# STURGIS

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · April 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311682

## Case

- **Full name:** Dylan Sturgis v. Diamond Hospitality Services LLC and Penn State Cobblestone, LLC
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311682

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a three-month gap, without more, was insufficient to establish causation

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DYLAN STURGIS )
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) C.A. No. 1:24-CV-241
)
DIAMOND HOSPITALITY SERVICES )
LLC, )
and )
PENN STATE COBBLESTONE, LLC, _)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 26), and the Brief in Opposition (ECF No. 30). Plaintiff brings a four-count
Second Amended Complaint alleging (1) Disability Discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendment Act, (“ADA”) and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (““PHRA”),
(2) Retaliation under the ADA, Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and PHRA, (3) Hostile
Work Environment under all three statutes, and (4) a Tortious Interference Claim.

Il. THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Dylan Sturgis began his employment at Cobblestone Hotel and Suites on or about
May 2, 2021 in the position of a night audit. ECF No. 20 { 8, 12, 15.1 He maintained a full-time,

1 The business entity addresses for both Diamond Hospitality Services, LLC, and Penn State
Cobblestone, LLC Cobblestone Hotel and Suites, are listed as 1001 State Street, Erie,
Pennsylvania 16501. ECF No. 20, 9 5 n.1. This Court will assume, for purposes of deciding this

Monday-through-Friday schedule and an unblemished employment record, devoid of any formal
disciplinary action. Jd. □ 16, 22. Plaintiff was the most senior front desk employee and worked
under four different managers during his employment. Jd. at { 15.
In July 2023, Plaintiff was diagnosed with cancer. Id. § 19. Prior to the start of
chemotherapy treatment in September 2023, Angela Boyd (“Boyd”) became the general manager
of the Harborcreek Cobblestone location beginning in August 2023. Jd 19, 46. Plaintiff was
admitted to the hospital on September 18, 2023 and was not released until November 3, 2023. Jd.
{ 20. Defendants were also aware that Plaintiff had been previously diagnosed in 2004 with
Asperger’s Syndrome. /d. J 18, 47.
On November 14, 2023, Plaintiff notified Boyd that he would be able to return to work
from his chemotherapy treatment on November 16, 2023, but that his return to work papers
included a 10-pound lift limit. Jd. { 21. Upon his return to work, beginning November 24, 2023,
Plaintiff was continually scheduled to work every weekend instead of his prior week day shifts.
Id. | 23. He was informed that Boyd was attempting to find a part-time weekender to fill the
weekend shifts. Jd. { 24. No part-time employee was established to revert Plaintiff's schedule back
to Monday through Friday. /d.
About four months later, on March 6, 2024, Plaintiffreceived his first ever written warning
for allegedly failing to properly stock breakfast. Jd. {J 27, 30. Plaintiff was of the belief that he
was not responsible for re-stocking breakfast. Id. | 29. Following this, Boyd received a complaint
from a guest attempting to check in after midnight. Jd. { 32. The substance of the guest complaint
was that Plaintiff had been observed playing games on his computer. /d. Plaintiff states that he had

motion, that Penn State Cobblestone, LLC, and Diamond Hospitality Services LLC are joint
employers.

previously been granted permission to use his computer when he was not busy at night. Jd. J 33.
Subsequently, on March 21, 2024, Plaintiff's employment was terminated as a result of the
complaint. Jd. 4 31.
Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff presents the following legal claims:
I Disability discrimination against both Defendants
II Retaliation against both Defendants
Il Hostile work environment against both Defendants
IV Tortious interference with contract against Diamond Hospitality
Defendants have moved to dismiss. ECF No. 26. Plaintiff has filed a brief in opposition to
the pending motion. ECF No. 30. The motion is fully briefed and is ripe for disposition by this
Court.

Il. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Under Rule 12(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move to
dismiss when a plaintiff fails to effectuate proper service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). “In resolving a
motion under Rule 12(b)(5), the party making service has the burden of demonstrating its validity
when an objection to service is made.” Martin v. OSHA, 2017 WL 1326212, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
11, 2017). District courts possess “broad discretion” when evaluating a motion to dismiss for
insufficient service of process. See Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 30 (3d Cir.1992). “Where

2 Following the termination, Plaintiff initiated administrative proceedings. A Charge was filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against Diamond Hospitality on or about
May 2, 2024, for which a Notice of Right to Sue was issued on June 5, 2024. Jd. 9] 57-58. A
subsequent Charge was filed against Penn State Cobblestone, LLC, on or about December 20,
2024, with a corresponding Notice of Right to Sue issued on March 7, 2025. Id. 59-60. During
this period, it was revealed that Plaintiffs personnel records had been inadvertently discarded by
the subsequent General Manager, Scott Katren, after Defendants had received notice of
Plaintiffs claims. Id. {J 39, 41-42.

a plaintiff acts in good faith, but fails to effect proper service of process, courts are reluctant to
dismiss an action.” Ramada Worldwide Inc. v. Shriji Krupa, LLC, 2013 WL 1903295 (D.N.J.
Apr.17, 2013).
In contrast, a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. □□
Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. A court need not accept as true unsupported conclusions and
unwarranted inferences. Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 Gd
Cir. 2000). Similarly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. While a court must accept all
factual allegations in Plaintiffs complaint as true, courts are not compelled to accept “unsupported
conclusions and unwarranted inferences|,]” (see Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light
Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir.1997)), or “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Papasan vy. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of Service

Defendant Pennsylvania State Cobblestone moves to dismiss the claims against it based on
Plaintiff's failure to properly serve it. ECF No. 27 § 7. However, the defense of “insufficient
service of process” is subject to waiver. Zokaites Props., LP vy. La Mesa Racing, LLC, 2012 WL
3144127, at *17 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2012). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h), service
must be effectuated unless the corporation—-Penn State Cobblestone—executes an effective
waiver of service.
Here, a waiver of service has been completed. ECF No. 28. The waiver, executed by
Pennsylvania State Cobblestone and filed by Plaintiff plainly states, “I waive any objections to the
absence of a summons or of service.” Jd. The waiver was executed on June 5, 2025 after
Defendants’ pending motion was filed. ECF Nos. 27, 28.
Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly states that when a plaintiff
files a waiver of service, proof of service is not required, and the Rules apply as if a summons and
complaint had been served at the time of filing the waiver. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4). The filing of a
waiver of service under Rule 4(d) has the effect of mooting any motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process. See, e.g., Kohar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2016 WL
1449580, at *3 n.7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2016) (“The [cJourt notes that [although the defendant]
initially moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5), that aspect of the motion is moot, given that it ...
waived service.”); CC Ford Grp. W., LLC v. Johnson, 2025 WL 1810206, at *9 (D.N.J. June 30,
2025) (“Dismissal would only be appropriate under Rule 12(b)(5) when service is not properly
effectuated upon the defendant and that said defendant does not waive service.”). Accordingly,
this Court will deny Defendants’ motion under Rule 12(b)(5) as moot.

B. The Disability Discrimination Claims’
At this early stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs claim of disability discrimination needs only
be “facially plausible and give fair notice to the defendants of the basis of the claim.” Dreibelbis
v. Cnty. of Berks, 438 F. Supp. 3d 304, 313 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
511-12 (3d Cir. 2002)). For a claim to be “facially plausible,” it must be the case that the allegations
state, “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the
claim's] necessary element[s].” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016).
Other district courts in this circuit have described such a pleading standard as deferential. Doe v.
Triangle Doughnuts, LLC, 472 F. Supp. 3d 115, 126 (B.D. Pa. 2020); Flynn v. City of Scranton,
2024 WL 4839367, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2024). Lastly, while a prima facie showing is not
necessary, a court may analyze the elements of a claim as “analytical guideline[s] in assessing the
plausibility” of the claims. Fabian v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr, 2018 WL 4145037, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
30, 2018) (collecting cases).
Defendants seek dismissal of the disability discrimination claim contending that Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. They argue the Second Amended
Complaint lacks any factual allegation connecting the adverse employment action to Plaintiff's
disability, a necessary element for claims of discrimination under both ADA and PHRA. ECF No.
27, 4 9.
To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must allege that: (4)
he is “disabled” as defined by the ADA; (ii) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of
the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (iii) he has suffered an adverse

The Third Circuit applies the same analysis to disability discrimination claims under both the
ADA and the PHRA. See Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 Gd Cir.1996).

employment decision as a result of discrimination. Brown v. Saint Vincent Health Ctr., 2022 WL
865818, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2022)(citing Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177,
185 (3d Cir. 2010)). Defendants admit that the first two elements of the prima facie case of
discrimination have been met. ECF No. 27 10 (“For purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, the first
and second elements of Sturgis’ disability discrimination claims are not in dispute....”). The Court
is left with the issue of causation: whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged (1) the adverse
employment action he suffered was (2) as a result of his disability.
An adverse employment action is “serious and tangible enough to alter an employee's
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Cunningham v. Nordisk, 615 F.
App'x 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Storey v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d
Cir.2004)). Causation can be demonstrated by factual allegations that support a logical inference
of causation between the alleged disability and the adverse employment action. See Rubano vy.
Farrell Area Sch. Dist., 991 F. Supp. 2d 678, 700 (W.D. Pa. 2014)(internal quotation marks and
citations omitted.); Jakomas v. City of Pittsburgh, 342 F. Supp. 3d 632, 650 (W.D. Pa. 2018).
The Second Amended Complaint posits three alleged adverse employment actions: an
altered work schedule, the written warning related to breakfast stocking, and the termination on
March 21, 2024. ECF No. 20 §§ 23, 27 31. For each, the Court examines the pleaded facts to
determine whether the actions as pled constitute adverse employment actions and then the Court
analyzes whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the actions were taken as a result of Plaintiffs
disability.

Schedule Change
The Second Amended Complaint explains that prior to his medical leave, Plaintiff's usual
shift was Monday through Friday. ECF No. 20 4 22. Upon his return to work, he alleges he was

“continuously scheduled to work every weekend.” Jd. 23. He contends this new schedule was
unfavorable given his recent return from cancer treatment and his Asperger’s Syndrome, a
condition known to the Defendants, for which such scheduling changes can pose significant
difficulties. The parties present competing characterizations of the alleged schedule change.
Defendants argue that because he does not “allege any reduction in hours or pay,” the schedule
change was a “mere inconvenience.” ECF No. 27 at 11. Plaintiff disagrees.
Not every alteration of employment conditions gives rise to an adverse action. The standard
is an objective one: “whether a reasonable person would find the employment conditions
substantially worsened.” Dilenno v. Goodwill Indus. of Mid— E. Pa., 162 F.3d 235, 236 Gd
Cir.1998). Minor or trivial actions that merely occasion unhappiness are insufficient. Merit v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Auth., 315 F. Supp. 2d 689 (2004). It is clear, however,
that“[e]ven a mere schedule change to weekend work can qualify as an adverse employment
action.” Wesley v. Palace Rehab. & Care Ctr., L.L.C., 3 F. Supp. 3d 221, 235 (D.N.J. 2014) (citing
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 71 (2006)); Mondzelewski v.
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 787 (3d Cir. 1998)(“The change in his schedule may have
altered the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment.’”’)(internal quotations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff's pleading lacks precision -- it is unclear whether Plaintiff was scheduled
for five, six, or seven days per week upon his return. Drawing all reasonable inferences in
Plaintiff's favor, as the Court must at this stage, the allegation that he was scheduled to work
“every weekend” following a Monday-to-Friday schedule permits the reasonable inference that
his workweek was expanded to seven days. Such a change—from a 40-hour work week to what
could be a 56-hour work week—cannot be dismissed as a mere inconvenience. A reasonable
person could find being required to work every day of the week, which includes more demanding

weekend shifts, substantially worse than a standard five-day schedule. See e.g., Jones v. Barnhart,
349 F.3d 1260, 1269— 70 (10th Cir. 2003) (an increased workload can constitute a materially
adverse employment action); Ledbetter v. Alltel Corp. Servs., Inc., 437 F.3d 717, 724 (8th
Cir.2006) (increased workload that materially changes an employee's duties can constitute an
adverse employment action). Moreover, even assuming Plaintiff was not scheduled seven days per
week, reassignment to weekend-only shifts following medical leave plausibly altered the
conditions of employment in a materially adverse manner. Had the change merely shifted his five-
day schedule to different days, (for example Sunday through Friday) the claim would be far less
compelling and a closer question. As pled, the change in work schedule constitutes a plausible
adverse action.
Finally, the temporal proximity between Plaintiffs return from FMLA leave and this
immediate schedule change is sufficient, at this juncture, to support an inference of causal
connection. Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim of disability discrimination based on this adverse
employment action.

Written Warning
Plaintiff alleges he was issued a written reprimand on March 6, 2024 “relating to not
properly stocking breakfast” approximately eight or nine days before. ECF No. 20, {| 27. Plaintiff
did not understand breakfast stocking to be part of his job duties as an overnight employee. Jd. at
q 29. Plaintiff never received such a warning prior to being managed by Ms. Boyd. Jd. at { 30. In
his opposition brief, Plaintiff argues that the issuance of this warning was discriminatory.
A written reprimand may, in certain contexts, qualify as an adverse employment action
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Rubano, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 708 (“Some courts have
found that a written reprimand may constitute a materially adverse action”)(collecting cases). This

is most clearly established where the reprimand effects a tangible, material change in the terms or
conditions of employment. See, e.g., Campo v. Mid-Atl. Packaging Specialties, LLC, 564 F. Supp.
3d 362, 383 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (establishing written warnings can be considered adverse employment
actions when a progressive discipline policy is in place).
That said, the mere issuance of a warning, without more, does not automatically cross this
threshold. The critical inquiry ultimately turns on the warning’s concrete consequences. Ifa written
reprimand results in no immediate alteration to an employee’s duties, schedule, compensation, or
opportunities for advancement, courts have consistently declined to classify it as an adverse action.
See e.g., Deans v. Kennedy House, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 2d 393, 403-04 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (concluding
that warnings which do not alter the terms of employment remain non-adverse until acted on by
the employer); Sabbrese v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 311, 325 (W.D. Pa. 2004)
(holding that a warning’s potential for future consequences, without present effect, was
insufficient).
Here, the Second Amended Complaint plausibly clears this threshold at the pleading stage.
Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court may reasonably infer
that the written warning was not a meaningless or purely administrative act, but part of a
progressive disciplinary framework. See ECF No. 20-5 (describing a “Disciplinary Process”).
Within such a structure, a written reprimand serves as a building block toward more serious
sanctions and therefore carries tangible employment consequences. The Court also notes
Plaintiff's allegation that relevant personnel records were inadvertently discarded by Defendants,
limiting Plaintiff's ability to plead greater specificity at this juncture. See ECF No. 20 4§ 38-39.
Taken together, these allegations are sufficient, at this stage, to plausibly allege that the warning,
issued eight or nine days after the incident, constituted an adverse employment action because it

10

operated within a progressive disciplinary scheme capable of affecting Plaintiff's compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
The inquiry does not end there, however. Next, the Court examines whether Plaintiff has
adequately pled the nexus prong — in other words, that the adverse employment action was on
account of his disability. In this regard, Plaintiffs principal argument rests upon temporal
proximity. He notes the warning followed his return from FMLA leave. Plaintiff's argument
mischaracterizes the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint which indicates a gap of
approximately four months between Plaintiff's return to work in November 2023 and the
reprimand in March 2024. Jd. §[ 19-21, 27.
Although temporal proximity may, in limited circumstances, support an inference of
causation, the Third Circuit has made clear that timing alone suffices only where is “unusually
suggestive.” LeBron y. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2007)
(holding that a three-month gap, without more, was insufficient to establish causation). A lapse of
approximately four months, standing alone, is not usually suggestive and does not plausibly
establish the requisite nexus at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp,
Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that absent unusually suggestive timing,
additionally evidence is required); Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC, 147 F.Supp.3d 327, 338-39
(W.D. Pa. 2015) (applying LeBoon standard in ADA context and requiring more than timing alone
were gap was several months); Thompson y. Liberty Mut. Ins., 2021 WL 1712277, at *5 (D.N.J.
Apr. 29, 2021)(“‘lapse of two-and-half months by itself is not unusually suggestive of
discrimination”). Where the lapse in time is of this greater magnitude, a plaintiff must proffer
additional evidence of a “pattern of antagonism” or other circumstantial evidence to permit an
inference of causation. See Capps, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 337, aff'd, 847 F.3d 144 (Gd Cir. 2017)(‘Tn

11

the absence of an unusually suggestive temporal proximity, [Plaintiff] must show evidence that
[Defendant] engaged in a pattern of antagonism in the intervening period.”)(internal quotations
and citations omitted); Beird v. Lincoln Univ. of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 487 F. Supp.
3d 270, 278 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (if an unusually suggestive timeframe is not present then a plaintiff
can prove causation through a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal
link.). In other words, when, as is the case here, temporal proximity is not close enough to imply
direct causation, “[courts] apply the ‘timing plus other evidence” test to determine whether other
pleaded facts suggest motive. See Blakney v. City of Philadelphia, 559 F. App'x 183, 186 (3d Cir.
2014).
Here, Plaintiff alleges a series of employment actions that, at this preliminary stage, we
find sufficient to satisfy his burden. He claims that despite a lengthy tenure under four managers
without any record of reprimand, he was subjected to a written warning for a minor infraction, a
schedule change to a more onerous shift, and ultimately, termination for an action he previously
requested and was given permission to engage in. Accepting these well-pleaded allegations as true,
the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has carried his burden at this juncture for purposes of the
present motion.

Termination
Plaintiff was terminated shortly after a guest complained that he was using a computer to
play games. ECF No. 20 § 31-33. Plaintiff states that he had previously been given permission to
use his computer when he was not busy at night, and that he had never been given a verbal or
written warning about computer usage. Jd. J 33. Termination, of course, constitutes an adverse
employment action within the meaning of the ADA. Bossi v. Bank of Am., 2016 WL 4446444, at

12

*3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2016) (“It is well settled that termination is an adverse employment
action.”).
The Court is left with the issue of causation: whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the
adverse employment action he suffered was the result of his disability. On this particular issue, the
Court notes that Plaintiff simply avers that termination for such a “minor infraction” was
discriminatory and retaliatory. But it is critical that Plaintiff need not have “detailed evidence,”
but need only give Defendants fair notice of his claim and “raise the reasonable expectation that
discovery will uncover evidence of discriminatory motive.” Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986
F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants’ explanation for the
termination apart from disability may be relevant at summary judgment, but here, Plaintiff has
adequately alleged that he was plausibly terminated on the basis of his disability given the nature
of the infraction, the previously requested permission to play computer games, and the fact that he
previously had no negative employee remarks and presumably had played video games on his
computer before.
Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged discriminatory
termination, that determination does not end the inquiry. Plaintiff also advances a distinct theory
of liability under the ADA - namely that Defendants failed to provide a reasonable accommodation
for his disability. Such a claim must be assessed under its own distinct legal framework.
Under the ADA, discrimination includes not only adverse actions taken because of
disability, but also an employer’s failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.” See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A). At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff asserting a failure-to-accommodate
claim under the ADA need only allege facts that plausibly establish: (1) he is disabled within the

13

meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the
position, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) his employer failed to provide a
reasonable accommodation. See EEOC vy. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 158 F.Supp.3d
393, 399 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2016) (quoting Hohider v. UPS, Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 186 (3d Cir.
2009)). Importantly, a failure-to-accommodate claim does not require allegations of discriminatory
animus; the failure itself constitutes the discrimination. Reyer v. Saint Francis Country House, 243
F.Supp.3d 573, 595 (E.D. Pa. March 20, 2017) (quoting Sharbaugh vy. West Haven Manor, LP,
2016 WL 6834613, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2016)). To survive dismissal, a complaint must
plausibly allege that the employer knew of the disability and the request for accommodation and
failed to engage in the interactive process in good faith or otherwise denied a reasonable
accommodation.
The Second Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege a failure-to-accommodate
claim. It contains no factual assertion that Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation for
either his cancer treatment or his Asperger’s Syndrome, nor does it allege that any such request
was denied. The pleading is devoid of facts suggesting that Defendants refused to provide an
accommodation or failed to engage in the interactive process. Although the Second Amended
Complaint does not expressly allege that Plaintiff requested medical leave, the Court assumes,
drawing all inferences in Plaintiff's favor, that leave was sought and granted, particularly during
his hospitalization from September 18" through November 3. Even with that inference, however,
there are no allegations that any requested accommodation was denied. Accordingly, Plaintiff
cannot proceed on a failure to accommodate theory and the motion to dismiss will be granted in
this regard.

14

Given that Plaintiff has had three opportunities to plead this failure to accommodate claim
and given his repeated failure to do so,* further leave to amend will not be permitted. See Long v.
Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 400 (3d Cir. 2004) (listing “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous
amendments” as a factor supporting denial of amendment”).

C. The Retaliation Claims
Plaintiff alleges that he “was harassed, humiliated, disciplined, terminated, and
discriminated against by Defendants in retaliation of the disclosure of his medical conditions,
using medical leave, and the assertion of his rights” under ADA, FMLA, and PHRA. ECF No.
20 P 69.
The elements of a retaliation claim under the ADA, the FMLA, or the PHRA are materially
the same. Lott v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 2020 WL 6131165, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2020). To
state a prima facie claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse action. Dreibelbis v. County of Berks, 438 F. Supp. 3d 304, 319
(E.D. Pa. 2020).
As relevant here, protected activity under the ADA includes requesting a reasonable
accommodation. See Barber v. Subway, 131 F. Supp. 3d 321, 329 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting
Sulima, 602 F.3d at 188-89). see also Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494 (holding
that a request for accommodation constitutes protected activity); Laguna v. Chester Housing Auth.,

4 Plaintiff filed the original complaint on September 3, 2024 [ECF No. 1]. Defendants moved to
dismiss the original complaint on January 24, 2025. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff then filed a First
Amended Complaint on February 14, 2025 [ECF No. 11] and Defendants moved to dismiss that
pleading [ECF No. 14]. Finally, and presently at issue, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended
Complaint [ECF No. 20] and Defendants again moved to dismiss [ECF No. 26].

15

616 F. Supp. 3d 462, 469 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (same). Likewise, requesting or taking medical leave
may constitute protected activity under the FMLA.
In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff identifies two forms of protected conduct:
(1) his request for medical leave, and (2) his request for the reinstatement of his original Monday-
through-Friday schedule, which he characterizes as a request for accommodation.
Defendants move to dismiss the retaliation claims on two grounds. First, they argue that
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he requested an accommodation within the meaning of the
statutes. Second, they contend that the Second Amended Complaint fails to plead facts establishing
a causal connection between Plaintiffs medical leave and the termination of his employment.
At this stage, however, Plaintiffs burden is modest. Accepting the well-pleaded allegations
as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court cannot conclude — albeit
narrowly—that Plaintiff has failed to allege protected activity or a plausible causal link. The
motion to dismiss the retaliation claims will therefore be denied.

D. The Hostile Work Environment Claim
Plaintiff alleges that he “experienced ongoing harassment” related to “his medical
conditions, medical leave, requested accommodations and complaints” and was therefore
subjected to a hostile work environment. ECF No. 20 PP 72-73. To state a hostile work
environment claim under the ADA and PHRA,? a plaintiff must allege:

5 Hostile work environment claims under the PHRA are subject to the same analysis as hostile
work environment claims under the ADA. See, e.g., Hatch, 755 F. Apex at 201. However,
because the FMLA does not provide for a “hostile work environment” cause of action (see
Hilton v. Home Depot, Inc., 2022 WL 837207, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2022) (collecting cases)),
this Court only reviews the hostile work environment claim as it relates to the ADA and PHRA.
If Plaintiff intended to raise such a claim under the FMLA, it is dismissed with prejudice as
amendment would be futile.

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(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA; (2) he was subject
to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on his disability or a
request for an accommodation; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and to create an abusive
working environment; and (5) that [his employer] knew or should have known of
the harassment and failed to take prompt effective remedial action.
Hatch v. Franklin Cnty., 755 F. App'x 194, 201-02 (Gd Cir. 2018) (citations omitted); see also
Woods vy. AstraZeneca Pharms., L.P., 659 F. Supp. 3d 512, 544 (M.D. Pa. 2023) (citing Walton v.
Mental Health Ass'n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999)). Dispositive to the Court’s
analysis is whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive. Thus, the Court begins
with the fourth element.
A hostile work environment exists when the “workplace is permeated with “discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.” AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101, 115 (2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). In determining
whether a work environment is sufficiently abusive, courts look at all the circumstances, including
“the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance. Harris., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). “[O]ffhanded comments, and
isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)” are insufficient to sustain a hostile work environment
claim.” Caver y. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 263 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998)). A hostile work environment claim should not be used to
enforce a “a general civility code” and “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace” are not grounds

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for a hostile work environment claim. Stucke v. City of Philadelphia, 685 Fed.Appx. 150, 154 Gd
Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted).®
Measured against this standard, the factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint
fall short. Plaintiff premises his claim on a series of discrete employment actions that might be
sufficient for a retaliation or discrimination claim, at this stage, but not for the more demanding
pleading required for a hostile work environment claim. He alleges that upon his return from
medical leave, his manager “continuously scheduled [him] to work every weekend,” a departure
from his previous Monday-through-Friday schedule. ECF No. 20 § 23. He further alleges that he
received a “written warning” for allegedly failing to stock breakfast, an infraction he contends was
a simple misunderstanding unworthy of a write up. Jd. § 27. Finally, he was terminated for playing
computer games after a guest complaint, an act for which he claims he had prior permission. Jd.
qq 31-33.
While the plaintiff categorizes these actions as “ongoing harassment,” (id. § 72), it is not
enough that “the employee subjectively perceives [the environment] as abusive or hostile[.]”
Ullrich v. U.S. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 457 F. App'x 132, 140 Gd Cir. 2012). The environment
must also be “objectively hostile or abusive,” one “a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive.” Jd. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). As plead, a change in work schedule, a single written
reprimand, and a termination (for a stated reason) are insufficient to plead a cause of action for
hostile work environment. None of these actions, as described, are objectively physically

6 It is well established in the Third Circuit that discrimination, hostile work environment, and
retaliation claims brought under the PHRA are subject to the same analysis as those claims
brought under Title VIL Gomez v. Allegheny Health Sves., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1084 (3d
Cir.1995). Further, “[t]he Third Circuit has assumed without specifically deciding that claims
may be brought pursuant to the ADA ... for a hostile work environment under substantially the
same framework as a Title VII hostile work environment claim.” Magerr v. City of Philadelphia,
2016 WL 1404156, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2016).
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threatening or severely humiliating. There is no allegation of a single offensive utterance, much
less a constant barrage of ridicule or abuse based on his disability. The Second Amended
Complaint is also silent as to any facts suggesting that these incidents unreasonably interfered with
his ability to perform his work.
What remains is a narrative of employment decisions Plaintiff views as unfair or
retaliatory. The conduct alleged here, while potentially relevant to other legal theories, describes
the very “ordinary tribulations of the workplace” that fall outside the ambit of a hostile work
environment. The Second Amended Complaint fails to plead facts that plausibly suggest the
workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was severe or
pervasive. Consequently, Plaintiff has not met his burden of alleging the requisite severity or
pervasiveness, and his hostile work environment claim must fail. Like the failure to accommodate
claim, further leave to amend will not be permitted because Plaintiff has already had two
opportunities to replead this claim.

KE. The Tortious Interference Claim
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Diamond Hospitality took steps “to interfere with or otherwise
prevent Plaintiff from being employed with Penn State Cobblestone.” ECF No. 20, P78.
Plaintiff concedes that evidence in his possession at this stage of the litigation suggests
that Defendants are joint employers, a concession that would foreclose, as a matter of law, the
tortious interference claim. See ECF No. 30 at 24. Should later proceedings in this litigation,
however, reveal through discovery that Defendants are not in fact joint employers, Plaintiff will
be at liberty to seek reinstatement of this claim at an appropriate time. Accordingly, Count IV is
dismissed without prejudice.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 26) will be granted in
part and denied in part. The motion under Rule 12(b)(5) will be denied as moot. As to the motion
under Rule 12(b)(6), it will be denied as to Count I (Disability Discrimination) and Count II
(Retaliation). The motion will be granted as to Count II (Hostile Work Environment) which will
be dismissed with prejudice and Count IV (Tortious Interference) which will be dismissed without
prejudice. An appropriate order will follow.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311682. Public record. Not legal advice.