# Reynolds

> District Court, S.D. Texas · March 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11315751

## Case

- **Full name:** Valerie Reynolds v. Kuraray America, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** March 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT March 30, 2026
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
VALERIE REYNOLDS, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-00182
§
KURARAY AMERICA, INC., §
§
Defendant. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Valerie Reynolds has worked as a process operator at the same chemical plant in
La Porte, Texas, for nearly 20 years. She is one of two openly homosexual women at the
plant and one of only a few women among the facility’s 50 operators. While many of her
colleagues—mostly heterosexual men—advanced into supervisory roles or received
supervisory training, Reynolds’s career stagnated. Reynolds alleges that her employer,
Defendant Kuraray America, Inc. (“Kuraray”), discriminated against her based on her
sex and sexual orientation. She also claims that Kuraray retaliated against her after she
sought relief.
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt.
No. 34). For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the
Motion.
I. BACKGROUND1
Reynolds began working at the LaPorte plant in 2005. (Dkt. No. 41 at 6); (see also
Dkt. No. 34-4 at 23). Kuraray purchased the plant in 2014. (Dkt. No. 34-2 at 2). In July

2019, Reynolds told her supervisor, Daniel Clark, (Dkt. No. 34-2 at 1), that she was
interested in training for a supervisory position, (Dkt. No. 41-1 at 1). Reynolds renewed
her request in May 2020 after learning that a second employee had received the training
before her despite being hired later. (Id. at 12). Clark responded with steps Reynolds
could take to get the training. (Id. at 13).

Reynolds applied for another supervisory position in September 2019. (Dkt. No.
34-5). Kuraray received Reynolds’s application but did not promote or interview her
because she did not meet the “minimum requirements for the position.” (Dkt. No. 34-8
at 2–3). Joseph Waddell, who worked in human resources for the La Porte site, (Dkt. No.
34-4 at 50), and Clark contacted Reynolds to help with future promotion opportunities,
(Dkt. No. 34-2 at 2). Reynolds did not follow up with Clark or Waddell. (Id.); (see also

Dkt. No. 34-9 at 1–2). In June 2021, Reynolds applied for a second supervisory position.
(Dkt. No. 34-4 at 112). Kuraray denied Reynolds’s application the next month for the
same reason as in 2019. (Dkt. No. 34-11).
Reynolds filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge
against Kuraray in August 2020. (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 75). Reynolds alleged that Kuraray

1 Except where noted, this section contains only undisputed facts, and all facts and
reasonable inferences have been construed in favor of the nonmovant. Renfroe v. Parker, 974 F.3d
594, 599 (5th Cir. 2020). The Court has not weighed evidence or made credibility findings. Id.
discriminated against her based on her sex and sexual orientation by passing her over for
promotions, denying her advancement opportunities, and treating her differently than

her colleagues. (Dkt. No. 41-5 at 4). Since then, Reynolds has been disciplined three times
by Kuraray. (Dkt. No. 34-12). In July 2021, Kuraray issued Reynolds a “Note to File” for
an operational error. (Id. at 1); (see also Dkt. No. 34-2 at 2). The next month, it placed
Reynolds on special review for unsatisfactory performance. (Dkt. No. 34-12 at 2–4); (see
also Dkt. No. 34-2 at 2). And in March 2022, it put Reynolds on probation for her role in
an overpressure event that allegedly cost Kuraray $10 million. (Dkt. No. 34-12 at 5–7);

(see also Dkt. No. 34-2 at 2). Kuraray disciplined six other employees for the same event.
(Dkt. No. 34-10 at 90–91).
Reynolds sued Kuraray on January 18, 2022, alleging sex discrimination and
retaliation under Title VII. (Dkt. No. 1). Kuraray answered, (Dkt. No. 5), and moved for
summary judgment on February 17, 2025, (Dkt. No. 34).

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A fact is material if it could affect the suit’s outcome under governing law. Renwick
v. PNK Lake Charles, LLC, 901 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). And “[a] dispute about

a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party.” TIG Ins. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir.
2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510). The moving party “always
bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion”
and identifying the record evidence that “it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “If the moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the
motion [for summary judgment] must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s
response.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per
curiam).
If the movant meets this burden, the nonmovant must come forward with specific

facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355–56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
The nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings and by [the nonmovant’s] own affidavits,
or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Nola Spice Designs, LLC v.

Haydel Enters., 783 F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d
688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014)). “The nonmovant must ‘identify specific evidence in the record
and . . . articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim.’”
Carr v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 866 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting
Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998)), as revised (July 14, 2017).

If evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment is
appropriate. Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2019)
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the district court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Carr, 866 F.3d at 601. This means

that courts must resolve factual controversies in the nonmovant’s favor, “but only
when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at
1075.
III. DISCUSSION
Kuraray argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on all of Reynolds’s claims.
(Dkt. No. 34 at 7). For Reynolds’s discrimination claim, Kuraray argues that (1) Reynolds

has failed to produce direct evidence of discrimination, (id. at 15); (2) Reynolds cannot
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, (id. at 15–17); and (3) in the alternative,
Kuraray has produced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged adverse
action, (id. at 15). For Reynolds’s retaliation claim, Kuraray argues that (1) Reynolds
cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she did not suffer a materially
adverse employment action and (2) she cannot show a causal connection between her

protected activity and Kuraray’s actions. (Id. at 19–25). The Court holds that Kuraray
has not met its summary-judgment burden as to Reynolds’s discrimination claim but that
summary judgment is appropriate as to Reynolds’s retaliation claim.
A. DISCRIMINATION
Reynolds alleges that Kuraray discriminated against her because of her sex. (Dkt.

No. 1 at 2).2 “In employment discrimination cases, a plaintiff may present his case by

2 While Reynolds asserts that she was discriminated against both because of her sex and
sexual orientation, both allegations constitute a single sex discrimination claim under Title VII.
(continue)
direct or circumstantial evidence, or both.” Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 340 (5th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 2002)).

Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, proves discriminatory motive “without
inference or presumption.” Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir.
1993). Circumstantial evidence uses the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.3
Salazar v. Lubbock Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 982 F.3d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 2020). Reynolds has not
offered direct evidence of sex discrimination, so the Court applies the McDonnell Douglas
analysis. (Dkt. No. 34 at 15); (Dkt. No. 41 at 25–27 (discussing McDonnell Douglas

framework)).
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie case of
discrimination. To do that, a plaintiff must show (1) she is a member of a protected
group; (2) she was qualified for the position at issue; (3) her employer took an adverse
employment action; and (4) her employer treated her less favorably than other similarly

situated employees outside the protected group. Hassen v. Ruston La. Hosp. Comp., L.L.C.,
932 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised (Aug. 1, 2019) (citing Morris v. Town of
Independence, 827 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2016)). If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. (quoting Morris, 827

F.3d at 400). If the employer does, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “produce

See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 662, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1743, 207 L.Ed.2d 218 (2020) (“For an
employer to discriminate against employees for being homosexual or transgender, the employer
must intentionally discriminate against individual men and women in part because of sex.”).
3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
evidence from which a jury could conclude that [the employer’s] articulated reason is
pretextual.” Nall, 917 F.3d at 342 (citing Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs. N. Am., Inc., 813 F.3d

586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016)).
1. Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
The Parties do not dispute that Reynolds, a homosexual woman, is a member of a
protected class. (Dkt. No. 34 at 15). Kuraray also does not contest that Reynolds suffered
an adverse employment action, (see generally Dkt. No. 34 at 13–19), or that employees
outside her protected class received training and promotions, (Dkt. No. 34 at 10–11); (Dkt.

No. 34-4 at 64). The Parties disagree only on whether Reynolds was qualified for the
positions she sought in 2019 and 2021. (Compare Dkt. No. 34 at 15–17); with (Dkt. No. 41
at 22–25).
Kuraray argues that Reynolds was not qualified for the supervisory positions
because she did not meet the minimum experience requirements. (Dkt. No. 34 at 18).
Reynolds argues that she was qualified because the positions required only three or more

years of supervisory experience. (Dkt. No. 41 at 7–9, 15); (see also Dkt. No. 41-4). Reynolds
supports this claim with an internal Kuraray career-development guide from 2019. (Dkt.
No. 41-4). The guide states that three or more years of supervisory experience is sufficient
to be qualified for the supervisor role. (Id.) Kuraray argues that Reynolds’s argument
fails because she relies on a career development guide, rather than a job posting or

application. (Dkt. No. 42 at 2). However, the career development guide, as an official
Kuraray document, creates a fact issue as to whether Reynolds was qualified for the 2019
and 2021 positions. Reynolds testified to having between two and four years of
supervisory experience. (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 114). If the positions required only three or
more years of experience, Reynolds could have been qualified for either position. In

reaching this conclusion, the Court recognizes that the burden on plaintiffs at the prima
facie stage is “not onerous.” Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 228, 135 S.Ct.
1338, 1354, 191 L.Ed.2d 279 (2015) (quoting Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). Therefore, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Reynolds has successfully made out a prima
facie case of discrimination.

2. Kuraray’s Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason
Because Reynolds has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Kuraray to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Hassen, 932 F.3d
353 at 356. “The employer’s burden is only one of production, not persuasion, and
involves no credibility assessment.” McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494

(5th Cir. 2023) (en banc).
Kuraray’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to promote Reynolds is
that she was not qualified. (Dkt. No. 34 at 15–17). That is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 383
F.3d 309, 317–18 (5th Cir. 2004). Therefore, Kuraray has met its burden of production.

3. Pretext for Discrimination
Because Kuraray has provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the burden
now shifts to Reynolds to “produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that [the
employer’s] articulated reason is pretextual.” Nall, 917 F.3d at 342. A pretext in this
context is a “coverup” for a discriminatory decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 805, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1826, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); see also Godfrey v. Katy Indep.
Sch. Dist., 395 F.App’x 88, 91 (5th Cir. 2010).
Kuraray’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason mirrors its argument against
Reynolds’s prima facie case—i.e., she was not qualified for the position. The Fifth Circuit
has held that when an employer puts the employee’s qualifications at issue in both the
prima facie and the pretext stage, the objective hiring criteria is dealt with at the prima

facie stage and the subjective criteria is dealt with at the pretext stage. Medina v. Ramsey
Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d
344, 350–51 (5th Cir. 2007). Kuraray only disputes Reynolds’s objective qualifications.
The career development guide states that three or more years of supervisory experience
is the objective minimum. (Dkt. No. 41-4). The job posting states five or more years of

supervisory experience is the objective minimum. (Dkt No. 41-6 at 2). The conflicting
evidence creates a jury question regarding what the objective qualifications are.
Even if objective qualifications were part of the pretext analysis, Kuraray’s
summary-judgment motion still fails. The Fifth Circuit recently clarified that the failure
to provide “a roughly similar opportunity to access the necessary components of a

training program” can support a discrimination claim based on the adverse employment
action that comes from the lack of training. Rahman v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 56 F.4th 1041,
1046 (5th Cir. 2023); see also Gupta v. Qwest Gov. Servs., Inc., No. 3:20-CV-03560, 2023 WL
2025056, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2023) (“[T]he court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently
presented competent summary judgment evidence that she suffered an adverse
employment action when she was denied training opportunity . . . .); Thomas v. Burrows,

No. 2:22-CV-03511, 2023 WL 1783694, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2023) (“Allegations regarding
disparate mentoring and training may qualify as an adverse employment action when
same is directly tied to the worker’s job duties, compensation, or benefits . . . .” (citing
Rahman, 56 F.4th at 1046)). Accordingly, Reynolds can meet her burden by showing that
her lack of supervisory experience resulted from discrimination and that inadequate
training affected her job duties, compensation, or benefits.

The record indicates that Reynolds’s supervisory experience and promotion
potential was constrained by Kuraray’s control over training opportunities—
opportunities that Reynolds was allegedly denied. Kuraray provides supervisory
experience to employees through a process called “detailing” or “step-up.” (Dkt. No. 41-
12 at 51, 80). This process trains employees to become temporary supervisors, or “detail

supervisors,” whenever a supervisor is out. (Id.); (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 34–35). Being a detail
supervisor helps meet the minimum supervisory experience requirements for becoming
a shift supervisor, (Dkt. No. 41-10 at 56), which is one of the roles Reynolds applied for,
(id. at 54). Similar supervisory experience opportunities are also offered during
shutdowns via random selection. (Id. at 77). Detail supervisors are chosen by shift

supervisors. (Id. at 68, 73); (see also Dkt. No. 34-4 at 96). There is no record evidence
indicating other ways to obtain supervisory experience. (Cf. Dkt. No. 41-12 at 82–83).
Reynolds attempted to obtain supervisory experience through detailing or
overseeing shutdowns. (See Dkt. No. 41-1 at 4, 11–12, 17–20); (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 34–35, 44–
45, 67–68). While Kuraray gave Reynolds some supervisory training and experience, (see
Dkt. No. 41-1 at 11–12, 17–19); (Dkt. No. 41-10 at 83); (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 63), the record

reflects a pattern of Reynolds’s less-tenured male colleagues obtaining more supervisory
training and experience than her. (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 59–60). Keaton Bowland, one of
Reynolds’s male colleagues, began detail-supervisor training only two years after he was
hired. (Dkt. No. 41-10 at 72). Chris Aguero, another male colleague hired after Reynolds,
began training for the same role. (Dkt. No. 41-1 at 12). Reynolds also testified that two
other male colleagues were training for the detail-supervisor position, despite being

newer hires. (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 59–60); (see also Dkt. No. 41-10 at 74–75).
Although the summary-judgment record reflects that Reynolds has received some
supervisory experience and has failed to follow up on some opportunities to discuss her
career trajectory, this does not fully account for the faster career progressions of her
heterosexual male counterparts. Career discussions were only offered after Reynolds

complained about discrimination. (Dkt. No. 41-1 at 2). By that point, Reynolds had been
employed with Kuraray for five years but was still not training her to be a detail
supervisor. (See Dkt. No. 41-11 at 34–35). Yet, Bowland reached that point in two years.
(Dkt. No. 41-10 at 72). This record creates a jury question regarding whether Reynolds’s
access to supervisory experience, and thus to promotion possibilities, was prevented by

Kuraray for discriminatory reasons. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is a genuine
issue of material fact regarding Reynolds’s discrimination claim.
B. RETALIATION
Reynolds also alleges that Kuraray retaliated against her because she filed an
EEOC charge and later filed this action. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2); (see Dkt. No. 41 at 28–29). Like

employment discrimination, Title VII retaliation claims are subject to the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Jones v. Gulf Coast Rest. Grp, Inc., 8 F.4th 363, 368 (5th Cir. 2021). After
following the burden-shifting framework, the Court holds that Reynolds’s retaliation
claim does not survive summary judgment.
1. Prima Facie Case of Retaliation
To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under Title VII Reynolds must show

that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) Kuraray took an adverse employment
action against her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action. Feist v. Louisiana, 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013).
Kuraray does not dispute that Reynolds engaged in protected activity by filing her EEOC
charge. (Dkt. No. 34 at 20). The Parties disagree on whether Reynolds showed that she

suffered an adverse employment action and whether there is a causal connection.
a. Adverse employment action
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision “applies only when the retaliatory action is
‘materially adverse,’ meaning that it causes ‘significant’ harm.” Muldrow v. City of St.
Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 357, 144 S.Ct. 967, 976, 218 L.Ed.2d 322 (2024) (quoting Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415, 165 L.Ed.2d 345

(2005)). The Court considers only actions occurring after Reynolds’s earliest protected
activity—filing her EEOC charge—because no causal link can exist between protected
activity and events that predate it. See Stone v. La. Dept. of Revenue, 590 F.App’x 332, 341
(5th Cir. 2014).

Reynolds filed an EEOC charge in August 2020. Kuraray denied Reynolds’s shift-
supervisor application in July 2021. (Dkt. No. 34-11). Kuraray also disciplined Reynolds
three times; specifically, in July 2021, August 2021, and March 2022.4 (Dkt. No. 34-12).
“Failure to promote is clearly an adverse employment action.” Haire v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La.
State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 719 F.3d 356, 364 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Breaux v. City of
Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000)). So too a “formal reprimand is an adverse

employment action.” Lubbe v. Milanovich, No. A-18-CV-1011-RP, 2022 WL 3129106 (W.D.
Tex. Feb. 25, 2022); see also Breaux, 205 F.3d at 157. Therefore, Reynolds has suffered an
adverse employment action.5
b. Causal connection to protected activity
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Reynolds must show a “causal

connection” between the adverse employment actions and her protected activity.
Reynolds argues that the causal connection is proved by the close timing between the
filing of both her EEOC charge and this lawsuit and the adverse actions. (Dkt. No. 41 at

4 Reynolds states that she was disciplined in January 2022. (Dkt. No. 34-4 at 82). She was
placed on probation in March 2022, but the event happened in January 2022. (Dkt. 34-12 at 5–7).
The Court’s analysis of the prima facie retaliation claim is the same using either date.
5 Reynolds also alleges that Kuraray assigned her to “undesirable shifts.” (Dkt. No. 34-4
at 101–10). However, what makes these shifts undesirable is that they have supervisors that
Reynolds considers more strict. (Id. at 102). Furthermore, the record shows that Kuraray
employees “get rotated around all the time. . . . There[] [are] certain supervisors that [Reynolds]
prefer[s] not to work for.” (Id.). Kuraray has not changed the terms, conditions, or privileges of
Reynolds’s employment; nor is Reynolds treated any differently from other Kuraray employees.
Accordingly, these “undesirable shifts” are not materially adverse employment actions.
28–29). Close timing may satisfy the causal-connection element, Feist, 730 F.3d at 454
(quoting McCoy, 492 F.3d at 562), but the “temporal proximity must generally be ‘very

close,’” id. (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74, 121 S.Ct. 1508,
1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (per curiam)). “[A] time lapse of up to four months may be
sufficiently close,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Evans v. Houston, 246
F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001)), but a five-month lapse is insufficient, absent other evidence
of retaliation, id. (citing Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 472 (5th Cir. 2022)).
The only causal connection that Reynolds can establish through close timing (her

only causal evidence) is between her probation and the filing of this action.6 Reynolds
filed suit in January 2022. (Dkt. No. 1). Kuraray placed Reynolds on probation in March
2022. (Dkt No. 34-12 at 5–7). The two-month gap is sufficiently close. See Feist, 730 F.3d
at 454. Reynolds has thus shown a prima facie case of retaliation as to the January 2022
probation but not the other alleged retaliatory acts.

2. Kuraray’s Legitimate, Nonretaliatory Reason
Because Reynolds has met her burden of showing a prima facie case, Kuraray must
articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for placing Reynolds on probation. “This
burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’”
Shahrashoob v. Tex. A&M Univ., 125 F.4th 641, 653 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105

6 While Kuraray does not concede that the filing of a lawsuit constitutes a protected
activity, the Fifth Circuit has held that it does. Casarez v. Burlington Northern/Santa Fe Co., 193 F.3d
334, 339 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Casarez’s complaint to the EEOC and subsequent suit are protected
activity . . . .”).
(2000)). Kuraray’s reason for placing Reynolds on probation is for “failing to follow
Operating Procedures,” (Dkt. No. 34-12 at 5), which allegedly contributed to an

overpressure incident that cost Kuraray millions of dollars, (Dkt No. 41-10 at 90).
Workplace errors are a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discipline. See, e.g.,
Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 231–33 (5th Cir. 2015). Kuraray has
thus produced a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for placing Kuraray on probation.
3. Pretext for Retaliation
Reynolds now has the burden of showing that Kuraray’s reasons are a pretext for

retaliation. To meet that burden, Reynolds must show “that the adverse action would
not have occurred ‘but for’ the employer’s retaliatory motive.” Shahrashoob, 125 F.4th at
653 (quoting Feist, 730 F.3d at 454).
Reynolds has produced no evidence that Kuraray’s reasons are a pretext for
retaliation. Reynolds’s retaliation allegation relies solely on the temporal proximity of
the probation to the filing of this action. (See Dkt. No. 41 at 27–29). Temporal proximity

is not enough at the pretext stage. Garcia v. Pro. Cont. Servs., Inc., 938 F.3d 236, 243 (5th
Cir. 2019). Reynolds has failed to produce evidence that suggests that the “employer’s
explanation is false.” Saketkoo v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 1002 (5th Cir.
2022)). Nothing in her Response, (Dkt. No. 41), rebuts Kuraray’s assertion that she was
disciplined because “she did not completely empty all of the final acetate from . . . the

column and associated equipment,” which contributed to the overpressure incident that
cost Kuraray over $10 million,7 (Dkt. No. 41-10 at 91). Reynolds also fails to distinguish
herself from the six other individuals that were disciplined for the same incident. (See

Dkt. No. 41-10 at 91). On the other hand, Kuraray’s action complied with their
progressive discipline policy. (Dkt. No. 41-10 at 38–39). Playing a role in causing the
company millions of dollars reasonably comes with disciplinary consequences.
Reynolds has not shown that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding
whether Kuraray’s reasons for disciplining her were pretextual. As a result, Reynolds’s
Title VII retaliation claim fails.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Kuraray’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 34). The Court GRANTS summary judgment
on Reynolds’s retaliation claims under Title VII and DENIES summary judgment on
Reynolds’s discrimination claims. This action will be set for trial in short order.
It is SO ORDERED.

7 Reynolds does assert that “[t]he most obvious problems with the discipline imposed
[related to the incident] are that: (1) Reynolds was simply complying with instructions and (2) it
happened while Reynolds was at home, off-duty and asleep.” (Dkt. No. 41 at 11 (emphasis in
original)); (see also Dkt. No. 34-4 at 82–88 (Reynolds’s deposition testimony in which she disputes
the discipline she received for the January 2022 incident)). However, this assertion is supported
only by her self-serving testimony. Such testimony does not constitute competent summary
judgment evidence. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Fitch, 801 F.Supp.2d 555, 565 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citing In re
Hinsley, 201 F.3d 638, 643 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Signed on March 30, 2026.

DREW B. TIPTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11315751. Public record. Not legal advice.