# Bellamy

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · March 25, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11312543

## Case

- **Full name:** Aieshya Kay Bellamy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of South Carolina, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 25, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11312543

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding personal jurisdiction existed because the employer hired the plaintiff “with the express agreement . . . that she would work from New York.”
- recognizing a defendant must deliberately reach into the forum state “by, for example, ‘exploiting a market’ in the forum State or entering a contractual relationship centered there.”
- recognizing a corporate defendant is “at home” at its place of incorporation and its principle place of business.

## Opinion text

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

AIESHYA KAY BELLAMY, )
) CASE NO. 4:25-CV-775
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
)
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF )
SOUTH CAROLINA, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
) AND ORDER
Defendants. ) [Resolving ECF No. 16]

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion to
Transfer. ECF No. 16. The motion is fully briefed. Plf. Response Br., ECF No. 20; Defs. Reply
Br., ECF No. 21. Being duly advised, having reviewed the parties’ briefs, evidence, and
applicable law, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants and that venue
is improper. With its only pending motion resolved, this action shall be transferred to the
District of South Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Aieshya Kay Bellamy is an African American woman with more than 15 years
of experience as an underwriter. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 6–13. She was hired by Defendant Blue Cross
Blue Shield of South Carolina (“Blue SC”) in or around September 2017 as a senior underwriter
based in Columbia, South Carolina. The parties seem to agree that, by 2021, Plaintiff had
relocated to Ohio and worked remotely for Blue SC from her residence in Ohio. Throughout her
employment, Plaintiff received positive performance reviews. Beginning in 2019, she began
expressing interest in management positions and advancement opportunities. In 2020, Plaintiff
applied for an underwriting management position. Despite Plaintiff’s positive performance
reviews and years of experience, Defendants promoted a white male employee with less
experience than Plaintiff, citing that he had received specialized training and was groomed for
the position by Defendant Masqood Ali, the Vice President of Major Group Underwriting in

Columbia, South Carolina. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 16–24. Plaintiff complained that she was not given
opportunities to work on complex cases or to receive training necessary to advance in
management. ECF No. 1, ⁋ 25.
In 2021, Plaintiff took approximately three months of maternity leave under the Family
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). She alleges that Defendants retaliated against her by: (a)
assigning her five times the number of prospect cases compared to other employees; (b)
assigning her additional projects and teams; and (c) transferring her book of business to a white
male counterpart. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 27–28.
Plaintiff applied for a director’s position in June 2022. Although the position’s posting
initially did not include a specific location, after Plaintiff had applied, she was told the job

required her to be on site in South Carolina and asked her to provide her “relocation timeline”
from Ohio “within 48 hours” to remain an active candidate. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 34–35. Shortly
thereafter, Plaintiff withdrew her application. ECF No. 1, ⁋ 36. Throughout her tenure,
Defendants Ali, John O’Grady, and Rick Griggs made negative comments about Plaintiff and
other female employees having family commitments outside of work. On September 12, 2022,
Plaintiff served a demand letter on Defendants, but no action was taken. She was constructively
discharged in October 2022. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 59–60.
Plaintiff claims she timely filed a charge for gender and race discrimination with the
South Carolina Human Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). ECF No. 1, ⁋ 61. She received a right to sue letter on January 23, 2025, and timely
filed the present action. Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.01 et seq. and Title VII, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants committed employment discrimination based on her race and gender in
the following ways: hostile workplace, retaliation, constructive discharge, and harassment.

Defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue or, in
the alternative, transfer the case to the District of South Carolina.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)
Defendants move to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(2). In the context of a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the burden of establishing personal
jurisdiction is on the plaintiff. Welsh v. Gibbs, 631 F.2d 436, 438 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing Weller
v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1974)). That burden shall meet the preponderance
of the evidence standard. Welsh, 631 F.2d at 439. “[I]n the face of a properly supported motion
for dismissal, the plaintiff may not stand on his pleadings but must, by affidavit or otherwise, set

forth specific facts showing that the court has jurisdiction.” Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d
1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Weller, 504 F.2d at 930). “[When] . . . the district court relies
solely on written submissions and affidavits to resolve a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, rather than
resolving the motion after either an evidentiary hearing or limited discovery, the burden on the
plaintiff is ‘relatively slight,’ and ‘the plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing that
personal jurisdiction exists in order to defeat dismissal.’ ” Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech
Int’l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d
1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1988)); Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1458). In that instance, the court views the
pleadings and affidavits submitted in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the court “should
not weigh ‘the controverting assertions of the party seeking dismissal.’” Id. (quoting Theunissen,
935 at 1459). Dismissal is proper “only if all the specific facts” alleged by the plaintiff
“collectively fail to state a prima facie case for jurisdiction.” Gronski v. InContact, Inc., 774 F.
Supp. 3d 873, 880 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (quoting Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d

147, 149 (6th Cir. 1997)) (emphasis in original).
B. Motion to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3)
Defendants also move to dismiss the Complaint for improper venue under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(3). Plaintiff also bears the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that venue
is proper. Tobien v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., 133 F.4th 613, 621 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing
Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1458). As with a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), the Court may consider
facts outside the complaint but must “draw all reasonable inferences and resolve factual conflicts
in favor of the plaintiff.” Harrison Prosthetic Cradle Inc. v. Roe Dental Lab., Inc., 608 F.
Supp.3d 541, 546 (N.D. Ohio 2022) (quoting Audi AG & Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Izumi, 204
F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1017 (E.D. Mich. 2002)). If venue is improper, “The district court . . . shall

dismiss, or if it be in the interest justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it
could have been brought.” Harrison Prosthetic Cradle Inc., 608 F. Supp. 3d at 546 (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over All Defendants.
When resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), federal courts must first
consider whether the forum state’s long-arm statute establishes personal jurisdiction and, second,
whether personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution. IHF Ltd. v. Myra Bag, 391 F. Supp. 3d 760, 767 (N.D. Ohio 2019) (citing Mid-
West Materials, Inc. v. Tougher Indus., Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 726, 729–30 (N.D. Ohio 2007)).
Even when the state’s long-arm statute prong is satisfied, personal jurisdiction may nevertheless
fail “unless exercising jurisdiction over the defendant comports with the traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.” Calkins v. Danaher Corp., 739 F. Supp. 3d 615, 626 (N.D.

Ohio 2024) (Boyko, J.) (quoting J.M. Smucker Co. v. Hormel Food Corp., 526 F. Supp. 3d 294,
300 (N.D. Ohio 2021)).
1. Ohio’s long-arm statute
The Court must first determine whether Ohio’s long-arm statute provides personal
jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants. Plaintiff alleges the following provisions of Ohio’s
long-arm statute are satisfied:
(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who
acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the
person’s:
(1) Transacting any business in this state;
. . .
(6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act
outside this state committed with the purpose of injuring persons,
when the person might reasonably have expected that some person
would be injured thereby in this state[.]
Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382(A). The Court finds Ohio’s long-arm statute is satisfied.1
“Section (A)(1) has been found to be satisfied when an out-of-state employee regularly
communicates or otherwise works with Ohio-based employees.” Dugger v. Honeywell Int’l,
Inc., No. 1:21-CV-00892, 2021 WL 5961624, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 2021) (Polster, J.)

1 Defendants argue that it is unnecessary to evaluate Ohio’s long-arm statute
because Plaintiff cannot satisfy the due process analysis. ECF No. 16 at PageID #: 80. The
Court disagrees.
(citing The Rightting, LLC v. Brown, No. 3:09 CV 135, 2009 WL 249694, at *3–4 (N.D. Ohio
Feb. 2, 2009)). Similarly, Section (A)(6) is satisfied when the out-of-state defendant has
intentionally committed a tortious act—such as employment discrimination—with the reasonable
expectation that the injury will occur in Ohio. Dugger, 2021 WL 5961624, at *5. Because

Plaintiff worked remotely from her home in Ohio, and because she has alleged claims of
employment discrimination, Ohio’s long-arm statute is satisfied.
2. Due Process
Next, the Court must determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction in this case
would comport with due process. “Due process requires that an out-of-state defendant have
‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state sufficient to comport with ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’” Calkins, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 626 (quoting Blessing v.
Chandrasekhar, 988 F.3d 889, 904 (6th Cir. 2021)). The “minimum contacts” analysis considers
“the defendant’s contact with the forum state itself, not the defendant’s contacts with the persons
who reside there.” Id. (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)); see Ford Motor Co. v.

Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021) (recognizing a defendant must
deliberately reach into the forum state “by, for example, ‘exploiting a market’ in the forum State
or entering a contractual relationship centered there.”) (cleaned up).
There are two personal jurisdiction categories: general and specific. Goodyear Dunlop
tires operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). General jurisdiction is proper when
“a defendant’s contacts with the forum state “are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it]
essentially at home in the forum State.” Flake v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 538 F. App’x
604, 617 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919); Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865,
873 (6th Cir. 2002) (same). In the context of corporations, general jurisdiction is proper where
the company is either incorporated or has its principal place of business (i.e., its headquarters).
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924; see Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (recognizing a
corporate defendant is “at home” at its place of incorporation and its principle place of
business.). Plaintiff argues that Blue SC’s affiliates and subsidiaries having contacts in Ohio is

sufficient to render Blue SC “at home” in this state. ECF No. 20 at PageID ##: 377–79. It is
undisputed that Blue SC and the individual defendants in this case are all residents of South
Carolina. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 2–5. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Blue SC or any of its affiliates
or subsidiaries are incorporated or headquartered in Ohio such that they are “at home” in Ohio.
Therefore, the Court lacks general personal jurisdiction over all Defendants.
Specific jurisdiction, in contrast, “depends on an affiliation between the forum and the
underlying controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State
and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (internal citations
and quotation omitted). The analysis focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum
state, and the case of action in the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977);

Walden, 571 U.S. at 284.
The Sixth Circuit prescribes a three-part test for assessing specific jurisdiction:
[1] First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the
privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in
the forum state. [2] Second, the cause of action must arise from the
defendant's activities there. [3] Finally, the acts of the defendant or
consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial
enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.
Air Prods. & Controls, Inc., 503 F.3d at 550 (quoting S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401
F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968)). “Failure to meet any one of the three prongs means that personal
jurisdiction may not be invoked.” Maclin v. Reliable Reports of Texas, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d
845, 849 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (Polster, J.).
Plaintiff argues specific personal jurisdiction is proper for two main reasons: (1) Blue
SC’s affiliates and subsidiaries conduct business in Ohio, and (2) Blue SC permitted Plaintiff to

work remotely from Ohio and, therefore, the employment discrimination was effectuated in
Ohio. ECF No. 20 at PageID ##: 373–75. Both fail for independent reasons.
a. Blue SC’s subsidiaries and affiliates
The first prong for specific personal jurisdiction is satisfied when an out-of-state
defendant “reaches out beyond one state and create[s] continuing relationships and obligations
with citizens of another state.” Calkins, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 626 (quoting Calphalon Corp. v.
Rowlette, 228 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2000)). “The purposeful-availment requirement prevents
the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant ‘solely as a result of . . . the unilateral activity of
another party or a third person.’” Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd., 79 F.4th 651, 671 (6th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). As such, “an employee’s

personal contacts with a forum are not automatically attributed to their employer.” Phillips v.
Persons Servs. Corp., No. 2:20-cv-2392, 2021 WL 5277481, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2021)
(citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 478). Stated another way, “the plaintiff cannot be the
only link between the defendant and the forum.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 278.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case that the
district court can maintain personal jurisdiction over each defendant.” Carbone v. Kaal, 140
F.4th 805, 808 (6th Cir. 2025) (emphasis added); see Olsavsky v. Five Star Quality Care, Inc.,
No. , 2009 WL 10715843, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2009) (holding that a defendant company’s
business contacts in Ohio, alone, was insufficient to bring individual defendants within the reach
of Ohio’s long-arm statute). Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Defendants Ali, Griggs, or
O’Grady purposefully availed themselves to Ohio law or engaged in any discriminatory conduct
in Ohio. Instead, the Complaint alleges that the discriminatory employment decisions the
individual Defendants made occurred in South Carolina, not Ohio. Accordingly, the Court lacks

personal jurisdiction over the individual Defendants.
Regarding Blue SC, Plaintiff first claims that National Alliance, an organization built by
and operating as a subsidiary of Blue SC, operates nationwide, including in Ohio. ECF No. 20 at
PageID #: 373. Her evidence further indicates that CSG, a Blue SC affiliate, was awarded a
contract to administer Medicare Part A and Part B Fee-for-Service claims in Ohio and Kentucky.
ECF No. 20-3 at PageID ##: 418–20. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that she provided underwriting
services for another Blue SC’s affiliate, Alliance Group, which provides products to customers
headquartered in South Carolina with employees nationwide, including in Ohio. ECF No. 20 at
PageID ##: 374–75; ECF No. 20-14, ⁋⁋ 6–7. Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff satisfied her
burden to make a prima facie showing that Blue SC’s affiliates and subsidiaries satisfy the

purposeful availment prong, her employment discrimination claims fail on the “arise out of”
prong.
The second prong for specific personal jurisdiction requires “an affiliation between the
forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place
in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulations.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S.
at 359–60 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Fran. Cty., 582 U.S.
255, 262 (2017)). “This is a ‘lenient standard,’ requiring only that the cause of action have a
‘substantial connection’ to the defendant’s activity in the state.” MAG IAS Holdings, Inc. v.
Schmückle, 854 F.3d 894, 903 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Bird, 289 F.3d at 875). The Supreme Court
recently held that the second prong “contemplates that some relationships will support
jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does not mean anything goes.” Ford Motor Co., 592
U.S. at 362; Sullivan, 79 F.4th at 672.
None of Plaintiff’s employment discrimination allegations relate to Blue SC’s affiliates

or subsidiaries. CSG is the only Blue SC affiliate Plaintiff identifies as having direct contacts in
Ohio. But she does not allege that she worked for CSG or, indeed, any other Ohio-based Blue
SC subsidiaries or affiliates. Similarly, even if she had provided underwriting services for
Alliance Group, she does not allege such services were provided directly to any Ohio-based
customers or employees. Rather, she admits her customers were headquartered in South
Carolina. ECF No. 20-14, ⁋ 7. That her South Carolina-based customers may have employed
individuals in Ohio is not due to Plaintiff’s employment but resulted from unilateral third-party
decisions not fairly attributable to Blue SC. See Sullivan, 79 F.4th at 671. Importantly, Plaintiff
did not seek any training, promotions, or management positions with CSG, National Alliance,
Alliance Group, or any other Blue SC subsidiaries. Instead, her promotion applications related

to leadership roles within Blue SC, which she acknowledges does not have any offices or
operations in Ohio. These facts demonstrate that Plaintiff’s claims do not “arise out of” contacts
with Ohio established by Blue SC’s affiliates or subsidiaries. Therefore, the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over Blue SC based on its affiliates and subsidiaries.
b. Plaintiff’s telework arrangement
Plaintiff’s second argument that Blue SC purposefully availed itself to Ohio law by
permitting her to work remotely from Mahoning County also fails. When considering whether
retaining a remote employee satisfies the purposeful availment prong, courts evaluate several
factors, including whether:
(1) the defendant solicited the employment of the plaintiff in
the forum state; (2) the plaintiff worked predominantly from within
the forum state; (3) the plaintiff was a high-level employee in the
defendant’s business; (4) the plaintiff signed the employment
contract in the forum state; (5) the defendant had knowledge of, and
“facilitated,” the plaintiff’s remote employment; and (6) the work
the plaintiff performed in the forum state advanced the defendant’s
business interests in the forum state.
Carpenter v. Southern Airways Express, No. 2:21-945cv-568, 2021 WL 5937749 (S.D. Ohio
Dec. 16, 2021) (citing Hall v. Rag-O-Rama, LLC, 359 F. Supp. 3d 499, 511 (E.D. Ky. 2019)).
In Hall v. Rag-O-Rama, the court held personal jurisdiction existed because, although the
foreign company did not operate any stores or sell merchandise in Kentucky, it had (a) actively
recruited the plaintiff for an executive-level position while she was living in Kentucky, (b)
negotiated and executed the plaintiff’s employment contract to permit her to work remotely from
Kentucky, and (c) provided the plaintiff with a computer and cellphone for business use in
Kentucky. 359 F. Supp. 3d at 511; see Winner v. Tryko Partners, LLC, 333 F. Supp. 3d 250, 260
(W.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding personal jurisdiction existed because the employer hired the plaintiff
“with the express agreement . . . that she would work from New York.”).
In contrast, the court in Carpenter v. Southern Airways Express concluded plaintiff’s
remote work in Ohio for an out-of-state airline company’s call center was insufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction. 2021 WL 5937749 at *1. The court determined that the
plaintiff’s decision to work remotely from Ohio was a “unilateral decision” because defendants
had not: (a) actively recruited her in Ohio; (b) bargained for or required her to work from Ohio;
(c) met with her in Ohio; (d) supplied her with materials to work remotely from Ohio; or (e)
tasked her with extending the defendants’ business in Ohio. Id. at *6. Other courts have reached
the same conclusion under similar circumstances. See Fields v. Sickle Cell Disease Ass’n of Am.,
Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d 647, 653 (E.D.N.C. 2018) aff’d, 770 F. App’x 77 (4th Cir. 2019)
(“Plaintiff’s choice to complete her work in North Carolina for her own reasons is a unilateral
decision that cannot be fairly attributed to the defendant as an attempt to avail itself of the
privileges of conducting business in North Carolina.”); Perry v. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders of
United States, No. TDC-20-0454, 2020 WL 5759766, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2020) (holding the

plaintiff’s “decision to conduct most of her work from Maryland, even if known to and
supported” by her employer “constitutes ‘unilateral activity’ that does not establish purposeful
availment.”).
In this case, Blue SC did not recruit Plaintiff while she was living in Ohio, negotiate her
employment contract while she was in Ohio, or require her to work from Ohio. Rather, she
unilaterally decided to relocate to Ohio approximately three years after Blue SC had hired her.
ECF No. 1, ⁋ 5; ECF No. 20-12. Although Defendants accommodated her telework request,
Plaintiff acknowledges that she was still required to provide underwriting services to customers
located in South Carolina. See ECF No. 20-14, ⁋ 7. Indeed, Plaintiff presents no evidence that
she provided services directly to any Blue SC customers, affiliates, or subsidiaries located in

Ohio. As in Carpenter, Plaintiff’s telework arrangement with Defendants constitutes a
“unilateral decision” on her part that is insufficient to support specific personal jurisdiction.
B. Improper Venue and Transfer
Even if the Court could exercise personal jurisdiction, Defendants urge the Court to
dismiss this action for improper venue or, in the alternative, to transfer this action to the District
of South Carolina. ECF No. 16. They argue that Plaintiff was initially hired in South Carolina,
worked in the South Carolina office for three years before moving to Ohio, where she continued
servicing South Carolina customers and accounts remotely. ECF No. 16 at PageID #: 84.
Plaintiff retorts that she worked in Ohio, provided underwriting services for Alliance Group
which serviced Ohio residents, and suffered the effects of Defendants’ discrimination in Ohio.
ECF No. 20 at PageID ##: 382–83. Defendants have the better argument.
The general venue statute provides that venue is proper in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought
as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect
to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). It is undisputed that all Defendants are South Carolina residents
and, as such venue is proper in South Carolina. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 2–5. Pursuant to § 1391(b)(2),
venue is proper if a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”
in this district. King, 2016 WL 3544745, at *2. That analysis coincides with the analysis of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) under Title VII, which provides that venue is proper in:
(1) [A]ny judicial district in the State in which the unlawful
employment practice is alleged to have been committed;
(2) [T]he judicial district in which the employment records relevant
to such practice are maintained and administered; or
(3) [T]he judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have
worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

King v. Forest River, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-590, 2016 WL 3544745, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 29, 2016)
(Gaughan, J.) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)). When “the plaintiff brings suit in a jurisdiction
that does not satisfy one of the venue requirements listed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), venue is
improper.” Vazima v. Potter, No. 4:05-cv-2793, 2006 WL 8450988, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 26,
2006). If venue is improper, courts must “dismiss, or in the interest of justice, transfer the case
to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” King, 2016 WL 3544745, at *2
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)).
In the present case, the only connection between the alleged unlawful employment
practices and Ohio is Plaintiff’s living arrangements. Plaintiff does not dispute that Blue SC is

headquartered in South Carolina, does not maintain offices in Ohio, and that her colleagues,
supervisors, and managers were in South Carolina. Her clients were also located in South
Carolina and even if those customers retained Ohio-based employees, Plaintiff offers no
evidence that she provided underwriting services directly to any Ohio businesses or residents.
ECF No. 20-14, ⁋ 7. In addition, each of the promotions and leadership positions Plaintiff
sought were based in South Carolina. The decision-makers regarding those promotions and
leadership opportunities were based in South Carolina. As such, it is likely that most, if not all,
witnesses (e.g., other Blue SC employees, Plaintiff’s former supervisors and managers, etc.) and
evidence (e.g., employment records, communications, etc.) relating to Plaintiff’s employment
discrimination claims are in South Carolina, not Ohio. It is also telling that Plaintiff filed a

discrimination charge with the South Carolina Human Rights Commission—not OCRC. ECF
No. 1, ⁋ 61. Although she worked remotely from her home in Ohio, for all intents and purposes,
Plaintiff worked in South Carolina, the alleged discrimination occurred in South Carolina, and,
as such, the District Court of South Carolina is the proper venue.
Accordingly, venue is not proper in this jurisdiction and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a),
this case shall be transferred to the District of South Carolina.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a single motion, Defendants’ Motion to Transfer (ECF No. 16), Defendants sought a
ruling on either its request for dismissal or transfer. For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned
has responded by providing a transfer. There is, therefore, no other pending motion before the
Court. As ruled above, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over all Defendants and, even if the
Court had personal jurisdiction, venue is improper. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Transfer
(ECF No. 16) is granted and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), this case shall be transferred to the

District of South Carolina.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

March 25, 2026 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Date Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11312543. Public record. Not legal advice.