# Hullum

> District Court, D. Massachusetts · April 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11312624

## Case

- **Full name:** Lance Hullum v. Stephen D. Adams, Taylor J. Landry, Steven C. Clark, and Brendon P. Metcalf
- **Court:** District Court, D. Massachusetts
- **Decided:** April 1, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11312624

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that, where prison officials required the prisoner plaintiff to wear a T-shirt that identified him as a sex offender, the plaintiff “faced an objectively serious risk of harm”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
LANCE HULLUM, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action
) No. 23-cv-10082-PBS
STEPHEN D. ADAMS, TAYLOR J. )
LANDRY, STEVEN C. CLARK, and )
BRENDON P. METCALF, )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________ )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

April 1, 2026

Saris, J.
INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Lance Hullum brings this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four correction officers of the
Massachusetts Department of Correction in their individual
capacities (“Defendants”). Hullum claims that when he was
previously incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at Souza-Baranowski
Correctional Center (“SBCC”), Defendants called him various
derogatory names like “pedophile,” “skinner,” “rapist,” and
“snitch” in front of other inmates with the intent to incite
violence against him. Defendants deny these allegations.
Hullum brings two claims: a First Amendment claim alleging
that Defendants acted in retaliation for his filing grievances
about their misconduct and a failure-to-protect claim under Eighth
Amendment standards. He does not claim that any inmate physically
injured him because of Defendants’ conduct. He seeks compensatory

damages for his ongoing psychological issues and the impact of his
stress on his lupus.
Defendants now move for summary judgment on Hullum’s failure-
to-protect claim on the basis of qualified immunity.1 The Court
concludes that the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to Hullum, would permit a reasonable jury to find that
Defendants violated Hullum’s clearly established constitutional
rights. The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Dkt. 243).

BACKGROUND
Although the parties heavily dispute the underlying facts,
the Court “examin[es] the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor.” Dusel v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 52 F.4th 495, 502 (1st
Cir. 2022). Hullum has submitted evidence of the following facts,

1 The Court previously denied Defendants’ motion for partial
summary judgment based on administrative exhaustion and denied
Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. See
Hullum v. Mici, No. 23-cv-10082, 2025 WL 928778, at *5 (D. Mass.
Mar. 26, 2025). In the instant motion, Defendants do not seek
summary judgment on Hullum’s First Amendment claim that Defendants
were verbally harassing him in retaliation for his filing
grievances against them.
primarily through declarations and affidavits (including from
other inmates).2
Lance Hullum pleaded guilty in 1990 to four counts of raping

four different children by force in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 265, § 22A. Hullum is currently awaiting trial in connection
with unrelated charges for physical assault. He was held at SBCC
from January 2020 to April 2024. During the period at issue,
Defendants Stephen Adams, Taylor Landry, Steven Clark, and Brendon
Metcalf were correction officers at SBCC.
According to evidence submitted by Hullum, Defendants called
Hullum various derogatory names -- including “pedophile,” “child
molester,” “chicken hawk,” “skinner,” “rapist,” and “snitch” -- in
front of other inmates on several occasions between November 2023
and early 2024.3 A sworn declaration from Hullum states that

2 Given Hullum’s pro se status, this Court considers various
affidavits and potentially admissible evidence submitted by Hullum
throughout the history of this case, even those that are “somewhat
buried in the record.” Pace v. Salamone, No. 24-1865, 2025 WL
2798641, at *1 (1st Cir. Sep. 29, 2025).
3 See, e.g., Dkt. 91 at 1 (affidavit of Joshua Eloi stating that
he witnessed Adams verbally harassing Hullum by calling him a
pedophile, snitch, and “homo” in an attempt to “fuel[] other
inmates to attack, stab, [and] even murder” Hullum); Dkt. 98 at 1
(declaration of Joshua Eloi stating that he heard Adams, Landry,
and Clark calling Hullum a pedophile and snitch); Dkt. 99 at 1
(declaration of Wilnor Jean Baptiste stating that Metcalf called
Hullum a pedophile, snitch, and child molester, asked other inmates
“why they letting Hullum live here,” and offered a “bag for whoever
take[s] him out”); Dkt. 100 at 1 (declaration of Hullum stating
that all four Defendants called him a pedophile, chicken hawk, and
snitch “in front of other inmates in an attempt to incite [them]
Defendants used these epithets “in an attempt to incite” violence
against him. Dkt. 100 at 1. An affidavit submitted by one inmate
at SBCC states that Defendants’ conduct resulted in “other cons in

the unit . . . laughing and yelling get that fucking pig.” Dkt.
107 at 1. Hullum also received death threats from Defendants.
Hullum was never physically attacked or harmed by Defendants
or by other inmates as a result of Defendants’ threats and
derogatory remarks. In his deposition, however, Hullum testified
that Defendants’ conduct exacerbated his lupus symptoms, including
by causing him to have lesions, skin rashes, muscle spasms, weight
loss, trembling, chills, and sleep deprivation. Hullum seeks
damages for these injuries and for psychological distress.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is

to react against” him); Dkt. 102 at 1 (declaration of Hadyetou
Diaby stating that he heard Metcalf call Hullum a skinner, snitch,
pedophile, and rapist multiple times); Dkt. 104 at 1 (declaration
of Damien Santos stating that he heard Adams and Landry call Hullum
a pedophile and snitch); Dkt. 107 at 1 (declaration of Luis Ruiz
stating that he heard Adams call Hullum a pedophile, rat, and
rapist “in front of many other inmates to the point that other
cons in the unit are laughing and yelling get that fucking pig”);
Dkt. 108 at 1 (declaration of Alfred Lane-Bey stating that Clark
called Hullum a chicken hawk and that Clark said he was “gonna
beat Hullum to death”); Dkt. 110 at 1 (declaration of Jose
Hernandez stating that he heard Adams, Landry, and Clark call
Hullum a pedophile and snitch).
genuine where the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could
resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.” Rivera-
Rivera v. Medina & Medina, Inc., 898 F.3d 77, 87 (1st Cir. 2018)

(quoting Cherkaoui v. City of Quincy, 877 F.3d 14, 23-24 (1st Cir.
2017)). “A fact is material” if “it has [the] potential of changing
a case’s outcome.” Doe v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 892 F.3d 67, 79 (1st
Cir. 2018).
“The court must view the facts in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in [its]
favor.” Carlson v. Univ. of New Eng., 899 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir.
2018). Courts construe the filings of a pro se party “liberally,”
holding them “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

DISCUSSION
Defendants seek summary judgment on Hullum’s failure-to-
protect claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity. They argue
that Hullum has failed to provide evidence of a constitutional
violation and that even if he has, the unlawfulness of Defendants’
actions was not clearly established.
State officials “are entitled to qualified immunity under
§ 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct

was ‘clearly established at the time’” of that violation. District
of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018) (quoting Reichle
v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). “‘Clearly established’ means
that, at the time of the [defendant]’s conduct, the law was

‘“sufficiently clear” that every “reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing”’ is unlawful.” Id. at 63 (quoting
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). To be clearly
established, a legal rule must be “dictated by ‘controlling
authority’ or ‘a robust “consensus of cases of persuasive
authority.”’” Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741-42); see also
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 6 (2021) (per curiam)
(requiring plaintiffs in most instances to “identify a case that
put [the defendant] on notice that his specific conduct was
unlawful”). “A ‘robust consensus’ does not require the express
agreement of every circuit.” Irish v. Fowler, 979 F.3d 65, 76 (1st
Cir. 2020); see id. at 77 (noting that the agreement of three or

four circuits is sufficient to clearly establish the law).
The Court examines each prong of the qualified immunity
analysis in turn.
I. Constitutional Violation
As a pretrial detainee, Hullum is “protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth
Amendment; however, the standard to be applied is the same as that
used in Eighth Amendment cases.” Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002). The Eighth Amendment prohibits the
imposition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend.
VIII. As part of this prohibition, the Eighth Amendment “imposes
duties on [prison] officials,” including to “take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)). As relevant here, “[p]rison officials
must take reasonable measures to guarantee inmates’ safety from
attacks by other inmates.” Calderón-Ortiz v. LaBoy-Alvarado, 300
F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2002).
While “[a]n inmate may sue a correctional facility under the
Eighth Amendment for failure to afford adequate protection to
inmates from attack by other inmates . . . , not every injury a
prisoner suffers at the hands of another prisoner is actionable.”
Id. at 63-64. Rather, “[p]rison officials violate the
constitutional conditions of confinement” in a failure-to-protect

case “only where two requirements are met.” Id. at 64. First, “the
inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing
a substantial risk of serious harm.” Lakin v. Barnhart, 758 F.3d
66, 70 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Second,
“the prison official must have acted, or failed to act, with
‘deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.’” Id.
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The Court now analyzes each of
these two requirements.
A. Substantial Risk of Serious Harm
“The risk of inmate-upon-inmate violence has been held a
sufficiently serious harm to implicate inmates’ constitutional

rights.” Calderón-Ortiz, 300 F.3d at 66. Although verbal
harassment does not itself constitute cruel and unusual
punishment, see DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir.
2000), abrogated on other grounds by Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d
409 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc), courts had repeatedly recognized,
prior to November 2023 (when the alleged name-calling began), the
physical dangers posed by a prison official labeling an inmate a
“snitch,” “sex offender,” or similar derogatory terms. See, e.g.,
Dongarra v. Smith, 27 F.4th 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2022) (“It is obvious
that branding [the prisoner plaintiff] a sex offender could make
him a target of prison violence.”); Moore v. Mann, 823 F. App’x
92, 96 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (noting “that the sex offender

label is stigmatizing in the prison context, and that prison norms
may call for the assault of sex offenders”); Benefield v. McDowall,
241 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[L]abeling an inmate a
snitch has the potential for great harm and may violate
constitutional guarantees.”); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829
(9th Cir. 1997) (“We can hardly conceive of a state’s action
bearing more ‘stigmatizing consequences’ than the labeling of a
prison inmate as a sex offender.”); see also Renchenski v.
Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 326 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[S]tudies suggest
that sexual offenders’ rate of sexual abuse in prison ranges from
34% to 50% higher than that of the general prison population.”).
Accordingly, numerous courts have found a substantial risk of

harm under similar conditions of incarceration. See, e.g.,
Dongarra, 27 F.4th at 178-79 (concluding that, where prison
officials required the prisoner plaintiff to wear a T-shirt that
identified him as a sex offender, the plaintiff “faced an
objectively serious risk of harm”); Benefield, 241 F.3d at 1270-
71 (finding that prisoner plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment
violation by alleging that prison official “put him in danger of
attack or even death at the hands of other inmates by circulating
rumors that he was a snitch”). The same is true here: by allegedly
calling Hullum a “pedophile,” “child molester,” “chicken hawk,”
“skinner,” “rapist,” and “snitch” in front of other inmates,
Defendants created a substantial risk of harm to Hullum. Indeed,

one inmate affidavit states that Defendants’ actions resulted in
“other cons in the unit . . . laughing and yelling get that fucking
pig.” Dkt. 107 at 1.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment
because Hullum “admits that he did not suffer an actual injury as
a result of any Defendant’s conduct.” Dkt. 244 at 11-12. But the
lack of an actual attack does not defeat an Eighth Amendment claim.
See, e.g., Moore, 823 F. App’x at 96 (“[A]n inmate need not wait
until an actual attack occurs to obtain relief.”); Benefield, 241
F.3d at 1272 (holding that inmate’s allegations that officer
labeled him a snitch in front of other inmates stated a claim under
Eighth Amendment even though he had not in fact been assaulted);

Brown v. Narvais, 265 F. App’x 734, 735-36 (10th Cir. 2008) (same,
as to allegation that defendants had labeled the plaintiff a child
molester). As the First Circuit has stated, “a prisoner need not
wait to be assaulted to obtain relief for the infringement” of his
right to be “protect[ed] from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Purvis v. Ponte, 929 F.2d 822, 824-25 (1st Cir. 1991)
(quoting Leonardo v. Moran, 611 F.2d 397, 398-99 (1st Cir. 1979)).
Similarly, Defendants cite a section of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”) that provides that “[n]o [f]ederal civil action
may be brought by a prisoner . . . for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Although the First Circuit has

declined to decide whether this provision applies to
constitutional claims, see Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 73 n.5
(1st Cir. 2011), many circuits have held that it applies to all
federal civil actions including those alleging constitutional
violations, see Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir.
2002) (collecting cases). Hullum alleges exacerbation of his lupus
illness. He testified in his deposition that Defendants’ conduct
caused him to have lesions, skin rashes, muscle spasms, weight
loss, trembling, chills, and loss of sleep. Defendants point out
in a footnote that Hullum submitted no medical expert to support
this testimony, but they do not develop the argument. See P.R.
Tel. Co. v. San Juan Cable LLC, 874 F.3d 767, 770 (1st Cir. 2017)

(“[A]rguments raised only in a footnote or in a perfunctory manner
are waived.” (quoting Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181
F.3d 38, 60 n.17 (1st Cir. 1999))). They also do not brief the
issue of whether Hullum’s alleged injuries are “more than . . . de
minimis physical injur[ies],” the standard used by most circuits.
Johnson v. Reyna, 57 F.4th 776 (10th Cir. 2023); see id. at 776-
77 (collecting cases). The Court thus concludes that Hullum’s
testimony is “enough to keep his claims alive.” Kuperman, 645 F.3d
at 73 n.5; see Moore, 823 F. App’x at 97 & n.4.
Accordingly, viewing the record in the light most favorable
to Hullum, a reasonable jury could find that Defendants placed
Hullum at a substantial risk of serious harm by calling him

stigmatizing names that could incite violence from other inmates.
B. Deliberate Indifference
Turning to the second requirement of an Eighth Amendment
failure-to-protect claim, Hullum must show that Defendants acted
with deliberate indifference. See Calderón-Ortiz, 300 F.3d at 64.
“[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere
negligence . . . .” Id. The standard is “a subjective one” which
is satisfied “only if the official ‘knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Id. (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837). “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Id.

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Hullum has presented evidence that all four Defendants sought
to incite violence against him by other inmates by calling him
derogatory names and that Defendants even made death threats
against him. A reasonable factfinder could conclude based on this
evidence that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a risk
to his safety (or, indeed, that they even consciously intended
such a risk). “After all, who better knows the opprobrium and
consequent effect thereof that attaches to the label of snitch
than those who work daily within the inmate population.” Irving v.
Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 451 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Farmer, 511
U.S. at 842 (“[A] factfinder may conclude that a prison official

knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was
obvious.”). Because Hullum’s evidence permits a reasonable jury to
find in his favor on both requirements of a failure-to-protect
claim, he has satisfied the first prong of the qualified immunity
test at this stage.
II. Clearly Established
The Court also concludes that Hullum has met his burden as to
the second prong of the qualified immunity inquiry. While no
controlling Supreme Court or First Circuit cases are directly on
point, there was “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive
authority’” from other circuits by November 2023 placing a
reasonable official on notice that Defendants’ alleged actions

were unconstitutional. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (quoting Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)).
By 2023, at least three circuits had held in published
opinions that prison officials could be liable under the Eighth
Amendment for calling a prisoner certain derogatory terms. See
Benefield, 241 F.3d at 1271 (“snitch”); Irving, 519 F.3d at 451
(“snitch”);4 Dongarra, 27 F.4th at 179 (“sex offender”). Other
circuits had espoused similar views, albeit not expressly in the
context of Eighth Amendment claims. See, e.g., Valandingham v.
Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137-39 (9th Cir. 1989); Harmon v. Berry,
728 F.2d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). By November
2023, then, a robust consensus of circuit authority placed a

reasonable state official on notice that calling an inmate a
“pedophile,” “child molester,” “chicken hawk,” “skinner,”
“rapist,” or “snitch” in front of other inmates violated the Eighth
Amendment. See Irish, 979 F.3d at 77 (noting that the agreement of

4 It is notable that as of 2008 -- more than a decade before the
events at issue here -- the Eighth Circuit already felt that “the
clear weight of authority in the circuits that have ruled on the
question” would have put a reasonable officer on notice that
labeling an inmate a snitch was a constitutional violation. Irving,
519 F.3d at 451.
three or four circuits is sufficient to clearly establish the law).
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Dkt. 243) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS________________
Hon. Patti B. Saris
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11312624. Public record. Not legal advice.