# Brunton

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · February 25, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311807

## Case

- **Full name:** Jennifer D. Brunton v. Morrow County Courthouse, Ohio, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** February 25, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JENNIFER D. BRUNTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case Number 2:25-cv-769
Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers
MORROW COUNTY COURTHOUSE,
OHIO, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on an Order and Report and Recommendation issued by
the Magistrate Judge on February 6, 2026. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff Jennifer D. Brunton,
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings 12 claims against 14 defendants: William A.
Clark; Morrow County Victim Services; the Morrow County Sheriff’s Office; Morrow County
Sheriff Deputies Baker, Lt. Brian Newsome, Brandon Newsome, Eric Collins, and John Atwell;
GAL Lou Herzog; Judge Tom C. Elkin; Magistrate Celeste Brammer; Judge John C. Thatcher;
and public defenders Erica A. Young and John A. Dankovich. (ECF No. 9.) Ms. Brunton’s
claims appear to stem from an adverse divorce and custody judgment in the Morrow County
Court of Common Pleas. (See id.; ECF No. 12.)
After an initial screen of Ms. Brunton’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9), the Magistrate
Judge recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 11, PageID 156.) Ms.
Brunton filed a timely Objection to the Order and Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 12.)
If a party timely objects to a report and recommendation, the Court “shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Upon
review, the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
Ms. Brunton makes three general objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Order and Report
and Recommendation. First, she objects to the recommendation for dismissal for failure to state a
claim because the “Amended Complaint alleges deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty
and property interests without due process of law.” (ECF No. 12, PageID 158.) Next, she objects
to the characterization of her claims as vague or conclusory because “allegations of lack of
service, notice, and opportunity to be heard are factual in nature.” (Id. PageID 159.) Last, she
objects to premature dismissal of her claims because “unresolved factual issues exist concerning:
adequacy of service, sufficiency of notice, and opportunity to be heard.” (Id.)
Ms. Brunton also objects to the recommendation of dismissal of her Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process claim. (Id., PageID 158–59.) The only allegation1 in the

First Amended Complaint that suggests a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process
violation states: “[Judge] Tom C. Elkin, Magistrate Celeste Brammer Issued divorce and custody
orders without service or Plaintiff presence, violated due process, caused deprivation of property
and children. Took home and property without valid divorce.” (ECF No. 9, PageID 124.) Ms.
Brunton brings a procedural due process claim against “Judges, Magistrates, Officials.” (Id.

1 The other claim that could possibly implicate the Fourteenth Amendment is a claim against
Judge John C. Thatcher, which Ms. Brunton described as a Sixth Amendment violation. (ECF
No. 9, PageID 125) Nonetheless, Ms. Brunton withdrew her claims against Judge John C.
Thatcher in her Objection. (ECF No. 9, PageID 158.)
PageID 125.) The Objection lists “factual allegations” that Ms. Brunton says support her due
process claim, such as “service of process was unsuccessful,” “plaintiff received no notice of
hearings,” and “orders entered without Plaintiff’s knowledge.” (ECF No. 12, PageID 159.)
The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the claims against Judge Tom C. Elkin and

Magistrate Celeste Brammer must be dismissed because judges “enjoy judicial immunity from
suits arising out of the performance of their judicial functions.” Leech v. DeWeese, 689 F.3d 538,
542 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978). The Magistrate
Judge also correctly concluded that Ms. Brunton’s procedural due process claim against
“Officials” fails to assert a non-conclusory claim against a specific defendant.
Ms. Brunton attached documents to her Objection that were not previously presented to
the Court: a partial printout of a docket from the Morrow County Common Pleas Court
(“reflecting unsuccessful service”) and a divorce decree and judgment (“reflecting Plaintiff not
present”). (Id.) “As a general rule, district courts do not have to consider arguments on review
that were not raised before the magistrate judge. By logical extension, it is inappropriate to offer

new evidence at the time objections are filed and to argue that the Magistrate Judge erred in his
[or her] recommendation.” Nathan v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:10-CV-872, 2013 WL 139874, at
*4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Nevertheless, because
pro se litigants’ filings are subject to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers,” the Court will review the evidence provided by Ms. Brunton. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Upon review of Ms. Brunton’s documents, the Court concludes that no procedural due
process violation occurred in the Morrow County case. First, the divorce decree she provided
states that “[Ms. Brunton] failed to appear for the trial date of December 6, 2022. She was
properly served at last known address. The Court proceeded to trial as [Ms. Brunton] had notice
of these proceedings and missed previous hearings.” (Id. PageID 167.) Thus, there was no
service issue with the divorce judgment. Second, the docket printout provided by Ms. Brunton
shows two “unsuccessful” attempts to serve Ms. Brunton between January 31, 2025 and March

17, 2025. The Court located the hearing and subsequent order that these service attempts were
related to on the Morrow County Court of Common Pleas docket. Clark, Jennifer v. Clark,
William, Case No. 2022 DR 00055 (Ohio Morrow County Ct. C.P.). The service attempts were
for a hearing on an “order show cause for contempt for failure to pay child support.” Id.,
Summons and Order to Appear and Show Cause (Jan. 30, 2025). According to the Morrow
County court’s subsequent judgment entry, “[Ms. Brunton] was present for the hearing, along
with her attorney, [and] waived any defects in service process . . .” Id., Judgment Entry (Mar. 21,
2025). Thus, any issues of service regarding that hearing were waived by Ms. Brunton.
Accordingly, Ms. Brunton’s claim that a due process violation occurred is without merit.
A court must dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989); Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 (6th Cir.
2000). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact if it contains factual allegations that are
fantastic or delusional or if it is based on legal theories that are indisputably meritless. Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327–28; Bargery, 207 F.3d at 866. Further, “[a]lthough pro se pleadings are to be
liberally construed, courts are not required to conjure up unplead allegations or guess at the
nature of an argument.” Durrstein v. Arthur, 28 F. App'x 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2002). A complaint
will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557 (2007).
Ms. Brunton’s claim of procedural due process violations are without merit. Further, the
Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Ms. Brunton’s claims must be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted because they consist of vague assertions that are
unsupported by material facts. Accordingly, Ms. Brunton’s Complaint must be dismissed under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 12) is OVERRULED, and the Magistrate Judge’s Order
and Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 11) is ADOPTED and AFFIRMED. Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint is DISMISSED. Additionally, the Court CERTIFIES, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), that any appeal of this Opinion and Order would not be taken in good faith.
Further, Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Related State Court Proceedings and Enforcement
Actions (ECF No. 4) and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 6) are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment, terminate this case from the docket, and

mail a copy of this Opinion and Order to Plaintiff at 480 West Rushville Road NE, Lancaster,
OH, 43130.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
2/25/2026 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311807. Public record. Not legal advice.