# HOHSFIELD

> District Court, D. New Jersey · February 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11312677

## Case

- **Full name:** David Hohsfield v. Commissioner of Social Security, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** February 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

DAVID HOHSFIELD,

Plaintiff,
Civil A. No. 25-2673
v. (RMB)

COMMISSIONER OF OPINION
SOCIAL SECURITY, et al.,

Defendants.

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon the filing of a Complaint and
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) by pro se Plaintiff David Hohsfield.
[Compl. (Docket No. 1); IFP (Docket No. 4).]1 Plaintiff’s IFP application establishes
his financial eligibility to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and will be
granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons explained herein, upon screening,
however, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.

1 At the time he filed his Complaint and IFP application, Plaintiff was
incarcerated at South Woods State Prison. He has recently advised the Court that he
is no longer incarcerated, but that he does not yet a new mailing address [Docket
No. 6]. Once Plaintiff has obtained a new mailing address, he is required to submit a
notice of address change within seven (7) days, consistent with District of New Jersey
Local Civil Rule 10.1(a).
I. SCREENING FOR DISMISSAL
When a person files a complaint and is granted IFP status,
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) requires courts to review the complaint and dismiss claims

that: (1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. Courts, however, must liberally construe pleadings that are filed pro se.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is the same as that for dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122
(3d Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). And while “detailed factual allegations” are not
necessary, a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Legal conclusions,
together with threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, do not suffice to
state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
II. THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested and incarcerated in September 2020 and
remained incarcerated until January 2022. [Compl. at 3.] Prior to his release, the

Gloucester County Superior Court dismissed and expunged the criminal charges
against him. [Id.] Upon his release, Plaintiff allegedly went to his local Social Security
Administration office in Neptune, New Jersey and “inquired into being paid”
retroactive benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(x) in light of the dismissal of his criminal
charges. He alleges that the Social Security employee told him that “his request for

retroactive benefits would have to be reviewed by another for approval.” [Id.] Plaintiff
claims that he has not received any further information from the Social Security
Administration regarding his request for retroactive benefits, despite having “made
many good faith attempts to resolve this issue with Social Security with negative
results.” [Id.] He does not set forth the nature of these alleged “good faith attempts.”

III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Court has an independent obligation to satisfy itself of its subject matter
jurisdiction, and the Court “always has jurisdiction to determine its [own]
jurisdiction.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)). “A federal court has subject

matter jurisdiction over civil actions arising under ‘the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States’ (federal question jurisdiction) and civil actions between citizens
of different states with the amount in controversy exceeding the sum or value of
$75,000 (diversity jurisdiction).” Rockefeller v. Comcast Corp., 424 F. App’x 82, 83
(3d Cir. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a)). “If a federal district court
determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
the action.” Finneman v. Fuller, 2025 WL 3055029, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2025)

(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3)).
Here, Plaintiff checked two boxes for the bases of this Court’s jurisdiction:
(1) federal question and (2) U.S. Government Defendant. [Compl. at 2.] The Court
begins with federal question jurisdiction.

A. Federal Question Jurisdiction
“Federal question jurisdiction exists only if a federal question is presented on
the face of the complaint.” Rockefeller, 424 F. App’x at 83 (citing Club Comanche, Inc.
v. Gov’t of V.I., 278 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2002)). While courts must liberally construe
pro se pleadings, this requirement does not excuse pro se plaintiffs from complying with
the standard rules of civil procedure. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113

(1993); Thakar v. Tan, 372 F. App’x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010) (a plaintiff is “not absolved
from complying with Twombly and the federal pleading requirements merely because
s/he proceeds pro se.”). As such, Plaintiff must sufficiently establish this Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction over his Complaint.
1. Social Security Act Claim

Plaintiff claims that his suit arises under 42 U.S.C. § 402(x). [Compl. at 2.] He
claims that he is entitled to receive retroactive Social Security benefits for the time he
was incarcerated because his criminal charges were expunged and dismissed and that
the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) has failed to pay those
benefits. Section 402(x) of the Social Security Act provides that incarcerated
individuals may not receive Social Security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(1)(A).
It further provides, in relevant part, that an individual previously incarcerated may

receive retroactive benefits “if the Commissioner determines that . . . a court of
competent jurisdiction has found the individual not guilty of the criminal offense,
dismissed the charges relating to the criminal offense, vacated the warrant for arrest of
the individual for the criminal offense, or issued any similar exonerating order (or
taken similar exonerating action).” Id. § 402(x)(1)(B)(iii)(I). But based on Plaintiff’s

allegations, the Commissioner has not yet made such a determination.
This Court has “subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under the Social
Security Act only after a claimant has exhausted administrative remedies and obtained
a final decision of the Commissioner.” Cope v. SSI-SSA, 2013 WL 775760, at *5

(D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2013) (emphasis in original), aff’d sub nom. Cope v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
532 F. App’x 58 (3d Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs “must generally proceed through a four-step
process before they can obtain review from a federal court.” Smith, 587 U.S. at 475–76.
This process is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which “provides the exclusive
basis for judicial review of decisions issued by the Social Security Administration.”

Cope, 2013 WL 775760, at *4. “First, the claimant must seek an initial determination
as to his eligibility. Second, the claimant must seek reconsideration of the initial
determination. Third, the claimant must request a hearing, which is conducted by an
ALJ. Fourth, the claimant must seek review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals
Council. If a claimant has proceeded through all four steps on the merits, . . .
§ 405(g) entitles him to judicial review in federal district court.” Smith, 587 U.S. at 476
(internal citations omitted).
There is no indication that Plaintiff has even attempted to undertake even the

first of these administrative steps prior to seeking federal court review, let alone all
four. As set forth in the Complaint, Plaintiff merely “inquired into being paid
retroactive benefits” at his local Social Security office. He was told that such a request
must be “reviewed by another for approval.” [Compl. at 2.] Plaintiff does not set forth
what steps, if any, he took thereafter to formally request – as opposed to merely

“inquire” about – retroactive benefits. Indeed, he has not alleged that he even initiated
the administrative process to determine his eligibility for retroactive benefits under
Section 402(x).
Clearly, based on the allegations before the Court, Plaintiff has not exhausted
his administrative remedies or obtained a final decision from the Commissioner prior

to filing this action. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s claims insofar as they arise under the Social Security Act. See, e.g., Edwards
v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 1213329, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2022); Alvarez v. Berryhill,
2018 WL 2411605, at *2 (D.N.J. May 29, 2018); Carter v. Hartman, 2013 WL 1501926,

at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 2013).
2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
Plaintiff also contends that the Social Security Administration has violated his
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution “by failing to adjudicate his request for benefits.” [Compl. at 4.]
As the Court has already explained, “where there has been no final decision of
the [Commissioner] . . . because the claimant failed to exhaust remedies, as occurred
here, a court cannot review the disposition of the claim.” Hines v. Bowen,

671 F. Supp. 10, 11 (D.N.J. 1987) (citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107–08
(1977)). “However, the Supreme Court in Sanders explicitly recognized an exception
for cases in which a decision of the [Commissioner] is challenged on constitutional
grounds. The proper inquiry, therefore, is whether plaintiff has stated a colorable

constitutional claim.” Brittingham v. Schweiker, 558 F. Supp. 60, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
“A ‘colorable constitutional challenge’ is presented where a claimant alleges
that his mental impairment rendered him unable to understand or act upon notice of
administrative remedies so as to give rise to a violation of his due process rights.”
Hines, 671 F. Supp. at 11 (citing Parker v. Califano, 644 F.2d 1199, 1202–03 (6th Cir.

1981); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256, 257 (3d Cir. 1983)); see also Timmons v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 719 F. App’x 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding that Commissioner’s failure
to consider a relapse in claimant’s disability condition in determining whether
claimant had established good cause for failing to attend ALJ hearing set forth a
colorable due process claim).

Even construing Plaintiff’s pro se allegations liberally, as it must, the Court
cannot discern a “colorable constitutional claim over which it [has] jurisdiction.”
See Timmons, 719 F. App’x at 164. A claim is not colorable if it is “wholly insubstantial
and frivolous.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006). Here, at most,
Plaintiff alleges that he inquired as to the process for obtaining retroactive benefits.
But he has set forth no allegations that he was misled or misinformed about the
process, denied access to that process, or that he was unable to understand or initiate
that process due to any mental or other impairment. On the contrary, it appears that

he did not even attempt to initiate the administrative process to determine his eligibility
for retroactive benefits. Without more, his constitutional claim is not colorable, but
“wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” See id. As Plaintiff has not adequately pled a
constitutional claim, the claim must be dismissed. Without a viable federal claim, the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s case.

3. No Other Federal Questions
The Court has carefully reviewed the Complaint and liberally construed
Plaintiff’s allegations to determine whether there is any other viable claim pled over
which it has subject matter jurisdiction. Despite having done so, the Court cannot
discern any other violation of federal law, the Constitution, or treaty of the United

States pled in the Complaint over which this Court may properly exercise federal
question jurisdiction. Accordingly, unless Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim
against a U.S. Government Defendant – which, as set forth below, the Court finds he
has not – the Complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. U.S. Government Defendant
The Court now considers whether it has jurisdiction based on the naming of a

federal government defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1346. While Plaintiff has named an
agency of the federal government as the Defendant in this case, he has not adequately
pled any basis for liability against that Defendant. Without a viable claim against the
Defendant, the mere fact that Plaintiff checked the box for “U.S. Government
Defendant” does not provide a basis for this Court to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over this case.2

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s IFP application is GRANTED.
Upon screening, however, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff may amend his
pleadings to remedy the deficiencies identified herein within thirty (30) days.

Should he fail to timely do so, this matter will be deemed dismissed with prejudice.
An appropriate Order shall issue on this date.

Dated: February 27, 2026 s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge

2 Plaintiff does not assert diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1), as a basis for jurisdiction. Nor could he. It is clear from the Complaint
that federal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship is inapplicable here.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11312677. Public record. Not legal advice.