# Kilgore

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · April 22, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11314324

## Case

- **Full name:** Katy Kilgore v. Rock Island County Forest Preserve, d/b/a Niabi Zoo
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** April 22, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11314324

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing discriminatory harassment as a factor in a hostile work environment claim
- finding that isolation of a female employee in combination with occasional outbursts was sufficient to establish a hostile work environment claim

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

KATY KILGORE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:24-cv-04145-SLD-RLH
)
ROCK ISLAND COUNTY FOREST )
PRESERVE, d/b/a NIABI ZOO, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 27, from Defendant Rock
Island County Forest Preserve, doing business as Niabi Zoo (“the Zoo”). For the reasons that
follow, the Zoo’s motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND1
The Zoo’s season typically spans from March through October each year, so it fills many
of its roles with temporary seasonal employees. These temporary seasonal positions are always
terminated at the end of the season and, if employees want to return for the following season,
they must reapply. Hannah Stockton, the Zoo’s office manager, interviewed, hired, trained, and
supervised Plaintiff Katy Kilgore in her role as a receptionist, a temporary seasonal position, at
the Zoo for the 2023 season. Receptionist job duties include accurately answering phone
inquiries from guests, responding to voicemails and guest emails with correct information, and,
when their phone and correspondence tasks are minimal, filling food bags.

1 At summary judgment, a court “constru[es] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and avoid[s]
the temptation to decide which party’s version of the facts is more likely true.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770
(7th Cir. 2003). The facts related here are, unless otherwise noted, taken from the Zoo’s statement of undisputed
material facts, Mot. Summ. J. 3–9; Kilgore’s response thereto and statement of additional material facts, Resp. 2–8,
ECF No. 28; the Zoo’s reply to Kilgore’s additional material facts, Reply 1–2, ECF No. 29; and the exhibits to the
motion.
Kilgore has paralysis on one side due to a stroke. Her disability is visible—she walks
with a cane and struggles with certain physical acts, such as standing or walking for over thirty
minutes. That Kilgore is physically disabled was apparent to Stockton when Kilgore arrived for
her in-person interview. When she filled out her employment paperwork, Kilgore said she would

not need any accommodations. However, while on a tour on her first day at work, Kilgore saw
that the breakroom had one table and one set of chairs, both of which were taller than regular
tables and chairs. Kilgore can sit in some of these tall chairs and not others, so she realized she
needed to test them. When Kilgore attempted to sit in the chairs, she confirmed that because of
her disability, she could not get as high as necessary to sit in the chairs.
Kilgore began eating her lunch on a bench in the hallway by the breakroom (“the
bench”). The bench was directly across from bathrooms used by employees and the public and
near the public entrance to an animal exhibit. Fellow temporary seasonal employee Cara
Chamberlain occasionally sat and ate lunch on the bench with Kilgore. The Zoo director, Lee
Jackson, saw Kilgore eating at the bench alone and directed her supervisor, Stockton, to tell

Kilgore not to eat there because it did not look appropriate. When Stockton conveyed Jackson’s
instructions to Kilgore, Kilgore told Stockton that the table and chairs in the breakroom were
unusable because of her disability. This conversation humiliated, upset, and embarrassed
Kilgore, who already felt singled out by her inability to eat with everyone else. Stockton offered
to move a regular height chair into the breakroom for Kilgore to sit in, but Kilgore felt this was
not a viable option because the table would still be tall.
The conservation classroom was also near the breakroom and the bench. This classroom
was reserved for birthday parties and other guest events, during which time employees were not
allowed to use it. Because the door was usually closed, no one besides managers and supervisors
ever went into the classroom. During her deposition, Kilgore testified that the classroom would
have been a suitable alternative had it been offered to her, but that it was never given as an
option. Kilgore Dep. 82:16–83:2, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1, ECF No. 27-1. But during Stockton’s
deposition, she testified that she did offer the classroom as an option for Kilgore, Stockton Dep.

21:12–14, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 6, ECF No. 27-6, and in response, Kilgore gave her a “look of
disgust,” id. 22:16–23:3 (describing the look as “raised eyebrows”). Based on that look,
Stockton offered the final accommodation. Id.
This final accommodation was for Kilgore to eat at assistant registrar Jan Williams’s
desk—but only while Williams was not working. Williams’s shift usually started at 12:00 p.m.
and Kilgore’s lunch break typically ran from 12:00 p.m. to 12:30 p.m. Williams frequently
arrived at work late, so Stockton believed that Kilgore’s inability to eat at Williams’s desk while
Williams was present would not frequently interfere with Kilgore’s lunch break. Stockton Dep.
24:2–15. Kilgore said she was not humiliated to eat at someone else’s desk, Kilgore Dep. 84:2–
3, but that she “[a]bsolutely” felt embarrassed and humiliated when Williams would arrive while

Kilgore was still sitting and eating at the desk, id. 92:3–6, which would happen frequently, id.
86:10–20. When this happened, Kilgore said she threw out her lunch and returned to work early.
Sometimes, especially in the beginning of the season, Kilgore returned to work early but did not
clock back in until her entire thirty minute lunch break had elapsed. Stockton never followed up
with Kilgore to determine if eating at Williams’s desk was satisfactory for Kilgore, and Kilgore
never informed anyone at the Zoo that she could not take a full lunch break at Williams’s desk.
Like all other temporary seasonal employees, Kilgore was terminated at the end of the
2023 season and encouraged to reapply for the 2024 season. Kilgore anticipated being rehired;
she never received any negative feedback, Kilgore Dep. 111:4–5, 112:18–21; always showed up
on time, id.; offered to help Stockton, id. 112:22–113:4; was told she did “awesome” at the end
of the season by Stockton, id. 111:10–13; and believed that most temporary seasonal employees
were rehired, id. 100:1–4. But when Kilgore reapplied for the 2024 season, she was not rehired,
despite Stockton’s preference for rehiring, Stockton Dep. 32:17–20.

Stockton informed Kilgore that the receptionists hired for the 2024 season were better
qualified than Kilgore. Contrary to Kilgore’s testimony of her performance at work, Stockton
discussed finding typos and incorrect information in Kilgore’s work, id. 40:2–21; providing
Kilgore with verbal corrections, id. 41:3–4; and frequently explaining and re-explaining tasks
that Kilgore never quite performed as expected, id. 61:3–17, 74:1–17 (“[I]t was the same thing,
same few things that she just couldn’t catch on to.”). She also described Kilgore as lacking
computer confidence. See, e.g., id. 73:20–74:14. Stockton acknowledged that she did not
document any of her concerns with Kilgore’s work, id. 41:18–20; did not discuss them with
anyone present besides Kilgore, id. 42:10–12; was unsure if she ever issued a formal reprimand,
id. 58:1–59:2 (after being asked if she was “unsure as to whether or not the discussions

[Stockton] had with . . . Kilgore fall underneath the verbal warning in this policy,” Stockton
agreed it would be considered a verbal warning but that she never informed Kilgore because she
“did not think of it at the time”); did not believe that Kilgore’s errors were significant enough to
warrant termination or formal, recorded discipline, id. 99:4–15; and never actually engaged in
the Zoo’s evaluation and feedback policy, id. 59:3–14. According to Stockton, this lack of
procedure was not unique to Kilgore—she never engaged in these formal processes or recorded
performance issues with temporary seasonal employees. When asked how the receptionists hired
for the 2024 season were more qualified than Kilgore, Stockton pointed to their higher self-
identified computer confidence, id. 66:10–14, 69:15–70:1, which Stockton never verified, id.
70:2–12 (saying she asked the 2024 receptionists “what [computer programs] they were familiar
with and confident using” without giving them any type of test).
Kilgore received her right to sue letter and brought this action against the Zoo alleging
eight counts of discrimination: failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”) and Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) (Counts III & IV); disparate treatment
under the ADA and IHRA (Counts I & II);2 retaliation under the ADA and IHRA (Counts VII &
VIII); and hostile work environment under the ADA and IHRA (Counts V & VI).3 Second Am.
Compl. 5–12, ECF No. 23. The Zoo moves for summary judgment on all counts.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). At the summary judgment stage, the court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial—that

is, whether there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a factfinder to return a
verdict in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Patel v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 1997). The court must view the evidence “in the light most

2 Kilgore characterizes her disparate treatment claims as disability discrimination, Second Am. Compl. 5–6, ECF
No. 23. “Disability discrimination” under the ADA includes failure to accommodate, which she clearly alleges in
Counts I and II, and disparate treatment. Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 2019). ADA disparate
treatment claims require a plaintiff to prove that (1) she was disabled; (2) she was qualified to perform essential
functions with or without accommodation; and (3) disability was the but for cause of the adverse employment
action, id., and Kilgore’s filings articulate the same elements, see Second Am. Compl. 5–6; Resp. 9, ECF No. 28.
Accordingly, the Court construes Kilgore’s claims as disparate treatment.
3 Kilgore also characterizes her hostile work environment claims as disability-based harassment. Second Am.
Compl. 9–10, ECF No. 23. But hostile work environment claims seek to remedy harassment in the workplace, see,
e.g., Ford v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 942 F.3d 839, 852 (7th Cir. 2019) (discussing discriminatory harassment as
a factor in a hostile work environment claim), and the parties refer to her claims as hostile work environment claims
in the filings, see Mot. Summ. J. 21–22; Resp. 14–16, ECF No. 28. As such, the Court treats Kilgore’s claims as
hostile work environment.
favorable to the non-moving party, and draw[] all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”
McCann v. Iroquois Mem’l Hosp., 622 F.3d 745, 752 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 255). “A genuine issue for trial exists only when a reasonable jury could find for the party
opposing the motion based on the record as a whole.” Pipitone v. United States, 180 F.3d 859,

861 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). The moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law” when the nonmovant has failed to put forth sufficient evidence to satisfy the
essential elements of her case as to which she has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (quotation marks omitted). In other words, if the nonmovant fails to make a
showing of fact sufficient to establish an essential element of her case, summary judgment will
be issued against her. Id. at 322–23.
II. Analysis4
The ADA prohibits discrimination against “a qualified individual on the basis of
disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of

employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). This is commonly termed a disparate treatment claim. An
employer must also make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The
ADA also prohibits employers from retaliating against an individual for opposing an act or
practice made unlawful by the ADA. Id. § 12203(a). Protection from a hostile work

4 Throughout its analysis, the Court also cites to cases involving other antidiscrimination laws, such as Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17, because the statutes are similar. See Miranda v. Wis.
Power & Light Co., 91 F.3d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[I]n analyzing claims under the ADA, it is appropriate to
borrow from our approach to the respective analog under Title VII.”).
environment is also cognizable under the ADA, providing a cause of action against a workplace
“permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal citations omitted).

“Because Illinois courts analyze IHRA claims under a framework that is practically
indistinguishable from the ADA framework, [the court will] focus on the federal ADA claims.”
Tate v. Dart, 51 F.4th 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2022).
a. Failure to Accommodate
Kilgore brings failure to accommodate claims under the ADA and IHRA alleging that the
Zoo did not properly accommodate her disability. Compl. 7–9. The ADA provides that covered
employers may not discriminate against qualified individuals on the basis of disability. 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a). “Discrimination” includes the failure “to mak[e] reasonable accommodations
to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability
who is an applicant or employee.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To prevail on a failure to accommodate

claim, “a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the
employer was aware of her disability; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate
the disability.” E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 2005). The Zoo
does not dispute that Kilgore can establish both that she is a qualified individual with a disability
and that the Zoo was aware of that disability. Zoo Mot. Summ. J. 19 n.4. Instead, the Zoo
argues it is entitled to summary judgment on Kilgore’s failure to accommodate claims because
“(1) the Zoo provided reasonable accommodation and (2) Plaintiff failed to uphold her end of the
interactive process by notifying the Zoo if accommodations offered were not acceptable.” Id. at
18–21. Kilgore in turn argues that the Zoo is not entitled to summary judgment because a
reasonable jury could find that it failed to provide Kilgore with a reasonable accommodation and
violated its duty to engage in the interactive process. Resp. 12–14, ECF No. 28.
To determine a reasonable accommodation, an employer and employee should “engage in
an interactive process.” Sears, 417 F.3d at 797 (quotation marks omitted). “If a disabled

employee shows that her disability was not reasonably accommodated, the employer will be
liable only if it bears responsibility for the breakdown of the interactive process.” Id.
Reasonable accommodations may include “making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities” and “job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, . . . acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modifications of . . . policies, . . . and other similar accommodations.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(9). “It is the employer’s prerogative to choose a reasonable accommodation; an
employer is not required to provide the particular accommodation that an employee requests.”
Jay v. Intermet Wagner Inc., 233 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, “the employer
is obliged to provide an accommodation that effectively accommodates the disabled employee’s

limitations.” Sears, 417 F.3d at 802. An employer has satisfied its duty of reasonable
accommodation when “the employer does what is necessary to enable the disabled worker to
work in reasonable comfort,” Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 546
(7th Cir. 1995), and “[a]n ineffective ‘modification’ or ‘adjustment’ will not accommodate a
disabled individual’s limitations.” US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002)
(emphasis omitted). Employers “must be willing to consider making changes in . . . ordinary
work rules, facilities, terms, and conditions in order to enable a disabled individual to work.”
Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542.
The Zoo asserts that Stockton’s offering of “(1) bringing a regular height chair into the
breakroom; [and] (2) eating at an employee’s desk near the breakroom” constituted reasonable
accommodation and that Kilgore “cannot meet her burden of providing evidence that the Zoo’s
accommodation was unreasonable.” Mot. Summ. J. 19. Kilgore argues that “an arrangement

that forces [a mobility-impaired employee] into a coworker’s desk space subject to disruption
and early termination of her lunch break, while denying her access to a safely usable bench and
never offering an admittedly accessible classroom, does not constitute an effective or comparable
accommodation.” Resp. 14. A reasonable jury could find that the offers to bring a regular height
chair into the breakroom or eat at another employee’s desk failed to accommodate Kilgore, and
that a genuine dispute of material fact remains as to whether the conservation classroom was
offered as an option.
A jury could reasonably find that providing Kilgore with a chair significantly lower than
the table was not a reasonable accommodation. Kilgore testified that without a table roughly at
or below waist level, Kilgore Dep. 60:24–61:14, “it would be difficult” to manage the height

difference between the regular chair and high table, id. 53:2–13. She would need an alternative
place to set her food—food would fall off her lap due to her disability.5 Id. As such, a
reasonable jury could find that the regular height chair with the tall table would not resolve the
underlying issue of providing Kilgore with a space in which she could eat her lunch.
Additionally, a jury could reasonably conclude that the use of another employee’s desk
only when the employee, who was typically scheduled to work the entirety of Kilgore’s lunch
break, was not present, was not a reasonable accommodation. E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.

5 Although the bench Kilgore originally sat at did not have a table, she was able to place her lunch on the empty
portion of the bench next to her. Kilgore Dep. 52:17–53:1. This option was not available when sitting in a regular
height chair at a tall table.
is instructive. In that case, when a plaintiff struggled to walk long distances but was otherwise
able to perform her job duties, her employer allowed her to eat lunch in a stockroom and
temporarily use a shortcut. Sears, 417 F.3d at 803. The Sears court determined these were not
reasonable accommodations when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff—“a jury

could conclude that these did not make the facility accessible to [the plaintiff] because the
accommodations were either rescinded or [she] faced reprimand when she tried to use them.” Id.
Similar to Sears, the offer of Williams’s desk was not a stable or consistent alternative.
Although she did not face reprimand for using an offered alternative, Kilgore could not use
Williams’s desk if Williams was present, and Williams was typically scheduled to be present for
the entirety of Kilgore’s usual lunch break. As a direct result of their disability-based mobility
limitations, neither Kilgore nor the plaintiff in Sears had a reliable place to eat lunch.
A reasonable jury could conclude that use of Williams’s desk for lunch was not a
reasonable accommodation. If Williams’s shift generally began at 12:00 p.m., Kilgore’s lunch
regularly began at 12:00 p.m., and Kilgore was told that she could not eat at Williams’s desk

while Williams was present, the Court does not see how this constitutes a reasonable, equivalent
accommodation as a matter of law. A jury could reasonably conclude that relying on one
employee’s late arrival to ensure the accommodation of a disabled employee is not a reasonable
solution. As such, ascertaining the exact number of times that Kilgore’s lunch break was cut
short by Williams’s arrival is a somewhat moot point—either way, Williams’s shift began at
12:00 and Kilgore’s break began at 12:00, rendering Williams’s desk a possibly unreasonable
alternative. Nevertheless, the Zoo provides its own analysis of the data provided by Williams
and Kilgore’s timesheets. Mot. Summ. J. 7 (compiling information on Kilgore’s sixty-five lunch
breaks and comparing it to Williams’s shifts). To the extent this is an effort to highlight that
Kilgore’s lunch was interrupted just a few times, the data at best presents a genuine dispute of
material fact.
Based on the Court’s review of Williams’s and Kilgore’s timesheets, there were at least
fourteen instances in which Williams was clocked in while Kilgore was clocked out on her lunch

break.
Date Kilgore Kilgore Returned Williams Duration of
Began Lunch from Lunch Clocked in Kilgore’s Break
April 21, 2023 12:31 1:01 12:20 30 minutes
April 28, 2023 12:02 12:32 12:20 30 minutes
May 3, 2023 12:08 12:38 12:31 30 minutes
May 10, 2023 12:05 12:35 12:09 30 minutes
May 17, 2023 12:05 12:38 12:37 33 minutes
May 19, 2023 12:03 12:38 12:24 35 minutes
May 24, 2023 12:00 12:30 12:17 30 minutes
May 26, 2023 12:02 12:34 12:28 32 minutes
June 14, 2023 12:43 1:13 12:37 30 minutes
July 19, 2023 12:32 12:54 12:38 22 minutes
July 31, 2023 12:05 12:36 12:24 31 minutes
September 27, 2023 12:20 12:54 12:43 34 minutes
October 13, 2023 12:15 12:43 12:29 28 minutes
October 18, 2023 12:13 12:43 12:42 30 minutes
Compare Kilgore Timesheets, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 18, ECF No. 27-18, with Williams Timesheets,
Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 19, ECF No. 27-19.
Kilgore also testified that she frequently returned to work early but waited until thirty
minutes elapsed to clock in. Kilgore Dep. 86:23–87:16. The Court does not see anything in the
record contradicting this testimony; therefore, a jury could reasonably find that the logged
duration of her lunch break, be it thirty minutes or twenty-one, is not a true reflection of how
long Kilgore was on break. In this case, it is helpful to also consider the instances in which
Williams clocked in shortly after Kilgore ended her lunch break. A review of the timesheets
reveals another six instances in which Williams clocked in within ten minutes of Kilgore
returning to work.
Date Kilgore Kilgore Returned Williams Duration of
Began Lunch from Lunch Clocked in Kilgore’s Break
April 26, 2023 12:13 12:34 12:37 21 minutes
June 2, 2023 12:04 12:36 12:36 32 minutes
July 3, 2023 12:16 12:44 12:45 28 minutes
July 12, 2023 12:04 12:30 12:39 26 minutes
August 14, 2023 12:07 12:40 12:41 33 minutes
September 13, 2023 12:12 12:45 12:46 33 minutes
Compare Kilgore Timesheets, with Williams Timesheets.
This totals as many as twenty instances in which Kilgore’s lunch break overlapped with
Williams’s arrival. It is difficult to discern the actual percentage of Kilgore’s lunch breaks and
Williams’s work shifts that overlap because there is no indication of when Kilgore was offered
Williams’s desk as an alternative. See, e.g., Kilgore Dep. 84:19–22. As such, the Court does not
find the Zoo’s calculations, Mot. Summ. J. 7, to be particularly conclusive given the lack of
clarity as to how many times this could have happened. The Zoo points out that, on days in
which both Kilgore and Williams worked, Kilgore’s lunch breaks were shortened only four
times. Mot. Summ. J. 7. The Court’s review of the record likewise reveals four shortened lunch
breaks where Williams was either clocked in during Kilgore’s break or clocked in within minutes
of Kilgore returning from her lunch (April 26, 2023; July 3, 2023; July 19, 2023; October 13,
2023) and one shortened lunch break where Williams clocked in nine minutes after Kilgore
returned to work (July 12, 2023). But the Court again notes that, according to Kilgore, the mere
fact that she was clocked out for thirty minutes does not necessarily mean she was on break the
entire allotted time.
Because a reasonable jury could find that the shorter chair and Williams’s desk were not
reasonable accommodations, whether the Zoo fulfilled its duty to reasonably accommodate
Kilgore hinges on whether the conservation classroom was offered as an option. No one disputes
that the classroom would have been a reasonable accommodation, but Kilgore testified she was
never given the option, Kilgore Dep. 82:16–83:2, while Stockton testified she offered it and
Kilgore seemed disgusted, Stockton Dep. 21:12–23:3. This establishes a genuine dispute of
material fact for the jury to decide.
In any case, the Zoo argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Kilgore

“failed to uphold her end of the interactive process by notifying the Zoo if accommodations
offered were not acceptable.” Mot. Summ. J. 19; see also Reply 5–6, ECF No. 29. Kilgore
argues that the Zoo “prematurely closed the interactive process, failed to offer [her] a
comparable and accessible break location despite knowing of her mobility impairment, and
impermissibly shifted the burden onto her to endure an inadequate arrangement rather than
continuing to work collaboratively to identify a reasonable accommodation.” Resp. 14. Because
the determination of who was responsible for a breakdown in the interactive process, if anyone,
requires resolution of whether the Zoo offered the conservation classroom to Kilgore, the Zoo’s
argument must fail.
“If a reasonable accommodation was available but the employer prevented its

identification by failing to engage in the interactive process, that failure is actionable.” Brown v.
Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2017). “Because the interactive process
is not an end in itself,” an employee “must show that the result of the inadequate interactive was
the failure of [the employer] to fulfill its role in determining what specific actions must be taken
. . . to provide the qualified individual a reasonable accommodation.” Rehling v. City of
Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). The process is
triggered when an employee “notif[ies] her employer of her disability.” Spurling v. C & M Fine
Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 2014).
The Zoo asserts that “this is a textbook case of an employee not providing the employer
with sufficient information to determine the necessary accommodation,” analogizing Kilgore’s
claims to that of the plaintiff in Graham v. Arctic Zone Iceplex, LLC, 930 F.3d 926 (7th Cir.
2019). Mot. Summ. J. 21. This is not convincing. The Graham plaintiff, after a work injury,

had several medical restrictions, including that he needed to work sitting down. Graham, 930
F.3d at 928. His employer assigned him to skate sharpening, which it asserts could be performed
while seated. Id. Even though the plaintiff argued that he could only complete skate sharpening
while standing and thus that his employer did not comply with his medical restrictions, the Court
found that the plaintiff was responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process because he
failed to inform his employer that the offered accommodation, which the employer thought
complied with his medical restrictions, was inadequate. Id. at 928–29. While the Graham
employer did not know that the plaintiff needed to stand for skate sharpening, the Zoo knew that
Kilgore could not sit in the taller chair, needed somewhere to eat her lunch, and that Williams’s
shift began at the same time as Kilgore’s lunch began. In other words, where the Graham

employer lacked requisite information to realize that the offered accommodation did not actually
meet the plaintiff’s needs, the Zoo had all the requisite information to understand that Williams’s
desk may not have accommodated Kilgore. That Kilgore never communicated the inadequacy of
Williams’s desk as an alternative does not mean she was responsible for a breakdown of the
interactive process; the interactive process does not require Kilgore, as an employee who put her
employer on notice of her need for an accommodation, to inform the Zoo that an
accommodation, which a reasonable jury could deem obviously inadequate, was not working.
Cf. Sears, 417 F.3d at 808 (“A reasonable jury could find that [the employer’s] only
communication to [the plaintiff] . . . was the suggestion that she use [an alternative] which [her
supervisor] knew would do nothing to facilitate [her] access to her work area. This is not
meaningful participation in the interactive process.”).
Furthermore, a reasonable jury viewing the undisputed facts could find that the Zoo did
not adequately engage in the interactive process with Kilgore. When an employee has a “blanket

nature” restriction, there is a greater burden placed on her to communicate and clarify the
nuances of what could reasonably accommodate her. Brown, 855 F.3d at 824 (“Given the
blanket nature of [the plaintiff’s] restriction, the obligation fell to the plaintiff to update and
further clarify the kinds of work she could do.” (quotation marks omitted)). Consideration of
Brown and Steffes v. Stepan Company, 144 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir. 1998), Seventh Circuit cases in
which the plaintiff was deemed responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process, is
instructive. Unlike the plaintiffs in Brown and Steffes, Kilgore did not have blanket restrictions
impacting her job duties. Where the Brown plaintiff was a school employee who could not be
around rowdy students, Brown, 855 F.3d at 824–25, and the Steffes plaintiff worked for a
chemical company but could not breath chemicals, Steffes, 144 F.3d at 1071–72, Kilgore merely

requested a place in which she could comfortably eat her lunch. Additionally, like the employer
in Spurling, neither Stockton nor the Zoo asked Kilgore any questions or followed up with her
about the accommodations offered, nor did they engage with any of the Zoo’s policies regarding
ADA accommodations. Cf. Spurling, 739 F.3d at 1061–62 (finding the employer liable for a
breakdown in the interactive process because, although the employer followed the appropriate
procedure for reviewing and providing accommodations initially, the employer ultimately “failed
to carry it through”). As such, the Zoo has not established as a matter of law that Kilgore was
responsible for the breakdown of the interactive process.
Also integral to the interactive process analysis is whether Stockton offered the
conservation classroom to Kilgore as an option. This is relevant to determining what steps the
Zoo took to accommodate Kilgore’s disability and how thoroughly it considered and presented
accommodation options. If the conservation classroom was provided to Kilgore, then her failure

to accommodate claims must fail because she was offered a reasonable accommodation.
Alternatively, if the conservation classroom was not offered to Kilgore, a reasonable jury could
conclude that she was not reasonably accommodated, and must then decide whether there was a
breakdown in the interactive process and, if so, which party bears responsibility. Because this
question cannot be resolved without first determining whether the conservation classroom was
offered to Kilgore, a genuine dispute of material fact remains as to the interactive process prong
of Kilgore’s failure to accommodate claim. For these reasons, the Zoo’s motion for summary
judgment as to Kilgore’s failure to accommodate claims under the ADA and IHRA is denied.
b. Disparate Treatment
Kilgore brings disparate treatment claims under the ADA and IHRA alleging that the Zoo

declined to rehire her for the 2024 season due to her disability. Compl. 5–7. To prevail on an
ADA disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [the] plaintiff was disabled; (2)
[the] plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions with or without reasonable
accommodation; and (3) [the] disability was the ‘but for’ cause of adverse employment action.”
Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 2019). Direct evidence of disability
discrimination is rare. Rowlands v. United Parcel Serv.-Fort Wayne, 901 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir.
2018). Instead, plaintiffs typically demonstrate discrimination with circumstantial evidence.6 Id.

6 Although the Seventh Circuit previously distinguished “direct” from “indirect” evidence, Andrews v. CBOCS W.,
Inc., 743 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 2014), it has subsequently abandoned this practice, Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc.,
834 F.3d 760, 763–66 (7th Cir. 2016). While the evidence in an employment discrimination case is rarely
straightforward, the Seventh Circuit has found that attempting to funnel the often factually complex cases into
This may include “(1) suspicious timing; (2) ambiguous statements or behavior towards other
employees in the protected group; (3) evidence, statistical or otherwise that similarly situated
employees outside of the protected group systematically receive[d] better treatment; and (4)
evidence that the employer offered a pretextual reason for an adverse employment action.”

Monroe v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 504 (7th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted).
“[A] subjective belief of discrimination[,] no matter how genuine, cannot be the sole basis for a
finding of discrimination.” Kizer v. Child.’s Learning Ctr., 962 F.2d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 1992)
(first alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). “The ultimate burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times
with the plaintiff.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
Disparate treatment claims can be evaluated under either the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework or the Ortiz holistic review framework,7 see Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834
F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2016); however, “when the issue of satisfactory job performance lies at
the heart of the dispute and must be analyzed in detail at multiple stages of the McDonnell

Douglas test, it is often simpler to run through that analysis only once,” Khungar v. Access Cmty.
Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 573–74 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
There is no question that Kilgore, as someone dealing with paralysis on one side of her body, has
protected characteristics. Kilgore Dep. 8:10–21; Vande Zande v. Wis. Dept. of Admin., 851 F.

categories has a greater potential for creating confusion rather than simplifying the analysis. Id. at 765. This is not
to say that courts should completely abandon any acknowledgement of the difference between the types of evidence,
but they should no longer separate evidence into categories when evaluating it. See Rowlands, 901 F.3d at 801–02.
7 “In discrimination cases, when a defendant moves for summary judgment, the singular question for the district
court is whether the plaintiff has introduced evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the
plaintiff’s . . . proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Mitchell v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 143 F.4th 800, 809 (7th Cir. 2025) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). The McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework is one way in which a plaintiff may establish her claim. Id. Alternatively, the holistic
review of Ortiz means “that a plaintiff does not have to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework to succeed.” Id.
In short, both McDonnell Douglas and Ortiz are “merely convenient ways to organize our thoughts.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted).
Supp. 353, 360 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (“[P]aralysis is clearly a disability under the ADA.”), aff’d, 44
F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995). She was not rehired, which is indisputably an adverse employment
action. Squibb v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 787 (7th Cir. 2007). The Zoo argues that
Kilgore cannot succeed under either the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework or the

Ortiz holistic review. Mot. Summ. J. 11. But because “the heart of this dispute” is “whether
[Kilgore] performed poorly and whether that poor performance caused her termination,” the
Court will “run through that analysis only once” under the Ortiz holistic review. Khungar, 985
F.3d at 574 (citing cases); see also Bommiasamy v. Galesburg Hosp. Corp., 727 F. Supp. 3d 767,
791 (C.D. Ill. 2024) (“The McDonnell Douglas framework is not as useful where, as here, the
defendant relies upon performance problems as the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the
plaintiff’s termination. The Court proceeds straight to the Ortiz inquiry and considers whether
there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that [the plaintiff] was illegally
terminated because of his [protected characteristic].” (citation omitted)). Kilgore argues that
there is sufficient evidence that the Zoo gave pretextual reasons for not rehiring her. See, e.g.,

Resp. 10.
Kilgore must show that there is sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude
that the Zoo’s cited legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not rehiring her “are pretextual,
meaning false, allowing an inference that the [Zoo’s] true intent was discriminatory.” Runkel v.
City of Springfield, 51 F.4th 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2022); see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (holding that a showing of pretext “may, together with the elements of
the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the
defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination . . . .”). “[A]n employer’s dishonest explanation of a decision can, by itself,
support an inference that its real reason was unlawful.” Vichio v. US Foods, Inc., 88 F.4th 687,
695 (7th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted).
The Zoo avers that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not rehiring Kilgore was
that she lacked “confiden[ce] in the position” and “computer skills,” including “getting around in

[the] computer system” and making phone calls. Stockton Dep. 73:20–74:14. As a result,
Stockton “was continuously having to help her.” Id. 74:1–4. Kilgore argues that the Zoo’s
reasons are pretextual because the Zoo’s “handling of [her] alleged performance issues and the
2024 hiring decision reflects exactly the kind of inconsistency and procedural deviation the
Seventh Circuit recognizes as probative of pretext.” Resp. 10. Because Stockton did not keep
any written record of her comments or concerns with Kilgore’s performance and never engaged
in a formal disciplinary process, Stockton’s testimony is the only evidence provided that
Kilgore’s work was unsatisfactory. Stockton Dep. 38:23–41:20 (testifying to correcting typos
and miswritten phone numbers with Kilgore without documenting the conversations or
mistakes). And Kilgore’s testimony directly contradicts Stockton’s—according to Kilgore, she

never received any unsatisfactory comments and Stockton told her she did “awesome” at the end
of the season. Kilgore Dep. 111:4–13, 115:24–116:13 (testifying that she never received any
negative feedback and Stockton never spoke with her about typos or work corrections).
The Zoo argues that many of Kilgore’s arguments turn on her evaluation of her own
performance. See, e.g., Mot. Summ. J. 18 (arguing that “[h]ow Kilgore perceived her
performance . . . is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment”). In some circumstances, a
plaintiff’s assertion that her job performance was satisfactory can show that the plaintiff was
meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations. See Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161,
1171–72 (7th Cir. 1997). However, an employee’s “own evaluation of [her] work cannot be
imputed to [the employer], and is insufficient to permit [her] case to survive past summary
judgment.” Dickerson v. Bd. of Trustees of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 603 (7th Cir.
2011); see also Lauth v. Covance, Inc., 863 F.3d 708, 715–16 (7th Cir. 2017); Wyninger v. New
Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 980 (7th Cir. 2004) (“An employee’s self-evaluation cannot

create an issue of fact about an employer’s honest assessment of inadequate performance.”).
When deciding whether an employee met employer’s expectations, courts must look at the
employee’s “job performance through the eyes of her supervisors at the time. The question is not
whether the [employer’s performance] ratings were right but whether the employer’s description
of its reason is honest.” Khungar, 985 F.3d at 574 (alteration and emphasis in original)
(quotation marks omitted).
The core disagreement here is a factual one about how Stockton evaluated Kilgore’s
work—Stockton says Kilgore had repeated errors requiring frequent verbal corrections and
Kilgore says she never received any verbal corrections at all. This is different than a plaintiff
asserting he fulfilled work expectations despite at least a year’s worth of mediocre to poor

performance evaluations, Denisi v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 99 F.3d 860, 865–66 (7th Cir.
1996); a doctor-plaintiff asserting she was meeting her employer’s expectations despite
documented complaints from patients, staff, and a “final warning” about violating policies,
Khungar, 985 F.3d at 574–75; a plaintiff arguing she met her employer’s expectations while
aware that supervisors “were dissatisfied with her performance,” Wyninger, 361 F.3d at 980; or a
plaintiff asserting his performance was “at least good” in an affidavit in an attempt to overcome
performance evaluations rating his overall work as “[u]nsatisfactory,” Dickerson, 657 F.3d at
602–03. In this case, unlike the others, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether
Kilgore’s performance was truly unsatisfactory such that a reasonable jury could credit Kilgore’s
testimony that she never received verbal corrections over Stockton’s testimony that she
consistently had to manage Kilgore’s work.
The Zoo raises a few other arguments, see Mot. Summ. J. 14–15; however, because “an
employer’s dishonest explanation of a decision can, by itself, support an inference that its real

reason was unlawful,” Vichio, 88 F.4th at 695 (quotation marks omitted), and Kilgore has
established a dispute of material fact as to the honesty of the Zoo’s explanation for its decision,
her claims for disparate treatment must survive summary judgment.
c. Retaliation
Kilgore brings retaliation claims under the ADA and IHRA alleging that the Zoo declined
to rehire her for the 2024 season in retaliation for her accommodation request. Compl. 10–12.
The ADA provides that “[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such
individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such
individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under [it].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To establish a prima facie case of

retaliation, a “plaintiff must prove that [she] engaged in protected activity and suffered an
adverse employment action, and that there is a causal link between the two.” Lord v. High
Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). At summary judgment, “the
plaintiff[] must produce evidence that a retaliatory motive actually influenced the decision-
maker, not merely that it could have.” Brown v. Advoc. S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1108
(7th Cir. 2012) (affirming a grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer where “the
plaintiffs’ argument for retaliatory animus relies entirely on speculation”). A plaintiff can prove
causation through either the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas or
through an evaluation of the evidence as a whole. See Dickerson, 657 F.3d at 601.
The Zoo argues that, under either framework, Kilgore’s retaliation claims fail because of
a lack of evidence. Mot. Summ. J. 15–18. Kilgore responds that she has provided sufficient
evidence that a reasonable jury could find that the Zoo’s decision not to rehire her was
retaliation. Resp. 11–12. As the Zoo argues, Kilgore’s retaliation claims cannot succeed under

the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework because she has not provided any evidence
of similarly-situated comparators. Mot. Summ. J. 16–17; see Dickerson, 657 F.3d at 601–02
(outlining that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that she “(1)
engaged in protected activity; (2) was performing [her] job satisfactorily; and (3) was singled out
for an adverse employment action that similarly situated employees who did not engage in
protected activity did not suffer”). Nevertheless, her retaliation claims survive under the Ortiz
holistic review. As such, the Court focuses its analysis on Kilgore’s retaliation claims under
Ortiz.
Under the Ortiz framework of holistic review, the Court must consider the evidence as a
whole and ask whether a reasonable jury could draw an inference of retaliation. Rowlands, 901

F.3d at 801. “[T]he mere fact that [a plaintiff] requested accommodations and was subsequently
terminated is not sufficient in itself to show causation.” Adzogble v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc.,
677 F. Supp. 3d 770, 789 (C.D. Ill. 2023). As with disparate treatment, plaintiffs often present
circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Monroe, 871 F.3d at 504. Kilgore bases her
argument on temporal proximity, “when viewed alongside the undisputed absence of any
documented performance deficiencies, the lack of written evaluations or discipline, and the
evidence that [Kilgore] had successfully performed the receptionist role and received positive
feedback.” Resp. 12. Contrary to Kilgore’s characterization, the temporal proximity in this case
is not strong—Kilgore engaged in protected activity during her employment, which ended in
October, and was not informed of the Zoo’s decision not to hire her for the 2024 season until the
following February, a few weeks after the 2024 season application reopened. See Jan. 18, 2024
Email, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 10, ECF No. 27-10 (informing several people, including Kilgore, that
the 2024 applications were open); see also Feb. 8, 2024 Email, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 20, ECF No.

27-20 (informing Kilgore that she was not selected for the 2024 season). Additionally, there is
no evidence of ambiguous statements or behavior towards other disabled employees. In fact,
Kilgore herself mentioned another disabled temporary seasonal employee who was consistently
rehired despite frequent mistakes. Kilgore Dep. 120:14–22. Kilgore presents no evidence of
similarly situated employees outside of the protected group who received better treatment. See
generally Resp.
Nevertheless, Kilgore has established a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the
Zoo’s asserted reasons for not re-hiring her for 2024 was pretextual. See supra Section II(b). As
this is sufficient to survive summary judgment, cf. Robertson v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 949 F.3d
371, 382 (7th Cir. 2020) (entering summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer

“because there is no material issue of fact as to whether its reason for not hiring [the plaintiff] is
pretext for retaliation”), the Zoo’s motion for summary judgment as to Kilgore’s retaliation
claims is denied.
d. Hostile Work Environment
Kilgore brings hostile work environment claims under the ADA and IHRA against the
Zoo. Compl. 9–10. A work environment is hostile when it “is permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions
of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21
(internal citations omitted). Hostile work environment claims are “composed of a series of
separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)).
Plaintiffs bringing a hostile work environment claim must show: “(1) the work environment was
both subjectively and objectively offensive; (2) the harassment was based on [their disability];

(3) the conduct was severe or pervasive; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.”
Trahanas v. Nw. Univ., 64 F.4th 842, 853 (7th Cir. 2023); Ford v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,
942 F.3d 839, 856 (7th Cir. 2019).
Kilgore’s hostile work environment claims cannot survive summary judgment. She has
not identified a genuine dispute of material fact as to the severity or pervasiveness of any
harassment and, based on the evidence in the record, no reasonable jury could find that the
harassment was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create a
hostile or abusive working environment. To determine whether conduct is severe or pervasive,
courts “consider the totality of the circumstances.” Scaife v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 49
F.4th 1109, 1116 (7th Cir. 2022). This includes consideration of “(1) the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; (2) how offensive a reasonable person would deem it to be; (3) whether
it is physically threatening or humiliating conduct as opposed to verbal abuse; (4) whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance; and (5) whether it is directed at
the victim.” Id.
First, the discriminatory conduct—not providing Kilgore with an appropriate space to eat
her lunch—occurred every shift she worked after informing Stockton that she could not eat at the
breakroom table. Regardless of whether Kilgore’s lunch was actually interrupted by Williams’s
arrival on any given day, Kilgore’s daily experience was one of eating lunch in isolation and
frequent interruption. Cf. Hall v. City of Chicago, 713 F.3d 325, 334 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding
that isolation of a female employee in combination with occasional outbursts was sufficient to
establish a hostile work environment claim). Second, a reasonable person would find the lack of
a dependable location to eat lunch challenging and disappointing, but they would not find
Kilgore’s lunch situation to be so offensive as to constitute a hostile work environment. Third,

Kilgore did not find eating at Williams’s desk humiliating, Kilgore Dep. 84:2–5; however, she
did find it humiliating to be at the desk when Williams arrived, id. 92:3–6, and felt “very
humiliated” to learn that Jackson thought it was not appropriate for her to eat at the bench, id.
69:13–22. Fourth, Kilgore has presented no evidence at all indicating that her lack of a
consistent place to eat lunch unreasonably interfered with her performance at work—she
discussed the ways in which it took an emotional toll on her and unpredictably impacted her
lunch break, but ultimately presented nothing suggesting any sort of negative impact on her
performance. See generally, Kilgore Dep. And fifth, the conduct was directed at Kilgore.
Although some of these factors weigh slightly in Kilgore’s favor, when considering the
totality of the circumstances, she cannot establish that the conduct was sufficiently severe or

pervasive as to interfere with her work performance. Her lunch experience was isolating, but it
did not rise to the level of that in Hall, in which the plaintiff’s supervisor “assign[ed] her
unnecessary menial work and prevent[ed] others from interacting with her,” as well as
“sporadically intimidating and directing anger at her.” Hall, 713 F.3d at 331. Despite Kilgore’s
humiliation when learning of Jackson’s feelings and when Williams arrived to her desk while
Kilgore was on her lunch break, the absence of abuse or threats, as well as the lack of
humiliation for eating at Williams’s desk generally, weakens Kilgore’s claim. When comparing
these with the fact that no reasonable person would find her lack of a place to eat lunch to
constitute a hostile work environment and that she has provided no indication that it
unreasonably interfered with her work performance, a reasonable jury could not find that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of her employment.
See, e.g., Milligan-Grimstad v. Stanley, 877 F.3d 705, 714 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding the claim was
not sufficiently severe or pervasive because “[t]hough [superior’s] conduct was pervasive, it was

not physically threatening, nor did it interfere with [the plaintiff’s] work performance.”); Yancick
v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 544 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[The court] will not find a hostile
work environment for mere offensive conduct that is isolated, does not interfere with the
plaintiff’s work performance, and is not physically threatening or humiliating.”). For these
reasons, the Zoo’s motion for summary judgment on Kilgore’s hostile work environment claims
is granted.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Rock Island County Forest Preserve, doing business as Niabi Zoo’s, motion
for summary judgment, ECF No. 27, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff
Katy Kilgore’s claims for hostile work environment under the ADA and IHRA are dismissed;

her claims for failure to accommodate, disparate treatment, and retaliation under the ADA and
IHRA survive. The proposed pretrial order is due on September 30, 2026, the final pretrial
conference is set for 1:30 p.m. on October 7, 2026, and the trial is set for 9:00 a.m. on November
30, 2026. The final pretrial conference and the trial will both take place in Courtroom A in the
Rock Island Federal Courthouse at 1701 4th Ave. Rock Island, Illinois 61201.
Entered this 22nd day of April, 2026.
s/ Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11314324. Public record. Not legal advice.