# Opinion

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · April 16, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311575

## Case

- **Full name:** Andrea Jaye Mosby v. Reaves Law Firm, PLLC
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** April 16, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311575

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding prejudice where party seeking discovery was “required to waste time, money, and effort in pursuit of cooperation which [plaintiff] was legally obligated to provide”
- affirming a finding of willfulness and bad faith where plaintiff failed to appear for noticed deposition and declined to coordinate with defense counsel for a new deposition date

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

)
ANDREA JAYE MOSBY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
v. ) No. 2:23-cv-02099-SHM-tmp
)
REAVES LAW FIRM, PLLC, )
)
Defendant. )
)
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT/JUDGMENT DEBTOR TO
APPEAR FOR DEPOSIION AND FOR SANCTIONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff Andrea Jaye Mosby’s December
8, 2025 Motion to Compel Defendant/Judgment Debtor Reaves Law
Firm, PLLC (“the “Law Firm”) to Appear for Deposition and for
Sanctions. (ECF No. 95.) Defendant has not responded to the
Motion. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is
GRANTED.

I. Background
On August 21, 2025, the Court entered Judgment in favor of
Plaintiff and against Defendant Law Firm in the amount of
$3,631,095.92. (ECF No. 78.) Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal
on September 23, 2025. (ECF No. 93.)
As part of the efforts to collect the judgment debt,
Plaintiff has pursued post-judgment discovery to determine the
nature, location, and extent of Defendant/Judgment Debtor’s
assets and property on which execution can issue. (ECF No. 95-2
at 3.) By Plaintiff’s account—which is undisputed by Defendant

and documented by email correspondence attached to Plaintiff’s
Motion—Plaintiff has attempted to schedule depositions with
Henry Reaves c/o Defendant/Judgment Debtor, Henry Reaves
individually, and Neva Reaves since October 2025.1 Defendant
and Henry Reaves have not cooperated with those efforts. (ECF
No. 95 at 2-4.) On December 3, 2025, Defendant/Judgment Debtor
and Henry Reaves failed to appear at properly noticed
depositions. (ECF No. 95 at 3.) To date, no depositions have
been taken and no documents have been provided. (ECF No. 95 at
4.)

II. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(2), a judgment
creditor, “[i]n aid of the judgment or execution, . . . may
obtain discovery from any person—including the judgment debtor—
as provided in [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or by the
procedure of the state where the court is located.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 69(a)(2). “A judgment creditor is entitled to utilize
the full panoply of federal discovery measures provided for

1 Plaintiff requests Defendant to produce documents for inspection at the
depositions under Federal Rule 30(b)(2) and Rule 34. (ECF No. 95-2 at 4.)
under federal and state law to obtain information from parties
and non-parties alike.” United States v. Edmond, No. 2:13-cv-
02938-STA-tmp, 2016 WL 11543254, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. June 27,

2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he scope of
postjudgment discovery is very broad[.]” United States v.
Conces, 507 F.3d 1028, 1040 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation and
quotations omitted).
Post-judgment discovery plays a crucial role in the
execution of a judgment by allowing a judgment creditor “to
obtain information . . . about assets on which execution can
issue or about assets that have been fraudulently transferred.”
Iron Workers Dist. Counsel of S. Ohio & Vicinity Benefit Trust
v. Matheny & Sons Gen. Contracting, LLC, No. 3:21-cv-00081,
2023 WL 3570605, at 2 (S.D. Ohio May 19, 2023) (quoting Searcy
v. GUUAS, LLC, No. 2:19-CV-03124, 2021 WL 2256220, at *1 (S.D.

Ohio 2021); see also Scioto Constr., Inc. v. Morris, 2007 WL
108906, *2 (E.D. Tenn. 2007).
A judgment creditor may avail itself of oral depositions
and document inspection requests provided by the Federal Rules.
Under Rule 30, “a party may, by oral questions, depose any
person, including a party, without leave of the court . . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1). A notice to depose a person may be
accompanied by a request under Rule 34 for the deponent to
produce documents at the deposition for inspection. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 30(b)(2). The party seeking to depose another “must
give reasonable written notice . . . . The notice must state
the time and place of the deposition and, if known, the

deponent’s name and address.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1).
Where a party fails to comply with a permitted discovery
request, the party seeking discovery may move for an order
compelling compliance under Federal Rule 37. Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a). It is within a court’s discretion to grant a motion to
compel. See Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604 (6th Cir.
1993).
If a court grants a motion to compel, the court “must,
after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or
deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion . . . to pay the
movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion,
including attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)

(emphasis added). However, the court “must not order this
payment if: (i) the movant filed the motion before attempting
in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without
court action; (ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure,
response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii)
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)-(iii).
Where a party fails to comply with an appropriate
discovery request, the party seeking discovery may also move
for sanctions under Federal Rule 37. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)-(f).
The Rules specifically provide for sanctions for a party’s
failure to appear at a deposition after being served with

proper notice and for a failure to respond to a request for
document inspection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
Available sanctions include the payment of “reasonable
expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure,
unless the failure was substantially justified or other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed R. Civ. P.
37(d)(3).

III. Analysis
A. Summary of Events
On October 29, 2025, Counsel for Plaintiff served
deposition notices for the depositions of Henry Reaves, Neva
Reaves, and Defendant Law Firm on November 17, 2025 by email to

Henry Reaves’ email address. (ECF No. 95-1 at 6-7.) The same
day, Henry Reaves responded to the email confirming receipt of
the notices and representing that neither he nor Neva Reeves
was available to be deposed on that date. (ECF No. 95-1 at 5.)
He did not explain the nature of his conflict2 but simply said

2 Mr. Reaves explained that Neva Reaves was in the “final trimester of a
high-risk geriatric pregnancy with a scheduled C-section delivery date of
January 8, 2026” and “will not be attending a deposition prior to her
delivery and recovery period.” (ECF No. 95-1 at 5.) Plaintiff’s counsel
that he was not available from November 17 through the end of
Thanksgiving week and asked Plaintiff’s counsel to “please
confer and propose available dates in early December for my

deposition.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s counsel responded less than ten
minutes later, proposing December 1, 3, or 4 for Mr. Reaves’
and Defendant Law Firm’s depositions. (ECF No. 95-1 at 5.)
After securing Plaintiff’s agreement to reschedule the
depositions noticed for November 17, 2025, on the
representation that Mr. Reaves was unavailable that day but
available in early December and wished to “confer” on the
matter, Mr. Reaves failed to reply to emails attempting to
confirm an alternative date for the depositions. Five days
after Plaintiff’s counsel had offered alternative dates as
requested, Plaintiff’s counsel followed up on November 3,
asking Mr. Reaves if he would be available to be deposed on

December 1, 3, or 4. (ECF No. 95-1 at 1-2.) An additional
fourteen days passed without any response from Mr. Reaves.
By failing to respond for nearly three weeks, Mr. Reaves
forced Plaintiff to reschedule the depositions unilaterally or
accept an indefinite delay in post-judgment discovery critical
to executing on the Judgment. Plaintiff chose the former
option. On November 17, 2025, using the limited information Mr.

agreed to postpone the scheduling of Neva Reaves’ deposition. (ECF No. 95-1
at 4.)
Reaves had provided about his availability to best ensure the
noticed date would work for him, Plaintiff’s counsel served
notices for depositions on December 3, 2025. (ECF No. 95-1 at.)

On November 18, 2025, Mr. Reaves broke his extended
silence to respond to the second deposition notice with a one-
sentence email: “I’m filing chapter 11, I’ll send you the
petition.” (ECF No. 95-3 at 3.) Mr. Reaves was then silent for
another two weeks. He never filed a bankruptcy petition or
otherwise confirmed that Defendant Law Firm had filed for
bankruptcy. On November 30, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel sought to
confirm whether Defendant had filed for bankruptcy and
emphasized that “[i]f not, we intend to go forward with the
depositions that we noticed for Dec. 3.” (ECF No. 95-3 at 3.)
Mr. Reaves did not respond.
At noon on December 2, 2025, one day before the scheduled

deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel again followed up with Mr.
Reaves, confirming that the depositions were scheduled for the
next day and that a court reporter and videographer had been
booked and would bill Plaintiff if Mr. Reaves did not attend.
(ECF No. 95-3 at 1-2.) Plaintiff’s counsel asked for “the
courtesy of a response” about whether Mr. Reaves planned to
attend. (ECF No. 95-3 at 1.) At 10:35PM on December 2, 2025,
the evening before the noticed depositions, Mr. Reaves
responded, “I never said I was available at that time. I won’t
be able to attend.” (ECF No. 95-3 at 1.) Mr. Reaves did not
attend the depositions on December 3, 2025. (ECF No. 95-4.)
On December 8, 2025, Plaintiff brought the instant Motion

asking the Court to order Defendant/Judgment Debtor and Mr.
Reaves to appear for depositions at a date, time, and location
within 21 days of the Court’s order, subject to sanctions for
non-compliance. (ECF No. 95 at 4.) Plaintiff also requests that
the Court award her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs
associated with Defendant’s and Mr. Reaves’ failure to appear
for depositions on December 3, 2025, and with bringing this
Motion. (ECF No. 95 at 4.)
B. Motion to Compel
There is no question that Plaintiff served Defendant with
proper, reasonable notice of the depositions to be held on
December 3, 2025. The notice clearly stated the date of the

depositions as December 3, 2025, the time of the depositions as
9:00AM for Henry Reaves c/o Defendant and 10:30AM for Henry
Reaves, individually, and the place of the depositions as
Donati Law, PLLC, 1545 Union Ave., Memphis TN, 38104. (ECF No.
95-2.) The notice was served a reasonable sixteen days before
the depositions. See, e.g. Anderson v. Furst, No. 2:17-12676,
2019 WL 2284731, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 39, 2019) (nine-days’
notice reasonable given the facts and circumstances of the
case).
There is no question that Defendant and Mr. Reaves failed
to appear for the properly noticed depositions.3 (ECF No. 95-
4.) Mr. Reaves’ failure to appear is not excused by his

representation to Plaintiff’s counsel on November 18, 2025,
that Defendant intended to file bankruptcy, which would have
automatically stayed proceedings, including the scheduled
depositions. Defendant did not, in fact, file bankruptcy before
the depositions and has not filed to date.4
Mr. Reaves’ failure to appear is not excused by his email
to Plaintiff’s counsel at 10:35PM on December 2, the evening
before the depositions scheduled for December 3 at 9:00AM,
saying he was not available at the scheduled time and would not
be attending. If Mr. Reaves in fact had an unavoidable conflict
so that he was unable to attend the depositions on December 3,
he failed to communicate that information in a timely way and

to engage in good faith discussions to reschedule, despite
sixteen days’ notice in which to do so.
Defendant’s unexcused failure to attend the properly
noticed depositions on December 3, 2025, in which Plaintiff
sought information to which she was entitled as a judgment
creditor, warrants granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

3 By failing to attend, Defendant has also failed to provide documents for
inspection as requested under Rule 34.
4 If Defendant has filed for bankruptcy, it has failed to notify the Court
as required.
Defendant/Judgment Debtor and Mr. Reaves to appear for
depositions and to produce the requested documents for
inspection.5
C. Motion for Sanctions

Before imposing sanctions under Rule 37, courts in the
Sixth Circuit ask whether (1) the party's failure to cooperate
in discovery is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault, (2)
whether the adversary was prejudiced by the party's failure to
cooperate in discovery, and (3) whether the party was warned
that failure to cooperate could lead to the sanction.6 Freeland
v. Amigo, 103 F.3d 1271, 1277 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation
omitted).

5 “Plaintiff's requests, which seek information regarding the existence and
whereabouts of Defendant's assets, constitute exactly the type of discovery
requests permissible under Federal Rule 69(a)(2).” Miller v. Ability
Recovery Servs., LLC, No. 1:18-cv-266, 2020 WL 2838597, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
June 1, 2020)
6 When the sanction of dismissal is sought, courts consider a fourth factor:
whether less drastic sanctions were first imposed or considered. Freeland,
103 F.3d at 1277. That factor is not relevant here. See Holbrook v. Ownbrix
Int’l Corp., No. 2:19-cv-5087, 2021 WL 783550, at *3n. 2 (W.D. Tenn. Mar.
1, 2021).
Although many courts in this Circuit apply the Freeland factors when
imposing any sanction under Rule 37, including monetary sanctions, courts
are inconsistent on whether review of the factors is only necessary when
considering the sanction of dismissal. Compare Chandler v. Daly, No. 06–
2742 B/P., 2008 WL 2357673, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. June 4, 2008)(“The Sixth
Circuit has articulated four factors to be addressed by the court in
assessing whether . . . monetary sanctions are warranted” for failure to
cooperate with discovery) with Oro BRC4, LLC v. Silvertree Apartments,
Inc., No. 2:19-cv-5087, 2022 WL 19558082, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2022)
(finding four-fact test inapposite when invoking monetary sanctions under
37(d) given compulsory language).
1. Willfulness, Bad Faith, or Fault
Defendant and Mr. Reaves’ failure to cooperate with
Plaintiff’s repeated, good faith efforts to schedule
depositions and their failure to appear at the depositions

noticed for December 3, 2025, were willful and in bad faith.
See Papucci v. A. Ray Brown Family Inv. LP, No. 1:21-cv-280,
2025 WL 622070, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2025)(“After a
pattern of evasive and inadequate communication regarding
scheduling of the deposition, Defendant ultimately failed to
ensure its appearance, or otherwise provide notice that it
would not attend the deposition. Fault, here, therefore lies
with Defendant.”); In re Berkeley, No. 24-12845, 2026 WL
404202, at *4 (Bankr. ND Ohio Feb. 1, 2026) (“[Defendant’s]
failure to cooperate with [Plaintiff’s counsel] (despite his
repeated requests) to establish a deposition date, failure to

appear at [the] deposition, . . . and failure to provide any
other evidence precludes [Defendant] from meeting its burden of
showing that [the] failure to appear . . . was due to
inability, not willfulness or bad faith.”)(citation, brackets,
and quotation marks omitted); see also Maldonado v. Thomas M.
Cooley Law Sch., 65 F. App'x 955, 956-57 (6th Cir. 2003)
(affirming a finding of willfulness and bad faith where
plaintiff failed to appear for noticed deposition and declined
to coordinate with defense counsel for a new deposition date);
TERA II, LLC v. Rice Drilling D, LLC, 2:19-cv-2221, 2022 WL
34397, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2022) (deponent’s last-minute
notice that it would not attend noticed deposition was

willful). Defendant has not replied to Plaintiff’s Motion to
explain its failure to appear. See McGowan v. Dell Comput.
Corp., No. 3:04-0996, 2007 WL 2327063, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Aug.
10, 2007)(“[E]ven now, [Defendant] fails to provide a
legitimate reason for his failure to appear at
his deposition.”).
2. Prejudice
Plaintiff was prejudiced when Defendant failed to appear
for the December 3 depositions. “The deponents’ failure to
appear has needlessly delayed enforcement of the judgment and
increased expenses and costs.” (ECF No. 95 at 4.) Plaintiff was
required to pay for the services of a court reporter and

videographer despite Defendant’s non-appearance and had to
prepare the instant motion. See Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
110 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding prejudice where
party seeking discovery was “required to waste time, money, and
effort in pursuit of cooperation which [plaintiff] was legally
obligated to provide”).
3. Warning
The Court has not previously warned Defendant and Mr.
Reaves that failing to appear for noticed depositions and
failing to produce requested documents could lead to sanctions.
However, Defendant, a law firm, and Mr. Reaves, an attorney,
were aware that failure to cooperate with discovery could lead

to sanctions. Papucci, 2025 WL 622070, at *2. Moreover, “no one
factor is dispositive . . . .” in the decision to impose
sanctions. Mager v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 924 F.3d 831, 837 (6th
Cir. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
4. Imposition of Sanctions
Plaintiff made good-faith attempts to obtain Defendant’s
cooperation with post-judgment discovery, Defendant’s failure
to cooperate was not substantially justified, and no
circumstances would make an award of expenses against Defendant
unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)-(iii). The imposition of
expenses against Defendant, including attorney’s fees, is
warranted to compensate Plaintiff for the reasonable expenses

incurred in bringing this Motion and caused by Defendant’s
failure to appear at the noticed depositions.
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for reasonable
expenses, including attorney’s fees (1) incurred in making the
Motion to Compel pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A) and (2) caused by
Defendant’s failure to appear for depositions and produce
documents for inspection pursuant to Rule 37(d)(3).
IV. Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and for
Sanctions.
Defendant/Judgment Debtor Law Firm and Henry Reaves are

ORDERED to appear for depositions between April 20, 2026, and
May 11, 2026. If the parties are unable to agree on a date
within that window, Defendant Law Firm and Henry Reaves are
ORDERED to appear for depositions on May 13, 2026, at 9:00
a.m., at a location designated by Plaintiff’s counsel.
Defendant Law Firm and Henry Reaves are ORDERED to produce
legible copies of all documents previously requested.
Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file an affidavit verifying the
expenses incurred within fourteen (14) days of this Order.
Defendant is permitted to respond to Plaintiff’s accounting of
expenses within seven (7) days of service of the affidavit.

Defendant is cautioned that failure to comply with the
terms of this Order may result in the imposition of additional
sanctions, including but not limited to, civil contempt. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2),(d)(3).
SO ORDERED this 16th day of April, 2026.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.Saays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311575. Public record. Not legal advice.