# Mendoza

> District Court, W.D. Missouri · April 21, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11313834

## Case

- **Full name:** Daniela Mendoza v. Annett Holdings, Inc., Terrence Dixon
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** April 21, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
ST. JOSEPH DIVISION
DANIELA MENDOZA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 5:26-cv-06016-RK
)
ANNETT HOLDINGS, INC., TERRENCE )
DIXON, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
This is a negligence action against the driver of a commercial motor vehicle and his
employer following an accident. Before the Court is Defendant Annett Holdings, Inc.’s motion to
dismiss and/or strike certain paragraphs of Plaintiff’s petition. (Doc. 10.) The motion is fully
briefed. (Docs. 11, 17.) After careful consideration and review, the Court ORDERS that the
motion to dismiss and/or strike is DENIED without prejudice.
Background
Plaintiff filed this negligence action against Defendants Annett Holdings, Inc. (“Annett”)
and Terrence Dixon in the Circuit Court of Platte County, Missouri, on December 15, 2025. (Doc.
1-1.) The action arises from a cargo-related motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff alleges that while
she was driving on the interstate, Defendant Dixon was operating a commercial motor vehicle with
a flatbed trailer when unsecured and improperly distributed cargo came off the trailer and collided
with Plaintiff’s motor vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Defendant Dixon’s commercial motor vehicle was
owned, leased, or otherwise possessed by Defendant Annett, and Defendant Dixon was operating
the vehicle within the course and scope of his employment with Defendant Annett. (Id. at ¶ 8.)
As against Defendant Annett, Plaintiff alleges claims for both direct negligence (inadequate
policies and procedures and negligent hiring, training, supervision) and vicarious liability for
Defendant Dixon’s negligent operation of the commercial motor vehicle by virtue of the
employment relationship. (Id. at ¶ 14.) In Defendant Annett’s answer, it admits that Defendant
Dixon was its employee and acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the
accident, and therefore, “the doctrine of respondeat superior applies.” (Doc. 12 at ¶ 8.) On January
22, 2026, Defendants removed this action to the District Court of the Western District of Missouri,
and Defendant Annett filed its motion to dismiss and/or strike on the same day.
Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim is facially plausible where the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Wilson v. Ark. Dept. of Human Servs., 850 F.3d 368, 371 (8th Cir.
2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While a complaint does not need to include
detailed factual allegations, the complaint must allege more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant acted unlawfully to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. When considering a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, the well-pled allegations in the complaint must be accepted as
true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brown v. Conagra Brands,
Inc., 131 F.4th 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2025).
As to Defendants’ motion to strike portions of the petition, Rule 12(f) permits the Court to
“strike from a pleading any insufficient defense, or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.” “While striking a party’s pleadings is an extreme and disfavored measure,
judges have broad discretion to do so when appropriate under Rule 12(f).” Owens v. Pugsley,
No. 25-00806-CV-W-JAM, 2026 WL 194816, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2026) (citing Stanbury L.
Firm v. I.R.S., 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000); BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 478
F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir. 2007)).
Discussion
Defendant Annett moves to dismiss and/or strike Plaintiff’s direct negligence claims
asserted against it (subparts g and h of paragraph 14), arguing that because it has admitted
respondeat superior liability, Plaintiff cannot plead an alternative theory of direct negligence.
Defendant Annett relies on State ex rel. McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo. banc 1995),
a case where an automobile accident victim, Laura McHaffie, sued the other driver and his
employers for negligence arising from the accident. McHaffie alleged two theories of liability
against the driver’s employers—vicarious liability and direct liability based upon claims of
negligent hiring and supervision of the truck driver. The employers appealed following a jury
verdict in favor of the McHaffie, arguing that she should not have been permitted to pursue theories
of vicarious and direct liability simultaneously at trial. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed and
adopted the majority view “that once an employer has admitted respondeat superior liability for a
driver’s negligence, it is improper to allow a plaintiff to proceed against the employer on any other
theory of imputed liability.” Id. at 826.
Defendant Annett’s argument is misplaced for two reasons. First, McHaffie addressed
whether multiple theories of liability may be submitted to the jury—not whether such theories may
be pleaded in the alternative at the outset of litigation. At the pleading stage in district court, Rule
8(d) expressly permits a party to assert alternative and even inconsistent claims. That distinction
is significant. See Owens v. Pugsley, No. 25-00806-CV-W-JAM, 2026 WL 194816, at *3 (W.D.
Mo. Jan. 26, 2026) (“the McHaffie Rule does not prohibit a plaintiff from pleading alternative
theories of recovery at the outset of litigation”); Lawler v. Baylor Trucking, Inc., No. 4:24-CV-
00567-SEP, 2025 WL 986914, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2025) (“reliance on McHaffie at this early
stage of litigation is misplaced because ‘the holding in McHaffie concerns the assessment of fault
and submission of evidence at trial and does not prevent Plaintiff from pleading alternative theories
of recovery under respondeat superior and negligent hiring, training, and supervision’”). The
Court will not require Plaintiff to elect between potentially viable theories of liability before
discovery has occurred and the factual record has been developed.
Second, Plaintiff argues that dismissal of her direct negligence claims will deprive her “of
the opportunity to discover facts that may provide a reasonable basis for an exception to the
McHaffie Rule, like punitive damages.” (Doc. 17 at 8.) The Court agrees.
In 2013, the Missouri Court of Appeals expressly held that a punitive damages exception
to McHaffie exists, reasoning:
If an employer’s hiring, training, supervision, or entrustment practices can be
characterized as demonstrating complete indifference or a conscious disregard for
the safety of others, then the plaintiff would be required to present additional
evidence, above and beyond demonstrating the employee’s negligence, to support
a claim for punitive damages. Unlike in the McHaffie scenario, this evidence would
have a relevant, non-prejudicial purpose. And because the primary concern in
McHaffie was the introduction of extraneous, potentially prejudicial evidence, we
believe that the rule announced in McHaffie does not apply where punitive damages
are claimed against the employer, thus making the additional evidence both relevant
and material.
Wilson v. Image Flooring, LLC, 400 S.W.3d 386, 392-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).1
Federal district courts have generally applied Wilson at the motion-to-dismiss stage and
“have held that where an employer might be liable for punitive damages under theories of liability
other than respondeat superior, a plaintiff may assert alternative theories of liability against the
employer even where the employer has admitted respondeat superior liability.” Mason v.
Robinson, No. 4:22CV649 HEA, 2023 WL 2913574, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 12, 2023); see, e.g.,
Owens, 2026 WL 194816, at *2-3 (recognizing Wilson’s punitive damages exception to McHaffie;
explaining that dismissal of alternative negligence theories at the pleading stage may prevent a
plaintiff from developing the facts necessary to support a claim for punitive damages; collecting
federal cases applying Wilson’s punitive damages exception).
However, Wilson also held that “in order to invoke the punitive damages exception, the
plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages—i.e. factual
allegations indicating the defendant willfully, wantonly, or maliciously injured the plaintiff by its
tortious act.” Kyles v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., No. 6:15-CV-03193-MDH, 2015 WL
6143953, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 19, 2015) (citing Wilson, 400 S.W.3d at 393-94).
Plaintiff acknowledges that she did not allege punitive damages in her Complaint,
originally filed in state court—§ 510.261.5, RSMo, bars her from doing so.2 But, Plaintiff argues
that Defendant Annett could be liable for punitive damages that could not otherwise be assessed
against Defendant Dixon, which would require her “to present additional evidence, above and
beyond demonstrating [Defendant Dixon’s] negligence” to support that claim. Wilson, 400 S.W.3d
at 393. The Court agrees. Dismissal of Plaintiff’s direct negligence claims at this juncture is
premature. See Aubuchon v. Tate Trucking, LLC, No. 4:24CV189 HEA, 2024 WL 4285880, at *5
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2024) (“Plaintiff may seek to amend her claims to include punitive damages
and may need to obtain discovery (and eventually present evidence) in support of any claims for
punitive damages that go above and beyond demonstrating [defendant-employer’s] negligence.”).

1 In McHaffie, the Missouri Supreme Court noted that it was “possible that an employer or an
entrustor may be liable for punitive damages which would not be assessed against the employee/entrustee,”
but it declined to rule on a punitive damages exception because that issue was not present. 891 S.W.2d at
826.
2 Section 510.261.5, RSMo, prohibits a claim for punitive damages in an initial pleading.
Defendants removed this action to federal court on January 22, 2026, and Defendant Annett filed its motion
to dismiss and/or strike on the same day. (Docs. 1, 10.)
Because Plaintiff has a sufficient legal basis to set forth alternative negligence theories at
this juncture, Defendant Annett’s motion to dismiss and/or strike is DENIED without prejudice.
Conclusion
After careful consideration and review, the Court ORDERS that Defendants’ motion to
dismiss and/or strike is DENIED without prejudice.

s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATED: April 21, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11313834. Public record. Not legal advice.