# WILSON-LOVE

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · April 21, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11315773

## Case

- **Full name:** Candace Wilson-Love As executrix of the estate of William Martin Love, deceased and as Next Friend of C.W., K.L., and T.L., minors v. Dealer's Choice Truckaway System INC. d/b/a TRUCK MOVERS, STEVEN BURKE, DAIMLER TRUCK NORTH AMERICA LLC
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** April 21, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11315773

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

CANDACE WILSON-LOVE As executrix of the )
estate of William Martin Love, deceased and as )
Next Friend of C.W., K.L., and T.L., minors, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:24-cv-01084-SEB-TAB
)
DEALER'S CHOICE TRUCKAWAY SYSTEM )
INC. d/b/a TRUCK MOVERS, )
STEVEN BURKE, )
DAIMLER TRUCK NORTH AMERICA LLC, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
Plaintiff Candace Wilson-Love, executrix of the estate of William Martin Love
("Mr. Love") and next of friend of C.W., K.L., and T.L., brought this wrongful death action
against Defendants Dealer's Choice Truckaway System Inc. d/b/a TruckMovers ("Truck-
Movers"); Steven Burke ("Mr. Burke"); and Daimler Truck North America LLC ("Daim-
ler") (collectively, "Defendants"), asserting that Defendants' negligence was a proximate
cause in a single-vehicle pedestrian collision that resulted in Mr. Love's death.1 (We shall
refer to Plaintiff as the "Estate" without distinguishing between the decedent and the estate
and/or personal representative unless specified otherwise.)

1 A fourth Defendant, J.B. Hunt Transport, was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on June
27, 2025. Dkt. 96.
Now before the Court are the following motions: TruckMovers's (first) Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, dkt. 97; Daimler's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, dkt.

103; and TruckMovers's (second) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, dkt. 139. As de-
scribed in greater detail below, these motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may
move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Much "[l]ike Rule 12(b) mo-

tions, courts grant Rule 12(c) motions only if 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief.' " N. Indiana Gun & Outdoor
Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Craigs, Inc. v.
Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1993)). The moving party must, therefore,
"demonstrate that there are no material issues of fact to be resolved." Id.

In reviewing "the complaint, the answer, and any written instruments attached as
exhibits," we must take the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.;
e.g., Unite Here Local 1 v. Hyatt Corp., 862 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 2017). Likewise, a
"complaint need not identify a legal theory, and specifying an incorrect theory is not fatal."
Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992). In the interests

of construing the pleading "so as to do justice," as directed by Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 8(e), we must "disregard labels and treat pleadings for what they are." Lengacher v.
Wayne, No. 3:23-cv-547 DRL-MGG, 2024 WL 728050, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 22, 2024)
(quoting United States v. Griffin, 782 F.2d 1393, 1399 (7th Cir. 1986)).
BACKGROUND
The following averments are drawn from the Estate's Second Amended Complaint

(the "SAC"), dkt. 66, which we accept as true for purposes of ruling on the instant motions
for judgment on the pleadings. Bielanksi v. Cnty. of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008).
I. Factual Background
Defendants are each involved in the domestic trucking industry. TruckMovers is an
interstate motor carrier that transports goods to customers across the United States. At all
relevant times, Mr. Burke was employed by TruckMovers as a commercial driver. Daimler

is a shipper who, in this case, selected TruckMovers to transport its (then) recently pur-
chased 2020 Cascadia Freightliner tractor (the "tractor") to a designated location across
state lines.
The SAC avers that, on September 14, 2023, at approximately 9:50 p.m., Mr. Burke
was operating the tractor (owned by Daimler) in a residential area of Indianapolis, Indiana.

As Mr. Burke approached a stop sign at the intersection of North Centennial Street and
West 10th Street, he allegedly failed to come to a complete stop before executing a left
turn. In so doing, the tractor collided with Mr. Love as he was crossing on foot through the
intersection. Mr. Love's injuries proved fatal, resulting in his tragic and untimely death.
The Estate alleges, and TruckMovers admits, that Mr. Burke was acting within the scope

of his employment at the time of the collision. The Estate also alleges that, at the time of
the accident, Mr. Burke was unlawfully operating the tractor in a residential area while
under the influence of cocaine, in violation of state and local law.
II. Procedural History
On May 22, 2024, the Estate filed this wrongful death action against Defendants in

state court. Shortly thereafter, on June 26, 2024, Defendants removed it to federal court on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See dkts. 313, 314 (confirming complete diversity of
citizenship). The SAC consists of seven counts, reflecting myriad legal theories against
varying subsets of Defendants, including negligence, negligence per se, vicarious liability,
and joint enterprise. Dkt. 66. The Estate seeks damages for pecuniary losses, loss of com-
panionship, physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, physical impairment, lost wages,

and loss of inheritance.
On June 27, 2025, TruckMovers moved for judgment on the pleadings, seeking the
dismissal of all direct negligence and joint enterprise claims as well as the Estate's "claims"
for damages relating to physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, and physical impair-
ment. Dkt. 97. On July 16, 2025, Daimler moved for judgment on the pleadings on the

basis that the Estate's state-law claims are preempted by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion Authorization Act (the "FAAAA"), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Dkt. 103. Several months
later, TruckMovers filed a second motion for judgment on the pleadings, this time arguing
that the Estate failed to plead facts to support relief under Indiana's wrongful death statutes.
Dkt. 139. Although Mr. Burke has not individually moved for judgment on the pleadings,

he has joined TruckMovers's motions and supporting briefs in certain limited respects,
which we shall note below as relevant. Dkt. 102, 206. TruckMovers's two motions and
Daimler's motion for judgment on the pleadings are fully briefed and ripe for ruling.
During the pendency of these motions for judgment on the pleadings, TruckMovers
and Daimler, respectively, have also moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 141, 146. (Nota-

bly, Truckmovers moved for summary judgment on the same day that it filed its second
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 141.) Additionally, the parties have filed eleven
separate motions to exclude expert witnesses as well as several motions to strike. We shall
not resolve all of these motions in this order; they will be resolved in due course.
DISCUSSION
The parties' substantive arguments are analyzed below in the context of TruckMov-

ers's and Daimler's motions for judgment on the pleadings.
I. TruckMovers's First Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
TruckMovers argues that: (1) all direct negligence claims fail as a matter of Indiana
law because it has admitted that Mr. Burke was acting within the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the accident; (2) the "joint enterprise" claim fails as a matter of

Indiana law; and (3) Indiana's wrongful death statutes foreclose the availability of damages
for physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, and physical impairment. Mr. Burke has
joined TruckMovers's motions as to the second and third arguments. Dkt. 102. We turn to
each challenged aspect of the SAC seriatim.
A. Direct Negligence Claims against TruckMovers

The SAC identifies various theories of liability against TruckMovers, including vi-
carious liability (based upon Mr. Burke's alleged negligence) and direct negligence (based
upon TruckMovers's own negligence in hiring, training, and supervising Mr. Burke). Vi-
carious liability, on one hand, imputes responsibility to an employer for an employee's
negligent conduct that occurs within the scope of employment. Cmty. Health Network, Inc.
v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368, 377 (Ind. 2022). Direct forms of liability, on the other hand,

arise when an employee's negligent conduct occurs outside the scope of employment. Id.
Pursuant to either theory, "the plaintiff seeks the same result—employer liability—and re-
covery is based on the same negligent act—the employee's." Sedam v. 2JR Pizza Enters.,
LLC, 84 N.E.3d 1174, 1178 (Ind. 2017) (citing Tindall v. Enderele, 320 N.E.2d 764, 768
(Ind. Ct. App. 1974)). "[W]hen an employer admits that an employee was acting within the
course and scope of his or her employment, absent special circumstances, negligent hiring

claims are precluded," id. at 1179, because "[p]roof of additional elements of negligent
hiring . . . would not be relevant to the issues in dispute, would be wasteful of the court's
time, and may be unnecessarily confusing to the jury." Levinson v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of
Evansville, 644 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
Relying on these principles of Indiana law, TruckMovers contends that the Estate's

direct negligence claims (i.e., for negligent hiring, training, supervision, retention, and/or
entrustment) must be dismissed because TruckMovers has admitted that Mr. Burke was
acting within the scope of his employment. TruckMovers's Am. Answer ¶ 10, dkt. 85. A
straightforward application of well-established Indiana law compels us to agree that Truck-
Movers's admission concerning the scope of Mr. Burke's employment requires the dismis-

sal of the Estate's direct negligence claims. The Estate raises several arguments to the con-
trary, though none is availing.
First, the Estate asserts that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d) permits alternative
pleading, regardless of consistency. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)–(3). Notwithstanding the
permissibility of alternative pleading, however, the Indiana Supreme Court has clearly ex-
plained that a negligent hiring theory "is of no value where," as here, "an employer has

stipulated that [its] employee was within the scope of his employment. The doctrine of
respondeat superior provides the proper vehicle for a direct action aimed at recovering the
damages resulting from a specific act of negligence committed by an employee within the
scope of his employment." Tindall, 320 N.E.2d at 768.
Next, the Estate contends that its direct liability claims need not be dismissed be-
cause TruckMovers has admitted only that Mr. Burke's conduct occurred within the course

and scope of his employment—not that Mr. Burke's conduct amounted to negligence for
which TruckMovers is vicariously liable. (Notably, TruckMovers does agree that, if Mr.
Burke "is found negligent, [it] would be vicariously liable." Dkt. 106 at 4.) Because Mr.
Burke's underlying negligence has not yet been conclusively established, the Estate argues,
dismissal of its direct negligence claims is premature. Indiana law requires no such admis-

sion, however. Indiana law is clear: "When an employer admits that an employee was act-
ing within the course and scope of his or her employment, the employer may only be held
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and thus the plaintiff is precluded from
also bringing a negligent hiring claim in most circumstances." Sedam, 84 N.E.3d at 1175–
76. Accordingly, that the Estate's negligence claim against Mr. Burke remains pending does

not, as a matter of law, preclude the dismissal of the Estate's direct negligence claims
against his employer, TruckMovers.
As noted above, a plaintiff might be permitted to proceed under both vicarious and
direct theories of liability in "special circumstances," such as "when an employee commits
an intentional tort, [when] an employee is incapable of being negligent, . . . when an em-
ployer is a charitable institution," or when a plaintiff seeks punitive damages. Id. at 1177

n.3 (citing Lange v. B & P Motor Exp., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 319, 323 (N.D. Ind. 1966); Tin-
dall, 320 N.E.2d at 768). Here, the Estate asserts that special circumstances exist prevent-
ing the dismissal of its direct negligence claims, because the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (the "FMCSRs") "set a federal floor for motor carrier safety, [and] any state
rule that would prevent juries from considering a carrier's independent negligence is
preempted and unenforceable." Dkt. 100 at 5. According to the Estate, the FMCSRs impose

nondelegable duties that federal motor carriers, like TruckMovers, cannot evade simply by
admitting that its employee's alleged negligence occurred within the scope and course of
his employment.
The FMSCRs, at most, supply an alternative basis for establishing TruckMovers's
direct negligence. Indeed, according to the Estate, the FMSCRs require motor carriers to

"ensur[e] driver qualifications, training, regulatory compliance," and the like, all of which
overlaps with the Estate's theories that TruckMovers acted negligently in hiring, training,
and supervising Mr. Burke. That the FMSCRs might supply an additional avenue through
which to impose direct liability upon TruckMovers does not, however, undermine the ra-
tionale for the dismissal of redundant direct negligence claims against an employer who

has conceded the scope-of-employment element of vicarious liability.
The Estate's final argument is that its negligent entrustment claim need not be dis-
missed because resolution of that claim does not depend upon the existence (or nonexist-
ence) of an employment relationship. Dkt. 100 at 6. Negligent entrustment claims hinge
upon "the supplying of [ ] chattel for probable negligent use." Johnson v. Patterson, 570
N.E.2d 93, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). A person may be liable to another when an "instrument

is entrusted to one who is incompetent or irresponsible or who lacks the capacity to safely
use or operate the instrumentality." Id. As noted by the federal district court on our sister
jurisdiction, "[n]egligent entrustment claims are generally not brought against a defendant
employer, as 'respondeat superior provides the proper vehicle for a direct action aimed at
recovering the damages resulting from a specific act of negligence committed by an em-
ployee within the scope of his employment.' " Davis v. Macey, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1112

(N.D. Ind. 2012) (quoting Tindall, 320 N.E.2d at 768). Where, as here, the employer has
conceded that its employee was acting within the scope of his employment, "the employer
is already responsible for the negligent acts of the employee[,] and any additional theory
of liability under negligent entrustment [is] unnecessary," duplicative, and potentially prej-
udicial. Id. For these reasons, the Estate's negligent entrustment claim against TruckMovers

fails as a matter of Indiana law and shall be dismissed accordingly.
TruckMovers's first motion for judgment on the pleadings shall therefore be
granted with respect to the Estate's direct negligence claims.
B. Joint Enterprise Liability
In Count VII of the SAC, the Estate avers as follows:

In addition or alternatively to the foregoing, Truck Movers, Daimler and
Burke, or any combination thereof, operated as a joint venture or joint enter-
prise where there were various agreements, whether express or implied,
among the entities and/or individuals, a common pecuniary interest, and var-
ious contractual and/or actual rights of control over the enterprise. Each of
these defendants contributed resources and/or skills to achieve the common
purpose of transporting goods in interstate commerce. Accordingly, each of
these Defendants are [sic] liable for all negligence and negligence per se
herein under a theory of joint venture or joint enterprise as a result of the
negligent acts and/or omissions alleged in this Complaint.

SAC ¶ 88, dkt. 66.
TruckMovers seeks the dismissal of the Estate's "joint enterprise" claim on three
grounds. First, TruckMovers argues, the doctrine of joint enterprise is entirely inapplicable
to the facts of this case, since the doctrine pertains to situations in which the negligence of
a driver can be imputed to the passenger—not to situations where a plaintiff is attempting
to make all defendants liable for the conduct of one defendant. Second, according to Truck-
Movers, the Estate's invocation of joint enterprise liability reflects an attempt to impose
joint and several liability upon Defendants, in contravention of Indiana's Comparative Fault
Act, which requires damages to be allocated among responsible parties according to their
degree of fault. See Ind. Code § 34-51-2-1 et seq. Third, to the extent that the Estate's joint
enterprise averments pass legal muster, TruckMovers asserts that they are unfairly cumu-

lative and should be dismissed as such. The Estate responds that TruckMovers has "misap-
plied the applicable law" in its motion and contends that its allegations of a "joint venture"
(as an alternative to "joint enterprise") should proceed as pleaded. Dkt. 100 at 6–7.
A joint enterprise exists where the parties share joint control over the management,
operation, course, and conduct of their activity; joint financial interest in their activity; an

equal right to direct and govern each other's movements; and an express or implied agree-
ment regarding that activity. See, e.g., Benson v. Sorrell, 627 N.E.2d 866, 868–69 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994); McKinney v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Indiana, 597 N.E.2d 1001, 1009 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992) (outlining the elements of a "joint venture" and noting that "at least one jurist . . . has
advocated the abandonment of the doctrine of imputed negligence in view of his state's
adoption of comparative fault"). Similarly, "[i]n a joint venture, the parties must be bound

by an express or implied contract providing for (1) a community of interest, and (2) joint
mutual control" as well as a profit-sharing agreement. Linares v. El Tacarajo, 119 N.E.3d
591, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citation modified). Indiana courts describe "the doctrine of
imputed negligence through joint enterprise" as "limited to actions against a third party, [ ]
where an injured passenger may have his own recovery against a third party diminished or
defeated because of negligence on the part of his own driver with whom he is engaged in

a joint enterprise. Gilmer v. Carney, 608 N.E.2d 709, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
Given the overlapping legal elements between joint "enterprises" and "ventures," it
is not entirely clear to us how one theory of liability is necessarily an "alternative" to the
other, as alleged by the Estate. In any event, whether a joint venture exists such that one
defendant's liability may be imputed to another2 is ultimately a question of fact, which we

are not prepared to resolve on the basis of the pleadings alone. See DLZ Indiana, LLC v.
Greene Cnty., 902 N.E.2d 323, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Although we agree with Truck-
Movers that the Estate will not be entitled to "double recovery," we find that TruckMovers's
request for the dismissal of the Estate's joint enterprise/venture claim is premature. Thus,
TruckMovers's motion shall be denied.

2 Of course, the possibility that TruckMovers is vicariously liable for Mr. Burke's negligence is
itself a form of imputed liability under Indiana law. See Dugan v. Stucker, 262 N.E.3d 851 (Ind.
Ct. App.), trans. denied, 267 N.E.3d 979 (Ind. 2025) (unpublished).
C. Damages for Physical Pain and Suffering, Mental Anguish, & Physical
Impairment

TruckMovers seeks the dismissal of the Estate's "damages claims" for physical pain
and suffering, mental anguish, and physical impairment on the basis that Indiana's wrongful
death statutes do not permit such remedies. "Because wrongful death actions are purely
creatures of statute, they are strictly construed." Ed Wiersma Trucking Co. v. Pfaff, 643
N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), opinion adopted, 678 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. 1997). Indi-
ana law is clear that "[o]nly those damages prescribed by the applicable wrongful death
statute are recoverable . . . ." Edna Martin Christian Ctr., Inc. v. Smith, 202 N.E.3d 1118,
1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).
Here, the SAC enumerates several categories of damages allegedly caused by De-

fendants' negligence. SAC ¶ 90, dkt. 66. However, prayers for relief do not constitute in-
dependent "claims" subject to dismissal on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See,
e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Sis-Bro Inc., No. 24-cv-968-JPG, 2024 WL
3845359, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2024) (denying motion to dismiss requests for damages
because "[m]otions to dismiss . . . are for claims, not prayers for relief") (emphasis in orig-

inal). Accordingly, TruckMovers's request for the dismissal of the Estate's "damages
claims" shall be denied with the caveat that the Estate's damages, if any, are necessarily
limited to those allowed by Indiana law.
II. Daimler's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Daimler's motion seeks the dismissal of the Estate's negligence claims against it

(including negligence, negligence per se, negligent selection, vicarious liability, and joint
enterprise) on the grounds of express preemption. Insofar as express preemption does not
impel the dismissal of all claims against it, Daimler argues, the Estate's negligent selection

and joint enterprise claims as well as of any requests for damages that are not permitted
under Indiana law must be dismissed.
At the outset, we can quickly dispose of Daimler's argument relating to allegedly
unrecoverable damages for the same reasons outlined above: to wit, a prayer for relief is
not a standalone claim subject to dismissal. We address Daimler's remaining arguments
below.

A. Express Preemption under the FAAAA
"The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution establishes a rule of decision precluding
courts from 'giv[ing] effect to state laws that conflict with federal laws.' " Nationwide
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Illinois Com. Comm'n, 784 F.3d 367, 372 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324 (2015)). "Of the three recog-

nized types of preemption, it is express preemption that is at issue in this case, as the
FAAAA states explicitly what states may and may not do with respect to motor carriers of
property." Id. at 372–73 (citation modified). Our task, therefore, "is one of statutory con-
struction," as we must determine whether the Estate's claims against Daimler fall within
the ambit of the FAAAA, or whether any of the FAAAA's exceptions apply. Ye v. Global-

Tranz Enters., Inc., 74 F.4th 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2023).
Congress enacted the FAAAA in 1994 "as part of a greater push to deregulate inter-
state transportation industries" based on its "finding that state governance of intrastate
transportation of property had become unreasonably burdensome to free trade, interstate
commerce, and American consumers." Id. (quoting Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,
569 U.S. 251, 256 (2013)) (citation modified). To effectuate this goal, the FAAAA bars

"burdensome state regulations." Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1)).
In this case, Daimler invokes the express preemption provision under § 14501(c),
which addresses "Motor Carrier of Property." Section 14501(c)(1) provides that states
"may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect
of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . or any motor private
carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property." 49

U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
"Several exceptions then follow," Ye, 74 F.4th at 457, though only one, the "safety
exception," is relevant to the case at bar. Under the safety exception, § 14501(c)(1)
shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to mo-
tor vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or lim-
itations based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous
nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with
regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance
requirements and self-insurance authorization.

Id. § 14501(c)(2)(A). Altogether, §§ 14501(c)(1) and 14501(c)(2)(A) reveal "the overarch-
ing statutory structure: Congress broadly disallowed state laws that impede its deregulatory
goals, but it made a specific carveout for laws within a state's 'safety regulatory author-
ity . . . with respect to motor vehicles,' even though such laws may burden interstate com-
merce." Ye, 74 F.4th at 458.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we address whether the Estate's negligence
claims against Daimler fall within the scope of the FAAAA's express preemption provision
prohibiting the enforcement of state laws "related to a . . . service of any motor carrier . . .
with respect to the transportation of property." 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). If so, our next step

is to determine whether the safety exception applies.
Before conducting these inquiries, we briefly note that, although Daimler seeks the
dismissal of the Estate's negligence claims in their entirety, the delineation among the Es-
tate's various theories is not entirely clear to us nor whether the preemption rationale rele-
vant to negligent selection (and/or hiring) claims is directly applicable to claims of imputed
liability (e.g., vicarious liability and joint enterprise). This lack of clarity in the parties'

arguments requires us to focus principally on the Estate's negligent selection claim, as the
(binding) legal authorities cited by the parties and referenced herein provide direct guid-
ance only as to this specific theory.
The Estate's contention that a preemption analysis is premature at this stage of the
litigation due to the lack of factual development can be disposed of without difficulty.

Courts in our circuit (and beyond) routinely decide FAAAA preemption on motions for
judgment on the pleadings, and the Seventh Circuit itself has affirmed those determinations
on more than one occasion. E.g., Ye, 74 F.4th 457; Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC,
124 F.4th 1053, 1055 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 146 S. Ct. 79 (2025). The Estate's argument
in favor of delay is unavailing.

1. Whether the Estate's Negligent Selection Claim Against Daimler Is
Expressly Preempted by § 14501(c)(1)

Daimler, as the party seeking to establish preemption, must demonstrate: (1) that a
state "enacted or attempted to enforce a law"; and (2) that the state law "relate[s] to carrier
rates, routes, or services 'either by expressly referring to them, or by having significant
economic effect on them.' " Nationwide Freight, 764 F.3d at 373–74 (quoting Travel All

Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996)).
There is no dispute that the first element is satisfied here: "Common law tort
claims," like those interposed by the Estate, "fall comfortably within the language of the
preemption provision that, by its terms, applies to state laws, regulations, or other provi-
sions having the force and effect of law." Ye, 74 F.4th at 459 (citation modified). At issue,
therefore, is whether the Estate's "proposed enforcement of [Indiana's] common law of

negligence would have a significant economic effect on" motor carrier services. Id.
The disagreement between the Estate and Daimler occurs at two levels: First, the
Estate maintains that § 14501(c)(1) cannot preempt its claims against Daimler because
Daimler is a shipper—not a motor private carrier, broker, or any other entity specifically
named in § 14501(c)(1). Second, the Estate argues that because shippers are not listed in §

14501(c)(1), enforcing Indiana common law against Daimler does not "relate to" any "ser-
vice of a motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property." 29 U.S.C. §
14501(c)(1). We address each argument in turn.
Whether the FAAAA preempts state law claims against shippers, as distinct from
brokers and the like, is a matter of first impression in our circuit. The facts presented in this

litigation differ from other cases involving express preemption under the FAAAA, which
predominately involve negligent hiring and/or selection claims against brokers—i.e., "the
person who connects the shipper and carrier" and "acts as the middleman between the two
to arrange for the transportation of the shipper's goods by the carrier . . . ." Aspen Am. Ins.
Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2023). Here, by contrast, a
shipper (Daimler) selected a motor carrier (TruckMovers) without the assistance of an in-

termediary.
In the Estate's view, the distinction between brokers and shippers is dispositive be-
cause § 14501(c)(1) expressly includes the former but not the latter. If Congress intended
to include "shippers" within § 14501(c)(1)'s preemptive scope, the Estate argues, it easily
could (and would) have done so, given that the term "shippers" is defined elsewhere within
Title 49 of the United States Code. Dkt. 114 at 4 (citing, inter alia, 49 U.S.C. § 13102(13)).3

Thus, the Estate reasons, the omission of any explicit reference to "shippers" evinces Con-
gress's intent to exempt shippers from the FAAAA's preemptive breadth. See Rotkiske v.
Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 14 (2019) ("A textual judicial supplementation is particularly inappro-
priate when . . . Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or
provision.").

However, the Estate's position—that the FAAAA does not preempt state law claims
against shippers—is squarely at odds with the Supreme Court's holding in Rowe v. New
Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008). In Rowe, a trade association of air
and motor carriers challenged a Maine statute requiring, in relevant part, that licensed

3 Section § 13102(13) defines "individual shipper[s]" as "any person who," among other things,
"is the shipper of a household goods shipment." 49 U.S.C. § 13102(13)(A) (emphasis added). Alt-
hough we are dubious that the tractor subject to the transportation services petitioned by Daimler
qualifies as a "household good" relating to "personal effects and property used or to be used in a
dwelling," id. § 13102(10), we have adhered to the parties' apparent agreement that Daimler was
a "shipper" for purposes of resolving the instant motion.
tobacco shippers utilize delivery services that verified the legal age of their buyers. Id. at
368–69. In holding that FAAAA preemption applied, the Supreme Court explained that the

Maine statute "create[ed] a direct 'connection with' motor-carrier services" through its "fo-
cus[ ] on trucking and other motor carrier services." Id. at 371. Likewise, the state law
"produce[d] the very effect that the [FAAAA] sought to avoid, namely, a State's direct sub-
stitution of its own governmental commands for 'competitive market forces' in determining
(to a significant degree) the services that motor carriers will provide." Id. at 372. Notably,
the Court "concede[d] that the regulation . . . [wa]s less 'direct' than it might be, for it t[old]

shippers what to choose rather than carriers what to do." Id. at 372 (emphasis in original).
At bottom, however, "the effect of the regulation [wa]s that carriers w[ould] have to offer
tobacco delivery services that differ significantly from those that, in the absence of the
regulation, the market might dictate. And that being so, 'treating sales restrictions and pur-
chase restrictions differently for pre-emption purposes would make no sense.' " Id. at 372

(quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 255 (2004)).
A straightforward application Rowe forecloses the Estate's argument that shippers
lie beyond the scope of FAAAA preemption. Thus, we reject the Estate's argument to the
contrary and turn to the issue of whether the Estate's negligent selection claim against
Daimler relates to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier with respect to the trans-

portation of property. Upon careful review of Daimler's and the Estate's competing argu-
ments, we answer this question in the affirmative.
The Seventh Circuit's 2023 decision in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc. is partic-
ularly instructive. 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023). Ye arose out of a fatal vehicular collision
involving a motorcyclist and a commercial truck driver. The motorcyclist's surviving
spouse brought a negligence action against the driver's employer, a motor carrier, as well

as the broker who selected the motor carrier. The district court dismissed the claims against
the broker on grounds of FAAAA preemption. Id. at 456. In affirming the dismissal, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's negligent hiring theory "str[uck] at the core
of [the defendant's] broker services by challenging the adequacy of care the company
took—or failed to take—in hiring [a motor carrier] to provide shipping services." Id. at
459. Continuing, the Seventh Circuit explained:

[E]nforcement of such a claim—and the accompanying imposition of li-
ability—would have a significant economic effect on broker services. By
recognizing common-law negligence claims, courts would impose in the
name of state law a new and clear duty of care on brokers, the breach of
which would result in a monetary judgment. . . . To avoid these costly dam-
ages payouts, . . . brokers would change how they conduct their services—
for instance, by incurring new costs to evaluate motor carriers. Then, by
changing their hiring processes, brokers would likely hire different motor
carrier than they would have otherwise hired without the state negligence
standards.

Id. at 459.
Read together, Rowe and Ye impel the conclusion that § 14501(c)(1) preempts the
Estate's state law negligent selection claim against Daimler. Although Daimler differs from
the defendant in Ye in that Daimler is a shipper rather than a broker, the likely consequences
of imposing tort liability are similar: shippers "would change how they conduct their" op-
erations, likely altering their selection processes and hiring different motor carriers or ex-
pending additional resources to hire brokers in order to distance themselves from potential
liability. Ye, 74 F.4th at 459. As with the negligent hiring claim in Ye, the Estate's negligent
selection claim here necessarily implicates the deregulatory purposes of the FAAAA. As
such, we hold that the state law negligent selection claim against Daimler is preempted by

the FAAAA.
2. Whether the Safety Exception Applies
Having determined that FAAAA preemption applies, we next assess whether the
Estate's claim "may be saved" by the safety exception. Id. at 460. As noted above, §
14501(c)(2)(A) excepts "laws within a state's 'safety regulatory authority with respect to
motor vehicles . . . .' " Id. (citation modified). The Seventh Circuit has conclusively re-

solved the meaning of the key phrase "with respect to motor vehicles," holding that it
" 'massively limits the scope' of the safety exception" by "requir[ing] a direct link between
a state's law and motor vehicle safety." Id. (quoting Dan's City Used Cars, 569 U.S. at
261).4
Applying this statutory interpretation to the facts presented in Ye, the Seventh Cir-

cuit held that the plaintiff's negligent hiring claim against the defendant broker did not
implicate the safety exception. Id. "Absent unusual circumstances, the relationship between
brokers and motor vehicle safety will be indirect, at most." Id. at 461. Indeed, the plaintiff's
allegations in Ye "mirror[ed] practical realities"; to wit, that brokers typically do "not own

4 We recognize that the scope of the FAAAA's safety exception is the source of a circuit split: The
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, on one hand, hold that state tort claims against brokers do not
implicate the safety exception, Ye, 74 F.4th at 460–66; Aspen Am. Ins. Co., 65 F.4th at 1268–72,
and the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, hold that such state tort claims do fall within
the safety exception, Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc., 142 F.4th 847 (6th Cir. 2025); Miller v.
C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court is poised to
resolve this circuit split in Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC, 124 F.4th 1053, 1055 (7th
Cir.), cert. granted, 146 S. Ct. 79 (2025), though, at the time of the issuance of this order, no deci-
sion has been handed down.
or operate motor vehicles" in the same manner that motor carriers do. Id. To see "the con-
nection between . . . a broker and motor vehicle safety requires an extra link to connect the

alleged chain of events: [the broker]'s negligent hiring of [the motor carrier] resulted in [the
motor carrier]'s negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle to a negligent driver who, in turn,
caused a collision that resulted in [the victim]'s death." Id. at 462. This "additional link . . .
between a broker hiring and motor vehicles," in the Seventh Circuit's view, was "too atten-
uated to be saved under § 14501(c)(2)(A)." Id.
Here, Daimler contends that its role in the underlying events mirrors that of the

broker in Ye, meaning that an "additional link" is logically necessary to relate the Estate's
negligent selection claim to motor vehicle safety. Dkt. 104 at 7–8. The Estate rejoins that,
unlike the defendant broker in Ye, who neither owned nor operated motor vehicles, Daimler
admittedly does own the tractor involved in the underlying accident. In the Estate's view,
Daimler's ownership of the motor vehicle in this case creates a "direct link" that places the

Estate's claims against it naturally within the FAAAA's safety exception.
Certainly, as the Estate contends, Daimler has conceded its ownership of the tractor.
However, we fail to see how its ownership alone is a sufficient basis on which to except
the Estate's negligent selection claim from the FAAAA's preemption, especially since the
Estate does not allege that a defect in the tractor itself caused or contributed to the accident.5

5 The only specific argument Daimler raises to support the dismissal of the Estate's vicarious lia-
bility and joint enterprise claims is that the SAC fails to plead any connection between Daimler
and Mr. Burke other than that relevant to the Estate's negligent selection claim: to wit, Daimler's
selection of TruckMovers, Mr. Burke's employer. Dkt. 104 at 8. This contention, however, ignores
the Estate's allegation that Daimler is vicariously liable by virtue of its ownership of the tractor.
Whether or to what extent Daimler's ownership of the tractor supports an indirect theory of liability
Daimler's conduct giving rise to the Estate's negligent selection claim is, at bottom, indis-
tinguishable from that alleged in Ye: to wit, the alleged negligent selection of a motor car-

rier, which the Seventh Circuit has described as requiring an "additional link [that] goes a
bridge too far" in its relation to motor vehicle safety. Ye, 74 F.4th at 462.
We therefore conclude that the Estate's negligent selection claim against Daimler
falls within the ambit of § 14501(c)(1)'s preemptive scope and that the § 14501(c)(2)(A)'s
safety exception is inapplicable. Because the FAAAA preempts the Estate's negligent se-
lection claim, Daimler's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted in this respect.

The Estate's negligent selection claim, as asserted in Count VI of the SAC, must and there-
fore shall be dismissed.
III. TruckMovers's Second Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
On October 30, 2025 (on the same day that it moved for summary judgment), Truck-
Movers filed a second motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Estate failed

to plead facts sufficient to state a claim for relief under any of Indiana's wrongful death
statutes, thus warranting the dismissal of "all claims with prejudice." Dkt. 140 at 6.
"At common law, there was no tort liability for killing another 'because personal
injury actions did not survive the injured party's death.' " Smith, 202 N.E.3d at 1121 (quot-
ing Pfaff, 643 N.E.2d at 911). "Actions for wrongful death are [thus] purely statutory in

Indiana." Pfaff, 643 N.E.2d at 911. "The purpose of [Indiana's] wrongful death statutes is

has not been presented to us at this juncture. As such, we decline to dismiss the Estate's vicarious
liability and joint enterprise theories against Daimler. See Montgomery, 124 F.4th at 1055–58 (af-
firming summary judgment ruling on the merits of a vicarious liability claim brought against
freight broker).
to compensate surviving dependents for pecuniary losses but not for loss of life." Smith,
202 N.E.3d at 1121.

Indiana's General Wrongful Death Statute ("GWDS"), Ind. Code § 34-23-1-1, "de-
lineates two separate categories of decedents." SCI Propane, LLC v. Frederick, 39 N.E.3d
675, 678 (Ind. 2015). The first encompasses "all decedents generally" and allows an estate
to recover "a fixed list of death-related expenses," including medical, hospital, funeral, and
burial expenses. Id. (quoting I.C. § 34-23-1-1) (citation modified). "The remaining dam-
ages, if any, must 'inure to the exclusive benefit of the widow or widower . . . and to the

dependent children, if any, or dependent next of kin . . . ." Id. (quoting I.C. § 34-23-1-1)
(citation modified).
"The second includes only those decedents who 'depart this life leaving no such
widow or widower, or dependent children or dependent next of kin," in which case "the
damages inure to the exclusive benefit of the person or persons furnishing services related

to the decedent's death, and the personal representative is expressly entitled to recover rea-
sonable attorneys' fees in prosecuting or compromising the action." Id. (quoting I.C. § 34-
23-1-1) (citation modified).
"[E]very decedent in the second GWDS category also satisfies the conditions to
bring suit under either" of two additional wrongful death provisions: the Adult Wrongful

Death Statute ("AWDS"), Ind. Code § 34-23-1-2; or the Child Wrongful Death Statute
("CWDS"), id. § 34-23-2-1. Frederick, 39 N.E.3d at 679. The AWDS "governs actions for
the wrongful death of unmarried adult persons with no dependents," whereas the CWDS
"permits parents or guardians to obtain damages for the wrongful death of unmarried
children with no legal dependents and who were under twenty years of age (or under
twenty-three and still in school)." Smith, 202 N.E.3d at 1122.

These three avenues—the GWDS, the AWDS, and the CWDS—allow for different
forms of recovery, depending upon which category the decedent falls into. Most relevant
for our purposes is the distinction between the GWDS and the AWDS: the GWDS allows
an estate to recover damages for lost earnings as well as loss of love and companionship,
as determined by a court or jury upon consideration of, inter alia, the value of future sup-
port and continued care that the dependent children could reasonably have expected to

receive from the decedent. See Ind. Model Civil Jury Instructions 725 (2026). Under the
AWDS, damages for lost earnings are disallowed entirely, Ind. Code § 34-23-1-2(g); and
damages for the loss of love and companionship (in an aggregate amount no greater than
$300,000) may inure to the benefit of nondependent children only upon a showing of a
"genuine, substantial, and ongoing relationship with the adult person . . . ." Id. § 34-23-1-

2(e)–(f). "[T]he determination of dependency controls which statute (the GWDS or the
AWDS) applies." Hubbard v. City of Bedford, Indiana, No. 4:24-cv-00103-TWP-KMB,
2025 WL 1939879, at *4 (S.D. Ind. July 11, 2025) (citing Est. of Sears v. Griffin, 771
N.E.2d 1136, 1138–39 (Ind. 2022)).
In our case, TruckMovers argues that the Estate cannot avail itself of any potential

recourse under Indiana's wrongful death statutes due to its failure to aver whether Mr. Love
"left behind a widow or widower, dependent child(ren), and/or dependent next of kin"
within the meaning of the GWDS as well as whether Mr. Love "was an 'adult person' or a
'child' " within the meaning of the AWDS to the CWDS, respectively. Dkt. 140 at 1.
Beginning with the latter, we are entirely unpersuaded by TruckMovers's argument
that the Estate's apparent failure to explicitly specify whether Mr. Love was an "adult per-

son" or a "child" merits the wholesale dismissal of this action. Our review of the relevant
pleadings reveals no support whatsoever for the contention that the Estate sought relief
pursuant to the CWDS. Likewise, TruckMovers's own prior submissions to the Court
acknowledge that this action arises under either the GWDS or the AWDS. See, e.g., Truck-
Movers's Am. Answer ¶ 14, dkt. 85 at 26 (citing to the AWDS); Dkt. 98 at 12 (recognizing
that either the GWDS or the AWDS applies to the Estate's claims). TruckMovers's request

that we foreclose all potential avenues of recovery on the basis of (what amounts to nothing
more than) a technicality is thus contrary to the letter and spirit of our procedural rules,
which arc towards "ensuring each litigant a full and fair hearing on the merits of his or her
claim or defense." Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech. Supply Inc., 983 F.3d 307, 313
(7th Cir. 2020) (citation modified).

As for whether the SAC sufficiently alleges that Mr. Love had minor dependent
children at the time of his death such that the Estate may pursue recovery under the GWDS,
as opposed to the AWDS, the Estate's response in opposition notably does not defend the
adequacy of its pleading. Rather, the Estate argues that "a minimal review of the record"
belies TruckMovers's contentions, as evidence produced in discovery apparently estab-

lishes that Mr. Love did in fact have minor dependent children at the time of his death. Dkt.
176 at 1. To support the veracity of its position, the Estate has submitted documentary
evidence, including two deposition testimonies of the minors' respective mothers as well
as K.L.'s (unredacted) birth certificate.6 In so doing, the Estate asks that we convert Truck-
Movers's motion to a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(d), and deny it as such.
"A district court has discretion as to whether to convert a motion for judgment on
the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment." Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 983 F.3d at
313. "If, however, a court chooses to consider materials outside the pleadings, the discre-
tion ends, and the court 'must' treat the motion as one for summary judgment." Id. (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). In this case, the Estate has not shown that our consideration of mat-

ters beyond the pleadings is either necessary or appropriate. Accordingly, we decline to
consider the materials submitted by the Estate and thus need not convert TruckMovers's
motion for judgment on the pleadings to one for summary judgment.
Returning to the SAC, the relevant inquiry is whether the Estate has alleged facts
from which we can plausibly draw an inference that minors C.W., K.L., and T.L. were Mr.

Love's dependent children. The ultimate determination of dependency entails "proof of . . .
a need or necessity of support on the part of the person alleged to be dependent . . . coupled
with the contribution of such support by the deceased." New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Johnson,
127 N.E.2d 603, 607 (Ind. 1955) (emphasis added). Beyond inclusion of the minors' initials
in the caption and three bareboned paragraphs introducing each as "a minor," see SAC ¶¶

6 The Estate filed an unredacted copy of K.L.'s birth certificate, in violation of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 5.2, which "requires the use of initials rather than names for minors." Doe v. Trs.
of Indiana Univ., 101 F.4th 485, 491 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. The Trs. of Indiana
Univ., 145 S. Ct. 546 (2024). The Court shall sua sponte direct the Clerk to place K.L.'s birth
certificate under seal. Dkt. 176-3.
3–5, dkt. 66, the SAC contains no averments whatsoever concerning the nature and extent
of the minors' relationship to Mr. Love, never mind their alleged dependency. "[F]ederal

courts require notice pleading, not fact pleading complete with all the minutiae." Auto
Driveaway Franchise Sys., LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670, 675 (7th
Cir. 2019). Here, the SAC's sparse references to C.W., K.L., and T.L can hardly be said to
surpass this minimal threshold. Because the SAC lacks sufficient allegations from which
we can plausibly draw an inference of dependency, we have little trouble concluding that
the Estate has failed to state a claim under the GWDS.

Accordingly, TruckMovers's second motion for judgment on the pleadings shall be
granted insofar as the Estate has failed to state a claim for relief under the GWDS; and
denied insofar as the Estate has successfully pleaded a claim under the AWDS. Whether
the Estate can marshal evidence to support an award of damages for nondependent chil-
dren, pursuant to the AWDS, shall be determined at the appropriate juncture.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby rules as follows:
• TruckMovers's (first) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED as
to the Estate's direct negligence claims; and DENIED as to the Estate's joint
enterprise claim and prayers for relief. Dkt. 97.

• Daimler's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED as to the Estate's
negligent selection claim; and DENIED as to the Estate's joint enterprise and
vicarious liability claims and prayers for relief. Dkt. 103.
e TruckMovers's (second) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED
as to the Estate's recovery under the GWDS; and DENIED as to the Estate's
recovery under the AWDS. Dkt. 139.
Additionally, the Clerk is DIRECTED to place K.L.'s unredacted birth certificate
UNDER SEAL, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2. Dkt. 176-3. The Clerk is
also DIRECTED to correct C.W.'s initials on the docket.
No partial final judgment shall issue. This matter shall proceed accordingly.
□□ □□ SO ORDERED.
Date:
4/21/2026 Tuk, Bous Biker
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
Aaron C. Cox
aaron.cox@icemiller.com
Ramona Frazier
The Witherspoon Law Group
rfrazier@twlglawyers.com
Christina Laun Fugate
ICE MILLER LLP (Indianapolis)
christina.fugate@icemiller.com
Tiffany R. Guthrie
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
tguthrie@k-glaw.com
Andrea Howell
Ice Miller LLP
andrea. howell@icemiller.com
28

Thomas J. Jarzyniecki, Jr.
KIGHTLINGER & GRAY, LLP (Indianapolis)
tjarzyniecki@k-glaw.com

Paul K Leary, Jr
Cozen O'Connor
pleary@cozen.com

Jeremy D. Lemon
HUNT SUEDHOFF & KALAMAROS LLP (Fort Wayne)
jlemon@hsk-law.com

Derek Harold MacKay
Knight MacKay Morrow, LLC
mackay@knightnicastro.com

Kathleen Meara
Knight MacKay Morrow, LLC
meara@kmmlaw.com

Aubrey Nick Pittman
The Pittman Law Firm, P.C.
pittman@thepittmanlawfirm.com

Carolyn E. Riggs
ICE MILLER LLP (Indianapolis)
carolyn.riggs@icemiller.com

Linje Rivers
The Witherspoon Law Group
rivers@twlglawyers.com

Tasha Rebecca Roberts
ROBERTS LITAGATION GROUP
troberts@robertslitigation.com

Nuru Witherspoon
Nuru Witherspooon
stegall@twlglawyers.com

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11315773. Public record. Not legal advice.