, the Court finds that those claims are not moot.

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Pre-May 2024 Events
Defendants assert that any claims based on events before May 6, 2024 must be dismissed
because according to a declaration from Chaplain Atkinson, prior to that date, Nolan was not
formally registered with the DPSCS as an Odinist, such that Defendants had no formal notice of
his asserted religious identity and no obligation to accommodate his Odinist beliefs or practices.
Defendants assert that under DPSCS policy, inmates are required to complete a Religious
Preference Registration form “to be added to the appropriate pass list for participation in religious
activities aligned with their selected faith.” Atkinson Decl. § 3, Mot. Ex. B, ECF No. 30-3. DPSCS
records reflect that on April 19, 2024, Nolan was transferred from NBCI to WCI, and on April 29,
2024, Nolan selected Odinism as his preferred religion by completing the required form. Nolan’s
registration under Odinism was entered in the DPSCS Offender Case Management System
(“OCMS”) on May 6, 2024. Prior to that designation, Nolan’s religion had been listed as Catholic
since August 24, 2016.
Nolan disputes that he ever registered as Catholic, contends that any such listing was based
on an error by DPSCS, and asserts that while he was at NBCI, Chaplain Lamp, Warden Nines, and
Chief Stotler were aware that he was an Odinist. Specifically, he has provided records showing
that he made a request about the Odinist Yule feast on October 18, 2019 to which Chaplain Lamp
responded. Moreover, as discussed below, Nolan filed administrative grievances while at NBCI
relating to Thor’s Hammer and the Yule feast which identified him to prison officials as an Odinist.
See infra part V. Indeed, in the response to the grievance relating to Thor’s Hammer, dated
November 30, 2022, Assistant Warden Keith Arnold acknowledged that his “investigation revealed
that [Nolan’s] religious preference is listed as Odinism.” Opp’n Ex. at 2. Further, Nolan has
submitted a December 19, 2022 letter from Chaplain Kitchen addressing his complaint relating to

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Thor’s Hammer. Nolan has thus demonstrated that, at a minimum, there is a genuine issue of
material fact whether Defendants had actual notice that he was an Odinist prior to May 6, 2024.
Defendants have cited no authority for their position that Nolan’s constitutional and
statutory claims prior to May 6, 2024 are “not legally cognizable” because he was not registered
as an Odinist during that time. Mot. at 5, ECF No. 30-1. Notably, none of the pre-May 6, 2024
submitted records reflect that prison officials invoked Nolan’s failure to register as an Odinist as
grounds for denying his requests. Where the record demonstrates that prison had actual notice of
both Nolan’s status as an Odinist and of his specific complaints prior to May 6, 2024, the Court
will not dismiss claims arising during that time period based solely on the failure to register
formally as an Odinist. For the same reasons, the Court rejects Defendants’ related argument that
the claims against Chaplain Lamp, Warden Nines, and Chief Stotler should be dismissed based on
a lack of allegations of personal participation, which is premised on the position that there can be
no violations of Nolan’s religious rights during the time period before he was formally registered
as an Odinist.
V. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants also assert that Nolan’s claims should be dismissed because he has failed to
properly exhaust administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a)):
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.
Id. Inmates must exhaust administrative remedies before they bring any “suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The failure to

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exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense which must be established by the
defendant. See Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017).
Exhaustion is mandatory and generally may not be excused unless the administrative
procedure is not available. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (holding that an inmate
“must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones”). “[A]n administrative
remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was
prevented from availing himself of it.” Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008). In
Ross, the United States Supreme Court identified three circumstances when an administrative
remedy is unavailable. An administrative procedure is not available when officers are consistently
unwilling or unable to provide relief to aggrieved inmates, the procedure is so opaque that it is
practically incapable of use, or prison administrators actively thwart inmates from filing
grievances. Ross, 578 U.S. at 643-44.
In the Maryland state prison system, exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that a
prisoner first file an Administrative Remedy Procedure grievance, known as an “ARP,” with the
warden of the prison within 30 days of the incident at issue. See Md. Code Regs.
12.02.28.05(D)(1) (2025) (requiring filing with the “managing official”); Md. Code Regs.
12.02.28.02(B)(14) (defining “managing official” as “the warden or other individual responsible
for the management of a correctional facility”); Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.09(B) (setting the 30-
day deadline). Second, if the ARP is denied, or the prisoner does not receive a timely response,
the prisoner must file an appeal with the Commissioner of Correction within 30 days. See Md.
Code Regs. 12.02.28.14(B)(5). If that appeal is denied, the prisoner must file a further appeal
within 30 days to the Incarcerated Individual Grievance Office (“IIGO”). See Md. Code Ann.,
Corr. Servs. § 10—206(a) (LexisNexis 2025); Md. Code Regs. 12.07.01.05(B).

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Administrative exhaustion must be proper. Proper exhaustion requires “using all steps that
the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)”
and “demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 93 (2006) (citation omitted). A prisoner thus must complete the
administrative review process “in accordance with the applicable procedural rules” of the prison
grievance system.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). A court, however, must “ensure that
any defects in [administrative] exhaustion were not procured from the action or inaction of prison
officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); see Kaba v. Stepp,
458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006).
Here, Defendants assert, based on declarations by relevant officials, that Nolan did not file
any ARPs between May 1, 2024 and June 1, 2025 relating to his requested accommodations for
his Odinist beliefs; that the Commissioner of Correction received no appeals from Nolan during
this time period; and that the IIGO received no grievances or appeals relating to these issues at all.
Defendants, however, do not claim that no ARPs relating to these issues were filed prior to
May 1, 2024. In fact, Nolan submitted ARPs relating to both Thor’s Hammer and the Yule feast.
On November 18, 2022, Nolan submitted ARP No. NBCI-2012-22 in which he complained that
he was not permitted to possess a Thor’s Hammer amulet, and that the prohibition violated the
First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA, and RLUIPA. Assistant Warden Arnold
denied the ARP on November 30, 2022. According to Nolan, on December 6, 2022, he submitted
an appeal of this decision to the Commissioner of Correction (“the Commissioner’), and he has
submitted a copy of that appeal with his brief. After he received no response to this appeal, Nolan
filed a further appeal to the ITIGO on January 10, 2023 in which he reported that he had submitted
the appeal to the Commissioner on or about December 5, 2022 but that the Commissioner had not

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responded to his appeal. Nolan submitted another appeal to the Commissioner on March 20, 2023
in which he stated that he had filed a first appeal on December 6, 2022. On May 4, 2023, Nolan
sent a letter to the Commissioner again stating that he had sent an appeal on December 6, 2022
and requested proof of receipt of that appeal to submit to the IGO. On May 12, 2023, the
Commissioner dismissed the second appeal as untimely. On August 28, 2023, the IIGO
administratively dismissed Nolan’s appeal on the grounds that he had not filed a timely appeal to
the Commissioner because his appeal was not submitted until March 20, 2023. On September 8,
2023, Nolan submitted a request for reconsideration to the IIGO, in which he again maintained
that he had submitted a timely appeal to the Commissioner on December 6, 2022. That request
was denied on November 13, 2023.
As for the Yule feast, on November 10, 2022, Nolan submitted ARP No. NBC-1975-22 in
which he asserted that he had been denied a proper ceremonial Yule meal with proper food in
violation of the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA. Assistant Warden
Arnold denied the ARP on November 21, 2022. According to Nolan, he submitted an appeal of
this decision to the Commissioner on December 5, 2022. When he received no response, Nolan
filed a further appeal to the IIGO on January 10, 2023 in which he reported that he had submitted
the appeal to the Commissioner on December 5 but that the Commissioner had not responded to
his appeal. On March 20, 2023, Nolan submitted a second appeal to the Commissioner, in which
he stated that he had previously filed an appeal on December 6, 2022. On May 4, 2023, Nolan
sent a letter to the Commissioner again stating that he had sent an appeal on December 6, 2022
and requested proof of receipt of that appeal to submit to the IIGO. On May 12, 2023, the
Commissioner dismissed the second appeal as untimely. On August 28, 2023, the IIGO
administratively dismissed Nolan’s appeal on the grounds that he had not filed a timely appeal to

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the Commissioner because his appeal was not submitted until March 20, 2023. On September 3,
2023, Nolan submitted a request for reconsideration to the IIGO, in which he again maintained
that he had submitted a timely appeal to the Commission on December 6, 2022. That request was
denied on November 13, 2023.
Thus, the record reflects that Nolan filed ARPs on both religious issues and pursued appeals
up to and including to the IGO. Although the I[GO dismissed the appeals on procedural grounds
based on the alleged failure to file timely appeals to the Commissioner, such that Nolan arguably
did not properly exhaust administrative remedies, Nolan has provided evidence that he, in fact,
submitted timely appeals to the Commissioner on or about December 6, 2022 but was thwarted
because the Commissioner did not process those appeals. Thus, at a minimum, there is a genuine
issue of material fact on whether Nolan properly exhausted the ARP process.
Finally, as to exhaustion of administrative remedies, Defendants further argue that Nolan
failed to complete a specific form, a Request to Amend Recognized Religious Practices and
Property form, as required by DPSCS policy to request a change to a prison religious practice such
as those relating to Thor’s Amulet or the Yule feast. Defendants have submitted a declaration from
Chaplain Atkinson stating that Nolan did not complete and submit this required form, as well as a
declaration stating that Nolan did not submit a written request to the WCI dietary department for
specific food items for the Yule feast. Defendants, however, have provided no legal authority
demonstrating that submission of these specific written requests is necessary to exhaust
administrative remedies under the PLRA. Where exhaustion of the ARP process is generally
sufficient to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, and where Nolan, at a minimum, has
demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact on whether he satisfied that requirement, the Court
will not grant Defendants’ Motion based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

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VI. RFRA
Defendants seek dismissal of the RFRA claim on the grounds that RFRA does not apply to
actions taken by state and local governments. RFRA provides that “Government shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability,” unless the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-1. The Supreme Court has held that RFRA may not be applied to the actions of state and
local governments. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 3571 (1997); Holt v. Hobbs, 574
U.S. 352, 357 (2015). Because Nolan’s claims relate to the actions of state prisons, the RFRA
claim must be dismissed.
Vil. First Amendment and RLUIPA
Defendants also seek dismissal or summary judgment on Nolan’s First Amendment and
RLUIPA claims. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I. In the
context of a free exercise claim by a prisoner, the plaintiff must show that (1) “he holds a sincere
religious belief’; and (2) “his religious practice has been substantially burdened by the prison
policy or practice.” Firewalker-Fields v. Lee, 58 F.4th 104, 114 (4th Cir. 2023). “A substantial
burden” is one that “either puts pressure on a person to change his religious beliefs or puts that
person to a choice between abandoning his religion or following his beliefs and losing some
government benefit.” Jd. If such a showing is made, the practice is nevertheless constitutional if
it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” /d. at 115. Whether a prison
regulation is reasonable under this standard requires consideration of four factors:
(1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and
the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are

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alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; (3)
the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards
and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally; and (4)
whether there are ready alternatives.
Id.
RLUIPA provides greater protection for religious exercise in a prison setting than is
required by the First Amendment by heightening the standard required to justify a policy or
practice that substantially burdens such religious exercise. See Ramirez v. Collier, 142 S. Ct. 1264,
1277 (2022). RLUIPA states in relevant part that:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution .. . even if the burden results from
a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that the
imposition of the burden on that person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc—
5(7)(A); Holt, 574 U.S. at 358. Under RLUIPA, a “substantial burden” on religious exercise has
the same meaning as under the Free Exercise Clause. Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir.
2006). The least-restrictive-means standard requires a showing that the government “lacks other
means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of
religion by the objecting party.” Holt, 574 U.S. at 364-65 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014)).
A. Thor’s Hammer
Nolan has alleged that a Thor’s Hammer amulet, to which Odinists pray, is central to his
belief system. Defendants do not provide a basis to contest this claim, but they argue that the ban

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on possession of a Thor’s Hammer amulet does not impose a substantial burden on Nolan’s
religious exercise because he is permitted to possess other religious items associated with Odinism.
For example, under the DPSCS Religious Services Manual, Nolan is permitted to possess Odinist
religious pendants featuring either the Helm of Awe, the World Tree, or Yggdrasill. See Mot. at
12-13, ECF No. 30-1; DPSCS Religious Services Manual, Mot. Ex. B at 114, ECF No. 30-3.
However, the presence of alternative means by which to observe sincerely held religious beliefs
does not necessarily demonstrate that there is no “substantial burden” from prohibiting a specific
means of religious practice, because “RLUIPA's ‘substantial burden’ inquiry asks whether the
government has substantially burdened religious exercise .. . not whether the RLUIPA claimant is
able to engage in other forms of religious exercise.” Holt, 574 U.S. at 361-62 (holding that other
opportunities to practice Islamic faith did not erase the substantial burden of requiring plaintiff to
shave his beard that his sincerely held religious belief required he maintain). At this early stage,
the record does not demonstrate conclusively that the availability of the permitted religious
pendants is sufficient to alleviate the substantial burden alleged by Nolan.
Although Nolan acknowledges that the DPSCS has justified the ban on Thor’s Hammer on
the grounds that it has been co-opted as a symbol of an STG, specifically, the Aryan Brotherhood,
he maintains that the ban is not necessary, for security reasons or otherwise, in part because that
gang is in decline in the Maryland area. At this stage, Defendants have provided no specific
argument or evidence supporting the position that the ban meets a compelling state interest based
on its use by an STG, or that the ban is the least restrictive means of doing so. Where these issues
are fact-based and the record is presently insufficient to allow for definitive conclusions, summary
judgment in favor of Defendants is not presently warranted. Rather, there are genuine issues of
material fact, including whether the failure to permit Thor’s Hammer in fact imposes a substantial

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burden, whether there is presently a security risk or some other government interest justifying the
ban, and whether the DPSCS policy is the least restrictive means to meet that interest. The Motion
will therefore be denied as to the RLUIPA claim relating to Thor’s Hammer.
As for the First Amendment claim, Defendants can prevail based on a showing that the
policy meets the lesser standard of being “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,”
which is determined in part by a showing that “there is a valid, rational connection between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.” Firewalker-
Fields, 58 F.4th at 115. Nevertheless, where Defendants have not actually advanced evidence in
support of the specific justification for the policy, and the record will necessarily be further
developed in relation to the RLUIPA claim, the Court finds that it is premature to dismiss this
claim.
B. Yule
As for his claim relating to Yule, Nolan has asserted that, as an Odinist, it is part of his
religious practice to celebrate Yule from December 20 to December 31 each year, including with
communal prayer each day of Yule, and with a Yule feast on December 31 featuring a menu
including pork, goat, or oxen, as well as a series of toasts and cakes. Although Maryland prisons
permit a Yule celebration on December 21 each year, NBCI and WCI provide the prison’s best
meal consisting of baked chicken, without any of the appropriate meats. On at least one occasion,
it did not allow for Odinists to eat together but instead required them to eat individually in their
cells.
Defendants do not directly contest Nolan’s claim that the failure to provide pork, goat, or
oxen for the Yule feast imposes a substantial burden on Nolan’s religious exercise. Indeed, the
DPSCS Religious Services Manual recognizes that Yule is a major Odinist celebration lasting 12

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days, that the Yule feast is held on December 21, and that pork, toasts, and cakes are important
parts of the celebration. Rather, they argue that the prisons are properly following the relevant
DPSCS policy, which provides that religions may have one major celebratory meal per year for
which they receive the prison’s best meal, which is typically chicken. Chaplain Lamp explained
this policy to Nolan in his March 5, 2020 letter. They also note that providing pork is not feasible
because the prison operates a pork-free kitchen in order to accommodate other religions, such as
Judaism and Islam. The DPSCS Religious Services Manual confirms that DPSCS prison kitchens
are pork-free and further states that prisoners “may not dictate the form in which the diet is
provided,” and that for special meals “approval and menu details are at the discretion of the
Managing Official or his/her designee.” DPSCS Religious Services Manual at 37. However, it
also states that for a ceremonial meal, a “facility’s operation shall strive to accommodate dietary
restrictions and considerations,” and that a “Managing Official may choose to prepare special
meals for holidays that may reflect religious observance.” Jd. Thus, it is not clear that no special
meal could be provided under DPSCS policies.
Even if Defendants are, in fact, adhering to DPSCS policies, such compliance does not
conclusively demonstrate that the policies comply with RLUIPA or the First Amendment.
Defendants do not articulate or provide evidence of the specific compelling government interest
served by failing to provide pork, goat, or oxen for the Yule feast, or that the general policy of
providing only the “best meal” is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. Moreover,
to the extent that Defendants may argue that providing religion-specific meals for the annual
religious celebration is infeasible, both Nolan and the WCI Correctional Dietary Manager have
provided charts showing that at least two religious groups, specifically Jewish and Native
American groups, in fact receive special meals on their holidays instead of the general chicken

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meal. The Court therefore cannot readily conclude that it is infeasible to provide a special meal
for the Yule feast.
Further, the explanation that pork cannot be provided because the prison kitchen is pork-
free in order to accommodate other religions does not alone justify the policy because it raises the
additional question of whether certain religions are favored over others, and it provides no
explanation for why the other meats are not provided. See Pauley on behalf of Asatru/Odinist
Faith Cmty. v. Samuels, No. 15-CV-158, 2019 WL 4600195, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2019)
(holding that where a prison provided beef and pork for a Yule feast, the failure also to provide
venison on one occasion did not substantially burden the plaintiffs’ religious exercise), aff'd, No.
19-3666, 2022 WL 1552125 (3d Cir. May 17, 2022); see infra part VIII. Thus, at this stage, and
based on the limited record available, there remain genuine issues of material fact on whether the
failure to provide the requested menu violates RLUIPA or the First Amendment, including as to
the importance of the specific menu items to the practice of Odinism; the feasibility and means of
providing special menu items for religious celebrations, both for other religions that currently
receive special celebratory meals and for Odinism if required; and the impact of doing so on the
penological objectives and needs. There also has been no showing as to the reasons that communal
prayer is not allowed throughout Yule. The Motion will therefore be denied as to these claims.
Cc, RLUIPA Damages
Defendants are correct, however, that RLUIPA does not authorize a claim for money
damages against government officials sued in either their official or individual capacities.
Rendelman vy. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2009). Therefore, Nolan’s only potential remedies
under RLUIPA are equitable. Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 496 n.5 (4th Cir. 2014). Any damages
claim under RLUIPA will therefore be dismissed.

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VIII. Equal Protection
Defendants also seek dismissal of Nolan’s equal protection claim, under which he argues
that other religions are treated more favorably than Odinism. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment generally requires the government to treat similarly situated people
alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To show
that equal protection rights were violated, a plaintiff “must first demonstrate that he has been
treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment
was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th
Cir. 2002) (quoting Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001)). Upon such a
showing, the court must “determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the
requisite level of scrutiny.” Jd. at 731 (quoting Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654). Religion is a suspect
class subject to heightened scrutiny. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(describing classifications based on religion as “inherently suspect distinctions”); Moore-King vy.
Cnty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 572 (4th Cir. 2013); Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277,
301 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Ashaheed v. Currington, 7 F.4th 1236, 1250 (10th Cir. 2021)
(concluding that equal protection claims relating to the deprivation of the right to free exercise of
religion warrant strict scrutiny).
Here, Nolan asserts that his right to equal protection of the law has been infringed because
similarly situated religions are treated more favorably than Odinism in relation to the issues in this
case. As to Thor’s Hammer, he asserts that symbols of other religions, such as crucifixes and star-
and-crescent symbols, which are symbols of Christianity and Islam, respectively, have been
adopted by gangs, but such items are not banned from Maryland prisons. He also asserts, as
reflected in WCI records, that certain other religions are treated more favorably in relation to

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celebratory meals, specifically Judaism and a Native American religion, because they receive
special meals tailored to their religious beliefs, while Odinism receives only a standard chicken
meal that does not comport with its religious tenets. He also appears to allege differential treatment
in that the failure to provide pork for the Yule feast is justified in part by the need to accommodate
other religions, including Judaism and Islam, which are thus treated more favorably.
Defendants have not provided any significant argument on this issue other than the
assertion that Nolan has not identified specific comparators who were treated more favorably.
Where Nolan has identified specific comparator groups, and this issue cannot fairly be resolved
on the present record, the Motion will be denied as to the equal protection claim.
IX. Maryland Declaration of Rights
Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantees “the liberty of the press ought
to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.” Md.
Const. art. 40. Because the Amended Complaint includes no allegations to support a claim that
Nolan’s freedom of speech has been abridged, this claim will be dismissed.
X. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Nolan’s claim that Defendants’ failure to accommodate his religious practices violates
Articles 8, 18, and 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a cognizable cause of
action. See Sosa v, Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004) (concluding that the Declaration
does not “create obligations enforceable in the federal courts”). This claim will be dismissed.
XI. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also seek dismissal based on qualified immunity. Government officials sued
in their individual capacities may invoke qualified immunity. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 391

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(4th Cir. 2013). “Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages in a § 1983
action insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178
F.3d 231, 250 (4th Cir. 1999)). To overcome an assertion of qualified immunity from a § 1983
claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) the government official violated a federally protected right of
the plaintiff; and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct, in that
a “reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Jd.
At the outset, the Court notes that Defendants’ qualified immunity argument does not apply
to Nolan’s claims under RLUIPA, because as discussed above, RLUIPA does not allow for
damages claims against state officials sued in either their official or individual capacity. See supra
part VII.C.; Rendelman, 569 F.3d at 184. The RLUIPA claim, for which injunctive relief is the
available remedy, therefore necessarily remains in the case. See Wall, 741 F.3d at 496 n.5.
The claims relevant to the issue of qualified immunity are the § 1983 claims alleging
violations of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause. As discussed above, the Court has found that, at a minimum, there are genuine
issues of material fact on whether Defendants violated the First Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment. See supra parts VII-VIII. Although Defendants argue that the rights at issue were
not clearly established, they have provided no specific argument demonstrating that position.
Though Nolan has not identified controlling authority or a consensus of persuasive authority
showing that the alleged free exercise and equal protection claims allege violations of clearly
established law, the Court notes that Nolan is self-represented and thus may not have been a
position to conduct a thorough analysis of relevant case law to address this question. Where
Defendants have not offered sufficient analysis on this point, the case will necessarily continue in

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light of the RLUIPA claim, and as discussed below, Nolan will have counsel appointed to address
that claim, the Court will decline to resolve the qualified immunity issue until Nolan’s counsel has
had the opportunity to address the legal aspect of this question. The Motion will therefore be
denied without prejudice on this issue.
XII. Appointment of Counsel
Nolan has also filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel in which he requests counsel
due to his inability to afford counsel, his lack of legal education, and the need to conduct
depositions and discovery in the next steps of this case. A federal district court, in its discretion,
may appoint counsel in a civil case when an indigent party presents exceptional circumstances. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); see Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975). Based upon a “fact
specific, two-part inquiry,” a court may find exceptional circumstances if it finds that (1) “the
plaintiff has a colorable claim”; and (2) “considering the claim's objective complexity and the
plaintiff's subjective abilities,” the plaintiff “lacks the capacity to present it.” Jenkins v. Woodard,
109 F.4th 242, 251 (4th Cir. 2024).
Here, as discussed above, Nolan has stated viable claims. Where the next step in the case
is discovery, the Court finds that as an incarcerated individual, Nolan lacks the ability to litigate
the case effectively going forward. Accordingly, the Court will grant the Motion and appoint
counsel to represent Nolan.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART in that it will be granted
as to the claims under RFRA, the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, and any claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacities, and
denied as to the remaining claims. Nolan’s Motion for Default Judgment will be DENIED, and
Nolan’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel will be GRANTED. A separate Order shall issue.

Date: March 27, 2026
THEODORE D. CHUAN
United States District Judé

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11317344. Public record. Not legal advice.