# PELLA

> District Court, D. New Jersey · February 25, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311609

## Case

- **Full name:** Phillip Pella v. Atlantic County Department of Family and Community Development, New Jersey Department of Human Services, Helen Cheatham, Audrey Alphaeus, John/Jane Does 1-10
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** February 25, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

PHILLIP PELLA,

Plaintiff,
Civil Nos. 25-13268 (RMB-EAP)
v. 25-16933 (RMB-EAP)

ATLANTIC COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF OPINION
FAMILY AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT, NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
HELEN CHEATHAM, AUDREY
ALPHAEUS, JOHN/JANE DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the filing of a Third Amended
Complaint, [Docket No. 40 (“Compl.”)], and an amended application to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”) by pro se Plaintiff Phillip Pella (“Plaintiff”). [Docket No. 35.]
Plaintiff’s IFP application establishes his financial eligibility to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee and will be GRANTED.1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

1 The Court notes that in his Complaint, Plaintiff makes mention of a monthly gift of
$600 from his daughter for “personal storage costs,” [Compl. at ¶ 31], which is not
disclosed within his IFP application. While granting Plaintiff’s IFP, the Court cautions
him that the ability to proceed IFP is a privilege, not a right. See Shahin v. Sec. of Del.,
532 F.App’x 123, 123 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing White v. Colo., 157 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th
Atlantic County Department of Family and Community Development, New Jersey
Department of Human Services, Helen Cheatham, Audrey Alphaeus, and John/Jane
Does 1-10 violated federal law and wrongly denied him New Jersey Emergency

Assistance (“EA”) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”)
benefits [Compl. at 1-2.] For the reasons stated herein, the Court DISMISSES
Plaintiff’s Complaint.
I. SCREENING FOR DISMISSAL
When a person files a complaint and is granted IFP status, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) requires courts to review the complaint and dismiss claims that are: (1)
frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3)
seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Courts,
however, must liberally construe pleadings that are filed pro se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a

claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is the same as that for dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122
(3d Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

Cir. 1998)). Should the Court find concern with Plaintiff’s disclosures, or lack thereof,
as the matter proceeds, it will exercise its discretion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status. Id.
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Although entitled to liberal interpretation, "pro se litigants still must allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,
704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th
Cir. 1996)). "Even a pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if the
allegations set forth by the plaintiff cannot be construed as supplying facts to support

a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282
(D.N.J. 2013) (citing Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981)).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a resident of Atlantic County, New Jersey, was laid off due to the
COVID-19 Pandemic and became disabled on June 15, 2020, following what he
describes as “a loss from suicide.” [Compl. at ¶ 13.] Plaintiff then applied for Social

Security Disability Insurance in August 2021. [Id. at ¶ 14.] He began receiving General
Assistance under Work First New Jersey (“WFNJ”) and SNAP benefits in September
2021. [Id. at ¶ 16.]
On April 10, 2022, Plaintiff applied for EA benefits through WFNJ in response
to a notice of eviction he received due to nonpayment of rent for two months. [Id. at ¶

17.] His application was denied on May 16, 2022, and Plaintiff successfully appealed
on March 30, 2023. [Id. at ¶ 18.] Plaintiff then reapplied for EA benefits on May 10,
2023, but was denied on the grounds that he was “overhoused” based on an increase
in calculated rent and a refusal to downsize his housing from three bedrooms to one.
[Id. at ¶ 22 (citing Pl. Ex. D).] Plaintiff again appealed and the denial was upheld on
June 28, 2023. [Id. at ¶ 23.]
On June 29, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a third application for EA benefits via

email. [Id. at ¶ 24.] He claims to have never received a determination on his application
within the statutory timeframe and requested additional verification on August 8,
2023. [Id.] He further claims his requests for an emergency fair hearing concerning this
delay were ignored. [Id. at ¶ 25.] Plaintiff was evicted on August 14, 2023, and his

tenancy was terminated on September 6, 2023. [Id. at ¶ 27.] Plaintiff states this eviction
rendered him homeless. [Id. at ¶ 30.]
On August 18, 2023, Plaintiff received a fully favorable decision from the Social
Security Administration declaring him disabled as of June 15, 2020. [Id. at ¶ 28 (citing
Pl. Ex. G).] He received his first Social Security payment in October 2023 and claims

that it is due to these payments that Defendants denied his reapplication for EA
benefits. [Id. at ¶ 28-29.] Despite his self-characterization as homeless, Plaintiff has
been living in “temporary shelter” for which he pays “out of pocket” using his Social
Security benefits. [Id. at ¶ 31.]
In January 2024, Plaintiff’s SNAP benefits were reduced following notification

of his increased Social Security income consistent with regulatory guidelines. [Id. at ¶
32 (citing Pl. Ex. H).] Plaintiff disagrees with this reason and instead believes that
Defendants purposely applied a gross income standard rather than the net income
standards applied to disabled households. [Id. at ¶ 33-34 (citing Pl. Ex. I, J).]
Plaintiff has also referenced an ongoing state criminal prosecution following his
alleged theft of a “Harrah’s Casino slot machine voucher in the amount of $2,005.50”
belonging to another patron which he claims the State has brought against him in

retaliation for his Benefits claims. [Id. at ¶ 42 (citing Pl. Ex. K).] He also included the
mention of State Appellate Actions he has currently pending against Defendants. [Id.
at ¶ 43.]
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff submitted his initial Complaint without paying the $350 filing fee and

$55 administrative fee nor did he submit an IFP application on July 14, 2025. [Docket
No. 1.] He was instructed to either submit the fee or a completed IFP application by
the Clerk’s Office the same day. [Docket No. 3.] Plaintiff submitted an Amended
Complaint and IFP application on July 22, 2025. [Docket Nos. 5, 6.]
Prior to the screening of Plaintiff’s IFP application, Defendants filed a Motion

to Dismiss. [Docket No. 11.] Plaintiff submitted several briefs in opposition, [Docket
Nos. 12, 13, 17], however, Defendants’ Motion was terminated by the Court as
premature on August 25, 2025. [Docket No. 30.]
Plaintiff then filed a Second Amended Complaint on September 26, 2025.
[Docket No. 32.] He also filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction on October 10,

2025. [Docket No. 33.] The Court screened Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
and IFP application, finding it to be deficient and advised Plaintiff to submit a “new
application, in full, with necessary details and explanations” within thirty days on
October 28, 2025. [Docket No. 34.] The matter was then dismissed without prejudice,
pending Plaintiff’s submission. [Id.] Plaintiff submitted his second IFP application on
October 29, 2025, [Docket No. 35], and a Third Amended Complaint (“Complaint”)
on November 10, 2025. [Docket No. 40.]

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate
Within his Complaint, Plaintiff moves to consolidate this action with Civil
Action No. 25-16933 that he also has pending before this Court as well as his related
State Appellate matters. [Compl. at 7.]

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), when multiple actions pending
before the Court present a common question of law or fact, the Court has discretion
to: “(1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate
the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 42(a)(1)–(3). The Third Circuit has explained that Rule 42 grants district courts

substantial authority—either upon motion of a party or sua sponte—to consolidate
cases for trial where doing so would promote judicial efficiency and the orderly
administration of justice. See Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 339 F.2d
673, 675 (3d Cir. 1964). The Court may also invoke this authority when consolidation
would “avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” Skoorka v. Kean Univ., No. 16-3842, 2019

WL 4509294, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Importantly, consolidation does not combine separate cases into a single action,
alter the substantive rights of the parties, or render parties in one case parties in
another. In re Only. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 298 n.12 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating whether consolidation is appropriate,
the Court recognizes that the actions need not be mirror images of one another; it is
sufficient that they share “common question[s] of law or fact.” In re Cendant Corp. Litig.,

182 F.R.D. 476, 478 (D.N.J. 1998). As the Third Circuit has noted, “[t]he purpose of
consolidation is ‘to streamline and economize pretrial proceedings so as to avoid
duplication of effort, and to prevent conflicting outcomes in cases involving similar
legal and factual issues.’” In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 724 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting
In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P’ships Litig., 158 F.R.D. 562, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).

Plaintiff asserts that consolidation is warranted because this matter and Civil
Action No. 25-16933 involve overlapping parties, similar allegations concerning the
administration of public assistance benefits, and related state appellate proceedings.
[Compl. at 7.] He further contends that consolidation would promote efficiency and

address what he characterizes as “urgent humanitarian circumstances.” [Id.]
After reviewing both matters, the Court notes that not only are these actions
substantially similar, but identical. It appears that Plaintiff initiated Civil Action No.
25-16933 the day this Court denied his Second Amended Complaint and has been
concurrently filing identical documents in both matters since. Therefore, in the interest

of judicial economy, the Court will dismiss the earlier filed case and there is no need
to consolidate. As to the State appeals, this Court has no authority to consolidate a
state action. As Rule 42(a) applies only to actions that are pending before it, the Court
lacks authority to consolidate federal actions with state court proceedings that remain
outside its jurisdiction. See Fata v. Bayonne N.J. Bd. of Educ., No. 24-9258, 2024 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 190095, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2024) (citations omitted).
B. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim (Counts I and VI)

Section 1983 imposes liability on individuals who deprive a person of a federal
constitutional or statutory right "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage" of a state. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983's "under color of law"
requirement is the "equivalent of state action." Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d
Cir. 2005); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) ("The ultimate issue

in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question
posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement
of federal rights 'fairly attributable to the State?'" (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982))). Thus, to avoid dismissal of his Section 1983 claim, Mr.
Pella must plead enough facts to show that he suffered a deprivation of a federal

constitutional or statutory right by a state actor. Leshko, 423 F.3d at 339.
1. State Action
In his Complaint, Plaintiff names The State of New Jersey and several various
State Agencies and Employees as Defendants. [Compl. at 1.] The conduct that gave
rise to the instigation of this suit concerns the administration of benefits through the

following programs: WFNJ, EA, and SNAP; and related fair-hearing determinations,
as well as a criminal prosecution. [Id.] The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has alleged
sufficient facts to support state action at this stage as all Defendants are either the State
of New Jersey or a State Administrative Agency. Thus, the inquiry now turns to
whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged the deprivation of a Constitutional right. Leshko,
423 F.3d at 339.
2. Deprivation of a Protected Property Interest

“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire and more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must,
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Hill v.
Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 2006). Assuming, arguendo, that

Plaintiff possessed a protected property interest in the public benefit assistance he
claims he qualifies for, the Complaint fails to plausibly allege the absence of adequate
process. Plaintiff acknowledges that he pursued administrative review, underwent
multiple hearings, and received several Final Agency Decisions. [Compl. at ¶¶ 18-20,
23, 25, 39-42, 46.] He further references ongoing appellate proceedings in New Jersey

Superior Court. [Compl. at ¶ 43.] The availability of administrative and judicial review
for Plaintiff’s claims strongly undermines any argument that he was deprived of
procedural due process. See DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 597 (3d
Cir. 1995) (overruled on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit v. Twp. of
Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003)).

At most, Plaintiff has alleged delay, adverse determinations, and personal
disagreement with regulatory interpretations. Such allegations, even when taken as
true, are not sufficient to establish that the procedures were constitutionally
inadequate. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). Due process guarantees notice
and an opportunity to be heard, not a favorable outcome. Id.

3. Substantive Due Process
Plaintiff also characterizes Defendants’ conduct as arbitrary, willful, and
retaliatory. Public assistance benefits are statutory entitlements, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 262 (1970), not fundamental rights deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition. See Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). Further, allegations
of regulatory misapplication, delay, or incorrect determinations do not rise to the level

of shock to the conscience required to proceed on a substantive due process claim. See
e.g., Miller v. City of Phila., 174 F.3d 368, 375-76 (3d Cir. 1999) (Conduct that violates
substantive due process must rise beyond “both negligence and deliberate indifference,
and reach a level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed 'shocks the
conscience.'"); J.R. v. Lehigh Cty., 534 F.App’x 104, 108 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[O]nly the

most egregious conduct violates substantive due process.”) Therefore, the facts alleged
do not plausibly demonstrate conduct of the magnitude required to sustain a
substantive due process claim.
4. Equal Protection
Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled and that Defendants improperly calculated

his SNAP eligibility by applying gross income standards rather than net income
standards applicable to disabled households. [Compl. at ¶ 33 (citing Pl. Ex. I).] The
Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const amend. XIV, § 1. In
essence, it requires that individuals who are similarly situated be treated the same. See
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). A plaintiff may pursue
an Equal Protection claim under two distinct theories: the traditional approach or the

class-of-one theory. As Plaintiff is pro se and has not explicitly pled his theory, the
Court analyzes both pathways.
Under the traditional approach, “[t]o prevail on [an] equal protection claim, [a
plaintiff] must show that the Government has treated [him] differently from a similarly

situated party and that the Government’s explanation for the differing treatment does
not satisfy the relevant level of scrutiny.” Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 867 F.3d 338, 348 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original). Additionally,
“[t]o state an equal-protection claim, Plaintiffs must allege (and ultimately prove)
‘intentional discrimination.’” Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 294 (3d Cir.

2015) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976)). “[M]ere unequal
treatment or adverse effect” does not suffice. Jewish Home of E. PA v. Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Servs., 693 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.
1, 8 (1944)). Instead, the plaintiff “must show that the decisionmaker . . . selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite

of, its adverse effects.” Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Under the class-of-one theory, a plaintiff need not belong to a protected class to
assert an equal protection claim. Rather, he must establish that the defendants
intentionally subjected him to differential treatment, compared with similarly situated
individuals, in a manner that was irrational. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
562, 564 (2000); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006). To

succeed in a class-of-one claim, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he was treated
differently from others who were similarly situated; (2) the disparate treatment was
intentional; and (3) no rational basis justified the difference. Hill, 455 F.3d at 239.
Regardless of which theory Plaintiff intends to pursue, this claim fails. The

Complaint does not identify similarly situated, non-disabled individuals who were
treated more favorably, nor does it allege facts supporting a plausible inference of
discriminatory intent. Rather, Plaintiff’s allegations concern disputes over regulatory
interpretation and eligibility calculations. [Compl. at ¶ 33-34 (citing Pl. Ex. I, J).]
Conclusory assertions of discrimination without a supporting factual basis are

insufficient under Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff therefore fails to plead an Equal
Protection claim.
5. Retaliation
Plaintiff further alleges that subsequent benefit denials and the initiation of a
seemingly unrelated criminal prosecution were done in “retaliation”, although
Plaintiff does not offer any further explanation. [Compl. at ¶¶ 20, 42.]

Even after liberally reading the Complaint, the Court finds it devoid of
allegations identifying protected activity that would give rise to the alleged retaliation,
nor does it plead facts supporting a plausible causal connection beyond conclusory
assertions. See Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir. 2007)). Absent factual
allegations establishing protected conduct and causation, Plaintiff has failed to plead
a claim of retaliation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

6. Plaintiff Has Failed to Plead a Section 1983 Claim
Although Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Defendants acted under color of
law, he has not plausibly alleged the deprivation of a Constitutional or Statutory right.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
C. Plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act and Americans with Disabilities Act
Claims (Counts VII and X)
Plaintiff asserts claims under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3604,
and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
[Compl. at 7.] Both claims arise from Defendants’ administration of Emergency

Assistance (“EA”) and related public benefits, including a determination that Plaintiff
was “overhoused.” [Compl. ¶ 22.] The Court addresses these claims together.
Under the FHA, it is unlawful to “discriminate in the sale or rental, or to
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a
handicap," or "to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges

of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
with such dwelling, because of a handicap." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f). Further, “[t]he ADA
. . . prohibits public entities from discriminating generally against any ‘qualified
individual with a disability,’ including with respect to housing.” Oxford House, Inc., v.

Twp. of N. Bergen, 158 F.4th 486, 491 (3d Cir. 2025) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132).
“Thus, to prevail on a discrimination claim under either the FHA or the ADA,
[Plaintiff] must ultimately prove two elements: (1) that [he has] a ‘handicap’ or a
‘disability’ as those terms are statutorily defined; and (2) that [Defendants]

discriminated against [him] on the basis of such handicap or disability.” Id.
Even after liberally construing the Complaint, Plaintiff failed to state a claim
under the FHA. The scope of the FHA is narrow and only regulates discriminatory
practices in the sale, rental, or making unavailable of dwellings. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(i),
3604(a)-(b). The conduct Plaintiff seeks to challenge involves the administration of

state emergency assistance benefits. [Compl. at 1-2.] The Court could not glean facts
from its reading of the Complaint that allege that Defendants refused to rent him a
dwelling, imposed discriminatory rental terms, or otherwise acted as housing
providers. Nor does he plead facts suggesting that the determination that he was
“overhoused” or that he was denied a housing opportunity because of his disability.

The mere allegation that an EA eligibility determination was erroneous or improperly
calculated does not convert a dispute over public assistance benefits into a claim of
housing discrimination under the FHA. Therefore, the Court cannot draw a
reasonable inference from the Complaint that any housing determinations were made
with discriminatory animus towards Plaintiff. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Plaintiff’s ADA claim fares no better. Title II of the ADA states “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
For the purpose of screening the Complaint, the Court assumes Plaintiff has a
qualified disability. [Compl. ¶ 28 (citing Ex. G).] The issue thus becomes whether the
Complaint plausibly alleges the denial or delay of state benefits occurred “by reason

of” his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Even after liberally reading the Complaint, the
Court concludes it does not plausibly allege that the denial of benefits occurred by
reason of Plaintiff’s disabilities. The SNAP denial notice explains the gross income
calculation that was done in computing the determination, leading the Court to
conclude that Plaintiff’s denial was based on statutory income thresholds. [Pl. Ex. I.]

Beyond this Exhibit, Plaintiff has failed to proffer any facts showing the denial was
due to his disability status nor does the Complaint allege that Plaintiff requested and
was denied reasonable housing accommodation.
Despite referencing disability related hardships and homelessness, Plaintiff does
not identify a specific modification to policy or procedure that was sought and refused.

At most, the Complaint alleges that Defendants incorrectly applied the correct
regulations to his case. [Compl. at ¶ 33-34.] Allegations of regulatory error, without
showing that the alleged error was disability-based or the byproduct of intentional
discrimination, are not sufficient to plead an ADA claim. See S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch.
Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2013). While Plaintiff has alleged serious hardship

and prolonged homelessness, the FHA and ADA claims as presently pleaded fail to
allege discrimination within the meaning of the statutes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
D. Count VIII – Civil Rights Act of 1964
Plaintiff asserts a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically Titles II
and VI. [Compl. at 6.] This claim too appears to arise from Defendants’ administration

of state benefits and alleged discriminatory treatment in connection with these
programs.
Title II prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation on the basis
of “race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). This statute applies
to places such as hotels, restaurants, theatres, and other similar facilities engaged in

interstate commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). It does not apply to state agencies
administering public assistance programs. See e.g. K.J. v. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.,
363 F. Supp 2d 728, 750 (D.N.J. 2005) (finding DYFS did not qualify as a place of
public accommodation as “place of public accommodation . . . refers to facilities
maintained for the use of [the] general public,” rather than merely the “services

provided by a state agency.”). Further, Plaintiff has only alleged discrimination on the
basis of his disability, not his race, color, religion or national origin. [Compl. at 8-9.]
Such allegations fall outside the scope of Title II.
Title VI provides “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,

or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Although Plaintiff makes general references
to federal funding and attaches program notices that include non-discriminatory
language, [Pl. Ex. I], he fails to allege that he is a member of a class protected by this
statute or that any adverse action was taken against him on the basis of said protected
class. Similar to Title II, Title VI does not encompass disability-based discrimination
and therefore has not been adequately pled. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

E. Count IX – Rehabilitation Act § 504
Plaintiff also asserts a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794. [Compl. at 6.] This claim too is based on the denial of state benefits and
“overhoused” determination. For the reasons below, as presently pleaded, this claim
fails the established pleading standard.

Section 504 states: “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States . . . shall, solely by reason of [their] disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Relying on the Favorable Decision Plaintiff received from the Social Security

Administration finding him to be disabled as of June 15, 2020, the Court considers
Plaintiff to have a qualifying disability for the purposes of screening the Complaint.
[Pl. Ex. G.] For screening purposes only, the Court also proceeds under the
assumption that the administration of the EA and SNAP benefits constitutes an
activity or program that receives federal financial assistance within the meaning of the

statute.
With these assumptions in mind, the dispositive issue becomes whether Plaintiff
has plausibly alleged that he was denied benefits solely by reason of his disability. 29
U.S.C. § 794(a). The Complaint recounts a series of adverse determinations, including
the May 2023 “overhoused” finding, subsequent Final Agency Decisions, delays in
processing applications, and SNAP eligibility determinations based on income
calculations. [Compl. at 3-5.] Plaintiff also included several notices from the Atlantic

County Department of Family and Community Development that state his benefits
determinations were made in accordance with the appropriate State regulatory
provisions governing income thresholds and program eligibility. [Pl. Ex. D, H, I.]
While Plaintiff vigorously disputes those determinations, the factual allegations
describe mere personal disagreements rather than disability-based exclusions.

The Rehabilitation Act requires that the alleged exclusion or denial solely occur
by reason of the plaintiff’s disability, which Plaintiff has failed to properly allege. There
are no allegations that non-disabled applicants were treated more favorably under
identical circumstances nor of discriminatory statements, policies, or refusal to modify
procedures in response to a specific accommodation request. Although Plaintiff

references internal training materials advising against the abuse of adverse outcomes,
[Pl. Ex. J], the mere existence of these materials does not demonstrate that the
challenged decisions were motivated by disability discrimination.
Plaintiff also failed to allege that reasonable accommodation was denied. A
failure to accommodate theory under Section 504 requires factual allegations that (1)

a requested accommodation was necessary to afford equal access and (2) such
accommodation was denied. See Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d
104, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2018). The Complaint contains no such allegations. Rather,
Defendants’ eligibility determinations are characterized as willful, erroneous, or
retaliatory. Assuming, arguendo, these characterizations to be true, they still fail to
establish disability-based discrimination.
While Plaintiff alleges serious hardship and homelessness, the Rehabilitation

Act does not provide a remedy for every alleged regulatory error in the administration
of public benefits. See S.H., 729 F.3d at 263 (Section 504 requires a “deliberate choice,
rather than negligence or bureaucratic inaction”) (citations omitted). As the Complaint
fails to plead facts demonstrating any of the denials Plaintiff references occurred solely
by reason of his disability, he has failed to adequately plead this claim. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).
F. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims (Counts II, III, IV, and V)
In addition to his claims arising under federal law, Plaintiff asserts several state
law claims under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (Count II); Gross Negligence,
Reckless Endangerment and Willful Misconduct (Count III); Harassment and Abuse

of Governmental Processes (Count IV); and Malicious Prosecution and Retaliation
(Count V). [Compl. at 6.]
The Court has determined that Plaintiff has failed to properly plead any of his
federal claims in this matter. Thus, with no properly pled federal claims appearing on
the face of Plaintiff's Complaint and no other basis for this Court's original jurisdiction,

the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims at
this time. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Court finds no extraordinary circumstances
warranting an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. Hedges v. Musco,
204 F.3d 109, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming district court's decision not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claim after all federal claims were dismissed
and noting that district court "must decline to decide [] pendent state claims unless
considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide

an affirmative justification for doing so."). Plaintiff is free to bring such claims in state
court, although this Court makes no finding as to the merits or procedural posture of
such claims.
G. Lack of Jurisdiction to Grant Relief Sought
The Court cautions Plaintiff that even assuming he files a properly Amended

Complaint, the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant some of the relief sought. Namely, the
Court cannot enjoin or otherwise interfere with ongoing State prosecutions; mandate
training for State agencies; or award Plaintiff State benefits. See Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908); see e.g. Jones v. Connell, 833 F.2d 503, 505 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal courts
are “barred by the eleventh Amendment from ordering . . . state officials to conform

their conduct to state law”).
H. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Further, to the extent Plaintiff asks this Court to address State Agency benefit
determinations, the Court addresses the threshold issue of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. It is well settled that where a statutory scheme provides a
comprehensive administrative review process, the plaintiff must pursue and complete

that process before seeking judicial intervention. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140,
144-45 (1992). This principle provides agencies the ability to apply their expertise,
develop a factual record, correct their own errors, and promotes judicial economy by
potentially preventing the need for judicial involvement. Id.
As this pertains to Plaintiff’s claims, New Jersey’s public assistance framework

provides a structured administrative process for challenging adverse determinations.
An applicant who is denied EA benefits is entitled to request a fair hearing before the
Office of Administrative Law, followed by the issuance of a Final Agency Decision by
the Department of Human Services. See N.J.A.C. 10:90-9.1 et seq. Judicial review of
the Final Agency Decision lies exclusively with the Superior Court of New Jersey’s

Appellate Division. N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-3(a)(2).
The record Plaintiff included with his Complaint reflects that he did, at various
times, pursue fair hearings and obtained Final Agency Decisions as it relates to his EA
benefits. [Pl. Ex. B, D.] He then pursued the appropriate avenue of review via direct

appeal in the New Jersey Appellate Division. [Pl. Compl. at ¶¶ 39, 41, 43.] However,
to the extent his appeal remains pending, this Court does not sit as a super-appellate
tribunal to review or overturn state administrative determinations. See O’Neill v. City of
Phila., 32 F.3d 785, 792 (3d Cir. 1994); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15
(1987). Accordingly, this Court cannot re-adjudicate Plaintiff’s benefits determinations

or award retroactive benefits as though exercising appellate jurisdiction over the State
agency. See Jones, 833 F.2d at 505.
The same analysis applies to Plaintiff’s SNAP benefits claims. Federal law
requires that someone dissatisfied with a SNAP eligibility determination be afforded
notice and an opportunity for a fair hearing. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10). New Jersey
regulations similarly provide for administrative review of adverse SNAP
determinations. See N.J.A.C. 10:87-8.1 et seq. The SNAP denial notices attached to the
Complaint expressly advise Plaintiff of his right to request a fair hearing within ninety

days. [Pl. Ex. H, I.] Although the Complaint references his disagreement with the
income calculations and benefit reductions, even when liberally read, it does not
clearly allege that Plaintiff completed the fair hearing process and received a Final
Agency Decision with respect to each challenged SNAP determination.
Absent such a showing, judicial review of those benefit determinations is

premature. Conversely, if Plaintiff did exhaust the administrative remedies and
received a Final Agency Decision regarding his SNAP benefits, his avenue for review
lies within the New Jersey Appellate Division, not this Court. N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-3(a)(2).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s IFP application,

DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Consolidation, and DISMISS his Complaint
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An appropriate Order follows.

February 25, 2026 s/Renée Marie Bumb
Date RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311609. Public record. Not legal advice.