# Singh

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · February 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311729

## Case

- **Full name:** Jashandeep Singh v. Todd M. Lyons, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JASHANDEEP SINGH, : Civil No. 3:25-CV-2388
:
Petitioner, :
: (Judge Munley)
v. :
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
TODD M. LYONS, et al., :
:
Respondents. :
:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Statement of the Case
This case comes before us for consideration of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by the petitioner,
Jashandeep Singh, an immigration detainee.1 Singh is a native of and
citizen of India who has resided in the United States since 2023.2
According to immigration documents, Singh entered the United States
on May 24, 2023, was arrested by United States Border Patrol, and
subsequently released with a Notice to Appear, which indicated that
Singh was “not then admitted or paroled after inspection by an

1 Doc. 1.
2 Doc. 1 at 11; Doc. 8-1 at 1.
Immigration Officer.”3 Singh was apprehended by immigration
authorities in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in November of 2025 at a

commercial vehicle inspection checkpoint.4 He was arrested and
transferred to the Pike County Correctional Facility, where he remains
detained pending the outcome of his removal proceedings.5 Singh also

has an asylum application pending in immigration court.6
In his petition, Singh asserts that he is being wrongfully detained

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and instead, should be considered for
release under § 1226(a) and provided the opportunity for a bond hearing.7
Singh argues in large part that he is a member of the “Bond Eligible

Class” certified in ,8 and as such, he is entitled to a
bond hearing under § 1226(a).9 For their part, the respondents contend
that is not controlling on this court, and further,

3 Doc. 8-1 at 2; Doc. 8-2 at 1.
4 Doc. 8 at 5; Doc. 8-1.
5 Doc. 1 at 11; Doc. 8-1 at 5; Doc. 8-3.
6 Doc. 1 at 11.
7 Doc. 1.
8 , Civ. No. 25-1873, 2025 WL
3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).
9
that Singh is properly detained under § 1225 and thus not entitled to a
bond hearing.10

After careful consideration, we will recommend that the petition be
denied.

II. Discussion

Claims by immigration detainees in federal custody “fall within the
‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus[,]” and must be brought in a petition
for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.11 Jurisdiction for a core
habeas petition “lies in only one district: the district of confinement.”12
While the Court of Appeals has seemingly narrowed this court’s

jurisdiction to consider claims related to immigration detention during
an alien’s removal proceedings,13 the parties to the instant petition
concede that we have jurisdiction to consider this petitioner’s claim

regarding his ongoing detention.14

10 Doc. 8.
11 , 604 U.S. 670, 372 (2025) (quoting , 597
U.S. 159, 167 (2022)); , 453 F.3d
169, 172 (3d Cir. 2006).
12 , 604 U.S. at 672 (quoting , 542 U.S. 426, 443
(2004)).
13 , --- F.4th ---, 2026
WL 111933 (3d Cir. Jan. 15, 2026).
14 Doc. 11.
In the instant petition, we must determine whether the petitioner
is subject to the provisions of Section 1225(b)(2) or Section 1226(a) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).15 These provisions govern the
detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings.16 We begin with
the petitioner’s argument that he is entitled to a bond hearing pursuant

to . The petitioner asserts that he is a member of the
nationwide class certified by the United States District Court for the

Central District of California in , 17
In November of 2025, the Court broadly certified a “Bond
Eligible Class” consisting of:

All noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who
(1) have entered or will enter the United States without
inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon
arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), §1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the
Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody
determination.18

It then extended the declaratory relief previously granted to the
petitioners in that matter to the class as a whole, declaring DHS’ policy

15 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2), 1226(a).
16 , 583 U.S. 281, 287-89 (2018).
17 , Civ. No. 25-1873, 2025 WL
3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).
18 at *9.
unlawful and finding that such relief “secures a right [of the class
members] to an individualized hearing.”19

At the outset, the petitioners in did not request class-wide
habeas relief; only the named petitioners applied for habeas relief.20 As
the Court there noted, “[i]f Petitioners had requested classwide

declaratory habeas relief, such relief could extend only to members of the
Bond Eligible Class .”21 Accordingly,

even if the petitioner believed he is considered a class member entitled to
such relief, he must seek that relief in the Central District of California.
Further, as one district court examining this issue noted, the Supreme

Court of the United States has cast doubt on whether “class relief may be
obtained in a habeas proceeding[,]” reasoning that “[t]he Supreme Court
has ‘never so held, and it is highly questionable whether it is

permitted.’”22

19 (“When considering this determination with the MSJ Order, the
Court extends the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the
Bond Eligible Class as a whole.”).
20
21 (citing , 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004)) (emphasis
added).
22
, --- F. Supp. 3d. ---, 2025 WL 3746495, at *5 (N.D.
In any event, contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, we are not
bound by . It is well settled that “[a] decision of a federal district

court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district,
the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different
case.”23 While we respect the Court’s holding as to those within

its purview, we respectfully disagree that the petitioner here, who is
detained in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, is afforded relief by way

of that holding. Accordingly, the petitioner’s reliance on is
unavailing and, in our view, does not entitle him to habeas relief.
Next, we must determine, then, if the petitioner is properly

detained pursuant to Section 1225(b). Courts nationwide have been
tasked with interpreting this statute given what some have characterized
as ambiguity in the phrases “applicant for admission” and “seeking

admission” in Section 1225. “As in any statutory construction case, ‘[w]e
start, of course, with the statutory text,’ and proceeding from the

Ohio Dec. 24, 2025) (quoting , 605 U.S. 91, 107 (2025)
(Alito, J., dissenting)).
23 , 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (quoting 18 J. Moore
et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.02[1] [d], p. 134–26 (3d ed.2011)).
understanding that, ‘[u]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are
generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning.’”24

Section 1226(a) broadly applies to noncitizens facing removal
proceedings and provides that individuals detained under this section
may be released on bond pending a final order of removal.25 On the other

hand, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires that “an alien who is an applicant
for admission, if the examining officer determines that an alien seeking

admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the
alien for a proceeding under section 1229a of this
title.”26 This section defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien

present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives
in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . .
.)[.]”27 The statute does not clearly define the phrase “seeking admission.”

Courts across the country have grappled with this statutory text,
with a majority concluding that the phrases “applicant for admission”

24 , 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (citation omitted).
25 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
26 § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphases added).
27 § 1225(a)(1).
and “seeking admission” are legally distinct.28 In these cases, courts have
found that noncitizens who have resided in the United States for some

period of time, but who have not actively sought legal status, qualify as
“applicants for admission” but not as individuals “seeking admission,”
and thus, they are not subject to the mandatory detention provision of

Section 1225(b)(2)(A).29 The rationale behind several of these decisions
appears to be based on thos courts’ findings that “seeking admission”

requires the physical act of arriving at the border, and as such, an alien
that has resided in the United States for some period of time cannot
qualify as “seeking admission,” even though such person wishes to be

admitted and remain in the United States.30 Other courts have found

28 , , Civ. No. 25-1288, 2026 WL
252513 (D.N.M. Jan. 30, 2026); , Civ. No. 25-
1527, 2026 WL 227155 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 28, 2026); ,
Civ. No. 25-2276, 2025 WL 3537279 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025); Anirudh v
McShane, et al., Civ. No. 25-6458, 2025 WL 3527528 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9,
2025); , ---F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3006772
(W.D. Ky. Oct. 27, 2025); , Civ. No. 25-14626, 2025
WL 2753496 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025).
29
30 , , 2025 WL 2753496, at *9 (discussing a distinction
between “a noncitizen who is ‘seeking admission’ to the country and one
who is ‘already in the country’”); , 2025 WL 3537279, at *5 (noting
that courts in the Third Circuit have described “seeking admission” as
“active and ongoing conduct, such as physically attempting to come into
the United States at a border or port of entry.”).
that “seeking admission” requires the affirmative act of applying for some
sort of legal status, such as for asylum or a visa.31 Ultimately, these

courts have concluded that noncitizens who have resided in the United
States for some period of time cannot be characterized as “seeking
admission” since they are already in the United States and are therefore

not subject to Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision.
A minority of district courts and the only circuit court to decide this

issue, however, have concluded that the plain text of Section 1225
establishes that “applicants for admission” are necessarily “seeking
admission,” and therefore subject to detention under Section

1225(b)(2)(A).32 After careful consideration, we agree that “one who is an

31 , , 2026 WL 252513, at *4 (“ ‘Seeking admission’
requires an active request for lawful admission. . .”) (citations omitted);
, 2025 WL 3006772, at *9 (finding that the petitioner,
“who ha[d] been present in the country for over twelve years . . . [and]
has never attempted to gain lawful entry into the United States” was not
“seeking admission.”);
32 , , --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL
323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026); , Civ. No. 25-
9670, 2026 WL 100761 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2026);
Civ. No. 25-157, 2026 WL 74558 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 9, 2026);
, Civ. No. 25-216, 2026 WL 31775 (N.D. Tx.
Jan. 6, 2026); , Civ. No. 25-1231, 2025 WL 3733302
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025); , ---F. Supp.
3d ---, 2025 WL 3199872 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025);
, Civ. No. 25-168, 2025 WL 3131942 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025).
‘applicant for admission’ is, by definition, ‘seeking admission[,]’”33 and is
consequently subject to the mandatory detention provision of Section

1225(b)(2)(A).
We begin with the statute’s definition of an “applicant for
admission,” which as we have noted encompasses “[a]n alien

who has not been admitted.”34 The INA defines
“admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after

inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”35 Thus, the
plain reading of this text is not limited to those physically arriving at the
border; it necessarily includes noncitizens who have been residing in the

United States but have not been lawfully admitted. Indeed, as at least
one court has noted, while subsection (b)(1) specifically contemplates
“aliens in the United States[,]”36 “nothing in § 1225(b)(2)(A)

limits its applicability to ‘arriving’ aliens.”37 Thus, the fact that a
petitioner has resided in the United States does not automatically render

33 , 2026 WL 74558, at *4.
34 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (emphasis added).
35 § 1101(13)(A).
36 § 1225(b)(1) (emphasis added).
37 , 2026 WL 74558 at *4; , 2025 WL 3131942, at *3
(describing subsection (b)(2) as the “catchall” provision of Section 1225).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) inapplicable—the text of the statute plainly
encompasses aliens who are “present in the United States” who have not

lawfully been admitted.38
While the phrase “seeking admission” is not defined in the INA,
Section 1225 twice “expressly treats applicants for admission as among

those seeking admission.”39 As the Honorable John Cronan aptly
explained:

First, Section 1225(a)(5) provides that “[a]n applicant for
admission may be required to state under oath any
information sought by an immigration officer regarding the
purposes and intentions
to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5) (emphasis added).
This provision contemplates that an applicant for admission
is one who, by default, is seeking admission.

Second, and similarly, Section 1225(a)(3) specifies that “[a]ll
aliens (including alien crewmen) who are applicants for
admission or readmission to
or transit through the United States shall be inspected by
immigration officers.” § 1225(a)(3) (emphasis added). That
provision “reinforces the reading that all ‘applicants for
admission’ are ‘seeking admission’ because it recognizes that
there are ‘other[ ]’ ways to seek admission besides being an
‘applicant[ ] for admission.’ ” , No. 1:25-
cv-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10,
2025); , --- F. Supp. 3d ----,
No. 2:25-cv-9785-SVW-AJR, 2025 WL 3199872, at *5 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 12, 2025). The word “otherwise,” after all, means to

38 8 U.S.C. §1225(a)(1).
39 , 2026 WL 100761, at *9.
do something “[i]n a different way” or “in another manner,”
Otherwise, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024), so Section
1225(a)(3) recognizes that one way to seek admission is to be
an applicant for admission, even if there are other ways to do
so. Otherwise, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/otherwise (last
visited Jan. 14, 2026) (defining “otherwise” as (1) “in a
different way or manner,” (2) “in different circumstances,” and
(3) “in other respects”).40

As explained by another court examining the interplay of Section
1225(a)(3) in this context, “[t]he word ‘otherwise’ establishes that ‘aliens
. . . seeking admission’ is the category to which “applicants for admission’
belong.”41 And because Congress created this relationship between the
phrases “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” in the same
statute, we cannot “abandon [the] usual presumption that ‘identical
words used in different parts of the same statute’ carry ‘the same
meaning.’”42 Indeed, as another court noted, “it makes no sense to
describe an active applicant for admission as somebody who is not
‘seeking’ admission. To ‘seek’ is a synonym of to ‘apply’ for.”43

40 at *9.
41 , 2025 WL 3733302, at *8.
42 at *9 (quoting , 582 U.S.
79. 85 (2017) (internal citation omitted)).
43 , 2025 WL 3131942, at *3.
To find otherwise would create illogical implications. As the
Court noted, if we conclude that an alien is not seeking admission unless

or until he or she formally applies for legal permission to remain in the
United States, we would essentially be encouraging those who reside
here but who have not lawfully been admitted to do nothing while

punishing those who have taken steps to obtain lawful permission by
subjecting them to mandatory detention. Such an outcome is nonsensical

in our view.
Nor can we conclude that there is some geographic or temporal
limitation after which an alien residing in the United States is no longer

“seeking admission.” As the Court noted, the surrounding
provisions, such as Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and (b)(1)(A)(iii), specifically
apply to an alien “arriving” in the United States and an alien who must

show continued presence in the United States “continuously for the 2-
year period immediately prior[,]” respectively.44 Because Section
1225(b)(2) contains no such limiting language, it is logical to conclude

that “[i]f Congress meant to say that an alien is no longer ‘seeking
admission’ after some amount of time in the United States, Congress

44 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(1)(A)(iii).
knew how to do so.”45 Thus, we do not read Section 1225 to limit an alien’s
act of “seeking admission” to physically arriving at the border or only

immediately following their arrival to the United States or some other
finite period.
This reading of Section 1225 was very recently adopted by the Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals in , As of
the time this Report and Recommendation is written, the Fifth Circuit is

the only circuit to have squarely addressed this issue.47 In holding that
an “applicant for admission” is necessarily “seeking admission,” the
Court of Appeals set forth a thorough and reasoned analysis of the plain

text of Section 1225.48 Similar to our analysis above, the Court looked at
the surrounding provisions of Section 1225, including 1225(a)(3) and
1225(a)(5), and found that the plain meaning of the words used in these

provisions supports the conclusion that those who are “applicants for

45 , 2025 WL 3131942, at *4.
46 , --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 323330 (5th
Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).
47 , 161 F.4th
1048, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 2025) (concluding in the context of a request for
injunctive relief that the government was not likely to succeed on the
merits of its argument regarding mandatory detention under Section
1225).
48 at *4-10.
admission” are necessarily “seeking admission.”49 The Court reasoned
that any other reading of the statute “would return to the pre-IIRIRA

regime in which illegal entrants receive favorable treatment compared to
aliens lawfully undergoing admission procedures.”50 The Court was
further unpersuaded by the petitioners’ argument that the government’s

longstanding practice, alone, justified a reading of the text that goes
against the plain meaning of the statute.51 We agree with this reasoned

analysis and the others we have found persuasive and conclude that an
“applicant for admission” is necessarily “seeking admission,” and
therefore, is subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A).

Turning to the instant petition, Singh arrived in the United States
in 2023, and despite residing here for over two years, was never lawfully
admitted or paroled.52 Singh, who currently has an asylum application

pending, is contesting his removal from the United States, which
necessarily means he is seeking lawful admission to the United States.
Accordingly, we conclude that Singh is an applicant for admission and

49
50 at *6.
51 at *8.
52 Doc. 8-2.
seeking admission, and thus, is properly detained pursuant to § 1225(b).
Because we conclude that Singh is properly detained pursuant to §

1225(b), we recommend that his requests for release and for an order
directing immigration officials to afford him a bond hearing be denied.53
In closing, we recognize that we are among the minority of courts

to reach this conclusion, and we appreciate the reasoned analyses of our
colleagues in this district and elsewhere that have reached a different

conclusion. However, we are persuaded by and agree with those courts
that have concluded that Section 1225(b) compels mandatory detention
for petitioners like Singh.

III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, upon consideration of this
petition for writ of habeas corpus, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the

petition be DENIED.

53 Because we are recommending the petition be denied, we decline to
reach the petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access
to Justice Act (“EAJA”). However, we note that this issue is currently
pending in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
, Civ. No. 3:25-CV-1896, 2025 WL
3513152, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (Wilson, J) (citing
, No. 24-3198 (3d Cir.)).
The petitioner is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local
Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: February 10, 2026

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311729. Public record. Not legal advice.