# Reyes-Medrano

> District Court, S.D. Texas · March 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11317339

## Case

- **Full name:** David Abisai Reyes-Medrano v. Investigator Lopez, City of Edinburg, Jorge Moreno, Sergeant Rodriguez, Daniel Pena, Orlando Garcia, Gustavo Villegas, Angela Villadares, Pablo Juarez, Doctors Hospital at Renaissance, Ltd.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** March 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

soutnern District or □□□□□
ENTERED
March 03, 2026
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MCALLEN DIVISION
DAVID ABISAI §
REYES-MEDRANO, §
Plaintiff, §
§
vs. § CIV. NO. 7:25-cv-00363
§
INVESTIGATOR LOPEZ, §
CITY OF EDINBURG, JORGE §
MORENO, SERGEANT RODRIGUEZ, §
DANIEL PENA, ORLANDO §
GARCIA, GUSTAVO VILLEGAS, §
ANGELA VILLADARES, §
PABLO JUAREZ, DOCTORS §
HOSPITAL AT RENAISSANCE, LTD. §
Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, David Abisai Reyes-Medrano, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint for violation of Civil Rights and Disability Discrimination
(“Complaint”) on July 22, 2025, against Defendants Investigator Lopez and the City of Edinburg.
(See Dkt. No. 2). On August 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed an addendum/amendment to the Complaint,
adding the following as defendants: Detective Orlando Garcia, Dr. Gustavo Villegas, M.D., Angela
Valladares, Juarez Pablo, Officer Daniel Pena, and Doctors Hospital at Renaissance, Ltd. (See
Dkt. No. 6). Plaintiff alleges various infractions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and Texas state law.
(Dkt. No. 2 at 3; Dkt. No. 6-1 at 3). This case was subsequently referred to the undersigned
magistrate judge for memorandum and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b) and LR
72.

After careful review of the record and relevant law, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's
Complaint be DISMISSED as outlined within this Memorandum. It is further recommended that
the Motion for Criminal Investigation (Dkt. No. 7), Motion for Service of Process (Dkt. No. 20),
Motion for ADA Accommodation (Dkt. No. 21), Motion for Liberal Construction of the Filings
(Dkt. No. 22), Motion for Special Appearance and Process Under an Alias (Dkt. No. 23), Motion
to Compel Discovery (Dkt. No. 24), Motion for Subpoena Duces Tecum (Dkt. No. 25), and Motion
to Consolidate Cases (Dkt. No. 26), all be DENIED as moot.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint

Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint on July 22, 2025.' (See Dkt. No. 2). Plaintiff claims
that, on or about May 17, 2023, he was “placed under police custody” for investigation purposes.
(id. at 3). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Investigator Lopez was assigned to Plaintiff’s case, and
despite Plaintiff being the victim, Defendant Lopez “refused to take his affidavit, failed to collect
witness statements, and ignored key facts that would support criminal charges.” (/d.). Plaintiff
claims he is a legally blind individual with medical needs, and that Defendant Lopez failed to
accommodate his needs while in custody. (/d.). Plaintiff asserts he was jailed overnight at the
Hidalgo County Jail without cause. (/d.). While an internal affairs complaint was allegedly filed
with Detective Orlando Garcia, Plaintiff never received a case number or follow-up, delaying any
probable investigation. (/d.). Plaintiff claims this “failure to investigate and advocate on behalf
of a disabled citizen directly contributed to delays in justice, harm to Plaintiff’s mental and physical

| Petitioner’s pro se petition is entitled to a more liberal construction than those drafted by practicing
attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420,
426-27 (5th Cir. 2011) (“It is the substance of the relief sought by a pro se pleading, not the label that the
petitioner has attached to it, that determines the true nature and operative effect of a [filing].”). Thus, the
Court reviews Plaintiff's filings in a more forgiving light.

health, and obstruction of Plaintiff’s rights under state and federal law.” (/d.). Plaintiff further
claims the City of Edinburg, through its agents and departments, failed to provide reasonable
disability accommodations under the ADA, failed to properly document or follow up on the
incident, and failed to investigate or protect Plaintiff’s civil and human rights as a victim of prior
offenses. (Dkt. No. 2-1 at 2). This has caused Plaintiff physical distress, vision-related worsening,
emotional trauma, fear of retaliation, anxiety, delayed access to justice in related investigations,
and financial hardship and prolonged suffering. (/d.). Thus, Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount
of $15,000,000.00. Ud).

B. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
On August 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed Addendum to Complaint. (See Dkt. No. 6). Therein,
Plaintiff reiterates that while in custody on May 17, 2023, Defendant Lopez failed to take
Plaintiff’s affidavit, ignored witness statements, and neglected Plaintiff's medical needs. (Dkt.
No. 6-1 at 2). Plaintiff then adds that on May 27, 2023, Sergeant Moreno used excessive force
“despite warnings about a known medical condition, causing permanent vision damages.” (/d.).
Plaintiff claims that, on multiple occasions, Sergeant Rodriguez and Officer Pena failed to respond
appropriately to complaints, mishandled or omitted police reports, and denied Plaintiff’s right to
service. (/d.).
Then, between 2021 and 2023, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Villegas fraudulently billed
Plaintiff’s insurance for medical services without resolution, harassed Plaintiff, and ignored his
medical needs. (Dkt. No. 6-1 at 2). Plaintiff claims Angela Valladares refused to allow
appointments, Juarez Pablo reported false statements to police which caused wrongful police
action against Plaintiff, and both the City of Edinburg and Doctors Hospital at Renaissance
“tolerated, covered up, and failed to discipline these actions, constituting a policy/custom under

Monell.” (/d. at 2-3). Plaintiff seeks economic damages for fraudulent billing, medical costs, and
lost income, non-economic damages for pain, suffering, emotional distress, and permanent
disability aggravation, and punitive damages for malicious and reckless disregard of rights. □□□□
at 3). Thus, Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $50,000,000.00, along with injunctive relief
requiring policy reforms, training, and accommodations and a criminal referral for white collar
crime, obstruction, and fraud. (/d.).
C. Hearing and Subsequent Filings
The Court held a status conference on September 26, 2025, discussing the status of the case
and advising Plaintiff that an amended complaint would be due by October 27, 2025. (See Dkt.
Entry, Dated September 26, 2025; see also Dkt. No. 17).2 Plaintiff failed to file an amended
complaint within the designated window. Thus, the Court held a second status conference on
December 5, 2025, providing Plaintiff with an additional extension to file an amended complaint
by December 12, 2025. (See Dkt. Entry, Dated December 5, 2025).
Plaintiff filed First Amended Complaint [sic] on December 9, 2025.7 (See Dkt. No. 19).
Therein, Plaintiff specifies his claims. On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff claims he was detained by
Edinburg Police while attempting to report an assault in which he was the victim, and Defendant
Lopez failed to record an affidavit, ignored evidence and witness accounts, and refused to
accommodate Plaintiff’s visual disability. (/d. at 3). Plaintiff asserts Sergeant Moreno used

Said order mooted the motion to file amended complaint filed on August 12, 2025. (See Dkt. No. 6).
* Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is the current live pleading and does not incorporate by reference any
of the prior filings. (See Dkt. No. 19); see King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (Sth Cir. 1994) (“An amended
complaint supersedes the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint
specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleading.) (citing Boelens v.
Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 508 (Sth Cir. 1985)). As such, the Original Complaint (Dkt. No. 2) and
subsequently filed addendum (Dkt. No. 6) are of no legal effect. However, in an abundance of caution, and
affording Plaintiff the benefit of liberal construction, the Court has reviewed the legitimacy of all pleadings
filed by Plaintiff. See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520; see also Hernandez, 630 F.3d at 426-27.

excessive force during a separate incident on May 27, 2023, which aggravated Plaintiff's visual
impairment. (/d.). Sergeant Rodriguez and Officer Pena neglected to file reports and denied
Plaintiff services despite repeated requests, and Detective Garcia failed to properly investigate
Internal Affairs complaints, contributing to the obstruction of justice. (/d.). Plaintiff suggests Dr.
Villegas engaged in fraudulent billing and failed to provide adequate care over multiple years,
Angela Valladares obstructed access to medical records and care, Juarez Pablo filed a false police
report against Plaintiff, and that the City of Edinburg and Doctors Hospital at Renaissance failed
to correct or supervise these acts, which fostered a pattern of abuse. (/d.).
Plaintiff additionally filed a slew of motions with the Court on the same day. Plaintiff filed
Motion for Service of Process by the United States Marshal (Dkt. No. 20), Motion for ADA
Reasonable Accommodation and for Procedural Safeguards for Disabled Pro Se Litigant (Dkt. No.
21), Plaintiff’s Motion for Liberal Construction of Pro Se Filings (Dkt. No. 22), Motion for Special
Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction and to Proceed Under the Alias “Don Doe” (Dkt. No. 23),
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery (Dkt. No. 24), Motion for Subpeona [sic] Duces Tecum
(Dkt. No. 25), and Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate Cases Pursuant to Rule 42(a) (Dkt. No. 26).
II. APPLICABLE LAW/ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), the Court must screen any complaint proceeding in
forma pauperis seeking relief against “a government entity, officer, or employee and dismiss the
complaint if the court determines it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.” Pacheco-Morales v. Belt, SA-23-CV-00417-JKP, 2023 WL 9105552, at *3 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 3, 2023); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring dismissal of a case filed IFP

where it is determined the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.).
An action is considered frivolous where “there is no arguable legal or factual basis for the
claim.” /d. (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). “A complaint lacks an arguable
basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges
the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716,
718 (Sth Cir. 1999) (quoting Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Sth Cir. 1998)). An action may
be considered factually frivolous “where the facts alleged are “fantastic or delusional scenarios’ or
the legal theory upon which a complaint relies is ‘indisputably meritless.’” Eason v. Thaler, 14
F.3d 8, 9 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28).
Analysis of claims under § 1915A(b)(1) and § 1915(e)(2)(B) directs the court to apply the
standards governing dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Pacheco-Morales, 2023 WL 9105552, at *3
(citing DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 152 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule
12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with the pleading standard set forth in Rule 8(a), which requires “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). “Thus, claims may be dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6) ‘on the basis of a dispositive issue of law[,]°” and also “if the complaint does
not contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.”” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (Sth Cir. 2019)
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326; Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 678). This plausibility standard does not
require detailed factual allegations. Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). However, a party’s “obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief? requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a

cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original). A claim
has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court, drawing upon its “judicial
experience and common sense[,]” to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556), 679. “But where the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—“‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Jd. at 679
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (alteration in original)).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 creates a private right of action for the deprivation of certain rights. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. To state a cause of action under § 1983, Plaintiff must (1) allege the Defendants violated
“a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) show “a person acting
under color of state law” committed the violation. Perdomo v. City of League City, 765 F.Supp.3d
613, 620 (S.D. Tex. 2025) (citing Petersen v. Johnson, 57 F.Ath 225, 231 (Sth Cir. 2023)).
However, in the context of § 1915A(b)(1) and § 1915(e)(2)(B), and, thus, Rule 12(b)(6),
the Court must determine whether the facts, taken as true, would overcome the defense of qualified
immunity. /d. (quoting Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (Sth Cir. 2012)). Qualified immunity
“shields officers from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” /d. (quoting
City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021)). Thus, to overcome qualified immunity, Plaintiff
must show (1) whether the facts alleged, taken as true, show a constitutional violation; and (2)
whether the right was clearly established in light of existing precedent. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.
7, 11-12 (2015).

For a law to be clearly established, Plaintiff “must be able to point to controlling
authority—or a robust consensus of persuasive authority—that defines the contours of the right in
question with a high degree of particularity.” Perdomo, 765 F.Supp.3d at 620 (quoting Hogan v.
Cunningham, 722 F.3d 725, 735 (5th Cir. 2013)). Simply put, qualified immunity protects “all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” /d. (quoting City of Tahlequah,
595 U.S. at 12).

3. Monell Municipal Liability
First, a municipality may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a theory of
respondeat superior. Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (Sth Cir. 2002). Rather,
municipalities may be held liable “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
capacity, inflicts the injury...” /d. (quoting Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978)). For Plaintiff to prove the municipality should be liable, he must show: (1) an official
policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive
knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose “moving force” is that policy (or custom). /d.
(citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (Sth Cir. 2001)).
Such an official policy may be “(1) a policy statement, ordinance, or regulation, or (2) ‘a
persistent, widespread practice of City officials or employees, which, although not authorized by
officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom
that fairly represents municipal policy.’” Holley v. Blomberg, 142 F.Supp.3d 517, 523 (S.D. Tex.
2015) (citing Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579). “The description of a policy or custom and its
relationship to the underlying constitutional violation, moreover, cannot be conclusory; it must

contain specific facts.” Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Dept, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir.
1997).

4, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
To make out a valid claim under Title I] of the ADA, Plaintiff must show (1) he is a
qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he was excluded from
participation or denied meaningful access to services, programs, and activities, or that he was
otherwise discriminated against by Defendants; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or
discrimination is by reason of his disability. Lathan y. Stevens, No. 2:16-cv-147, 2017 WL
7037704, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2017) (citing Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421,
428 (5th Cir. 1997)), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 497125 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 19,
2018).
For a failure-to-accommodate claim specifically, Plaintiff must show “(1) he is a qualified
individual with a disability; (2) the disability and its consequential limitations were known by the
covered entity; and (3) the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations.” K.R. ex rel.
Shannon vy. Cedar Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:25-cv-489-BN, 2025 WL 3265486, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 22, 2025) (citing Smith v. Harris County, 956 F.3d 311, 317 (Sth Cir. 2020)).

To show that the denial of services was “‘by reason of’ Plaintiff’s disability, Plaintiff must
show that the denial was intentional.” E.M. ex rel. Guerra v. San Benito Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
374 F.Supp.3d 616, 624 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (citing Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567,
574 (Sth Cir. 2002)). While the Fifth Circuit has not yet defined the intentionality requirement,
the cases that have touched on the issue have required something more than deliberate indifference.
v. Paley, 81 F.4th 440, 449-50 (Sth Cir. 2023) (citing Cadena v. El Paso County, 946 F.3d 717,
724 (5th Cir. 2020)). For a failure-to-accommodate claim, “intentional discrimination requires at

least actual knowledge that an accommodation is necessary.” Paley, 81 F.4th at 450 (citing Smith,
956 F.3d at 319). A plaintiff may “ordinarily satisfy the knowledge element by showing that they
identified their disabilities as well as the resulting limitations to a public entity or its employees
and requested an accommodation in direct and specific terms.” K.R. ex rel. Shannon, 2025 WL
3265486, at *5 (citing Smith, 956 F.3d at 317) (cleaned up). And, if Plaintiff “failfed] to request
an accommodation in this manner, he can prevail only by showing that the disability, resulting
limitation, and necessary reasonable accommodation were open, obvious, and apparent to the
entity’s relevant agents.” (cleaned up).

5. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance ...[.]
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Analysis under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act follows that of Title II of the ADA
above. “The RA is operationally identical to the ADA in that both statutes prohibit discrimination
against disabled persons; however, the ADA applies only to public entities while the RA applies to
any federally funded programs or activities, whether public or private.” Lathan, 2017 WL
7037704, at *3 (citing Borum v. Swisher County, No. 2:14-CV-127-J, 2015 WL 327508, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015)). As such, “[c]ourts utilize the same standards in analyzing claims under
both the ADA and RA.” /d. (citing Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 223 (Sth Cir. 2011)).
The main difference between Title I] of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA is the causation
requirement. “Section 504 requires that the plaintiff’s disability be the ‘sole reason’ for the

10

exclusion or denial of benefits, but the ADA’s standard is less stringent.” Paley, 81 F.4th at 449
(citing Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (Sth Cir. 2005)).

6. State Law Claims
Plaintiff brings various claims which appear to be based on Texas state law, including
medical fraud and billing violations, gross negligence, defamation and perjury, and corporate
liability under the theory of respondeat superior. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3-4).

When a federal court has original jurisdiction over a claim, the district court may also
extend supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are so related such that “they form part
of the same case or controversy.” Shields Doe v. Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:24-CV-171,
2025 WL 2625566, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2025) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367). However, the
district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). “So although
supplemental jurisdiction persists, the district court need not exercise it: Instead, the court may
(and indeed, ordinarily should) kick the case to state court.” /d. (quoting Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc.
v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 32 (2025)). As such, “the general rule [is] that ‘a court should decline
to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal-law claims are eliminated
before trial.’” Jd. (quoting Heggemeier v. Caldwell County, 826 F.3d 861, 872-73 (Sth Cir. 2016))
(alteration in original).
Accordingly, because the Court concludes that all of Plaintiff’s federal claims should be
dismissed, and in the absence of any other basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the District Court
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, regardless of
whether Plaintiff has stated a valid claim for relief. See Shields Doe, 2025 WL 2625566, at *11

11

(declining supplemental jurisdiction on state law claims where the court dismissed § 1983 and
ADA claims under Rule 12(b)(6)).
B. Plaintiff’s Claims
1. Investigator Lopez

Plaintiff claims on May 17, 2023, he was detained by Edinburg Police while attempting to
report an assault in which he was the victim. (Dkt. No. 19 at 2). Specifically, Plaintiff claims
Investigator Lopez “failed to record an affidavit, ignored evidence and witness accounts, and
refused to accommodate Plaintiff’s visual disability.” (/d. ).
Of Plaintiff’s various claims, this claim against Investigator Lopez actually contains an
offense date. However, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim in Texas is two years. See Ali
v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 439 (Sth Cir. 1990) (noting the applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983
claim in Texas is two years). Here, Plaintiff filed his application to proceed in forma pauperis on
June 27, 2025, which was subsequently granted on July 21, 2025, and followed by Plaintiff's
Complaint on July 22, 2025. (See Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Case No. 7:25-mc-
00142; see also Dkt. Nos. 1, 2). Thus, Plaintiffs claims fall just outside of the two-year statute of
limitations period and are time-barred.
Moreover, if Plaintiff seeks liability against Investigator Lopez for failing to investigate or
prosecute an individual, such claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because there is no
constitutional right to have another person investigated or prosecuted and should be dismissed.
See Morrison v. Dall. Cnty. Sex Trafficking Task Force, No. 3:23-CV-2046-N-BH, 2023 WL
9231399, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2023) (“Any claims for criminal investigation and prosecution
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL
150506 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2024); Lefebure v. D’Aquilla, 15 FAth 650, 657 (Sth Cir. 2021)

12

(“[V]ictims of crime do not have a cognizable interest in the investigation or prosecution of
others.”’).
Similarly, insofar as Plaintiff meant to bring claims against Investigator Lopez under Title
II of the ADA or the RA, such claims are not available against individual defendants. See Keith v.
Tex. Tech Med. Ctr., 2:24-CV-00010-Z-BR, 2024 WL 5112762, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2024)
(collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 5113192 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 13,
2024).
Accordingly, claims against Investigator Lopez should be dismissed.

2. City of Edinburg
Plaintiff claims the City of Edinburg failed to correct or supervise the acts of its employees,
which fostered a pattern of abuse. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).
First, Plaintiff fails to identify any custom or policy that could foster liability against the
City of Edinburg under Monell, nor does he make any attempt to do so. Plaintiff's complaints
appear to solely encompass the individual alleged acts of the City’s employees, and Plaintiff may
not hold the City of Edinburg vicariously liable based on the theory of respondeat superior under
Monell. See Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 316 (Sth Cir. 2018) (“A municipality cannot
be held liable under § 1983 ona theory of respondeat superior.”); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Thus,
Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Monell.

On the other hand, Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act do provide
for vicarious liability. See Paley, 81 F.4th at 449 (“[A] plaintiff need not identify an official policy
to sustain a claim against a public entity as it may be held vicariously liable for the acts of its
employees under either [the ADA or RA].”). Thus, Plaintiff could plausibly hold the City of

13

Edinburg liable under these provisions for the acts of the City’s employees. Nevertheless, Plaintiff
fails to state a claim under either provision.

First, Plaintiff claims Investigator Lopez failed to accommodate his visual disability. (Dkt.
No. 19 at 2). Second, Plaintiff claims Sergeant Rodriguez and Officer Pena denied Plaintiff
services despite repeated requests. (/d. at 3). Third, Plaintiff claims Angela Valladares obstructed
Plaintiff’s access to medical records and care, which Plaintiff argues violates ADA standards. (/d.
at 3).
At the preliminary level, Plaintiff's claims in general are simply insufficient to survive
dismissal. Plaintiff includes no details or facts that expand on the alleged ADA and RA violations.
This, alone, warrants dismissal. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting
that the Rule 8 pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.”).
However, even if sufficient facts were included in Plaintiff's pleadings, Plaintiff makes no
insinuation that he was “excluded from participation or denied meaningful access to services,
programs, or activities[.]” Lathan, 2017 WL 7037704, at *3. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to state a
claim because he is unable to show that he was denied such access to services because of his
disability. See Delano-Pyle, 302 F.3d at 574 (*A plaintiff asserting a private cause of action for
violations of the ADA or the RA may only recover compensatory damages upon a showing of
intentional discrimination.”’). Plaintiff makes no claim that he was denied any service because of
his disability, and this claim must fail.
Accordingly, claims against the City of Edinburg should be dismissed.

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3. Jorge Moreno

Plaintiff claims Sergeant Moreno “used excessive force during a separate incident on May
27, 2023, aggravating Plaintiffs visual impairment. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).
The Fifth Circuit has found that “the use of excessive force to apprehend a subject
implicates the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable seizures.” Colston v.
Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 1997). To make out a claim of excessive force, Plaintiff must
show: “(1) [an] injury (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly
excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” Walcotte v. Wicks, No.
C-08-323, 2009 WL 1373601, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 2009) (citing Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d
404, 416 (Sth Cir. 2007)). In considering whether an officer used excessive force, the court should
pay “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case[.]” Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Factors to be considered include “the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether
he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” /d. (citing Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)). Further, the reasonableness of the force “must be judged from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)).
At the outset, Plaintiff’s claims against Sergeant Moreno are impermissibly vague. While
Plaintiff asserts excessive force against Sergeant Moreno, Plaintiff does not identify any details to
the altercation whatsoever, other than utilizing the term “excessive force” and noting an offense
date. This will not suffice. See Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Aus., 836 F.3d 467, 469 (Sth Cir. 2016)
(“We take the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, but we do not credit
conclusory allegations or allegations that merely restate the legal elements of a claim.”).

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However, even if the Court could look past this fatal flaw, Plaintiff’s claim still fails, for
the same reason as the claim against Investigator Lopez (See supra Section II(B)(1)) because it is
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Ali, 892 F.2d at 439.
Accordingly, claims against Sergeant Moreno should be dismissed.

4, Sergeant Rodriguez
Plaintiff claims Sergeant Rodriguez neglected to file reports and denied Plaintiff services
despite repeated requests. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Sergeant Rodriguez are factually insufficient. Plaintiff does
not identify which reports he sought to file, which were neglected, or when this interaction
occurred. While Plaintiff is afforded the benefit of liberal construction, this is insufficient to
survive dismissal. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

Similarly, insofar as Plaintiff takes issue with the lack of reports filed in pursuit of criminal
investigation or prosecution, as noted, such claims are not actionable under § 1983 and must be
dismissed. See Morrison, 2023 WL 9231399, at *5; Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 657.
Finally, if Plaintiff intended on pursuing claims under Title II of the ADA or Section 504
of the RA against Sergeant Rodriguez, those provisions do not apply to individual defendants and
must be dismissed with regard to Sergeant Rodriguez. See Keith, 2024 WL 5112762, at *5.
Accordingly, claims against Sergeant Rodriguez should be dismissed.

5. Officer Daniel Pena
Plaintiff claims Officer Pena neglected to file reports and denied Plaintiff services despite
repeated requests. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Pena are factually insufficient. Plaintiff does not
identify which reports he sought to file, which were neglected, or when this interaction occurred.
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While Plaintiff is afforded the benefit of liberal construction, this is insufficient to survive
dismissal. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

Similarly, insofar as Plaintiff takes issue with the lack of reports filed in pursuit of criminal
investigation or prosecution, as noted, such claims are not actionable under § 1983 and must be
dismissed. See Morrison, 2023 WL 9231399, at *5; Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 657.
Finally, if Plaintiff intended on pursuing claims under Title II of the ADA or Section 504
of the RA against Officer Pena, those provisions do not apply to individual defendants and must
be dismissed with regard to Officer Pena. See Keith, 2024 WL 5112762, at *5.

Accordingly, claims against Officer Pena should be dismissed.
6. Detective Orlando Garcia
Plaintiff claims Detective Garcia failed to properly investigate Internal Affairs complaints
and contributed to the obstruction of justice. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).
These claims, too, are factually insufficient to pass muster. Plaintiff provides no details
regarding the failure to properly investigate, the subject matter of the investigation, or the date of
the incident. This claim may fail on this ground alone. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft,
556 U.S. at 678.
Even if the facts were sufficient, this claim fails under § 1983 because Plaintiff has no
constitutional right to investigate or prosecute another person. See Morrison, 2023 WL 9231399,
at *5; Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 657.
Accordingly, claims against Detective Orlando Garcia should be dismissed.

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7. Dr. Gustavo Villegas
Plaintiff claims Dr. Villegas “engaged in fraudulent billing and failed to provide adequate
care over a multi-year period.” (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).
At the outset, Plaintiff's claims against Dr. Gustavo Villegas are too vague to survive
dismissal. Plaintiff does not provide any specific details other than the generalized frustration with
billing and care over an extended period of time. This, again, will not suffice. See Chhim, 836
F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
Moreover, Plaintiff provides no details with regard to Dr. Gustavo Villegas that may allow
the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. (See supra Section II(A)(6)
(declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims).
Accordingly, claims against Dr. Gustavo Villegas should be dismissed.
8. Angela Valladares
Plaintiff claims Angela Valladares obstructed Plaintiff’s access to medical records and care,
which Plaintiff argues violates ADA standards. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).
The claims against Angela Valladares are factually insufficient as well. Plaintiff provides
no details regarding the alleged obstruction, when it occurred, nor how it falls under the scope of
Title II discrimination. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. This claim
must fail.
Further, Plaintiff provides no grounds for the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction
over this claim, and the Court recommends dismissal of state law claims. (See supra Section
II(A)(6) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims).

Finally, even if the claims could survive the pleading requirements, which they cannot, an
ADA claim is not available against an individual defendant. See Keith, 2024 WL 5112762, at *5.

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Accordingly, claims against Angela Valladares should be dismissed.
9. Juarez Pablo
Plaintiff claims Juarez Pablo filed a false police report against Plaintiff, which resulted in
adverse legal action. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).
This claim is factually insufficient. Plaintiff omits any details regarding this alleged
offense. Plaintiff does not include an offense date, what the context of the interaction was, or how
Juarez Pablo’s alleged police report was false. This claim must fail. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469;
see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
Similarly, while the Court recommends dismissal of any and all state law claims (See supra
Section II(A)(6) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims), to the
extent that Plaintiff seeks a claim of perjury, “neither federal nor state law provides a private cause
of action for such a claim.” Bey v. Delgado, No. 3:23-cv-00454-B-BT, 2023 WL 8262702, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 846253 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
27, 2024) (citing Graneto v. Humpert, No. 3:23-CV-76-G-BK, 2023 WL 1973231, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 17, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 1972008 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13,
2023)).
Accordingly, claims against Juarez Pablo should be dismissed.
10. | Doctors Hospital at Renaissance Ltd.

Plaintiff claims Doctors Hospital at Renaissance Ltd. failed to correct and supervise the
acts of its employees, which fostered a pattern of abuse. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3).

In following suit, Plaintiff’s claims against Doctors Hospital at Renaissance are
accompanied with no factual support. Plaintiff does not explain what acts of its employees should

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force liability, when they occurred, nor how they constituted a pattern of abuse. This simply will
not do. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469; see Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

Similarly, Plaintiff fails to identify grounds for subject matter jurisdiction over these
purported state law claims and the Court recommends dismissal of any state law claims. (See
supra Section II(A)(6) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims).
Accordingly, the claims against Doctors Hospital at Renaissance should be dismissed.

C. Additional Motions
1. Motion for Criminal Investigation
Plaintiff filed Motion for Criminal Investigation on August 12, 2025. (See Dkt. No. 7).
Therein, Plaintiff requests the Court refer this matter to the United States Department of Justice,
Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section; Federal Bureau of Investigation, White Collar Crime
Division (Houston Field Office); Texas Rangers, Public Integrity Unit; and Texas Attorney
General’s Office, Criminal Investigations Division. (/d. at 2).
As mentioned, Plaintiff does not have the right to have another individual criminal
investigated or prosecuted. See Morrison, 2023 WL 9231399, at *5; Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 657.
Regardless, because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, this Motion (Dkt.
No. 7) should be dismissed.
2. Motion for Service of Process by the United States Marshal

Plaintiff filed Motion for Service of Process by the United States Marshal on December 9,
2025. (See Dkt. No. 20). Therein, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order directing the United
States Marshals Service to serve the summons and complaint on the listed defendants in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. (/d. at 1).

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Because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No.
20) should be denied as moot.

3. Motion for ADA Reasonable Accommodation and_for Procedural
Safeguards for Disabled Pro Se Litigant
Plaintiff filed Motion for ADA Reasonable Accommodation and for Procedural Safeguards
for Disabled Pro Se Litigant on December 9, 2025. (See Dkt. No. 21). Plaintiff specifically
requests (1) authorization to correct any filings deficiencies arising from disability-related
limitations, like caption errors, formatting irregularities, or missing attachments; (2) procedural
flexibility allowing simplified pleadings, liberal construction, and accessibility assistance from the
Clerk’s Office as needed; (3) extensions of time under Rule 6(b) for any deadlines impacted by
Plaintiff’s disability and reduced access to transportation or assistive technology; and (4)
recognition that all pro se filings by Plaintiff shall be interpreted liberally. (/d. at 1-2).
While Plaintiff’s filings are afforded liberal construction, because the Court recommends
dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No. 21) should be denied as moot.

4. Motion for Liberal Construction of Pro Se Filings
Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Motion for Liberal Construction of Pro Se Filings on December 9,
2025. (See Dkt. No. 22). Therein, Plaintiff, again, requests that his filings be interpreted with the
liberal construction standard established by the Supreme Court and federal statutes. (/d. at 4).
As noted, Plaintiff’s filings are interpreted using liberal construction; however, because the
Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No. 22) should be denied
as moot.

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5. Motion for Special Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction and to Proceed
Under the Alias “Don Doe”
Plaintiff filed Motion for Special Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction and to Proceed
Under the Alias “Don Doe” on December 9, 2025. (See Dkt. No. 23). Plaintiff specifically
requests the Court (1) permit a special appearance solely to challenge personal jurisdiction; and
(2) allow Plaintiff to proceed under the alias “Don Doe” due to compelling privacy and safety
concerns. (/d. at 1-2).
Though curious minds may wonder why Plaintiff seeks to challenge the personal
jurisdiction of the Court in a case he initiated himself, the Court ultimately recommends dismissal
of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and this Motion (Dkt. No. 23) should be denied as moot.
6. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery
Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery on December 9, 2025. (See Dkt.
No. 24). Therein, Plaintiff claims the Defendants have engaged in unlawful investigative practices
and/or failed to provide adequate disclosures relevant to this matter, including but not limited to
investigative files, reports, and records. (/d. at 2). Thus, Plaintiff seeks an order compelling full
production of such materials. (/d.).
Because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No.
24) should be denied as moot.
7. Motion for Subpoena Duces Tecum
Plaintiff filed Motion for Subpeona [sic] Duces Tecum on December 9, 2025. (See Dkt.
No. 25). Therein, Plaintiff appears to inadvertently request records from the Pharr Police
Department, the subject of separate litigation initiated by Plaintiff (Cause No. 7:25-cv-00362). (dd.
at 1). Plaintiff then requests production of reports, body/dash cam footage, and “other materials

22

identified in Plaintiff's exhibit list, relevant to claims of officer misconduct, neglect, and civil
rights violations[,]” from the Edinburg Police Department. (/d.).
Because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No.
25) should be denied as moot.
8. Motion to Consolidate Cases Pursuant to Rule 42(a)

Finally, Plaintiff filed Motion to Consolidate Cases Pursuant to Rule 42(a) on December 9,
2025. (See Dkt. No. 26). Plaintiff seeks to consolidate this Action (Cause No. 7:25-cv-00363)
with Civil Action No. 7:25-cv-00362, claiming they arise from the same operative facts, involve
common legal issues, and seek similar relief under federal civil rights statutes. (/d. at 2).
Because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No.
26) should be denied as moot.

Il. CONCLUSION
Recommended Disposition
After careful review of the filings and relevant case law, and for reasons outlined above, it
is recommended that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED as follows:
(1) Plaintiff’s claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be DISMISSED with
prejudice for failure to state a claim;
(2) Plaintiff’s claims brought against the municipality under Monel] should be
DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim;
(3) Plaintiff’s claims brought under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA should
be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim; and

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(4) Any and all claims brought under Texas state law should be DISMISSED without
prejudice.’

It is further recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Criminal Investigation (Dkt. No. 7),
Motion for Service of Process (Dkt. No. 20), Motion for ADA Accommodation (Dkt. No. 21),
Motion for Liberal Construction of the Filings (Dkt. No. 22), Motion for Special Appearance and
Process Under an Alias (Dkt. No. 23), Motion to Compel Discovery (Dkt. No. 24), Motion for
Subpoena Duces Tecum (Dkt. No. 25), and Motion to Consolidate cases (Dkt. No. 26), all be
DENIED as moot.
It is further recommended that the matter be closed.
Notice to the Parties
Within 14 days after being served a copy of this report, a party may serve and file specific,
written objections to the proposed recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b). The district judge to whom this case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon
the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge’s disposition to
which specific written objection has been made. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify
the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate
judge with instructions.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained
in this report within 14 days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from de novo review by the
District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations and from appellate review of factual

* See Lucky Tunes #3, L.L.C. v. Smith, 812 F. App’x 176, 184 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding that state law claims
dismissed where district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should have been dismissed
without prejudice); Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 246 (Sth Cir. 1999) (concluding that such claims
“should expressly be without prejudice so that the plaintiff may refile his claims in the appropriate state
court.”).
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findings accepted or adopted by the District Court, except on grounds of plain error or manifest
injustice. See Douglas v. United Serv. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en
banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Clerk shall also provide a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and Counsel for Defendants.
DONE at McAllen, Texas, this 3rd day of March 2026.

Juan F, Alanis
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11317339. Public record. Not legal advice.