# Buccieri

> District Court, D. Massachusetts · March 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11312279

## Case

- **Full name:** John Buccieri v. Vital Emergency Medical Services
- **Court:** District Court, D. Massachusetts
- **Decided:** March 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)
JOHN BUCCIERI, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civ. No. 4:22-cv-40132-MRG
)
)
VITAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL )
SERVICES, )
Defendant. )

ORDER ON MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT [ECF No. 16]
GUZMAN, J.
Plaintiff John Buccieri brings suit against Defendant Vital Emergency Medical Services
(“Vital”) for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 1211 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“Section 504”),
and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B (“Chapter 151B”) alleging Vital failed to hire him for a “non-
emergency position” because he is deaf. Plaintiff filed his complaint on November 14, 2022.
[Compl., ECF No. 1]. Defendant failed to answer or otherwise respond, despite being served on
December 29, 2022. [See ECF No. 7]. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment,
[ECF No. 16]. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Facts
a. Allegations in the Complaint
The Court begins by stating the relevant facts, as alleged by the complaint. Mr. Buccieri is
a deaf individual and asserts he is a “seasoned EMT/firefighter.” [Compl. ¶ 9]. On or around
November 15, 2018, Mr. Buccieri applied for a “non-emergency position” with Defendant, an
ambulance services company. [Id. ¶ 10]. Plaintiff does not name the exact position or describe any
of its job duties, but asserts that he “is and has been capable of performing the essential functions
of the position with reasonable accommodations as necessary.” [Id. ¶ 19]. The Complaint alleges
that on or about January 10, 2019, Mr. Buccieri interviewed for the position and was initially

offered a position. [Id. ¶ 11]. When Mr. Buccieri attempted to accept the position, however, he
was told it was no longer available. Defendant further told Mr. Buccieri to reapply if the position
opened up in the future. [Id. ¶ 12]. In his memorandum in support of his motion for a default
judgment, Plaintiff added that Defendant “refused to allow Plaintiff to accept the position because
he took too long to accept it,” a justification that Plaintiff asserts was pretextual. [ECF No. 16-1 at
1]. Through his recruiter, Mr. Buccieri followed up with a call to Defendant on March 11, 2019,
but was told there were no openings at the time. [Compl. ¶ 13]. When the position was reposted,
Mr. Buccieri applied on February 25 and May 2, 2019. [Id. ¶ 14]. Despite multiple emails and
phone calls, these applications and Mr. Buccieri’s messages went ignored. [Id. ¶ 15]. Plaintiff
asserts that “at every step of the hiring process, [he] complied with the directions and requirements

of Defendant.” [Id. ¶ 16]. Plaintiff alleges, “[u]pon information and belief, Defendant refused to
hire Plaintiff on the basis of his disability.” [Id. ¶ 17]. Further, “[u]pon information and belief,
Plaintiff would have been hired without Defendant’s discriminatory policies, procedures, and
practices.” [Id. ¶ 18].
In terms of damages, Plaintiff is seeking a total of $50,000 in compensatory and/or punitive
damages. [ECF No. 29 at 2]. Plaintiff asserts he is seeking $25,000 “in emotional distress
damages” and $25,000 in punitive damages. [Id.] When ordered by the Court to detail his claim
for damages, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit and memorandum. [ECF Nos. 27, 29]. Neither
document contains any non-conclusory factual support for damages. Plaintiff’s strongest evidence
is contained in a single paragraph in his affidavit:
Because of Vital's discrimination against me based solely on my hearing disability,
I have suffered and continues to suffer from dignitary harm as well as psychological
and emotional distress, including but not limited to anger, anxiety, disappointment,
embarrassment, humiliation, self-doubt and loss of self-confidence, and feelings of
exclusion and isolation from society. I have also suffered from loss of opportunity,
including loss of work experience and trainings in the EMS field, which have
contributed to my emotional distress. I have been denied similar ambulance driving
positions in the past solely because of my disability, and Vital's discrimination
reaffirms that a large part of society deems me unable to work simply because I am
deaf.

[ECF No. 27 ¶ 13].

Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief, [Compl. at 9–10], which is listed and discussed below
in the Injunctive Relief section, infra.
b. Hearing Testimony
On February 19, 2026, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s default judgment motion.
Defendant did not appear, and Mr. Buccieri was the only witness called. Mr. Buccieri described
his interactions with Defendant in the application process and disclosed for the first time that, prior
to Vital’s rejection of his application, Vital had actually offered Mr. Buccieri a job in an in-person
meeting. [Hr’g Tr. 9:2–13; id. 14:19–23, rough transcript on file with the Court]. As this meeting
was in person, the Court may infer that Vital was aware that Mr. Buccieri was deaf. Despite being
offered a position, Mr. Buccieri rejected the offer because he wanted to work for another
ambulance company that had better benefits. [Id. 9:10–13]. Plaintiff himself noted that the Vital
employees who offered him the position “were upset” upon hearing that he was rejecting the offer.
[Id. 9:12]. Then, the other company with purportedly better benefits did not work out and did not
hire Mr. Buccieri.1 [Id. 9:13].
At this point, Mr. Buccieri went back to Vital and attempted to accept the offer he
previously turned down. [Id. 9:18–10:19]. After some back and forth, Mr. Buccieri made two

phone calls to Vital using a video relay interpreter. [Id. 10:1–23; id. 13:14–20]. When he inquired
if the job was still open the first time, he identified himself to the recipient of the call and that
person told him the job had already been filled. [Id. 10:18–19]. Mr. Buccieri alleges that he called
Vital again five minutes later, but this time, he asked the interpreter to pretend like they were the
job applicant and to not identify Mr. Buccieri as the true caller. [13:21–14:8]. On this second call,
the person on the line stated that the position was still open. [Id. 13:25–14:1]. Mr. Buccieri stated,
“that’s when I figured out, yes, I’m not getting a job because I’m deaf.” [Id. 14:6–7]. Later in the
hearing, Mr. Buccieri claimed that some unspecified time after his rejection, a manager at Vital
told him he was rejected “because [he] was deaf.” [Id. 21:9–13]. Mr. Buccieri states that Vital
“insulted” him with the rejection and that he felt “let down,” “awful,” and “discouraged.” [Id.

21:23–22:6]. Plaintiff noted that he felt he was not hired as “retribution for what I did,” but did not
clarify if he meant retribution for rejecting the offer, or for some other action. [Id. 21:12–19].
The Court pauses to note that Mr. Buccieri filed three lawsuits against ambulance
companies on the same day, each alleging failure to hire and seeking compensatory emotional
distress damages and punitive damages. See Buccieri v. Lifeline Ambulance Service, Inc., No. 22-
cv-40131-MRG (D. Mass.); Buccieri v. Brewster Ambulance Service, No. 22-cv-11939-MRG (D.

1 Mr. Buccieri also sued the competing ambulance company, Brewster Ambulance Service, Inc.
for failure to hire. Buccieri v. Brewster Ambulance Service, Inc., No. 4:22-cv-11939-MRG (D.
Mass.)
Mass.).2 In fact, Plaintiff’s assertions of his emotional distress are essentially verbatim in each of
the complaints. [Compare Compl. ¶ 23 with Brewster, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 19, 38, and Lifeline, ECF No.
1 ¶¶ 17, 49].
When asked by the Court how Mr. Buccieri could establish that this Defendant, Vital,

caused all his damages when he made nearly identical claims against three different companies,
neither Mr. Buccieri nor his counsel answered the question. [Hr’g Tr. 4:20–5:21]. Counsel said
Plaintiff’s testimony would resolve the issue, [id.] but Mr. Buccieri never addressed the issue of
causation and separating out his harm caused by Vital versus other sources.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on November 14, 2022. [Compl.]. Defendant failed to answer
or otherwise respond, despite being served on December 29, 2022. [See ECF No. 7]. On June 14,
2023, Plaintiff moved for entry of default against Vital for its failure to respond. [ECF No. 12].
The Court entered default, and Plaintiff subsequently moved for default judgment on June 15,
2023. [ECF No. 16]. The Court granted the motion for default judgment but withheld entering the

judgment until Plaintiff made a showing as to the damages he seeks. [ECF No. 28].
Upon reviewing Plaintiff’s proffer in advance of a hearing on the entry of default judgment,
the Court noted deficiencies in Plaintiff’s complaint and supplemental filings that brought into
question whether entering a default judgment in this case is appropriate. Accordingly, Plaintiff was
ordered to show cause as to his entitlement to damages as well as to respond to the Court’s concerns
about the substantive allegations. [Show Cause Order, ECF No. 31]. In the same Show Cause

2 “It is well-accepted that federal courts may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if
those proceedings have relevance to the matters at hand.” Rodi v. S. New Eng. Sch. of L., 389
F.3d 5, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299, 305 (1st Cir. 1990)).
Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of Mr. Buccieri’s other lawsuits.
Order, the Court noted that Plaintiff’s claims under Counts II and III may be barred by the statute
of limitations and asked Plaintiff to respond. [Id. at 7]. On January 12, 2026, Plaintiff filed a
response to the show cause order, [ECF No. 33], and conceded to dismissal of Counts II and III,
which were his claims pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“Section

504”) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B (“Chapter 151B”).
A hearing on the motion for default judgment was held on February 19, 2026. [ECF No.
37]. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified directly; however, as discussed above, his testimony relayed
a story that was materially different from the allegations made in his complaint.
With the factual and procedural background established, the Court next turns to the
applicable legal standards.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Default Judgment
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) authorizes judgment by default where, as here,
default against defendants have been entered for defendants’ failure to appear, or to plead or

otherwise defend.” Vuitton Malletier v. Forty, No. CV 03-2277 (JAG), 2005 WL 8167941, at *3
(D.P.R. Sept. 8, 2005), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Louis Vuitton Malletier v.
Lincoln Fantasy, No. CV 03-2277 (JAG), 2005 WL 8167907 (D.P.R. Oct. 31, 2005). “Unless set
aside for good cause, the entry of default deprives defendant of the right to contest the factual
allegations of the complaint.” Id. (citing Note at page 851, Fed. Civ. Rules Handbook, Thomson-
West, 2004 Edition).
Following entry of default, the Court may enter judgment by default by accepting as true
any well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint to determine whether it alleges a cause of
action. Id. (citing Ramos-Falcon v. Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica, 301 F.3rd 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2002);
Quirindongo Pacheco v. Rolón Morales, 953 F. 2d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1992)). Although the facts
alleged in the complaint are taken as true, “the facts must be sufficiently well pleaded to support
the requested judgment; otherwise, the district court may require ‘such hearings . . . as it deems
necessary and proper . . . .’” Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Loc. 4 v. Stanley Excavation, 243

F.R.D. 25, 27 (D. Me. 2007) (quoting Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771
F.2d 5, 12 n. 8 (1st Cir.1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)). The Court may conduct a hearing to
“establish the truth of any averment” in the complaint. Ramos-Falcon, 301 F.3d. at 3. However, in
the First Circuit such hearing “is appropriate only if the Court has made ‘its requirements known
in advance to the plaintiff, so that [he] could understand the direction of the proceeding and
marshal such evidence as may be available to [him].’” Vuitton Malletier, 2005 WL 8167941, at *3
(quoting Ramos-Falcon, 301 F.3d. at 3). “Although an entry of default establishes liability, it does
not establish the amount of damages owed to the plaintiff for purposes of a default judgment.”
Groden v. Epstein, No. 24-cv-10303-ADB, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188955, at *7 (D. Mass. Oct.
17, 2024). Further, although allegations in the complaint are taken as true, the Court “need not

accept the moving party’s legal conclusions or factual allegations relating to the amount of
damages,” and the Court “is required to conduct its own inquiry to ascertain the amount of damages
with reasonable certainty.” Bonnette v. Jmac Distribution, LLC, No. 20-30046-MGM, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 257689, at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 2021) (citations omitted).
B. Damages under Title I of the ADA
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual because of his or
her impairment with regard to certain employment practices, including the one at issue here: failure
to hire. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
ADA, the plaintiff must prove that he: (1) is disabled; (2) is a qualified individual; and (3) was
discriminated against by the employer because of the disability. See Connolly v. Dep't of
Conservation & Recreation, 768 F. Supp. 3d 214, 220 (D. Mass. 2025); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
The remedies available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
are available to those claiming employment discrimination under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).

Additionally, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 allows plaintiffs to claim compensatory and punitive
damages for discrimination under Title I of the ADA, just as they can for violations of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) & (b); DeRosa v. Nat'l Envelope Corp., No. 06 CIV.
3425 (BMC), 2011 WL 13281769, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2011) (quoting Sharp v. Abate, 887 F.
Supp. 695, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). To be eligible for compensatory damages under the ADA, a
plaintiff must first show intentional discrimination by the defendant. McDonough v. City of
Quincy, 452 F.3d 8, 23 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526,
534 (1999)). Plaintiffs face a higher burden for recovering punitive damages. “Punitive damages
are limited . . . to cases in which the employer has engaged in intentional discrimination and has
done so ‘with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved

individual.’” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 529–30 (quoting Rev. Stat. § 1977, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(b)(1)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Allegations
The Court’s earlier Show Cause Order detailed the Court’s concerns with the sufficiency
of Plaintiff’s allegations, and Plaintiff’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing on default judgment
did little to reassure the Court of the strength of Plaintiff’s claims. [See Show Cause Order]. Prior
to the hearing, the Court indicated that “Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant failed to hire him
because of discrimination is conclusory and speculative.” [Id. at 5]. Further, the Court noted that
Mr. Buccieri had not alleged any specific discriminatory policy of the Defendant other than the
singular failure to hire. [Id. at 6]. Many of Plaintiff’s key allegations were made pursuant to
“information and belief.” [See Compl. ¶¶ 17–18]. Pleading “upon information and belief” is
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11(b); however, in reviewing such

allegations, the Court should disregard the fact if it is conclusory and “otherwise credi[t] [it] as
true for the purpose of this decision.” In re LaMantia, No. 18-10632, 2019 WL 5388056, at *5 n.2
(Bankr. D. Me. Oct. 18, 2019) (citation omitted). The Court was hoping that the evidentiary
hearing on the default judgment motion would provide clarity and support for Plaintiff’s claims;
however, Plaintiff’s hearing testimony merely muddied the waters with inconsistent statements
and new allegations that did not appear in any other prior pleading.
Despite the inconsistent testimony, failure to include material facts in the Complaint, and
the Complaint’s vague and conclusory statements, the Court is mindful that on a default judgment,
the Court generally must take all well-pleaded allegations as true. Ramos-Falcon, 301 F.3rd at 2
(citing Quirindongo Pacheco, 953 F. 2d at 16). However, as noted, although allegations in the

complaint are taken as true, the Court, “need not accept the moving party's legal conclusions or
factual allegations relating to the amount of damages,” and the Court “is required to conduct its
own inquiry to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” Bonnette, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 257689, at *3 (citations omitted). Here, certain facts are material to determine a
damages amount. For example, the Defendant’s conduct and interactions with Plaintiff is critical
to establishing intentional discrimination for compensatory damages and malice or reckless
indifference for punitive damages. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 529–30, 534, 536. Mr. Buccieri
originally based his discrimination claim on the failure to hire him the first time he applied. [See
Compl.]. In his show cause response, he asked this Court to infer, based on timing, that the
Defendant intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff. [ECF No. 33 at 3 (“Drawing all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as the Court must on default, this sequence supports the inference
that Defendant extended an offer, learned Mr. Buccieri was deaf, and manufactured a pretextual
reason to withdraw it.”)]. The problem here is that Mr. Buccieri’s testimony– admitting that Vital

knew he was deaf when they originally offered him the job– undercuts his timing argument that
the company rescinded his offer after it “learned Mr. Buccieri was deaf.” This is just one
inconsistent or confusing fact in a record full of contradictions.
Despite the Court’s reservations, upon entry of default, the Defendant has waived its right
to contest the factual allegations of the Complaint, and the Court finds that Plaintiff has met his
prima facie burden on his ADA claim. See Vuitton Malletier, 2005 WL 8167941, at *3 (“Unless
set aside for good cause, the entry of default deprives defendant of the right to contest the factual
allegations of the complaint.” (citation omitted)). A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of
ADA disability discrimination by “proving by a [preponderance] of the evidence that she applied
for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which

give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., 283 F.3d
11, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) (alterations in original) (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). The First Circuit has noted, “[t]his showing is easily made and, once
achieved, triggers a presumption of discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, Mr. Buccieri has
alleged that he applied for and was qualified for the position at Vital. [Compl. ¶¶ 10, 19]. In light
of his own hearing testimony, the Court does not find credible Plaintiff’s allegation in the
Complaint that Vital simply rejected him despite his qualifications.
However, two facts alleged in the hearing allow Plaintiff to establish his prima facie case.
Mr. Buccieri stated that he was ultimately told by a manager at Vital that he was not hired because
he was deaf. [Hr’g Tr. 21:9–13]. Further, his story of the two phone calls (when he first called
Vital as himself using an interpreter and was told the position was no longer open, then five
minutes later when an interpreter pretending to be an applicant called and asked the same question
and was told the position was open) establishes that Vital continued to hire for the same position

after rejecting Mr. Buccieri. This is similar to the evidence that the First Circuit in Gillen found
sufficient to establish a prima facie case. See Gillen, 283 F.3d at 30 (“In the case at hand, the
appellant presented evidence that she is disabled; that she applied and was qualified for the EMT
position; that she was rejected despite her qualifications; and that [defendant] thereafter continued
to hire EMTs. This was enough to satisfy the prima facie case requirement.” (citation
omitted)). Because Vital has not defended against the claims, it cannot demonstrate a non-
discriminatory reason for the failure to hire to rebut the presumption of discrimination that is
triggered once Plaintiff establishes his prima facie case. See EEOC v. Aviation Port Servs., LLC,
No. 18-10909-FDS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57073, at *9 (D. Mass. Apr. 1, 2020) (“Because
defendant [in a default] has not defended against the claims, it has not demonstrated that it could

not reasonably accommodate their request to wear long skirts without undue hardship.”); Gillen,
283 F.3d at 30 (citation omitted). Regardless, Mr. Buccieri argues that any reason proffered by
Vital would be pretextual because Mr. Buccieri alleges he was told by a manager at Vital that he
was not hired “because [he] was deaf.” [Hr’g Tr. 21:9–17].
The next step in the analysis requires the Court to decide “whether the evidence adduced
is sufficient to sustain a finding of discriminatory intent on the part of the defendant[,]” which does
not depend on the truth or falsity of the Defendant’s explanation, but instead focuses on “whether
the plaintiff's evidence suffices to demonstrate the defendant’s animus.” Gillen, 283 F.3d at 30
(citations omitted). Mr. Buccieri’s hearing testimony both hurt his case and saved his claim. His
own admission that he had willingly rejected a viable job offer from Vital when the company knew
he was deaf fatally undercuts the reasonableness of an inference of intentional discrimination based
on his original theory, as alleged in the Complaint. See Ramos-Falcon, 301 F.3d. at 3 (the Court
may conduct a hearing on a default judgment motion to “establish the truth of any averment” in

the complaint). However, his hearing testimony that he called presenting as a deaf individual and
was told the position was not open while non-deaf applicants were told the opposite, and that a
manager at Vital blatantly told him he was not hired because he was deaf, must be accepted as true
because the Defendant waived any challenge to those facts by failing to respond to the suit. See
Vuitton Malletier, 2005 WL 8167941, at *3 (citation omitted).
In a discrimination case, “direct evidence of discriminatory intent is often hard to come by,
and circumstantial evidence is often the only means of proving such intent.” DeNovellis v. Shalala,
124 F.3d 298, 308 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)). In some cases, timing can serve as circumstantial evidence, where
proximity in time between the protected activity and alleged adverse action “may be suggestive of

discriminatory animus’ in conjunction with other evidence.” McCue v. Bradstreet, 807 F. 3d 334,
344 (1st Cir. 2015). Here, given the procedural restrictions of a default, the Court accepts
Plaintiff’s allegations at the hearing as true and will infer, based on the timing of Mr. Buccieri’s
rejection and the purported statement by the manager at Vital, that he has met his burden in
establishing intentional discrimination – but just barely. Mr. Buccieri has not put forth other
evidence to substantiate his claim of intentional discrimination beyond those two facts established
by his own testimony.
B. Damages
a. Emotional Distress Damages
Emotional damages are considered a type of compensatory damages under the ADA. See
EEOC 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57073, at *20-21. A plaintiff seeking compensatory damages under
the ADA must first show intentional discrimination by the defendant. McDonough, 452 F.3d at 23
(citing Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 534). A plaintiff seeking emotional distress damages must link the

defendant’s conduct to their harm and include “substantial evidence of a causal connection
between the complainant’s emotional distress and the respondent’s unlawful act.” Neal v. Omni
Bos. Corp., No. 1:23-cv-11682-JEK, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58638, at *15-16 (D. Mass. Mar. 28,
2025) (quoting DeRoche v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 848 N.E.2d 1197, 1202 (Mass.
2006)). Further, emotional distress damages “must be proved by substantial evidence of the
emotional suffering that occurred[.]” Id. A plaintiff may be eligible for emotional distress damages
“even when the defendant's conduct does not cause ‘concrete psychological harm.’” EEOC, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57073, at *20–21 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22
(1993)). While emotional distress damages may be warranted even where the plaintiff does not
provide medical or psychiatric evidence, “the lack of such evidence is relevant to the amount of

award.” Id. at *21 (quoting Koster v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 1999)).
Additionally, when a plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress is based solely on his own
testimony without corroborating evidence that would inform the factfinder “as to the existence,
nature, duration and seriousness of the condition,” the court may deny emotional distress damages
if such testimony is insufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff
experienced emotional distress caused by the defendant. Aadland v. Boat Santa Rita II, Inc., No.
17-CV-11248-DJC, 2023 WL 8720128, at *11–12 (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 2023), aff'd in part, vacated
in part on other grounds, remanded, 132 F.4th 33 (1st Cir. 2025) (citing Bullard v. Cent. Vermont
Ry., Inc., 565 F.2d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 1977)). Moreover, “a factfinder is not required to accept the
plaintiff's uncorroborated testimony of emotional distress.” Id. (citing Acevedo-Luis v. Pagan, 478
F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2007)). Overall, courts have considered the following factors when
determining emotional distress damages:
[T]he degree of mental pain and anguish (such as feelings of depression,
humiliation, or fear); physical manifestations of emotional distress (such as
disordered sleeping or eating); the type of medical or other treatment, if any, sought;
the effect on family members and family relationships; the economic hardships
suffered as a result of the employment practice (such as bankruptcy, depleted
retirement savings, or loss of housing); and the attachment that plaintiffs felt to their
workplace (such as length of tenure or seniority).

EEOC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57073, at*26-27.
In consideration of the factors listed above, as well as Plaintiff’s failure to disentangle
Vital’s conduct from the defendants in the other cases where he alleges near identical claims for
emotional distress, the Court finds that Mr. Buccieri’s emotional damages must be limited and
nominal in nature. First, as discussed at length, Plaintiff’s claims are not strong given
inconsistencies in the record, nor are they supported by substantial evidence. The inference of
intentional discrimination just barely passes the threshold of being reasonable given that Vital
certainly could have decided not to reopen the position for Mr. Buccieri since he rejected its
original offer. Second, Mr. Buccieri’s emotional distress does not appear to be severe. In
conclusory terms, he asserts, “I have suffered and continues to suffer from dignitary harm as well
as psychological and emotional distress, including but not limited to anger, anxiety,
disappointment, embarrassment, humiliation, self-doubt and loss of self-confidence, and feelings
of exclusion and isolation from society.” [ECF No. 27 ¶ 13]. Plaintiff offered no other evidence or
corroborating testimony from sources other than himself. He does not describe how any of the
conclusory sentiments he lists are manifesting in terms of emotional symptoms, except that he was
“upset” and “discouraged.” [Hr’g Tr. 21:23–25–22:4–6]. Likewise, nowhere in the record does he
assert any kind of physical manifestation of his distress, like loss of sleep or appetite. To the
Court’s knowledge, he never sought medical treatment for his emotional distress. He has not
argued that his emotional distress affected his family or other relationships in his life. He cannot
articulate an attachment to his workplace because this is a failure to hire case, so he never actually

worked at Vital. On the other hand, he has alleged economic consequences such as a “loss of
opportunity, including loss of work experience and trainings in the EMS field.” [ECF No. 27 ¶
13].
The Court’s greatest hesitation lays with the law’s requirement that Plaintiff prove
causation for emotional distress damages: that the defendant in the case at hand caused the
emotional harm the plaintiff alleges in his complaint. See Neal, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58638, at
*15-16 (quoting DeRoche, 848 N.E.2d at 1202) (plaintiff seeking emotional distress must allege
“substantial evidence of a causal connection between the complainant’s emotional distress and the
respondent’s unlawful act.”). Despite being asked directly about it in the hearing, Plaintiff has not
distinguished the harm he alleges was caused by this Defendant, Vital, versus the other ambulance

companies he sued for emotional distress on the same day. [Compare Compl. ¶ 23 with Brewster,
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 19, 38, and Lifeline, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17, 49]. Mr. Buccieri’s own statements indicate
that his emotional distress may be caused by actors other than this Defendant. [See ECF No. 27 ¶
13 (“I have been denied similar ambulance driving positions in the past solely because of my
disability, and Vital’s discrimination reaffirms that a large part of society deems me unable to work
simply because I am deaf.”)].
Because Plaintiff’s emotional distress is not severe and supported by only his own
testimony, because the inference of intentional discrimination is only marginally plausible, and
because the causal connection between the Defendant’s conduct and Plaintiff’s emotional trauma
“is complicated by other factors similarly causing such suffering,” the Court finds an award of
$1,000 in compensatory damages to be appropriate in this case. See McKinnon v. Kwong Wah
Rest., 83 F.3d 498, 506-07 (1st Cir. 1996) (awarding $2,500 in emotional distress compensatory
damages where emotional distress was caused, in part, by sources independent from the

defendant’s conduct). The Court took the opportunity to hold an evidentiary hearing on damages
and called on Plaintiff directly to make his best case for emotional distress damages. [See Show
Cause Order]. At the hearing, the Court was able to hear and see the Plaintiff and assess his
demeanor and credibility. His testimony was rife with inconsistencies and revealed material
omissions from the Complaint. Despite the difficulties in ascertaining an amount, the Court
carefully considered the factors required by law and determines that a $1,000 is an appropriate
sum to compensate the Plaintiff. See McKinnon, 83 F.3d at 506–07 (upholding trial court’s
emotional distress award where the court “had the opportunity to see and hear the plaintiffs, and
no doubt took into account their demeanor as well as other factors, such as their ages, nature of
employment, and earnings, in setting the damages amount.”).

b. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages under the ADA “are limited . . . to cases in which the employer has
engaged in intentional discrimination and has done so ‘with malice or with reckless indifference
to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.’” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 529–30 (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)). “[M]alice and reckless indifference concern, not the employer’s
awareness that it is discriminating, but the employer’s knowledge that it is acting in violation of
federal law.” McDonough, 452 F.3d at 24. There are recognized situations where intentional
discrimination may be present, but punitive damages are not appropriate. “Such situations may
occur where the employer believes that it can lawfully discriminate, where the theory of
discrimination is novel or poorly recognized, or where the employer believes that its discrimination
falls within a statutory exception.” Id. (citing Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536–37). Although allegations
in the complaint are taken as true in a default judgment, the Court, “need not accept the moving
party’s legal conclusions or factual allegations relating to the amount of damages,” and the Court

“is required to conduct its own inquiry to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable
certainty.” Bonnette, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 257689, at *3 (citations omitted).
Here Plaintiff has barely established intentional discrimination by virtue of procedural
constraints on this Court’s ability to test the veracity of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s argument in
support of punitive damages rested entirely on the false premise in the Complaint that Vital
withdrew an employment offer upon Mr. Buccieri’s attempt to accept it. [ECF No. 33 at 7 (“An
employer that extends a job offer to a qualified applicant, withdraws it immediately upon the
applicant's attempt to accept, reposts the same position, and then ignores the applicant's subsequent
applications acts in the face of an obvious risk that its conduct violates federal law.”)]. As noted,
Plaintiff himself testified that Vital never withdrew its offer of employment – Vital failed to reopen

the position for Mr. Buccieri after he rejected it for a company with better benefits. Plaintiff has
not made any allegations sufficient to support the higher standard of malice or reckless
indifference. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.
C. Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief, asking the Court to order Vital:
1. to develop, implement, promulgate, and comply with a policy prohibiting future
discrimination against Plaintiff or other deaf or hard of hearing individuals;
2. to develop, implement, promulgate, and comply with a policy to ensure that Defendant will
notify individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing of their right to effective auxiliary aids
and services;
3. to develop, implement, promulgate, and comply with a policy to ensure that Defendant will

provide individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing with reasonable accommodation;
4. to train all its employees, staff, and other agents about the rights of individuals who are
deaf or hard of hearing under the ADA, RA, and M.G.L c. 151B.; and
5. to hire Plaintiff.
[Compl. at 10].
An injunction must be “narrowly tailored to give only the relief to which plaintiffs are
entitled.” Brown v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 361 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)). As stated previously, employment discrimination claims
brought under Title I of the ADA are subject to the remedies and procedures available in a Title
VII action. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating the procedures found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–

5). Where the Court determines that an employer has intentionally engaged in an unlawful
employment practice, Title VII § 706 authorizes the Court, “to ‘enjoin the respondent from
engaging in such unlawful employment practice’ and to order ‘equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate.’” EEOC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57073, at *33 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)).
The question of whether to issue injunctive relief “rests in the sound discretion of the district
court.” Id. (quoting Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1135 (8th Cir. 1981)).
Generally, there are two kinds of injunctive relief in discrimination cases: (1) “obey the
law” relief, and (2) case specific relief “to prevent future discrimination of the kind contemplated
in the lawsuit.” Id. at *36. “Obey the law” relief asks the Court to command the Defendant to
“obey the law concerning [discrimination]” and is routinely rejected by courts because such
injunctions are “vague, overly broad, and [do] not provide defendant with adequate notice of the
specific acts prohibited.” Id. at *35–36. Case specific injunctive relief may be ordered to prevent
“acts that ‘are of the same type or class as unlawful acts which the court has found to have been

committed or whose commission in the future, unless enjoined, may fairly be anticipated from the
defendant's conduct in the past.’” Id. (quoting Brown, 891 F.2d at 361 n.23).
Returning to the principle that an injunction must be “narrowly tailored,” Brown, 891 F.2d
at 361, some courts will decline to issue injunctive relief that would benefit nonparties other than
the prevailing plaintiff. For example, in Brown v. Trustees of Boston University, the First Circuit
vacated an injunction against gender-based discrimination regarding all faculty members, where
plaintiff only made a showing of discrimination in her specific case. Id. On the other hand, the
Circuit did uphold orders reinstating plaintiff and prohibiting gender-based discrimination
regarding plaintiff's future promotion, salary, or other benefits. Id. Regarding the decision to vacate
the portion of injunctive relief affecting non-parties, the Circuit wrote, “there is no such reason

here for an injunction running to the benefit of nonparties. Professor Brown’s case established that
she alone had been the victim of sex discrimination. The only permissible focus of the injunctive
relief, therefore, would be on protecting her from further instances of sex discrimination or
retaliation.” Id.
Here, the Court must deny Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief because the “obey the
law” requests are overly broad and vague, and Plaintiff has not sufficiently developed the record
to warrant case specific relief. With respect to Mr. Buccieri’s first, third, and fourth requests
(requests for Vital to develop a policy to comply with the law or train its staff), these are “obey the
law” requests that are “vague, overbroad, and fail to give sufficient notice to defendants consistent
with principles of due process,” i.e., such requests do not provide the Defendant with notice of the
specific acts that are prohibited. EEOC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57073, at *34. Further, these forms
of relief would benefit non-parties and Plaintiff has not demonstrated harm to anyone but him
alone; therefore, he fails to establish that relief benefitting anyone but himself is warranted. See

Brown, 891 F.2d at 361.
Regarding Mr. Buccieri’s second request (for Vital to develop a policy regarding an
individual’s rights to auxiliary aids), this request must be denied because Plaintiff “has not shown
a cognizable danger of future [disability] discrimination of the same type or class as that
demonstrated in this suit should this Court fail to issue the suggested injunction.” EEOC, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57073, at *36–37. For example, he has failed to show any company-wide policy
that influenced the individual office’s refusal to hire him. All he has shown is a single act affecting
him personally. See id. at *37 (denying a similar request because plaintiff “has not shown that
there was any religious discrimination or failure to provide reasonable religious accommodation
at defendant’s nine remaining locations, or that there were company-wide policies that influenced

the Boston office's refusal to provide reasonable accommodation to the complaining
[employees]”.)
Regarding the fifth request to make Vital hire Mr. Buccieri, this relief is not supported by
the record before the Court. Because this is a default judgment case, the record is undeveloped on
key facts like what the job qualifications were, what reasonable accommodations Mr. Buccieri
would have needed, or whether the Defendant would be able to raise an affirmative defense to
those accommodations. Accordingly, the Court is unable to tailor the injunctive relief to be “no
more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiff[].” Id.
at *34 (quoting Califano, 442 U.S. at 702).
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is DENIED.
D. Counts II and III are Time Barred
Plaintiff’s claims under Counts II and III are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff
brings Count II under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“Section 504”) and

Count III under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B (“Chapter 151B”). Section 504 does not indicate its
own statute of limitations. This means that the Court must borrow a limitation period from the
most analogous state law, “provided that [the limitation period of choice] does not [upset] federal
law or policy.” Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 118 (1st Cir. 2003). The First Circuit
has held that in Massachusetts, district courts should apply the three-year limitations period
borrowed from the forum state’s statute of limitations for Chapter 151B claims. See Rae v. Woburn
Pub. Sch., 113 F.4th 86, 99 (1st Cir. 2024). A Chapter 151B claim “must be filed in court
within three years of the adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, §
9). In a failure to hire Chapter 151B case, the “adverse employment action” is the Defendant's
denial of Plaintiff's employment application. See Ward v. Town of Belmont, No. 15-10508-LTS,

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158670, at *2–3 (D. Mass. Nov. 23, 2015) (citing Hernandez-Torres v.
Intercontinental Trading, Inc., 158 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 1998)). Mr. Buccieri applied to the position
in question several times but was not hired. The latest date of his final application was May 2,
2019. [Compl. ¶ 14]. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims under Chapter 151B or Section 504 must have
been filed by May 2, 2022. See Rae, 113 F.4th at 99. Plaintiff filed his complaint on November
14, 2022. [ECF No. 1].
Plaintiff concedes that Counts II and III are barred by the statute of limitations. [ECF No.
33 at 10]. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Counts II and III.
E. Attorney’s Fees
The ADA permits a “prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. “The term ‘prevailing party’ is
a ‘legal term of art.’” Neal, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58638, at *37 (quoting Suárez-Torres v.
Panaderia y Resposteria España, Inc., 988 F.3d 542, 551 (1st Cir. 2021)). To qualify as a

“prevailing party,” the party seeking to recover fees must demonstrate (1) a material change of the
legal relationship of the parties (2) that is approved or authorized by the Court. Id. (quoting Suárez-
Torres, 988 F.3d at 551). “A material change occurs when the plaintiff succeeds on ‘any significant
issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the [plaintiff] sought in bringing the suit.’”
Suárez-Torres, 988 F.3d at 551 (brackets in original) (quoting Texas State Tchrs. Ass'n v. Garland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 789 (1989)). A plaintiff who obtains an “enforceable judgmen[t]
on the merits” qualifies as a prevailing party. Neal, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58638, at *37 (winner
of a default judgment qualifies as a prevailing party).
“‘When fashioning a fee award, the district court ordinarily starts by constructing what has
come to be known as the lodestar,’ which is generally ‘the product of the number of hours

appropriately worked times a reasonable hourly rate or rates.’” Id. (quoting Hutchinson v. Patrick,
636 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011)). Mr. Buccieri, as the party seeking the award, has a burden to
establish support for his request. Id. Such supporting materials “should include counsel’s
contemporaneous time and billing records, suitably detailed, and information anent the law firm's
standard billing rates.” Id. (quoting Hutchinson, 636 F.3d at 13). The Court retains discretion, and
has a duty, to modify or reduce a request for attorney’s fees based on its “overall sense of a suit,”
which may include “winnow[ing] out excessive hours.” Id. (first quoting Pérez-Sosa v. Garland,
22 F.4th 312, 322 (1st Cir. 2022) then quoting Gay Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247
F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 2001)).
As the Court has ruled in favor of Mr. Buccieri, he has achieved some of the “benefit” of
bringing his suit and has an enforceable judgment on the merits. Suárez-Torres, 988 F.3d at 551;
Neal, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58638, at *37. Therefore, he qualifies as a prevailing party in this
ADA case. Accordingly, Mr. Buccieri is entitled to attorney’s fees.

Within 30 days from this Order, Counsel is directed to file a motion for attorneys fees that
includes the supporting materials mentioned above. A determination of the amount of fees shall
be made following the Court’s review of Plaintiff’s request.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, ECF No. 16, is
GRANTED IN PART. The Court ORDERS the entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff and
against Defendant as follows: (1) compensatory damages for emotional distress in the amount of
$1,000; and, (2) attorney’s fees in an amount to be determined in a future proceeding. Plaintiff’s
counsel is directed, within 30 days of the entry of this Order, to file a motion for attorney’s fees
that is properly supported by counsel’s contemporaneous time and billing records and information

on his standard billing rate. See Neal, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58638, at *38.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 30, 2026

/s/ Margaret R. Guzman
Margaret R. Guzman
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11312279. Public record. Not legal advice.