# Simon

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · March 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311786

## Case

- **Full name:** Manoucheka Simon v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the substantial evidence standard is unmet when an ALJ fails to resolve a conflict created by countervailing evidence.

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MANOUCHEKA SIMON, : No. 1:23-CV-1802
Plaintiff, : (Caraballo, M..J.)
Vv. :
FRANK BISIGNANO,}! :
Commissioner of Social :
Security, :
Defendant :
MEMORANDUM
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Manoucheka Simon seeks judicial review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner’)
denying her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II
of the Social Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title
42, United States Code, Section 405(g), and Title 28, United States
Code, Section 636(c).

1Frank Bisignano was confirmed as the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration on May 6, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Frank Bisignano is substituted as the defendant
in this suit.

This matter comes before the Court on Simon’s claims that
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Michelle Wolf erred when she: (1)
evaluated the medical opinion of Ronald Pyram, M.D.; and (2) evaluated
the medical opinion of Daniel Upton, M.D. Doc. 14 at 8-14. The matter
18 fully briefed and ripe for decision.
As explained below, ALJ Wolfe’s evaluation of Dr. Pyram’s opinion

was not supported by substantial evidence in the record permitting
meaningful judicial review. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision to
deny Simon’s claim for social security disability benefits will be vacated
and this case will be remanded to the Commissioner for further
proceedings consistent with this memorandum.
II. Background
On December 17, 2018, Simon applied for social security disability
insurance benefits. Doc. 10 at 84 (hereinafter referred to as “Ty?)
Simon alleged complete disability from a myriad of impairments,
including high cholesterol, diabetes, neuropathy, a detached retina,
high blood pressure, back issues, arthritis, and vision issues in both

eyes. Id. Simon’s application was initially denied on April 2, 2019, after
which she requested a hearing before an ALJ. Id. at 100-05.

On November 19, 2019, ALJ Wolfe presided over Simon’s first
hearing. Id. at 15. Subsequently, on February 26, 2020, ALJ Wolfe
issued a decision concluding that Simon was not disabled between the
operative dates of August 24, 2018, through the date of the decision. Id.
at 29. After the Social Security Appeals Council denied her request for
review, Simon filed an appeal with this Court on March 12, 2021. Tr.
2178.

Upon the government’s motion and with Simon’s concurrence, on
October 14, 2021, the Court remanded the case back to the
Commissioner for further proceedings before an ALJ “to reevaluate Dr.
Pyram’s opinion that Plaintiff would require unscheduled breaks during
the workday.” Id. at 2182-85. Pursuant to the Court’s remand order, on
June 1, 2023, ALJ Wolfe held a second hearing. Jd. at 2118.
At the hearing, ALJ Wolfe received various evidence of record,
including clinical records, medical history, medical expert reports,
vocational expert testimony, Simon’s own testimony, and, critically, Dr.
Pyram’s testimony. Jd. at 2120—42. On August 30, 2023, ALJ Wolfe
issued a second unfavorable decision, concluding that Simon was not
disabled between the operative dates of August 24, 2018, through

February 29, 2020. Id. at 2111. ALJ Wolfe reached that conclusion by
employing a five-step analytical process required under the Social
Security Act to evaluate disability insurance and supplemental security
income claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
The process requires sequential consideration of: (1) whether the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity; (2) the medical
severity of the claimant’s impairments; (8) whether the impairment
meets or equals a defined list of impairments; (4) a comparison between
the claimant’s past relevant work and residual functional capacity, t.e.,
the most work that a claimant can perform despite his or her
limitations, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); and (5) an assessment of the
claimant’s residual functional capacity and his or her age, education,
and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)G)-(v). Should a
claimant proceed past the first three steps of the analysis, the
Commissioner will not find the claimant disabled when he or she can
perform past relevant work, or adjust to other work, under the third
and fourth steps, respectively. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)-(v), @®), (g)-
Applying that analysis, ALJ Wolfe first determined that Simon
met the insurance requirements of the Social Security Act, see 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.130, through June 30, 2023. Tr. 2096. ALJ Wolfe also found that

Simon had not engaged in substantial gainful activity between her
“alleged onset date of August 24, 2018 through February 29, 2020, the
period at issue on remand[.]|” Jd.
At the second step of the analysis, ALJ Wolfe found that Simon
suffered from six severe impairments: diabetic mellitus with diabetic
retinopathy bilaterally, with right eye traction retinal detachment
involving macular and hemorrhage status post pars plana vitrectomy,
and left eye with macula edema, right eye cataract status post Phaco
with intraocular lens, peripheral neuropathy, and diffuse idiopathic
skeletal hyperostosis. Jd. at 2097. The ALJ also identified several non-

severe impairments, including, among others, hypertension, mild
concentric left ventricular hypertrophy, hyperlipidemia,
microalbuminuria, hyperglyceridemia, closed fracture of rib, left breast
mass/hematoma, hypercholesterolemia, hypermagnesemia, and chronic
kidney disease. Jd. She found that these latter conditions were non-

severe because they were well treated by physicians and because the
evidence showed no “more than a minimal effect on the claimant’s
ability to perform basic work activities[.|’ Jd. at 2098.

Moving to the third step of the analysis, ALJ Wolfe determined
that Simon’s six severe impairments failed to meet or medically equal

one of the impairments listed in the Social Security Administration’s
regulations. Jd. at 2099. Simon thus did not automatically qualify as
disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)Gii) “Tf you have an
impairment(s) that meets or equals one of our listings in appendix 1 of
this subpart and meets the duration requirement, we will find that you
are disabled.”).
Accordingly, ALJ Wolfe proceeded to determine Simon’s residual
functional capacity, before addressing the final two steps in the
sequential analysis. Based on the evidence of record, ALJ Wolfe
concluded that Simon could perform light work, subject to a range of
additional exertional, postural, and environmental limitations. Tr.
2100-01. In reaching that conclusion, ALJ Wolfe considered one piece of
evidence germane to this opinion—the medical opinion testimony of Dr.
Ronald Pyram, an endocrinologist who treated Simon in 2018 and 2019.
Id. at 2053-61.
Dr. Pyram’s testimony concerned his October 21, 2019, medical
opinion, which stated that, because of her diabetes, Simon would

require two or three, 10- to 15-minute unscheduled breaks during an

average workday to check and address her glucose levels. [d. at 2054.
At the hearing, Dr. Pyram testified that his finding was due, at least in
part, to Simon’s uncontrolled diabetes, which caused unpredictable
glucose spikes or lows throughout the day. Jd. at 2124—26. By contrast,
Dr. Pyram testified that controlled diabetics, in ideal conditions, usually
do not require two or three unscheduled daily breaks to check their
glucose. Id. at 2126. Rather, because they are not commonly subject to
the same blood sugar volatilities as uncontrolled diabetics, Dr. Pyram
testified that controlled diabetics, as a baseline, require four glucose
checks a day to keep their glucose levels stable. Id. at 2126, 2129-30.
Importantly, Dr. Pyram testified that although well-controlled
diabetics must check their glucose levels at least four times daily to
keep their levels stable, “[o]ftentimes, additional checks [are required] if
[glucose] goes too high or too low]]” because of something trivial like
“taking a little extra sugar in a meal|[.]” Id. at 2130. Consistent with the
variability recognized in this answer, and in further response to a
question from the ALJ about whether three scheduled breaks a day

would be sufficient for a well-controlled diabetic to check his or her
glucose, Dr. Pyram only responded that “[i]t’s possible.” Id.
In reviewing Dr. Pyram’s testimony and findings compared
to the record, ALJ Wolfe deemed the opinion unpersuasive. Ty.
2108. Although not abundantly clear, the ALJ appears to have
based this conclusion, in the first instance, on Dr. Pyram having
only treated Simon twice. Jd. Second, ALJ Wolfe’s conclusion also

appears to hinge on her characterization of Dr. Pyram’s testimony
as stating that Simon required “unscheduled breaks lasting 10-15
minutes only... if her blood sugar is uncontrolled.” Jd. Similarly,
the ALJ’s conclusion was contingent on her construal of Dr. Pyram
having “testified that he recommends testing 4 times a day, before
breakfast, lunch, dinner, and bed,” which meant, in the ALJ’s
view, that because jobs come with lunch breaks, Simon would not
consistently need unscheduled breaks to check her glucose. Id.
After finding Dr. Pyram’s opinion unpersuasive, ALJ Wolfe
deemed Simon capable of performing light work subject to limitations.
This brought her to the fourth step of the analysis, to determine
whether Simon was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security

Act. Here, with assistance from the testimony of two vocational experts,
ALJ Wolfe compared Simon’s past relevant work and residual
functional capacity, finding that Simon was unable to perform her prior
employment as a research assistant, employment clerk, or medical
records auditor. Id. at 2108-09.
Finally, in the fifth step of the sequential analysis process, ALJ
Wolfe considered Simon’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity to perform light work, concluding that “there are
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the
claimant can perform|[.]” Jd. at 2109. Here, ALJ Wolfe again leveraged
testimony from a vocational expert, who advised that an individual
fitting Simon’s parameters could perform the occupational requirements
of a non-postal mail clerk, router, or clerical assistant. Tr. 2110-11.
As a result of this analysis, ALJ Wolfe determined that Simon was
not disabled and denied her application for disability benefits. Jd. at
2111. Simon unsuccessfully appealed the decision to the Social Security
Administration’s Appeals Council, which denied Simon’s request to
review ALJ Wolfe’s decision on December 26, 2024. Doc. 14 at 18.

Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Simon’s instant appeal
to the district court followed.
Simon initiated this action with the Court on October 31, 2023.
Doc. 1. The Commissioner filed an answer and provided the requisite
transcripts from the disability proceedings on December 18, 2023. Docs.
9-10. The parties then filed their respective briefs, Docs. 14, 17-18,
with Simon alleging two errors warranting reversal or remand, Doc. 14
at 8-14. Specifically, Simon avers that ALJ Wolfe: (1) erred when
evaluating the medical opinion of Dr. Pyram, contending that the ALJ’s
articulation of the supportability and consistency of this opinion was
insufficient to permit meaningful judicial review; and (2) erred when
evaluating the supportability and consistency of the medical opinion of
Dr. Daniel Upton, Simon’s ophthalmologist. Id.
III. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Review of the Commissioner’s decision denying a claimant’s
application for social security disability benefits is limited to
determining whether the factual findings of the final decisionmaker are
supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

10

Johnson v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (8d Cir. 2008).
Substantial in this context is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence
but may be less than a preponderance.” Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211,
12138 (3d Cir. 1988). Put more pointedly, it is “such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quoting Consol. Edison
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)) (citations omitted).
In an adequately developed record, this can mean “something less
than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s
decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed.
Maritime Comm’n., 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). Under this highly
deferential standard, “[flactual findings which are supported by
substantial evidence must be upheld.” Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d
538, 5386 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Thus, the Court’s role under this standard is not to re-weigh the
evidence and make factual determinations, but to simply review the
record to ensure factual findings are supported by substantial evidence,
and to confirm that the ALJ provided a “discussion of the evidence and

11

explanation of reasoning for his conclusion sufficient to enable judicial
review.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (8d Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted). And although an ALJ’s decision must “reasonably
articulat[e]” its reasoning so “a subsequent reviewer or a reviewing
court” can trace its path, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, 5858 (2017), an ALJ
need only give “some indication” of their consideration of probative
evidence to successfully carry this burden of articulation. Burnett v.
Comm’ of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (8d Cir. 2000).
That said, when there is countervailing, probative evidence, an
ALJ must “give some reason for discounting the evidence she rejects.”
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (8d Cir. 1999); cf. Mason v.
Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (8d Cir. 1998) (holding that the
substantial evidence standard is unmet when an ALJ fails to resolve a
conflict created by countervailing evidence.). In the context of
evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions, which are often

some of the most probative evidence available, an ALJ is required to

assess the level of support and consistency the opinion has against the
record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. Here, ALJ Wolfe’s factual findings on the
consistency and supportability of Dr. Pyram’s testimony were not

12

supported by substantial evidence in the record, leaving the Court
unable to conduct a meaningful judicial review.
B. The ALJ’s Evaluation of Dr. Pyram’s Opinion
Simon contends that ALJ Wolfe erred in her evaluation of the
medical opinion of Dr. Pyram, because the ALJ did not provide a
sufficient explanation concerning its supportability and consistency
when deeming it unpersuasive, and that this error was not harmless.
Doc. 14 at 9-12. In opposition, the Commissioner contends that the
record, read as a whole, supports the ALJ’s finding. Doc. 17 at 11-17.
As set forth below, the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Pyram’s opinion
mischaracterized the evidence while assessing its supportability and
consistency, thus rendering the corresponding findings unsupported by
substantial evidence.
When evaluating a medical opinion, an ALJ is required to assess
its support and consistency against the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c.
The supportability of a medical opinion “increases as the relevance of
the objective medical evidence and explanations presented by the
medical source increases.” Vellone v. Saul, 2021 WL 319354, at *6 □
(S.D.N.Y. 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 28011388

13

(S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)). The consistency
assessment is “an all-encompassing inquiry focused on how wella
medical source is supported, or not supported, by the entire record.”
Clay v. Kijakazt, 2022 WL 13989015, at *3 (N.D. Miss. 2022) (quoting
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)).
Because an ALJ’s duty of articulation requires just “some
indication” of his or her consideration of probative evidence, Burnett,
220 F.3d at 121, an ALJ’s assessment of a medical opinion’s consistency
and supportability “need not discuss every piece of evidence in the
record.” Gamret v. Colvin, 994 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698 (W.D. Pa. 2014).
However, it must, at a minimum, build “ ‘an accurate and logical bridge
between the evidence and the result.” Id. (quoting Hodes v. Apfel, 61 F.
Supp. 2d 798, 806 (N.D. Ill. 1999); and Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305,
307 (7th Cir. 1996)). Further, in assessing whether an ALJ has provided
an adequate analysis for rejecting or accepting an opinion, the court
must look to the ALJ’s opinion as a whole, not only the part directly
addressing the particular medical opinion. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364
F.3d 501, 505 (8d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ALJ’s decision, read as a whole,
illustrates that the ALJ considered the appropriate factors in reaching

14

the conclusion that [claimant] did not meet the requirements for any
listing|[.|”).
The sufficiency of an evaluation turns on the extent to which its
reasoning is driven by an ALJ’s accurate read of the evidence—and the
court’s ability to discern that evidentiary reasoning. See, e.g., Price v.
Astrue, 401 F. App’x 985, 986 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The ALJ does not need to
comment on every piece of evidence, but only must build an accurate
and logical bridge between the evidence and the final determination.”)
(citing Glomski v. Massanari, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1082 (E.D. Wis.
2001)); Acosta Cuevas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 363682, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. 2021), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., 2022
WL 717612 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) “The ALJ must provide a reviewing Court
with a sufficient explanation to ensure that they have complied with the
legal procedures controlling their decision and cannot ignore or
mischaracterize evidence.”).
Here, on October 21, 2019, Dr. Pyram provided a written medical
opinion on behalf of Simon regarding the impact of her diabetes on her
ability to function. Tr. 2057. That opinion was based on Dr. Pyram’s
experience as Simon’s endocrinologist in 2018 and 2019, and noted that

15

Simon’s uncontrolled diabetes caused her fatigue, infections/fevers,
general malaise, retinopathy, and visual impairment. Id. at 2053. Of
critical importance, Dr. Pyram opined that Simon’s condition would
require her to take two or three unscheduled, 10- to 15-minute long
breaks each workday to check and manage her glucose level. Id. at
2054. This latter finding, and reevaluating its precise impact on Simon’s
functionality, was the impetus behind this Court’s initial October 14,
2021, remand order, which instructed the Commissioner “to reevaluate
Dr. Pyram’s opinion that Plaintiff would require unscheduled breaks
during the workday.” Tr. 2182-85.
Pursuant to that order and an administrative subpoena, Dr. |

Pyram testified about the unscheduled breaks at the June 1, 20238,
hearing before ALJ Wolfe. In response to a question from ALJ Wolfe
about how often Simon would need unscheduled breaks, in addition to
scheduled breaks occurring every two hours, Dr. Pyram explained:
Yes, so, I see that—oftentimes with very uncontrolled
diabetes, oftentimes she was either spiked or [would] go low
in the middle of the [day]. So, it could happen once a day, it
could happen no time a day, it could happen two, three times
a day and it needs to be corrected. It can be corrected easily
within 15 minutes if she gets like that. Fifteen minutes in
general. ...So, that was my opinion at the time.

16

Tr. 2125 (cleaned up). When ALJ Wolfe subsequently inquired whether

a well-controlled diabetic would need as many unscheduled breaks as
Dr. Pyram opined Simon required, Dr. Pyram answered that “[u]sually
well-controlled diabetics don’t need that many breaks in between. Yes.”
Id. at 2126. .
However, the ALJ later asked Dr. Pyram a question premised on
whether Simon would only need to check her glucose four times a day if
her diabetes was well-controlled. Dr. Pyram responded:
In general, it’s at least four times a day. Sometimes, it’s more
because if for whatever reason it goes too low, taking a little
extra sugar in a meal, it might go too high. In general, if you’re
on insulin, at least four times a day. Oftentimes, additional
checks if it goes too high or too low.
Id. at 2130. When ALJ Wolfe asked whether three scheduled breaks
during the workday, including lunch, would suffice for a well-controlled
diabetic to check their glucose, Dr. Pyram expressed ambivalence,
stating that “[i]t’s possible.” Id.
In her decision denying Simon’s claim, ALJ Wolfe reviewed Dr.
Pyram’s opinion and deemed it unpersuasive, stating:
The undersigned considered the opinion of Ronald Pyram, MD
and did not find it persuasive (Hearing Record, 6/1/28, Exhibit
B21F). Dr. Pyram indicates that the claimant “may
sometimes” need to take unscheduled breaks 2-3 times during
17

a workday, for 10-15 minutes. The doctor’s opinion is based on
two examinations, with the last one occurring more than nine
months prior to when the doctor saw the claimant. That said,
the doctor testified in June 2023, that the claimant’s need to
take 2-3 unscheduled breaks lasting 10-15 minutes, is so that
she could correct her blood sugar level if it spikes or drops.
Also, he said the unscheduled breaks to check the blood sugar
is due to uncontrolled diabetes. While he also said the need to
check her blood sugar level continues when diabetes is
controlled, according to his testimony, the need for the
unscheduled breaks lasting 10-15 minutes only applies if her
blood sugar is uncontrolled. Thus, as the record reflects that
while doctors 2 visits note she had uncontrolled blood sugar,
thereafter, the record reflects that her blood sugar is better
controlled as she is testing it, and her ulcer healed. Moreover,
while the claimant continues to need to check her blood sugar
level, the doctor testified that he recommends testing 4 times
a day, before breakfast, lunch, dinner, and bed, and as she has
a lunch break, the glucose check for that time of the day does
not require an unscheduled break on a consistent basis. Thus,
considering that the record reflects improvement in her
diabetes with the A1C going from 14 to 9.7, and she is using
insulin and taking Ozempic, the record does not support that
the claimant would need to take 2-3 unscheduled breaks. For
these reasons, the doctor’s opinion is not persuasive.
Id. at 2108.
This evaluation of Dr. Pyram’s opinion, challenged by Simon now

on appeal, did not accurately summarize the testimony and therefore is
not supported by substantial evidence. Despite ALJ Wolfe’s conclusions
to the contrary, Dr. Pyram never testified that his recommendation for
Simon to take “unscheduled breaks to check [her] blood sugar is due to

18

[Simon’s] uncontrolled diabetes[,|” or that “the need for the unscheduled
breaks lasting 10-15 minutes only applies if her blood sugar is
uncontrolled.” Id. Rather, Dr. Pyram offered more nuanced answers to
questions about well-controlled versus uncontrolled diabetes, and the
potential impact either condition has on a work schedule.
Dr. Pyram opined that, generally, “well-controlled diabetics don’t
need” two or three unscheduled breaks in a workday, as he
recommended for Simon. Tr. 2126. Dr. Pyram later clarified, however,
that even assuming Simon had well-controlled diabetes, she would still
need to check her glucose at least four times a day, and that
“Tolftentimes” additional, unscheduled glucose checks would prove
necessary. Jd. at 2130. Dr. Pyram testified that even controlled
diabetics are still subject to glucose spikes or lows arising from minor
dietary variances. Id. Finally, Dr. Pyram declined to confirm that three
regularly scheduled breaks during a workday would suffice for a well-
controlled diabetic to check his or her glucose levels; instead, he only
responded that it was “possible.” Jd.
Thus, Dr. Pyram did not solely attribute his recommendation of
unscheduled breaks to Simon’s uncontrolled diabetes. Moreover, rather

19

than testify that unscheduled breaks were only necessary so long as
Simon’s diabetes remained uncontrolled, Dr. Pyram instead indicated
that even if her condition were well-controlled, Simon may nonetheless
require unscheduled glucose checks if her glucose spikes or lowers
because of small dietary variances.
‘The gap between Dr. Pyram’s statements, and ALJ Wolfe’s
characterization of that testimony, is significant for at least two

reasons. First, ALJ Wolfe’s determination that Dr. Pyram’s opinion was
unpersuasive was premised largely on this inaccurate read of his
testimony. Indeed, after the ALJ concluded that Dr. Pyram only
recommended that Simon take unscheduled breaks so long as her
diabetes remained uncontrolled, ALJ Wolfe found that because Simon’s
glucose was more recently “better controlled,” Simon therefore “does not
require an unscheduled break on a consistent basis.” Tr. 2108. This
conclusion both misconstrued Dr. Pyram’s opinion, and failed to account
for Simon’s testimony, which was consistent with Dr. Pyram’s
recommendation, in stating that “[w]hen I was at work, I would check it
about three or four times,” plus two more times at home each day. Id. at
2134-35.

20

Where, as here, an assessment of a medical opinion is anchored to

a faulty premise and ignores probative, countervailing evidence, a
material error exists. See Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (8d Cir.
1981) (“[T]he ALJ cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong
reason|.|”); Brownawell v. Comm’r Of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352, 357 (8d
Cir. 2008) (“The ALJ supports his rejection of [the physician’s|] opinion
of disability in large part on evidence that does not exist .... This
mistake, and others like it, indicate that the ALJ’s decision to discredit
[the physician] was not supported by substantial evidence.
Furthermore, the ALJ mischaracterizes the evidence that does exist [.}”);
Layton v. Astrue, 2010 WL 521190, at *8 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“An ALJ’s
rejection of a... physician’s opinion is not supported by substantial
evidence where it is based upon factual inaccuracies or
mischaracterizations of the evidence.”).
Second, Simon has met her burden to show that the error may not
be harmless. “An error is ‘harmless’ when, despite the technical
correctness of an appellant’s legal contention, there is also ‘no set of

facts’ upon which the appellant could recover.” Brown v. Astrue, 649
F.3d 1938, 195 (8d Cir. 2011) (quoting Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d

21

315, 341 (8d Cir. 2010)). In other words, remand is warranted under the
harmless error analysis “only if there is reason to believe that the
remand might lead to a different result.” Minarsky v. Kijakazi, 747
F.Supp.3d 801, 816 (M.D. Pa. 2024) (internal quotations omitted). The
plaintiff bears the burden of showing that an error was harmful. Jd. at
817.
Simon contends that testimony elicited from the vocational expert
at step five of the sequential analysis shows that the error was not
harmless. According to Simon, the vocational expert testified that, if an
individual with her characteristics required the number of unscheduled
breaks recommended by Dr. Pyram, it would preclude the ability to
work. Doc. 14 at 11—12; Doc. 18 at 5—6. Simon further avers that had
the ALJ not erred in deeming Dr. Pyram unpersuasive, the ALJ would
have been required to elicit more testimony from the vocational expert
concerning Dr. Pyram’s recommended limitations. Jd.
That position is consistent with the record. In response to a
question by counsel about the impact of the limitations recommended
by Dr. Pyram on Simon’s work ability, the vocational expert specifically
testified that “[t]he limitation impacts the productivity to the level that

22

we spoke [of], .. . [and] would preclude work.” Tr. 2140 (cleaned up).
Thus, had the ALJ not erred when evaluating Dr. Pyram’s opinion, a
contrary conclusion concerning its persuasiveness, coupled with the
vocational expert’s testimony, may have yielded a work preclusive
finding. Id. Although the Court takes no position on the merits of her
underlying contention, Simon has met her burden to show that “there is

reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different
result.” Minarsky, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 816; see also Kimberly L. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 4571429, *9 (M.D. Pa. 2024) “Courts
have found, however, that such an error is harmful where the result
could be different if the opinions at issue were given full
consideration.”); Jose V. v. O'Malley, 2024 WL 4583529, at *11 (M.D.
Pa. 2024) (“To decide whether an error is harmful or harmless, courts
consider whether remand might reasonably lead to a different result. If
there is a reasonable possibility that it could, the error at issue is
harmful.”).
The Commissioner’s contentions that the ALJ did not err in her
evaluation of Dr. Pyram’s opinion or, alternatively, that any error is
harmless, are unavailing. First, the Commissioner’s focus on Dr.

23

Pyram’s limited treatment history with Simon, and on evidence
indicating improved management of her diabetes, Doc. 17 at 14-15,
fails to rehabilitate the ALJ’s mistaken evaluation of Dr. Pyram’s
testimony.
Second, that mistake cannot be deemed harmless, as it proved
central to the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Pyram’s opinion was unpersuasive.
And as the Commissioner acknowledges, id. at 16-17, had the ALJ
deemed Dr. Pyram’s testimony consistent and supported—and therefore
persuasive—it may well have altered her ultimate evaluation of the
vocational expert’s testimony. As the vocational expert testified that
limitations like those recommended by Dr. Pyram would be work
preclusive, incorporating such testimony into the ALJ’s decision may
have led to a finding of disability.
Accordingly, remanding this matter to the Commissioner is
warranted. And as remand is warranted on this first claim of error,
there is no need for the Court to address the second claim of error. See
Chinchilla v. Geodis Am., Inc., 2024 WL 943424, at *8n.12 (D.N.J.
2024) (declining to address subsequent arguments on a motion for
remand when the motion was decided on other grounds).

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C. Awarding Benefits
Finally, this case will be remanded without awarding benefits, as
Simon requests. Doc. 14 at 15. “A district court, after reviewing the
decision of the Secretary may, under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)[,] affirm,
modify, or reverse the [Commissioner]’s decision with or without a
remand ... for a rehearing.” Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221
(3d Cir. 1984). The Court may direct that benefits be awarded “only
when the administrative record of the case has been fully developed and
when substantial evidence on the record as a whole indicates that the
claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits.” Id. at 221-22 (citations
omitted). “When faced with such cases, it is unreasonable for a court to
give the ALJ another opportunity to consider new evidence concerning
the disability because the administrative proceeding would result only
in further delay in the receipt of benefits.” Jd. at 222 (footnote omitted).
As set forth above, remand is necessary here because the ALJ’s
evaluation of a medical opinion is not supported by substantial evidence
permitting meaningful judicial review. However, this reason for remand
is limited in scope, and it is not clear, to any reasonable degree of
certainty, that proper evaluation of Dr. Pyram’s opinion will lead to a

25

disability determination. See Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 221; Fla. Power
& Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (If the record before the

agency does not support the agency action, [or] if the agency has not
considered all relevant factors, ... the proper course[] ...1s to remand
to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.”); Diaz, 577
F.3d at 504. Indeed, the Court does not intend for this remand to be
construed as taking any position on the merits of Simon’s substantive
claim of disability, or whether Dr. Pyram’s testimony should be deemed
persuasive.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will vacate the decision
of the Commissioner and remand this case for further proceedings
consistent with this memorandum. A separate order shall be issued.

Date: March 10, 2026 s/ Phillip J. Caraballo
Phillip J. Caraballo
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311786. Public record. Not legal advice.