# EVERY

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · March 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11315607

## Case

- **Full name:** Madilynn Mary Ellen Every v. MGM Trucking LLC, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** March 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11315607

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding delay of “only three months” not “extreme” but denying amendment due to “blatant delay, in combination with the showing of plaintiff’s bad faith in submitting the amendment”
- noting “danger of parallel lawsuits in federal and state court, which may spawn . . . inefficient use of judicial resources” (internal quotation marks omitted)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MADILYNN MARY ELLEN EVERY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:25cv560
)
MGM TRUCKING LLC, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on “Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to Amend Complaint and Add New Party” (Docket Entry 9) (the
“Motion”), which Defendants oppose (see Docket Entry 10). For the
reasons that follow, the Court should grant the Motion and remand
the case to the state court in which it originated.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Madilynn Mary Ellen Every (the “Plaintiff”), a North
Carolina resident (see Docket Entry 2 (the “Original Complaint”) at
1),1 initiated the instant action in state court against Defendants
MGM Trucking LLC (“MGM”) and Santo Miguel (“Defendant Miguel”)
(collectively, the “Defendants”). Defendants, Texas and Florida
residents, respectively (see Docket Entry 1 at 2),2 removed the
1 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s
pagination.
2 “For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of
a limited liability company is determined by the citizenship of all
of its members.” Central W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State
(continued...)
case during discovery (see id. at 3), pursuant to this Court’s
diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441 (b).
Following removal and continued discovery (see Docket Entry 9 at 2-
3), Plaintiff filed the Motion and attached a proposed amended
complaint (see Docket Entry 9-2 (the “Amended Complaint”)) seeking
to add DW Express, Inc. (“DW Express”), a North Carolina
corporation (id. at 3), as a defendant and to “assert[] allegations
and claims against it” (Docket Entry 9 at 1).
Those allegations and claims relate to a 2023 automobile
collision between Plaintiff’s vehicle and an MGM-owned truck driven
by its employee, Defendant Miguel (see Docket Entry 2 at 2), from
which Plaintiff allegedly “suffered serious personal injuries” (id.
at 3). According to the Motion, “Plaintiff filed [the O]riginal
Complaint . . . believ[ing MGM] to be the owner of the tractor-
trailer involved” in the collision (Docket Entry 9 at 1), but
“Defendants [later] revealed [in discovery] that another company,
[ ] *DW Express,’ owned the trailer” (id. at 2). (See also Docket
Entry 10-1 at 5 (stating in answer to interrogatory that “DW
Express is the company who [sic] owns the trailer”).)
As compared to the Original Complaint, the Amended Complaint
adds a claim for negligence and negligence per se against DW

2(...continued)
Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 103 (4th Cir. 2011) (parentheticals
omitted). Here, MGM “has one member named Mirian Valdez, who isa
citizen of Texas.” (Docket Entry 1 at 2.)

Express (see Docket Entry 9-2 at 7-9), adds DW Express to
Plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim against MGM (see id. at 6-7;
Docket Entry 2 at 4-5), and retains the Original Complaint’s
negligence claim against Defendant Miguel (compare Docket Entry 9-2
at 5-6, with Docket Entry 2 at 3-4). The Amended Complaint also
alleges that DW Express owned the trailer (see Docket Entry 9-2 at
4), entered into an “agreement with [ ] MGM . . . [regarding]
aspects of the [relevant] transportation” (id. at 8), and shared
control with MGM over Defendant Miguel’s actions (see id. at 4).
Opposing the Motion (see Docket Entry 10), Defendants contend
that the “add[ition of] a nondiverse defendant to the case[ would]
effectively destroy diversity jurisdiction” (id. at 1) and require
remand (see id.). In their view, the Court should deny the Motion
and maintain jurisdiction (A) because, for “four months prior to
the filing of t[{he [MJotion[,] . . . [P]laintiff knew the identity
of the trailer owner” (id. at 2; see also id. (“[O]n March 27,
2025, [ ] MGM served its discovery responses, confirming that the
owner of the trailer was DW Express.”)) and (B) because the record
lacks “evidence [that denial would] prejudice [ P]Jlaintiff” (id.).
Conversely, Plaintiff contends that “Defendants did not
disclose sufficient information for Plaintiff to identify which one
of five possible ‘DW Express’ entities was the correct one” (Docket
Entry 11 at 1; see also Docket Entry 11-1 at 2 (listing search
results of similarly named entities in U.S. Department of

Transportation database)), “despite the fact that [the
i]nterrogatory [ ] requested Defendants ‘give the full name(s) and
addresses(es) for the owner(s)’ of the trailer” (Docket Entry 11 at
1 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Docket Entry 10-1 at 5)).
(See also id. at 1-2 (“[Another, separate i]nterrogatory [ ] asked
that[,] if the trailer was leased, that the name, address, and
telephone number be provided . . . . Again, only the name of ‘DW
Express’ was provided in Defendants’ response.”).) According to
Plaintiff, “nothing in [ ] Defendants’ production of documents to
[ ] Plaintiff supporting those [answers] included . . . information
about ‘DW Express.’” (Docket Entry 11 at 2.) Plaintiff represents
that she gained sufficient information regarding DW Express’s
identity only after one of MGM’s employees “further identified [ ]
DW Express [as an] entity in Salisbury, NC [and] as the owner of
the trailer” (Docket Entry 9 at 3), during a deposition on July 8,
2025 (see id.), and that she filed the Motion one month later (see
Docket Entry 11 at 3).
Plaintiff further contends that “[t]here is no undue delay,
bad faith, or dilatory motive on [her] part [ ], and [that] no

undue prejudice will result to [ ] Defendants from the proposed
amendment.” (Docket Entry 9 at 3). Elaborating, Plaintiff
disputes Defendants’ assertion that she knew of DW Express’s
identity “four months prior to the filing of t[he [M]otion” (Docket
Entry 10 at 2) and instead posits that “the Motion was made [ ] one
4
month after [the] deposition in which [MGM’s employee] identified
[DW Express as a] North Carolina company” (Docket Entry 11 at 3).
Moreover, Plaintiff reasons that “there can be no prejudice to [ ]
Defendant[s]” (id.), “given the recency of the information as well
as the potential for shar[ed] liability [between MGM and DW
Express]” (id.), and that denial of the Motion would force her to
proceed “against DW Express in state court while prosecuting this
action in federal court against Defendants” (id.). Maintaining
those parallel suits, in her view, “[would] be inefficient, costly,
and a waste of judicial resources[ and ] could result in
inconsistent procedural and substantive rulings . . . even on
identical issues.” (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff therefore requests
that the Court grant the Motion and “remand[ the case] to the
[North Carolina] Superior Court of Cabarrus County” (id. at 4).
DISCUSSION
“When a plaintiff seeks to join a nondiverse defendant after
the case has been removed, the district court’s analysis begins
with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (‘Section 1447(e)’) . . . .” =Mayes v.
Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 1999).° “Section 1447 □□□
provides the district court with two options: ‘If after removal the

3 “[T]his decision is not controlled by a [Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (the ‘Rules’)] Rule 19 analysis.” Mayes, 198 F.3d
at 462; see also Gum_v. General Elec. Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 412, 414
(S.D. W. Va. 1998) (“[VJirtually every court to address the joinder
question since the enactment of § 1447(e) views the statute as
signaling a departure from a strict Rule 19 analysis ... .”
(italics and internal quotation marks omitted)).

plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would
destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or
permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.’” Graves
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:14cv398, 2015 WL 12911637, at *1
(M.D.N.C. June 11, 2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e)). “These
are the only two options for a district court faced with a
post-removal attempt to join a nondiverse defendant; the statute
does not allow a district court to retain jurisdiction once it
permits a nondiverse defendant to be joined in the case.” Mayes,
198 F.3d at 462.4
Section 1447(e) gives “flexible, broad discretion[]” to the
district court, id. at 463 (internal quotation marks omitted),
which may “consider all relevant factors, including: (1) the extent
to which the purpose of the amendment is to defeat federal
jurisdiction, (2) whether the plaintiff has been dilatory in asking
for amendment, (3) whether the plaintiff will be significantly
injured if amendment is not allowed, and (4) any other factors
bearing on the equities,” id. at 462 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (parentheticals added). “The district court, with input

4 “State law claims can be brought in federal court [or
removed from state court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441,] if diversity
jurisdiction exists pursuant to [Section] 1332(a), which requires
complete diversity of parties in a case. Complete diversity of
parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the
same State as any party on the other side.” Williams v. Glover,
Civ. Action No. 6:10-1591, 2010 WL 6872297, at *4 n.7 (D.S.C. July
12, 2010), recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 2682170 (D.S.C. July 11,
2011), aff’d, 461 F. App’x 315 (4th Cir. 2012).
6
from the parties, should balance the equities in deciding whether
the plaintiff should be permitted to join a nondiverse defendant.”
Id. at 463.
As to the first factor — whether the plaintiff requests
joinder to defeat federal jurisdiction — “if the defendant[] can
carry the heavy burden of proving fraudulent joinder, that fact
should be a factor — and perhaps the dispositive factor — [in] the
court[’s] consider[ation],” id. at 463.5 “[T]he absence of
fraudulent joinder[, however,] does not require acceptance of an
amendment to the complaint that would result in remand.” Copley v.
Argus Energy, LLC, Civ. Action No. 3:13-25305, 2014 WL 12692294, at
*3 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 21, 2014) (internal brackets and quotation
marks omitted). Instead, “courts often consider the chronology of
events and the timing of the plaintiff’s request . . . [ and have]
suggested caution where no attempt was made to add the nondiverse
defendant until after removal although the relevant facts . . .
were in the [plaintiff’s] possession [ ] well before suit was
filed.” Sour Grapes, LLC v. Vinum USA, Inc., No. 1:22cv203, 2023
WL 9775788, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 2023) (internal quotation

5 “Th[e fraudulent joinder] doctrine effectively permits a
district court to disregard, for jurisdictional purposes, the
citizenship of certain nondiverse defendants, assume jurisdiction
over a case, dismiss the nondiverse defendants, and thereby retain
jurisdiction,” Mayes, 198 F.3d at 461, so long as the defendant
“show[s] that the plaintiff cannot establish a claim against the
nondiverse defendant even after resolving all issues of fact and
law in the plaintiff’s favor,” id. at 464 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
7
marks and ellipses omitted). “Conversely, courts have allowed
amendments to add nondiverse defendants where the plaintiff could
not have identified all the defendants without discovery.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Defendants do not assert fraudulent joinder (see Docket
Entry 10 at 1-2), and, given “the chronology of events and the
timing of [ P]laintiff’s request,” Sour Grapes, LLC, 2023 WL
9775788, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court should
conclude that Plaintiff pursues the Motion for reasons unrelated to
defeating jurisdiction. Most notably, the record indicates that
“Plaintiff[] seek[s] the amendment based upon new information
uncovered during discovery,” Plemmons v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., Civ. Action No. 7:12-495, 2012 WL 13008154, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug.
14, 2012), namely, that “DW Express[] owned the trailer” involved
in the collision (Docket Entry 9 at 2 (internal quotation marks
omitted)) and that the relevant “DW Express entity [exists] in
Salisbury, NC” (id. at 3). Those facts “were [not] in
[Plaintiff’s] possession [ ] well before [she filed] suit,” Sour
Grapes, LLC, 2023 WL 9775788, at *4 (internal quotation marks

omitted), as the Original Complaint alleged “[u]pon information and
belief[ that ] MGM owned the [ ] tractor trailer” (Docket Entry 2
at 2; see also Docket Entry 9 at 1 (“[Plaintiff] believed [MGM] to
be the owner of the tractor-trailer . . . .”). “This new
information is a legitimate reason for Plaintiff now to seek
8
amendment of [the O]riginal [C]omplaint and joinder of [DW Express]
as a co-defendant.” Boatwright v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., No.
4:09cv1268, 2009 WL 4808586, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 9, 2009).
Additionally (as documented in the Background section), the Amended
Complaint “claims that [MGM] and [DW Express] were joint venturers
and therefore share liability. This is a[nother] valid reason to
join [DW Express] as a defendant.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
Johns Manville Int’l, Inc., No. 1:00cv673, 2001 WL 823604, at *3
(M.D.N.C. July 3, 2001) (parenthetical omitted).
As to the second factor, “[t]o determine whether a plaintiff
has been dilatory in asking for amendment, courts consider [the]
plaintiff[’]s actions between the time [she became] aware of
information potentially subjecting the [nondiverse] defendant to
liability and the filing of a motion to amend.” Curry v. Omni
Hotel Mgmt. Corp., Civ. Action No. 9:21-3587, 2022 WL 4481506, at
*3 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2022); see also 4 Suns Ranch, LLC v. Buckeye
Oil Producing Co., No. 5:12cv110, 2014 WL 1017907, at *5 (N.D. W.
Va. Mar. 17, 2014) (“[D]ilatory is defined as ‘tending to cause
delay or to gain time or to put off a decision.’” (internal

brackets omitted) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 522 (9th ed.
2009))). Pertinent actions include, among others, the plaintiff’s
“diligent efforts to determine the identities of the proper
[defendants] to name in an amended complaint as well as significant
difficulty encountered in obtaining from [d]efendant[s] th[ose]
9
identities,” Williams v. Walmart Stores E., LP, No. 5:20cv1090,
2021 WL 1616174, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 2021).
Defendants contend that, “four months prior to the filing of
th[e M]otion . . . , [P]laintiff knew the identity of the trailer
owner.” (Docket Entry 10 at 2; see also Docket Entry 9 at 5
(certifying the Motion’s filing on August 8, 2025); Docket Entry 10
at 2 (“[O]n March 27, 2025, [ ] MGM served its discovery responses,
confirming that the owner of the trailer was DW Express.”).) For
her part, Plaintiff insists that the March 27 discovery responses
“did not disclose sufficient information for Plaintiff to identify
which one of five possible ‘DW Express’ entities was the correct
one” (Docket Entry 11 at 1), and that Defendants’ subsequent
document productions did not fully identify DW Express (see id. at
2), as well as that “[i]t was not until [the July 8] deposition
that [MGM’s employee] confirmed that the relevant ‘DW Express’
entity leasing the trailer to [ ] MGM was the one in Salisbury,
North Carolina” (id.), after which Plaintiff filed the Motion on
August 8 (see id. at 3).
Upon “stud[ying P]laintiff’s road to the eventual discovery of

[DW Express, the Court should] find[ Plaintiff] was reasonably
prompt.” Estate of King v. McElroy Coal Co., No. 5:16cv1, 2016 WL
1241506, at *5 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 24, 2016). To begin, after
alleging “[u]pon information and belief[ that ] MGM owned the [ ]
tractor trailer” (Docket Entry 2 at 2), Plaintiff requested
10
information regarding its ownership, including “the full name(s)
and addresses(es) of the owner(s)” (Docket Entry 10-1 at 5) “and
the name, address, and telephone number” of any lessor (id.). When
Defendants (who do not contend otherwise (see Docket Entry 10 at 1-
2)) failed to provide identifying information beyond DW Express’s
name, “Plaintiff then researched the matter,” Correa v. Caliber
Bodyworks of Va., LLC, No. 3:23cv578, 2024 WL 37207, at *5 (E.D.
Va. Jan. 3, 2024). (See Docket Entry 11-1 at 2 (indicating
electronic records search resulting in list of multiple “DW
Express” entities).) When review of Defendants’ document
productions failed to reveal clarifying details (see Docket Entry
11 at 2), Plaintiff used the July 8 deposition “to further
investigate [DW Express’s] involvement [and identity],” Boykin v.
Spectrum Lubricants Corp., No. 3:13cv417, 2014 WL 12631658, at *5
(D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2014). (See Docket Entry 9-1 at 6.) As such,
“Defendant[s’] assertion that Plaintiff has been dilatory in
amending the [Original] Complaint to add [an entity] Defendant[s]
previously [failed] to identify [fully] is without merit. The
Court [should] find[] that [ ] Plaintiff has not been dilatory in
asking for amendment.” Williams, 2021 WL 1616174, at *3 (emphasis
added) .°

6 Moreover, for analogous amendment requests governed by the
Rules (rather than Section 1447(e)), “[d]elay alone . . . should
not suffice as reason for denial,” Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). That includes delays similar to
(continued...)
11

As to the third factor — whether a plaintiff will be
significantly injured if the court denies the request for amendment
— “courts consider the extent to which the proposed claims are
intertwined with claims already in the case and whether a plaintiff
could maintain a separate suit against the proposed nondiverse
defendant.” Burnette v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 1:19cv320, 2020
WL 3066641, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 22, 2020), recommendation adopted,
2020 WL 3063919 (W.D.N.C. June 8, 2020).
While Defendants insist on the existence of “no evidence of
prejudice to [ P]laintiff” (Docket Entry 10 at 2), Plaintiff
forecasts that a separate, state court suit against DW Express
would prove “inefficient, costly, and . . . could result in
inconsistent procedural and substantive rulings . . . even on
identical issues” (Docket Entry 11 at 3-4). To that latter point,
“Plaintiff’s proposed claims against [DW Express] arise out of the

6(...continued)
the “four[-]month[]” period (Docket Entry 10 at 2) of which
Defendants complain. See, e.g., Ransom v. Aspen Med. Prods., LLC,
No. 2:23cv407, 2024 WL 6468950, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2024)
(“Although [plaintiff] filed for leave to amend . . . [over three
months] after [learning of the relevant information,] . . .
discovery has not been completed. . . . [Defendant] thus has ample
time to address the few paragraphs added to the complaint which
should not have been a surprise in any event.”); Allegis Grp., Inc.
v. Bero, 689 F. Supp. 3d 81, 105 (D. Md. 2023) (“I do not consider
the [nearly three-month] delay so egregious as to justify denial of
leave to amend.”), aff’d, No. 23-2023, 2025 WL 2141298 (4th Cir.
July 29, 2025); GSS Props., Inc. v. Kendale Shopping Ctr., Inc.,
119 F.R.D. 379, 380-81 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (finding delay of “only
three months” not “extreme” but denying amendment due to “blatant
delay, in combination with the showing of plaintiff’s bad faith in
submitting the amendment”).
12
same set of facts on which Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant
are based,” Modlin v. United Grocery Outlet, Inc., No. 1:21cvl19,
2021 WL 9816247, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2021), recommendation
adopted in part, 2021 WL 3721446 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2021); the
Amended Complaint’s factual allegations differ negligibly from
those in the Original Complaint, save new allegations regarding DW
Express’s ownership of the trailer (see Docket Entry 9-2 at 4) and
partial control over Defendant Miguel’s actions (see id.).
Similarly, the Amended Complaint’s respondeat superior claim
against MGM and DW Express (see id. at 6-7) “seeks to bring [a]
claim[] against [DW Express] under the same theor[y] of liability,”
Modlin, 2021 WL 9816247, at *7, that Plaintiff pursued in the
Original Complaint (see Docket Entry 2 at 4-5). Denial, therefore,
would significantly prejudice Plaintiff by requiring her “to
maintain litigation in multiple forums regarding the same events,”
Modlin, 2021 WL 9816247, at *7.
Fourth and finally, the Court considers “any other factors
bearing on the equities,” Mayes, 198 F.3d at 462 (internal
quotation marks omitted), including “prejudice” to the non-movant,
C.A. ex rel. Achumba v. American Honda Motor Co., No. O9cv2159,
2009 WL 4730506, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2009), and “judicial
efficiencies,” Burnette, 2020 WL 3006641, at *7.
“Whether an amendment is prejudicial [ ] often [depends on]
. . . the nature of the amendment and its timing. A common example

13

is one that raises a new legal theory that would require the
gathering and analysis of facts not already considered by the
defendant, and is offered shortly before or during
trial.” Colavita v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 3:11cv585, 2012 WL
2577086, at *3 (W.D.N.C. July 3, 2012) (internal brackets,
citation, and quotation marks omitted). Here, nothing in the
record indicates that adding DW Express and remanding the case
would prejudice Defendants.7 “[T]he case has not developed fully.
While some discovery was conducted prior to [and shortly after]
removal, no scheduling order has been issued or trial date set,”
Modlin, 2021 WL 9816247, at *7, nor has any of the parties
submitted a “motion[] for summary judgment . . . [to] suggest[]
that [they] view the case as ripe for dispositive resolution,”
Mansaray v. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., Civ. Action No. 17-98, 2017 WL
2778824, at *5 (D. Md. June 26, 2017). (See Docket Entry 11 at 1-
3; Docket Entries dated July 3, 2025, to present.)
Moreover, even if Defendants had raised concerns regarding
unfair prejudice, “[i]t would have been foreseeable to

7 Of course, “[D]efendants have a fundamental interest in
retaining a federal forum.” Woods v. AlliedBarton Sec. Servs. LLC,
Civ. No. 11-2831, 2012 WL 439694, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2012); see
also McKinney v. Board of Trs. of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d
924, 927 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[B]y providing for removal in the first
place, Congress seems to believe that the defendant’s right to
remove a case that could be heard in federal court is at least as
important as the plaintiff’s right to the forum of his
choice.”). But neither the record nor Defendants’ pleadings raise
concerns beyond that basic interest, which arises in every case of
this sort.
14
Defendant[s ] from the outset of this action, based on the nature
of Plaintiff[’s] lawsuit originally filed in state court and
involving only state law claims[,] that federal jurisdiction
premised on diversity might be destroyed with the addition of other
defendants.” Plemmons, 2012 WL 13008154, at *3. Therefore, “[t]he
Court [should] not [find any basis to] believe Defendant[s ] will
be unduly prejudiced by a remand to state court.” Id.
“Courts also consider issues of judicial economy . . . when
analyzing a request to add a non-diverse defendant,” Modlin, 2021
WL 9816247, at *7, including the “costs of litigating the same
accident in both federal and state court,” Martin v. Leacock, No.
1:05cv218, 2005 WL 2587940, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2005).
Invoking similar concerns (see Docket Entry 11 at 3 (“[T]wo suits
[would] . . . waste [ ] judicial resources . . . .”)), Plaintiff
adds that “[her] claims against DW Express remain unbarred by the
[applicable] statute of limitations” (id.; accord Docket Entry 9 at
3). “Though this reduces somewhat the injury to [P]laintiff[’s]
interest from a denial of joinder, the result would be the kind of
parallel litigation the Fourth Circuit has cautioned against.”

Woods v. AlliedBarton Sec. Servs. LLC, Civ. No. 11-2831, 2012 WL
439694, at *5 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2012); see also Mayes, 198 F.3d at
463 (noting “danger of parallel lawsuits in federal and state
court, which may spawn . . . inefficient use of judicial resources”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Considering the particular
15
weight courts have afforded judicial economy in this context, see,
e.g., Jolley ex rel. Ferree v. United Parcel Serv., No. 1:06cv357,
2006 WL 3531621, at *1, 2-3 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 6, 2006) (allowing
joinder despite plaintiff’s knowledge of nondiverse defendant’s
identity prior to removal and despite the motion’s purpose of
defeating jurisdiction because of, in part, “the clear waste of
federal and state judicial resources”), that concern also counsels
in favor of remand here.
“[On] balance[,] the equities [favor] . . . permitt[ing
Plaintiff] to join a nondiverse defendant.” Mayes, 198 F.3d at
463. As noted above, (i) Plaintiff brings the Motion pursuant to
new information, not to defeat jurisdiction; (ii) Plaintiff filed
the Motion reasonably promptly after fully learning of DW Express’s
identity; (iii) maintaining a parallel suit against DW Express in
state court would unnecessarily subject Plaintiff to added costs
and potentially inconsistent rulings on intertwined claims; and
(iv) granting the Motion would conserve judicial resources without
unfairly prejudicing Defendants.

CONCLUSION
All relevant factors support allowing Plaintiff’s joinder of
DW Express.

16
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion (Docket Entry 9)
be granted and the case remanded to the North Carolina Superior
Court of Cabarrus County.
This 26th day of March, 2026.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11315607. Public record. Not legal advice.