# Davis

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · March 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11312446

## Case

- **Full name:** Angie Davis v. St. Louis County, Missouri, et al
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** March 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

ANGIE DAVIS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) No. 4:25-cv-00695-SEP
)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, et al, )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendants. )
Before the Court are the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants David Dooley, Janie
Stephens, Kelly Wilkens, Valerie Nelson, Dawn Davis, Lisa Maxwell, and St. Louis County,
Docs. [11], [22], [31], [43]. The Motions are fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the
reasons set forth below, the MotioFnAsC aTrSe A gNrDa nBtAeCdK iGnR pOaUrNtD a 1 n d denied in part.
On May 15, 2020, Plaintiff Angie Davis’s son, Dwight Williams (“Williams”), died
Id. th
while in custody at the St. Louis County Jail. Doc. [1] ¶ 1. On May 14 , Williams was
2
arrested and transported to the St. Louis County Jail. ¶¶ 16, 37. During his medical
intake at the jail, Williams reported “a history of addiction and his prescription use of
Suboxone to treat addiction to intake nurse Defendant David Dooley and Defendant Janie
Id.
Stephens, as well as a recent incision and drainage procedure on his left hand,” which
appeared infected. ¶¶ 28-29. Williams told Defendant Kelly Wilkens that he had been
admitted to a hospital “to receive intravenous antibiotics for three (3) days” a week prior to
Id.
his arrest, and that he was expected to return on May 15 to have a Penrose drain removed.
¶ 30. Wilkens “examined [Williams’s] hand, removed [the] Penrose drain that had been
placed in it during his incision and drainage operation, . . . and provided [Williams] . . . an

1 SeeNeitzke v. Williams
For the purposes of the motions to dismiss, the Court assumes that the factual allegations in the
Complaint are true. , 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989).
2
Plaintiff’s Complaint stateisd .that, while Williams was pronounced dead at 6:48 a.m. on May 15,
2020, Doc. [1] ¶ 40, he was escorted to his cell following his admittance to the jail on May 15 at
approximately 11:30 p.m., ¶ 37. While not relevant to the issues decided in this motion, the
Id.
antibiotic . . . [and] an anti-inflammatory.” ¶ 32. Following Wilken’s treatment, “Dooley
continued his intake examination,” determined that Williams was experiencing acute
Id.
withdrawal, and “provided Williams Clonidine, Loperamide, and Promethazine pursuant to
Dr. Davis’s physician’s standing order.” ¶ 33. “Stephens also knew and noted the fact
Id.
that [Williams] was prescribed Suboxone by his doctor,” but neither Stephens nor Dooley
Id.
gave Williams Suboxone. ¶¶ 35-36. Following his intake examination, Williams was
escorted to his cell at approximately 11:30 pm. ¶ 37. Plaintiff alleges that it was
Id.
“obvious” to both the correction officer who escorted Williams and his cellmate that
Williams “was experiencing acute withdrawal or OUD.” ¶¶ 37-38. Plaintiff provided no
additional information as to any specific symptoms that Williams was exhibiting or the
severity of those symptoms.
Id.
On May 15 at 6:20 a.m., Williams was found unresponsive in his cell, and at 6:48 a.m.
he was declared dead. ¶¶ 39-40. “The St. Louis County medical examiner’s report
Id.
determined [Williams’s] cause of death to be cardiomyopathy exacerbated by opioid
withdrawal.” ¶ 41. Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he sudden cessation of . . . Williams’s
Id.
prescription medication and the failure to provide . . . Williams with his prescription
medication led to acute withdrawals that caused . . . Williams’s death.” ¶ 42.
Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts claims against St. Louis County; nurse practitioner
Wilkens; registered nurse Dooley; Stephens; Chief Operating Officer of St. Louis County’s
Correction Medicine Valerie Nelson, who was “responsible for supervising nurses and . . .
the Medication Assisted Treatment (“MAT”) program”; Dr. Dawn Davis, the lead physician
at the St. Louis County Jail; and nurse manager Lisa Maxwell, who was “directly responsible
Id.
for training St. Louis County employees at the jail to administer the [MAT] program”
Id.
(collectively “Defendants”). ¶¶ 8-13. The individual defendants were named in their
individual capacities only. ¶¶ 9-14.
Plaintiff alleges that the individual defendants§ violated Williams’s Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 by acting with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs (Count I). Doc. [1] ¶¶ 77-94. Plaintiff further
alleges that Defendants St. Louis County, Nelson, Dr. Davis, and Maxwell (the “Supervisory
Id.
Defendants”) failed to train, supervise, and discipline medical staff at the jail “to ensure that
¶¶ 95-112. Plaintiff also alleges that the County knew about and allowed an
“unconstitutional custom and/or practice to ignore obvious signs of a severe medical
Id.
condition and not provide appropriate, adequate medical treatment, including but not
limited to providing detainees their prescribed medications” (Count III). ¶¶ 113-19.
Lastly, Plaintiff a§lleges that all Defendants violated the Americans with Disa§bilities Act
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794(a), by
Id.
“failing to accommodate [Willaims’s] disability . . . [b]y refusing to provide medically
necessary treatment,” (Counts IV and V). ¶¶ 120-32.
Defendants move to dismiss. Docs. [11], [22], [31], [43]. Defendant Maxwell moves
to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 4(m), arguing that
Plaintiff’s service of process was deficient and that she was served more than 90 days after
the Complaint was filed. Doc. [31]. St. Louis County and the other individual defendants
argue that the case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Docs. [11], [22], [43].
Plaintiff opposes the motions, arguing: (1) that Maxwell waived her affirmative defense
pursuant to Rule 12(h)(1), Doc. [35]; and (2) that the Complaint alleged facts sufficient to
state claims against the other defendaLnEtsG,A DL oScTsA. N[1D8A]R,D [ 25], [45].
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The notice pleading standard
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to give “a short and plain
statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” To meet this standard and
Ashcroft v.
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
Iqbal Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting , 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
Determining if well-pled factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
Id.
relief” is a “context-specific task” requiring the court to “draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” at 679. The factual content of the plaintiff’s allegations must “allow[]
Park Irmat Drug Corp. v. Express Scripts Holding Co.
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” , 911 F.3d 505, 512 (8th Cir.
Whitney v. Guys, Inc.
Iqbal Twombly
2018) (quoting , 700 F.3d 1118, 1128 (8th Cir. 2012)). In determining
the plausibility of a plaintiff’s claim, and instruct the Court to consider
Iqbal Twombly
whether “obvious alternative explanations” exist for the allegedly unconstitutional conduct.
Iqbal
, 556 U.S. at 682 (quoting , 550 U.S. at 567). The Court must then determine
Id.
whether the plaintiff alleges a violation of the law. , 556 U.S. at 679. The well-pled
facts must establish more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.”
Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court “must liberally construe a complaint in
Lustgraaf v.
favor of the plaintiff,” , 592 F.3d 853 (8th Cir.
Behrens
2010), and “grant all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,”
, 619 F.3d 867, 873 (8th Cir. 2010). But if a claim fails to allege one of the elements
Crest Contr. II, Inc. v. Doe
necessary to recovery on a legal theory, the Court must dismiss that claim for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. , 660 F.3d 346, 355
Iqbal Twombly
(8th Cir. 2011). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” , 556 U.S. at 678 (citing , 550
Id.
U.S. at 555). Although courts must accept all well-pled factual allegations as true, they “are
Twombly
not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” (quoting
, 550 U.S. at 555). DISCUSSION
I. Count I: Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care

At all times relevant to the Complaint, Williams was a pretrial detainee, so his
See Morris v. Zefferi
constitutional claims are brought pursuant to the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment. , 601 f.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 2010). But a pretrial
See Grayson v. Ross see also
detainee’s medical claims are analyzed under the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate
Morris v. Cradduck
indifference standard. , 454 F.3d 802, 808 (8th Cir. 2006);
, 954 F.3d 1055, 1058 (8th Cir. 2020) (a pretrial detainee has the same
rights to medical care under the due process clause as an inmate has under the Eighth
Estelle v. Gamble
Amendment). Under the Eighth Amendment, the government has an obligation to provide
adequate medical care to incarcerated individuals. , 429 U.S. 97, 103
McRaven v. Sanders Vaughn v. Gray
(1976). A deliberate indifference claim “has both an objective and subjective component.”
, 577 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting , 557 F.3d
Id.
objectively serious medical need”; “the subjective component requires a plaintiff to show
Vaughn
that the defendant actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, such need.” (quoting
, 557 F.3d at 908).
“A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
Holden v. Hirner
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the
Coleman v. Rahija
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” , 663 F.3d 336, 342 (8th Cir. 2011)
(quoting , 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997)). The subjective
component—whether a defendant was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need—
requires mor e N u th r a v n . O m lm er s e t e n d e C gl n ig ty e . n , ce. Rather, it requires a state of mind similar to cri B m a i r n t a o l n
v. Taber
recklessness 563 F. Supp. 3d 946, 965 (D. Minn. 2021) (quoting
, 820 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 2016)). “Such a mental state can be inferred from facts
that demonstrate the response to the medical care was obviously inadequate” or by
Id. Estelle v. Gamble
showing that a defendant “intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] access to medical care or
intentionally interfere[d] with prescribed treatment . . . .” (citing , 429
U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)).
Here, assuming all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations to be true and drawing all
reasonable inferences in h§is favor, Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a deliberate
indifference claim under 1983 against Defendants Dooley and Stephens. Plaintiff alleges
that Williams reported “his prescription use of Suboxone to treat addiction to the intake
nurse Defendant Dooley and Defendant Stephens”; that Dooley “determined that Mr.
Wiliams was in acute withdrawal, but instead of providing Mr. Williams with his
prescription medication, Suboxone, he provided Mr. Williams Clonidine, Loperamide, and
Promethazine”; that Stephens “knew and noted the fact that Mr. Williams was prescribed
Suboxone by his doctor through Assisted Recovery Centers of America”; and that “[n]either
Defendant Dooley or Stephens ensured that Mr. Williams received his prescription
Suboxone.” Doc. [1] ¶¶ 28, 33-36. Such allegations are sufficient, at this stage, to state a
claim that Williams’s addiction and withdrawal was a serious medical need that had been
“diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” and that Dooley and Stephens
“intentionally interfere[d] with prescribed treatment.” §
Plaintiff fails to state a deliberate indifference claim under 1983 against any other
See Holden Nur
with the exception of Dooley and Stephens, had actual knowledge of Plaintiff’s serious
medical need or his prescription for addiction treatment. , 663 F.3d at 342;
563 F. Supp. 3d at 965 . While Plaintiff makes several conclusory statements alleging that
“St. Louis County and all Defendants knew that Mr. Williams had a confirmed
see, e.g.
buprenorphine prescription of Suboxone” and that Defendants were aware of [Williams’s]
disability,” , Doc. [1] ¶¶ 19, 21, he makes no specific allegations that Williams told
any individuals other than Dooley and Stephens about his addiction treatment or that any
See Iqbal
other individual defendant actual reviewed his medical records prior to his death
approximately eight hours after his intake at the jail. , 556 U.S. at 678. Similarly,
while the Complaint states that Williams was suffering from acute withdrawal and that it
was “obvious” to his cellmate and a correctional officer, such allegations are similarly
Id.
conclusory, as they do not specifically state the symptoms Williams was exhibiting or their
severity. ; Doc. [1] ¶¶ 37-38. Without additional information, the Court cannot infer
whether any other individual defendant might have been deliberately indifferent to
Williams’s serious medical needs. As such, Defendants’ motions to dismiss Count I are

denied as to Defendants Dooley and Stephens and granted as to the remaining individual
dIIe. fendaCnotusn. t III: Municipal Liability

“Section 1983 liability for a constitutional violation may attach to a municipality if
Troupe v. Young
the violation resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom; or (3) a
Corwin v. City of Independence
deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” , 143 F.4th 955, 973
(8th Cir. 2025) (quoting , 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016)).
“To establish liability based on a custom, the plaintiff has to show the following: (1) The
existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by
the governmental entity’s employees; (2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization
of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the
Troupe Johnson v. Douglas Cnty. Med.
officials of that misconduct; and (3) That . . . the custom was a moving force behind the
Dep’t
constitutional violation.” , 143 F.4th at 973 (citing
Atkinson v. City of Mtn. View,
, 725 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2013). “Notice is the touchstone of deliberate
Mo.
indifference in the context of section 1983 municipal liability.”
Watkins v. City of St. Louis
Plaintiff’s municipal custom claim must satisfy the same pleading standard as his
individual capacity claims. , 102 F.4th 947, 953 (8th Cir. 2024)
Id.
“Conclusory assertions that are unsupported by facts will not satisfy this pleading
standard.” . In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant St. Louis County had specific
and detailed knowledge of a pervasive, widespread and well-known custom and practice of
not providing OUD patients with their prescribed medications” and “ignor[ing] obvious
signs of . . . serious medical notions and not provid[ing] appropriate, adequate medical
treatment,” and that such customs were the “moving force behind [Williams’s] injury and
death.” Doc. [1] ¶ 115-17. In support of the claim, Plaintiff alleges that in March 2014, over
Id.
six years before Williams’s death, St. Louis County corrections officials “acknowledged a
pattern of their nurses failing to distribute OUD medications.” ¶ 53. In response to the
issue, “St. Louis County nurse managers created a PDCA (“Plan-Do-Check-Act”), a quality
Id.
control process, to address [the County’s] pervasive pattern of failures to treat detainees
with [OUD], including the pervasive failure to provide detainees medication.” ¶ 54.
Id.
Plaintiff alleges that the issue continued for years, ultimately resulting in Williams’s death.
¶ 56. He cites testimony provided by a “former long time Nurse Manager,” who stated
that acute withdrawal “caused or contributed to cause more than twenty (20) deaths at the
Id.
St. Louis County jail in the eight years prior to 2015,” but that the “2014 PDCA
acknowledging the medication distribution problem at the jail was never completed.”
¶¶ 58-59. And he states that another former nurse manager similarly testified that “the
failure to provide Suboxone to detainee patients was a ‘persistent problem’ at the jail
through at least 2023”; that “MAT eligible patients were frequently not being referred to
custom and practice was not
the MAT program or provided with Suboxone”; and that “while the MAT policies were
being administered at all Id.
technically in force during May 2020, the . . . was that MAT
.” ¶¶ 63-67.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the constitutional issue before it in this case
is whether Defendants Dooley and Stephens violated Williams’s Eighth and Fourteenth
See
Amendment rights by denying him access to his prescribed Suboxone, not the
Dulany v. Carnahan
appropriateness of alleged denials of specific medications to inmate patients generally.
, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[I]nmates have no constitutional
free to exercise their independent medical judgment.”). Plaintiff’s allegat§ions relating to
the denial of Suboxone to the jail population are insufficient to sustain a 1983 custom
claim against the County. As it stands, the Court cannot determine the frequency, severity,
or result of any deprivation of prescription medication for acute withdrawal. Despite
Plaintiff’s attempt to extrapolate from deprivations that allegedly took place “in the eight
years prior to 2015,” long before Williams’s death, Doc. [1] ¶¶ 58, 60, Plaintiff has not
See Watkins v. City of St. Louis
“assert[ed] specific instances or provide[d] specific examples . . . that could support an
inference of an unconstitutional policy or custom.” , 102 F.4th
947, 954 (8th Cir. 2024). Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a
custom claim under section 1983, Plaintiff’s Count III against St. Louis County must be
dIIiIs.m issCeodu. nt II: Supervisory Failure to Train, Supervise, or Discipline
Plaintiff also claims that the Supervisory Defendants failed to train, supervise, or
discipline their employees, resulting in Williams’s death. Doc. [1] ¶¶ 95-112. “A
municipality can be liable under [section 1983] for a failure to train or supervise its
employees where: (1) the municipality’s training practices are inadequate; (2) the
municipality was deliberately indifferent to the rights of others in adopting those practices
such that the failure to train reflects a deliberate or conscious choice by the municipality;
Mitchell v. Saint Louis Cnty., Mo.
and (3) an alleged deficiency in the municipality’s training practices actually caused the
Ulrich v. Pope Cnty.
plaintiff’s constitutional deprivation.” , 160 F.4th 950, 963
(8th Cir. 2025) (citing , 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2013). “To be
Id. Andrews v.
deliberately indifferent, a municipality must have ‘notice that its procedures were
Fowler
inadequate and likely to result in a constitutional violation.’” (quoting
, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).
Similarly, while supervisory officials cannot be held individually liable under Section
1983 for the constitutional violations of a subordinate on a respondeat superior theory, “a
Troupe
supervisor may be held liable ‘if a failure to properly supervise and train [an] offending
Tlamka v. Serrell Andrews v. Fowler
employee caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.’” , 143 F.4th at 972 (quoting
, 244 F.3d 628, 635 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting , 98 F.3d
1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1996))). “When a ‘supervising official who had not direct participation
actor, the supervisor is entitled to qualified immunity unless plaintiff proves that the
Davis v.
supervisor (1) received notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by a
Buchanan Cnty., Mo. S.M. v. Krigbaum
subordinate, and (2) was deliberately indifferent to or authorized those acts.’”
Livers v. Schenck
, 11 F.4th 604, 624 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting , 808 F.3d
335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing , 700 F.3d 340, 355 (8th Cir. 2012))). This
Krigbaum
“rigorous standard” requires proof that the “supervisor had notice of a pattern of conduct
by the subordinate that violated a clearly established constitutional right.” , 808
F.3d at 340.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Supervisory Defendants failed to properly train,
supervise, or discipline their employees to “ensur[e] they provided detainees with their
prescription medications and monitored detainees who presented under the treatment of
an outside physician with OUD.” Doc. [1] ¶ 105. Plaintiff further alleges that: “Defendant
id.
St. Louis County and Defendant Dr. Davis oversaw policies and procedures relevant to” the
treatment of individuals “suffering from [Opioid Use Disorder (“OUD”)]” like Williams,
¶¶ 100-01; the Supervisory Defendants “were responsible for training, supervision, and
id.
discipline related to the [Medication Assisted Treatment] program at the St. Louis County
jail and ensuring that detainees received their prescription medication,” ¶ 102; the
Supervisory Defendants “failed to properly train the medical staff at the jail to ensure that
id.
patients would receive appropriate care, including their MAT and prescribed medication,”
¶ 103; and the Supervisory Defendants “were also aware of a pervasive, widespread and
well-known custom and practice of not providing OUD patients with their prescribed
id.
medications and Defendants St. Louis County and Dr. Davis were deliberately indifferent to
this custom and practice,” ¶¶ 73, 107.
As to notice, Plaintiff alleges that “[p]rior to [Williams’s] death, Defendants St. Louis
County, Dr. Davis, Nelson, and Maxwell knew that [OUD] was a serious medical need, and
they also know that St. Louis County jail was failing to provide medical care to this patient
Id.
population, including failing to provide detainees with their outside medical doctor’s
prescription and/or Suboxone.” ¶ 73. In support, Plaintiff cites to the “testimony” of
two former nurse managers, who allegedly stated that acute withdrawal had contributed to
approximately 20 inmate deaths in the eight years preceding 2015, and that “failure to
Id.
provide Suboxone to detainee patients was a ‘persistent problem’ at the jail through at least
2023.” ¶¶ 57-67.
Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim that Defendants had notice that
their training program or supervisory standards were insufficient and were resulting in
violations of inmates’ constitutional rights. “A pattern of similar constitutional violations
Connick v. Thompson Bd. Of
by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for
Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown see alsoMitchell
purposes of failure to train.” , 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quoting
, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997); , 160 F.4th at
962 (plaintiff must comply with “requirement of alleging—with enough factual matter—
that [supervisory defendant] had notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts by her
subordinates”). Here, like her custom claim, Plaintiff has failed to identify specific prior
instances of unconstitutional or improper conduct that would put the Supervisory
Troupe
Defendants on notice that their training and supervisory regimens were constitutionally
insufficient. While Plaintiff claims the allegations here are similar to those made in ,
the plaintiff in that case made specific allegations concerning “previous jail deaths” that had
Troupe
been “discussed by recent media reports, the St. Louis City Council, and internal reports.”
, 143 F.4th at 962. Plaintiff has made no such allegations in this case against any of
the Supervisory Defendants. As such, Plaintiff’s Count II against Defendants St. Louis
CIVo.u ntyC, Doru.n Dtasv IiVs, aanndd VN:e lAsoDnA i sa ndids mRAis sCelda.i ms
Plaintiff claims that St. Louis County and the individual defendants violated his
rights under both the ADA and the RA by “refusing to provide medically necessary
treatment for [Williams’s] disability.” Doc. [1] ¶¶ 120-32. “Title II of the ADA . . . prohibits
Randolph v. Rogers
qualified individuals with disabilities from being excluded from participation in or the
benefits of services, programs, or activitie§s of a pu e b t l s ic e q entity.” , 170 F.3d
850, 857 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. 12131 .). To prevail on a Title II ADA claim,
a plaintiff must establish: (1) that he is a person with a disability as defined by statute; (2)
Id.
that he is otherwise qualified for the benefit in question; and (3) that he was excluded from
§the bene f e i t t s b e e q c . ause of discrimination based upon his disability. at 858 (citing 42 U.S.C.
12131 ). “A qualified individual with a disability is defined as any person who
Id. §
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr. V. Yeskey
in programs or activities provided by a public entity.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. 12131(2)). A
state prison is a “public entity” under the statute. , 524
U.S. 206, 210 (1998). For all intents and purposes, “[t]he ADA and RA are ‘similar in
Randolph
substance’ and, with the exception of the RA’s federal funding requirement, ‘cases
Gorman v. Bartch
interpreting either are applicable and interchangeable.’” , 170 F.3d at 857
prima facie
(quoting , 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a case under Title II
because ADA and RA claims are based solely on medical treatment decisions. Docs. [12] at
3 Lustgraaf
14, [23] at 14; [44] at 12. The Court agrees. Assuming all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations
to be true and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, , 619 F.3d at 873,
she fails to plead violations of either the ADA or the RA. There is a difference between
because of See Postawko v. Missouri
alleging inadequate treatment for a prisoner’s disability and alleging that a prisoner was
Dep’t of Corr. Rogers v. Missouri Dep’t
denied access to medical services his or her disability.
of Corr.
, 2017 WL 1968317, at *13 (W.D. Mo. May 11, 2017);
, 2011 WL 3320521, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2011). While Plaintiff has sufficiently
stated a claim that certain Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Williams’s serious
medical needs, she does not allege facts sufficient to establish that such inadequate
Postawko v. Missouri Department of Corrections
treatment was discriminatory in nature.
In , the United States District Court of
the Western District of Missouri found that a plaintiff did “not merely allege inadequate
medical treatment” where the complaint asserted that the MDOC “follow[ed] one policy for
inmates with chronic [Hepatitis C] and another policy for inmates with other disabilities
under which they do receive lifesaving medications.” 2017 WL 1968317, at *13. There, the
plaintiff successfully pled a claim under the ADA because the allegations challenged a policy
under which inmates with a certain disability were not provided access to lifesaving
Id. see alsoMcNally v. Prison Health Servs.
medication, while inmates with other disabilities did have access to lifesaving medications.
; , 46 F. Supp. 2d 49, 58-59 (D. Me. 1999) (rejecting
the argument that a plaintiff could allege only that he received poor medical treatment and
3
Defendants leveled several other arguments against Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims as well. Docs.
not bring an ADA claim where the plaintiff demonstrated that the jail refused to provide
him with HIV medications but allowed inmates access to medications for other disabilities).
See, e.g.,
Drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, Plaintiff’s claims are based solely on
the alleged inadequate care Williams received related to his OUD. Doc. [1] ¶¶ 122,
124, 130 (Defendants “refus[ed] to provide medically necessary treatment”). Plaintiff
makes no attempt to allege that Williams was treated differently than other inmates with
respect to his medical conditions. Instead, the allegations appear to be “formulaic
Iqbal
recitation[s] elements” of an ADA or RA claim, which the Court is not required to accept as
true. , 556 U.S. at 679. Reading Plaintiff’s Complaint as a whole, the Court finds no
factual allegations that support a finding that his claims are based on anything other than
SeeBurger v. Bloomberg
medical treatment decisions. Those allegations alone cannot support a claim under the
ADA or RA. , 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“[W]e
agree with two other circuits that have recently concluded a lawsuit under the [RA or ADA]
cannot be based on medical treatment decisions”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Counts IV and V
Vag. ainstR aulll De e1f2en(bd)a(n5t)s Ianrseu dfifsimcieisnste dSe. rvice of Process

“In the absence of service of process (or waiver of service by the defendant), a court
Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.
ordinarily may not exercise power over a party the complaint names as defendant.”
Printed Media
, 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999). “If a defendant is
Servs., Inc. v. Solna Web, Inc.
improperly served, a federal court lacks jurisdiction over the defendant,”
Adams v. AlliedSignal Gen. Aviation Avionics
, 11 F.3d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted), even if the
Printed Media Servs.
defendant “had actual notice of the lawsuit,” , 74
F.32d 882, 885-86 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing , 11 F.3d at 843).
Service of a complaint is governed by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service may be achieved by the individual being served personally; by leaving a copy of the
summons and complaint at the person’s residence with a suitable person who resides
there; by delivering the summons and complaint to an agent legally authorized to receive
them for such purposes; or by a method approved under state law in the state where the
district court is located or where the individual is served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
Here, an executed proof of service of filed on July 9, 2025, stating that an employee
th
Missouri 63010. Doc. [7] at 2. On October 24 , Maxwell, through counsel, filed a consent
inter alia
motion for leave to file an answer out of time with an attached answer, in which she
asserted, , that “Plaintiff failed to properly serve” her. Doc. [28-1] ¶ U. On October
st
31 , the Court denied the motion “for failure to show good cause of excusable neglect per
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B).” Doc. [30]. On December 4, Maxwell filed an amended motion to
leave to file a motion to dismiss out of time and attached a motion to dismiss and a
supporting affidavit. Docs. [31], [32], [33]. Maxwell argues that dismissal is necessary
under Rules 12(b)(5) and 4(m), as she was not properly served. Doc. [31]. Maxwell
attached an affidavit stating that she “did not receive a copy of the Summons and Complaint
in this case on July 8, 2025,” and only received a copy when “it was mailed to [her] by [her]
Id.
attorney in November 2025.” Doc. [31-1] ¶¶ 6-7. Maxwell further states that neither she
nor any of her family members lived, resided, or worked at 2322 Oaker Dr. at any time.
¶¶ 4-5. In response, Plaintiff argues that Maxwell waived any affirmative defense under
Rule 12(b)(5) by filing her initial motion for leave and that any such defense is now
untimely under Rule 12(h)(1). Doc. [35]. The Court granted Maxwell’s amended motion
for leave, Doc. [38], and will thus address her motion to dismiss.
Rule 4(m) directs the Court, after notice to the plaintiff, to dismiss an action against
a defendant upon whom service has not been made within 90 days after the filing of the
complaint, or order that service be made within a specified time. As applied to this matter,
the Rule 4(m) period for service of the Complaint expired on August 12, 2025, 90 days after
its filing. Plaintiff has not presented evidence contesting Maxwell’s statement that she was
not served, instead relying on argument that she waived the defense by attempting to file
See
an answer. Plaintiff does not acknowledge that Maxwell did assert an affirmative defense
based on improper service of process in her proposed answer. Doc. [28-1] ¶ U. Rule
12(h)(1) states that a party can waive “any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) by,” as
relevant here, failing to “include it in a responsive pleading or in an amendment allowed by
Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course.” But Maxwell asserted the affirmative defense in her
proposed responsive pleading, so the Court will not find that she waived it by not
discussing it in her motion for leave to file that very pleading.
On the record before the Court, dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Maxwell is
of 14 days to properly serve Maxwell under Rule 4(e) and file a properly executed proof of
service under Rule 4(1). Failure to submit proof of proper and timely service within 14
days of this Order will result in dismissal of Maxwell as a party to this suit.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Docs. [11], [22], [31],
and [43] are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows. Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss Counts II, II, 1V, and V are GRANTED, and the counts are DISMISSED without
prejudice. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Count I are GRANTED IN PART as to
Defendants Kelly Wilkens, Dr. Dawn Davis, and Valerie Nelson and DENIED IN PART as to
Defendants David Dooley and Janie Stephens. An Order of Partial Dismissal will accompany
this Memorandum and Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants St. Louis County, Kelly Wilkens, Dr.
Dawn Davis, and Valerie Nelson are terminated as parties to this litigation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within fourteen (14) days of the date of this
Memorandum and Order, plaintiff will file an amended proof of service under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(1), showing that defendant Lisa Maxwell was properly served with
the summons and complaint under Rule 4(e). In the absence of an amended proof of
service that complies with Rule 4(e) and (m), Plaintiff shall show cause why her claims
against defendant Lisa Maxwell should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to
effect timely service of process upon her. Failure to timely comply with this order will
result in dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against defendant Lisa Maxwell without prejudice
and without further notice.
Dated this 30 day of March, 2026. /

SARAH E. PITLYK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11312446. Public record. Not legal advice.