# California Attorney General Opinion 24-802

> California Attorney General Reports · April 22, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11314231

## Case

- **Court:** California Attorney General Reports
- **Decided:** April 22, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California

ROB BONTA
Attorney General

_______________

:
OPINION :
: No. 24-802
of :
: April 22, 2026
ROB BONTA :
Attorney General :
:
KARIM J. KENTFIELD :
Senior Assistant Attorney General :
:
NICOLE WELINDT :
Deputy Attorney General :

The SAN DIEGO POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION has applied for leave to
sue the CITY OF SAN DIEGO and the SAN DIEGO CITY COUNCIL in quo warranto.
In a previous quo warranto lawsuit, the superior court invalidated San Diego City Charter
provisions added by a 2012 ballot initiative, Proposition B. The Association contends
that the earlier quo warranto judgment requires the City to restore pre-Proposition B
benefits coverage in the San Diego Municipal Code.

The Association’s proposed lawsuit meets all three of the Attorney General’s
criteria to grant leave to sue: quo warranto is the appropriate remedy; the application
raises a substantial legal issue; and resolution of that issue would serve the public
interest. Consequently, we GRANT leave to sue.

BACKGROUND

Although the legal remedy of quo warranto is commonly used to contest a
person’s entitlement to hold public office, it may also be used to challenge an amendment

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to a city or county charter. 1 This quo warranto application concerns an amendment to the
San Diego City Charter that San Diego voters approved in 2012 through a ballot initiative
titled “Proposition B.” 2 In 2021, a court declared Proposition B invalid in a previous quo
warranto judgment. The applicant is the San Diego Police Officers’ Association, which
represents city police officers holding the rank of captain and below. The Association,
which was not a party to the earlier suit, seeks to enforce the judgment against the City of
San Diego and its City Council (collectively, the City) by requiring the City to restore a
pre-Proposition B Municipal Code provision. To put the requested relief in context, we
begin by describing the charter amendment at issue and the history of related litigation.

Before Proposition B’s enactment, City employees were generally eligible for a
defined benefit pension plan. 3 Proposition B provided that most new employees would
instead receive a 401(k)-style defined contribution plan. 4 The initiative amended the City
Charter to add section 140, which stated that most City employees hired on or after the
Proposition took effect would be eligible for a defined contribution plan only. 5

The dispute here centers on the pension benefits of police recruits. While City
Charter section 140 excluded most new employees from the defined benefit plan, it
included a carve-out for “sworn police officers,” who remained eligible for the defined
benefit plan. 6 But because police recruits are not sworn officers until they graduate from
the Police Academy, newly hired police recruits could no longer participate in the defined

1
See, e.g., 103 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 4-5 (2020); 96 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 3 (2013);
76 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 169, 169 (1993).
2
See Boling v. Public Employment Relations Board (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 904-911
(Boling I).
3
Id. at p. 904. A defined benefit plan pays out based on factors such as income level,
years of service at retirement, and age at retirement. (See In re Marriage of Bergman
(1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 742, 748, fn. 4.) A defined contribution plan, by contrast, pays
out based on the value of the contributions made. (See ibid.)
4
Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 904-907; see San Diego City Charter, art. IX, § 140
(effective July 20, 2012).
5
Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 903-907; see San Diego City Charter, art. IX, § 140,
supra (“[A]ll Officers and employees, with the exception of sworn police officers, who
are initially hired or assume office on or after the effective date of this Section shall
participate only in such Defined Contribution Plans as authorized” by the City Charter).
6
San Diego City Charter, art. IX, § 140, supra (authorizing the City Council “to enroll
sworn police officers hired after the effective date of this section in either the Defined
Benefit Plan or the Defined Contribution Plan”). Proposition B enacted other changes to
the pension benefits of sworn police officers that are not at issue here.

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benefit plan during their six months of Academy time. To implement these changes, the
City amended the San Diego Municipal Code to conform to section 140. 7

Even before Proposition B was approved by voters, a coalition of municipal
employee unions challenged its validity. 8 The challenger unions, which did not include
the Police Officers’ Association, argued that the City had violated state labor law by
failing to negotiate the pension issue with the unions before the measure was placed on
the ballot. 9 Under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), “the governing body of a
local public agency, or its designated representative” must “‘meet and confer in good
faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with
representatives of . . . recognized employee organizations.’” 10 “The duty to meet and
confer in good faith . . . requires the public agency to refrain from making unilateral
changes in employees’ wages and working conditions until the employer and employee
association have bargained to impasse.” 11 A charter city such as San Diego must comply
with the MMBA’s meet-and-confer requirements before placing an initiative measure on
the ballot that would affect matters within the Act’s coverage. 12

The challenger unions filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB), a quasi-judicial administrative agency with
“jurisdiction over complaints alleging unfair labor practices violating the MMBA.” 13
After Proposition B was enacted, PERB agreed with the unions that the City had violated
the MMBA by failing to meet and confer with the unions before Proposition B was
placed on the ballot. 14 The City then challenged PERB’s decision in court, and,
ultimately, the California Supreme Court also concluded that the MMBA had been

7
San Diego Ord. No. O-20376 (June 10, 2014); see San Diego Mun. Code, ch. 2, art. IV,
div. 1, § 24.0103 (2014) (defining a “Safety Member” who is eligible for the defined
benefit plan to include “a Police Department recruit employed by the City and
participating in the City’s Police Academy, provided the recruit was initially hired by the
City before July 1, 2013,” italics added and omitted).
8
See Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 908-909.
9
See ibid.
10
Id. at p. 913, quoting Gov. Code, § 3505, ellipsis in original.
11
Id. at p. 914, internal quotation marks omitted.
12
People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d
591, 602.
Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 908; County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County
13

Employee Relations Commission (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 916.
14
See Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 909-910.

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violated. 15 The California Supreme Court remanded for the Court of Appeal to “address
the appropriate judicial remedy” for the MMBA violation. 16

On remand, the Court of Appeal held that to invalidate Proposition B, the
challenger unions had to proceed in a quo warranto action. 17 As described above, quo
warranto is a civil action used, among other purposes, to challenge an amendment to a
city or county charter. 18 The Attorney General exercises a “gatekeeping role” by
determining whether a proposed quo warranto lawsuit may proceed in court. 19 The
unions thus applied for leave to file a quo warranto lawsuit contesting Proposition B’s
validity, and the Attorney General granted the application. 20

In the ensuing quo warranto action, the superior court held that the City’s violation
of the MMBA rendered Proposition B invalid. 21 The court entered a judgment in 2021
declaring that sections of the City Charter added by Proposition B—including section
140—were “invalid, null and void.” 22 The judgment “command[ed] the City and Its City
Council” to “take all necessary steps within a reasonable period of time consistent with
the procedures which govern its legislative actions, to comply with this Judgment by
striking these 2012 Proposition B provisions from the City Charter and conforming the
San Diego Municipal Code and any other related enactments accordingly.” 23 The
superior court retained jurisdiction “for the sole purpose of determining that the City has
complied with the Judgment and the requirements set forth in the Writ.” 24

15
See id. at pp. 903-904, 910.
16
Id. at p. 920.
17
Boling v. Public Employees Relations Bd. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 376, 381 (Boling II).
18
See ante, fn. 1.
19
People ex rel. Internat. Assn. of Firefighters, etc. v. City of Palo Alto (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 602, 619-620.
20
See Cal. Atty. Gen., Indexed Letter, No. IL 19-404 (Aug. 15, 2019).
21
The People of the State of California ex. rel. San Diego Municipal Employees
Association v. City of San Diego (Super. Ct. San Diego County, Feb. 5, 2021, No. 37-
2019-00051308-CU-MC-CTL) Judgment Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 803-
809 Invalidating City of San Diego’s 2012 Proposition B Charter Amendments and
Commanding by Writ in Quo Warranto That the City and Its City Council Strike These
Invalid Amendments from Its Charter, at p. 5 (2021 Quo Warranto Judgment).
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.

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In response to the ruling, the City and the Police Officers’ Association met and
conferred over the course of several years about unwinding Proposition B. The parties
ultimately entered into an agreement with changes effective September 9, 2024. Relevant
here, the agreement provided that newly hired police recruits would once again be
eligible for the defined benefit pension plan during their Police Academy time. The City
revised the San Diego Municipal Code to provide that a City employee eligible for the
defined benefit plan includes “a Police Department recruit employed by the City and
participating in the City’s Police Academy, provided the recruit was initially hired by the
City before July 1, 2013, or on or after September 9, 2024.” 25

Although the agreement restored access to the defined benefit plan for newly hired
police recruits, it did not alter the pension benefits for those police recruits who entered
the Police Academy between July 1, 2013, and September 9, 2024. The Association
explains that the treatment of Academy time affects police officers for the rest of their
career: after police recruits graduate from the Academy and enter the defined benefit
plan as sworn officers, they will pay higher pension contributions in every paycheck than
if they had joined the defined benefit plan while at the Academy, because pension
contributions are lower when an employee joins the plan at a younger age. Because
Proposition B has been invalidated, the Association contends that the City should restore
the Municipal Code provision governing Police Academy recruits entering the Academy
between July 1, 2013, and September 9, 2024, “to its pre-Proposition B language,” as if
the Proposition had never been enacted. 26

In August 2023, before the City and the Association reached their agreement, the
Association sued the City for declaratory relief and a writ of mandate. 27 The Association
argued that the City had failed to comply with the quo warranto judgment because it had
not fully unwound Proposition B’s effects on the Municipal Code.

The superior court granted judgment for the City, concluding that the Association
lacked standing. 28 “‘A party seeking to pursue a Quo Warranto action in superior
court,’” the court explained, “‘must first obtain the Attorney General’s consent to do
so.’” 29 And “the Attorney General maintains the authority to control a quo warranto
25
San Diego Mun. Code, ch. 2, art. IV, div. 1, § 24.0103, italics omitted. The City
explains that July 1, 2013, is the date that the parties agreed Proposition B’s changes
would take effect.
26
Proposed Complaint, Prayer ¶ 1.
27
See San Diego Police Officers Association v. City of San Diego (Super. Ct. San Diego
County, June 4, 2024, No. 37-2023-00033350-CU-JR-CTL) Minute Order, at pp. 1-2
(2024 Superior Court Order).
28
Id. at p. 3.
29
Id. at pp. 1-2.

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action at all times, at any and every stage of the” proceeding—including post-judgment. 30
Applying those principles, the court held that the suit could not proceed because the
Association had not obtained the Attorney General’s permission. The court reasoned that
had the Association “attempted to intervene in the original quo warranto action to
enforce the Judgment,” the Attorney General’s permission would have been required,
“because it would be part of ‘the proceedings’ over which the Attorney General
maintains absolute and complete control.” 31 To avoid circumventing the Attorney
General’s role in controlling how quo warranto litigation “proceed[s] in a post-judgment
setting,” the court granted judgment for the City. 32

The Association then filed the application here, seeking the Attorney General’s
permission to sue the City and the City Council to enforce the quo warranto judgment.
The Association alleges that the proposed defendants have failed to comply with the
judgment because they have not unwound the effects of Proposition B on police recruits
hired between July 1, 2013, and September 9, 2024.

While this application was pending, the superior court dismissed without prejudice
the earlier quo warranto action holding that the City’s violation of the MMBA rendered
Proposition B invalid. 33 The City reports that all parties agreed dismissal was appropriate
because the City had satisfied the quo warranto judgment invalidating Proposition B.
The Association, which was not a party to that suit, maintains that the City has not fully
satisfied the judgment given Proposition B’s ongoing effects on police officer benefits.

30
Id. at p. 2, internal quotation marks omitted; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 8 (“The
Attorney General may at all times, at any and every stage of the said proceeding,
withdraw, discontinue or dismiss the same, as the Attorney General may seem fit and
proper; or may, at the Attorney General’s option, assume the management of said
proceeding at any stage thereof”); People ex rel. Southwest Exploration Co. v. City of
Huntington Beach (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 452, 455 (“[I]t is well settled that the attorney
general has control of [a quo warranto] action at all times”); Cage, People ex rel., v.
Petroleum Rectifying Co. of California (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 289, 291 (similar).
31
2024 Superior Court Order, supra, at p. 2.
32
Id. at pp. 2-3.
33
The People of the State of California ex. rel. San Diego Municipal Employees
Association v. City of San Diego (Super. Ct. San Diego County, May 30, 2025, No. 37-
2019-00051308-CU-MC-CTL), Minute Order, at p. 1 (“Counsel requests dismissal. The
Court orders the entire action dismissed without prejudice”).

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ANALYSIS

Where a party seeks to pursue a quo warranto action in superior court, that party
(the proposed relator) must apply for and obtain the Attorney General’s consent. 34 In
determining whether to authorize a quo warranto action, we do not attempt to resolve the
merits of the controversy. 35 Rather, we consider (1) whether quo warranto is an available
and appropriate remedy; (2) whether the proposed relator has raised a substantial issue of
law or fact that warrants judicial resolution; and (3) whether authorizing the quo warranto
action will serve the public interest. 36

Here, the answer to all three questions is “yes.” We therefore grant leave to sue.

1. Availability of the Quo Warranto Remedy

Quo warranto is a civil action used to challenge an amendment to a city charter,
among other purposes. 37 Code of Civil Procedure section 803, which codifies the quo
warranto remedy, provides that “[a]n action may be brought by the attorney-general, in
the name of the people of this state . . . upon a complaint of a private party . . . against
any corporation . . . which usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any
franchise, within this state.” As a charter city, the City of San Diego is a public
“corporation.” 38 And “franchise” means “right” or “privilege” and includes a city
charter. 39 Because quo warranto is available “to determine whether a public corporation
is unlawfully holding or exercising a right or privilege (‘franchise’), . . . it is an
appropriate remedy by which to challenge the validity of the process by which a city or
county charter was enacted or amended.” 40 In the employment context, “an employee
organization of a charter city, with the Attorney General’s permission, may sue the city in

34
Nicolopulos v. City of Lawndale (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1228-1229.
35
Rando v. Harris (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 868, 879.
36
Ibid.; 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 15, 20 (1989).
See Code Civ. Proc., § 803; ante, fn. 1; International Assn. of Fire Fighters v. City of
37

Oakland (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 687, 694.
38
See 103 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 4; International Assn. of Fire Fighters v. City
of Oakland, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 694.
39
103 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 4.
40
Ibid., internal quotation marks omitted; see 96 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 36, 39 (2013);
International Assn. of Fire Fighters v. City of Oakland, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 694
(the State delegates part of its sovereign power to public corporations, so when such
corporations do not comply with state laws governing the lawmaking process, “they are
usurping franchise rights as against [the] paramount authority” of the State); People ex
rel. Kerr v. County of Orange (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 914, 920, fn. 3.

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quo warranto to challenge the validity of a charter amendment on the ground that the city
unlawfully exercised its franchise by placing the amendment on the ballot without first
complying with the MMBA’s consultation requirements.” 41

Here, the court in the earlier quo warranto suit declared Proposition B invalid
because of the City’s MMBA violation. 42 As explained above, however, the Association
believes that the City has not fully complied with that judgment. 43 The Association
therefore seeks to sue the City to obtain compliance. But the superior court ruled that the
relief the Association seeks would be tantamount to enforcing the judgment in that earlier
quo warranto suit, so the Association must first obtain the Attorney General’s approval. 44

Despite having prevailed in superior court on the argument that the Association
must obtain the Attorney General’s permission to proceed, the City now argues that quo
warranto relief is not available. Because the Association was not a party before PERB,
the City contends that there has been no finding that the City violated the MMBA as to
the Association’s rights. The City also argues that even if quo warranto were appropriate,
the Association would need to intervene in the prior quo warranto lawsuit invalidating
Proposition B, but the Association does not meet the legal standard for intervention. And
given the prior action’s dismissal, the City contends that there is no remaining suit in
which the Association could intervene.

We decline to disagree with the superior court’s conclusion that the Association
must obtain the Attorney General’s approval to enforce the 2021 quo warranto judgment.
The superior court reasoned that the Association’s claim “involves the post-judgment
phase of a quo warranto action,” the Association “is an interested person under the”
earlier quo warranto judgment, and the Association “may not circumvent the law as to
quo warranto actions” by proceeding without the Attorney General’s permission. 45
Having carefully considered the superior court’s reasoning and the authorities submitted
by the City and the Association, we see no reason to disagree with the court’s analysis in
the circumstances of this case. The City may raise in court its various procedural
41
103 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 4; see Boling II, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 384-
386; People ex rel. Internat. Assn. of Firefighters, etc. v. City of Palo Alto, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at pp. 612-615; 96 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 1-3;
95 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 31, 31-33 (2012).
42
See 2021 Quo Warranto Judgment, supra, at p. 5 (commanding the City and City
Council “to take all necessary steps . . . to comply with this Judgment by striking these
2012 Proposition B provisions from the City Charter and conforming the San Diego
Municipal Code and any other related enactments accordingly”).
43
See ante, fns. 27-35 & accompanying text.
44
See 2024 Superior Court Order, supra, at p. 2.
45
Ibid.

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arguments, including whether the Association may seek to enforce the quo warranto
judgment in a separate lawsuit or must proceed by way of intervention, and whether the
Association could satisfy the standards for intervention under the circumstances
presented here. Those procedural issues involve fact-specific inquiries not suitable for
resolution here. 46

2. Substantial Issue of Law or Fact Warranting Judicial Resolution

We next examine whether the application presents a substantial issue of law or
fact warranting judicial resolution. The Association seeks restoration of the pre-
Proposition B Municipal Code provision relevant to the benefits of Police Academy
recruits. The Association argues that the final judgment rendering “invalid, null and
void” the City Charter sections added by Proposition B and commanding the City to
“conform[] the San Diego Municipal Code . . . accordingly” requires returning that Code
provision to the position it would have been in absent Proposition B. The City disagrees.
It argues that the Association is not entitled to the restoration of pre-Proposition B
benefits for any of its members on the ground that quo warranto judgments do not result
in retroactive remedies.

We conclude that there is a substantial issue regarding the meaning of the prior
quo warranto judgment. The superior court “command[ed] the City and Its City
Council . . . to take all necessary steps . . . to comply with this Judgment by striking these
2012 Proposition B provisions from the City Charter and conforming the San Diego
Municipal Code . . . accordingly.” 47 The Association argues that the City has not done
so, because the City has not fully restored the pre-Proposition B Municipal Code
provision governing certain Police Academy recruit benefits. The Association has raised
a substantial issue as to what the judgment requires, and we leave it to the superior court
to interpret its own judgment.

In arguing to the contrary, the City invokes the de facto officer doctrine. The de
facto officer doctrine holds that the “lawful acts” of “[o]ne who claims to be a public
officer while in possession of an office,” “if done within the scope and by the apparent
authority of office,” are “valid and binding,” even if a court later concludes that the
officer was unlawfully holding office at the time. 48 For example, if an officer were
removed from office in a quo warranto action for not meeting the office’s residency
requirement, the de facto officer doctrine may prevent challenges to the officer’s lawful
46
For example, the timeliness standard for intervention under Code of Civil Procedure
section 387 involves a “totality of circumstances” analysis considering “prejudice” and
“the reason for the delay.” (Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Lacy (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 560, 574.)
47
2021 Quo Warranto Judgment, supra, at p. 5.
48
Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc. v. Ensher (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 250, 255.

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acts taken before their removal. 49 Allowing challenges to a removed officer’s actions
could have a “debilitating effect” on government operations by “plac[ing] in jeopardy
many if not all of the actions taken by” the officer over an extended period of time. 50 By
barring such claims, the de facto officer doctrine protects “third persons” against
“inconsistency, confusion and insecurity of rights.” 51

Beyond the context of public officials, the doctrine has also been applied to bar
challenges to the actions of a municipal corporation that is later determined to have been
illegally formed. In McPhee v. Reclamation Dist. No. 765, a reclamation district sought
to levy assessments on lands within the district “to pay the cost of reclamation work.” 52
A landowner refused to pay and sued the district in quo warranto, arguing that the
assessment was invalid because the district itself was illegally organized. 53 The
California Supreme Court explained that the landowner would have to pay the assessment
regardless of the outcome of the suit: if the “reclamation district was a de facto
corporation, a judgment in quo warranto, even though it should determine that the district
had not been legally organized, would not annul or affect the acts performed by it before
the judgment in quo warranto.” 54

Citing McPhee, the City contends that the Association cannot challenge the San
Diego Municipal Code sections enacted to implement Proposition B. A quo warranto
judgment may invalidate a city charter amendment on a prospective basis, the City
argues, but it cannot call into question the amendment’s effects before it was declared
unlawful. In our view, there is at least a substantial question whether the de facto officer
doctrine applies here. Although courts have applied the doctrine to bar challenges to the
otherwise-lawful acts of a municipal corporation where the entity lacked legal status at
the time, the challenge here is not to the City of San Diego’s lawful status. 55 Instead,
relators seek to enforce a judgment invalidating a Municipal Code provision enacted to

49
See 108 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 130, 135-137 (2025).
50
Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Com. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1, 55-56 & fn.
26.
51
Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc. v. Ensher, supra, 238 Cal.App.2d at p. 255.
52
McPhee v. Reclamation Dist. No. 765 (1911) 161 Cal. 566, 567-568.
53
Id. at pp. 568-569.
54
Id. at pp. 571-572.
55
E.g., Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Com., supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 54-57
(doctrine barred retrospective challenge to Commission’s actions based on claim that the
officials had been unlawfully appointed); McPhee v. Reclamation Dist. No. 765, supra,
161 Cal. at pp. 571-572 (doctrine barred challenge to municipal corporation’s tax
assessments on the basis that the corporation had been illegally organized).

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implement Proposition B, which was itself held unlawful. 56 The City has not cited any
authorities applying the de facto officer doctrine in the context of a challenge to a city
charter amendment. We need not attempt to resolve the merits of this dispute; we simply
conclude that there is a substantial issue warranting judicial resolution. 57

The court of appeal’s decision in People ex rel. International Association of
Firefighters v. City of Palo Alto further supports that conclusion. There, the court
evaluated the proper remedy in a quo warranto action related to an unlawful city charter
amendment. 58 The court acknowledged McPhee and the de facto officer doctrine. 59 It
nonetheless instructed the trial court “to issue an order that commands the city to restore
the preamendment portion of article V of the city’s charter, invalidates Measure D, and
provides any other appropriate relief consistent with the views herein.” 60 A court may
conclude that the Palo Alto court’s decision to restore the pre-amendment charter
language supports the Association’s position here that a court could restore the pre-
Proposition B Municipal Code language by enforcing the 2021 quo warranto judgment.

3. Public Interest in Favor of Authorizing Suit

Finally, we conclude that granting leave to sue will serve the public interest.
Generally, the existence of a substantial question of law or fact presents a sufficient
“public purpose” to permit an action in quo warranto. 61 That is particularly true here,
where the dispute involves important public concerns such as public employee pensions
and the application of state labor law. The City argues that there are countervailing
circumstances, such that the action is not in the public interest. Taking each point in turn,
we conclude that the City’s considerations do not alter our conclusion.

First, the City reports that unwinding Proposition B for Police Academy recruits
would cost at least $6 million. The City argues that it would not serve the public interest
for it to spend such a substantial sum when the quo warranto judgment does not require it
to do so. But the amount of money at stake only reinforces the importance of a judicial
resolution to this dispute. If a court ultimately concludes that the quo warranto judgment

See San Diego Ord. No. O-20376, supra (explaining that the City had to amend the
56

Municipal Code “to conform” to section 140).
57
Rando v. Harris, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 879.
58
People ex rel. Internat. Assn. of Firefighters, etc. v. City of Palo Alto, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at pp. 608, 616.
59
Id. at p. 621, fn. 7.
60
Id. at p. 627.
61
E.g., 98 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 94, 101 (2015); 95 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 77, 87 (2012).

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requires the City to restore benefits, then it will serve the public interest for affected City
employees to receive the benefits to which they are entitled.

Second, the City argues that it would not serve the public interest to grant leave to
sue because only a “sector of [SDPOA]’s membership” remains affected by Proposition
B. But resolving a legal issue may serve the public interest even where a relatively small
number of individuals are affected. Indeed, we have previously granted leave to sue
where only a specific group is affected. 62

Third, the City contends that retroactively converting benefits could jeopardize the
pension plan’s tax status, triggering detrimental consequences for the City and its
employees. The Association disagrees. To the extent the City has identified a “practical
concern” with the requested relief, “we view it as a factor for the court to consider in
fashioning [a] remedy, not as a bar to granting leave to sue.” 63

Finally, the City alleges that the Association failed to negotiate in good faith over
the unwinding of Proposition B. The City filed an unfair practice charge with PERB over
the Association’s alleged bad faith, and PERB issued a complaint against the Association.
The Association defends its negotiating practices. To the extent this fact-intensive
dispute is material, the City will be free to raise it in court. 64

Accordingly, the application for leave to sue in quo warranto is GRANTED.

62
See, e.g., 95 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 31 (City of Bakersfield public safety
officers); 96 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 1 (City of San Jose police officers).
63
105 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 101, 109 (2022).
64
See 106 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 151, 154 (2023) (“The superior court will be in a position
to evaluate and weigh conflicting evidence and argument . . . in reaching its ultimate
conclusion . . .”).

12
24-802

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11314231. Public record. Not legal advice.