# Tillery

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · April 16, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311565

## Case

- **Full name:** Jason Tillery v. CoreCivic, Inc., et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** April 16, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311565

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a district court “may (and indeed, ordinarily should) kick the case to state court” where the district court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c))

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JASON TILLERY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 3:23-cv-00203
)
CORECIVIC, INC., et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Fellow inmates at Whiteville Correctional Facility (“WCF”), operated by CoreCivic, Inc.
and CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC (“CoreCivic”), assaulted Jason Tillery not once, but twice while
no guard was present. After the first assault, WCF sent Tillery to a hospital for treatment. The
doctor diagnosed him with facial fractures and ordered a follow-up at an outside eye clinic. WCF
brought Tillery back and put him in Dr. Elaina Rodela’s care. Though she saw and presumably
treated Tillery, she never sent him for the ordered follow-up. Despite the first attack, WCF
eventually placed Tillery back in general population. Tillery was again assaulted when no guard
was present.
Tillery now brings several claims. He asserts that warden Vince Vantell violated his civil
rights through indifference to his safety and that Vantell, Rodela, and her staff violated his civil
rights through indifference to his medical needs. At a corporate level, he claims that CoreCivic
and its officers—CEO Damon Hininger, COO Patrick Swindle, and VP of facility operations Jason
Medlin—knowingly acquiesced in his harm by systematically understaffing facilities to turn a
profit. Defendants move to dismiss those claims, as well as the state negligence and malpractice
claims. (Doc. No. 43). The threshold question is whether Tillery states a federal claim under the
Eighth Amendment’s two-part deliberate-indifference framework. He does, but only as to
Rodela’s alleged indifference to his medical needs. The remaining federal claims fail. The motion
will thus be granted in part and denied in part.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
On March 6, 2022, WCF left Tillery’s unit unguarded. (Doc. No. 38 ¶ 11). Because no

one guarded the unit, an inmate was able to enter Tillery’s cell. (Id.). The inmate then assaulted
Tillery with a fan motor. (Id.).
WCF sent Tillery to Elvis Presley Trauma Center in Memphis. (Id. ¶ 12). Physicians
found multiple fractures in his face and performed surgery on them. (Id.). They directed Tillery
to visit an eye clinic within two weeks of his discharge. (Id.)
When Tillery returned to WCF, the facility placed him in disciplinary segregation rather
than the medical unit. (Id. ¶ 13). WCF assigned Dr. Elaina Rodela to take care of him. (Id. ¶ 14).
Rodela oversaw “T. Robinson,” a nurse practitioner who periodically checked in on Tillery, but
“was not qualified to provide follow-up care.” (Id. ¶¶ 13-14). Tillery repeatedly complained about
headaches and blurred vision to Robinson, but neither Robinson nor Rodela sent him for his eye

clinic follow-up. (Id.).
Despite Tillery’s injuries, WCF placed him back in general population less than ten days
after the attack. (Id. ¶ 15). Inmates immediately “threatened and extorted” him. (Id.). Sometime
the next month, another inmate assaulted Tillery in the face when no guards were present.
(Id. ¶ 16). The second assault aggravated his preexisting injuries. (Id.). Around that same time,
another inmate also attempted to rape Tillery. (Id.). The unit was guarded when that incident

1 Unless noted otherwise, the Court draws the facts from the operative Complaint (Doc. No. 38)
and accepts them as true to rule on the motion. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
occurred, but the guard “was merely annoyed that she had [to] complete paperwork about the
rape.” (Id.).
Before Tillery left WCF later that year, “[m]edical staff” did not provide him with “his
prescribed pain medication,” and “he suffered continuously until his release.” (Id. ¶ 17). Tillery

filed grievances about his lack of medical care, but Rodela and Vantell ignored them. (Id.). Tillery
suffers from blurred vision, headaches, and PTSD, none of which WCF treated. (Id.).
Tillery references numerous audits, media reports, and litigation involving understaffing
and inmate danger at other CoreCivic facilities in Idaho, Oklahoma, Kansas, Mississippi, and
Tennessee from 2011 to 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 18-30). From that information, Tillery alleges that
CoreCivic has “adopted a policy of withholding medical care from inmates in order to maximize
profits” that contributed to his suffering. (Id. ¶ 31). He also alleges that CoreCivic’s officers—
Hininger, Swindle, and Medlin—“knew about persistently inadequate medical care,” withheld
“medical care in order to maximize profits,” and “continued to understaff prisons (including WCF)
in order to maximize profits.” (Id. ¶ 32).

II. LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Venema v. West, 133 F.4th
625, 632 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678). When determining whether the complaint meets this standard, the Court must
accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor, and “take all of those facts and inferences and determine whether they plausibly give rise to
an entitlement to relief.” Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018).
III. ANALYSIS
Tillery brings his federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants in one
single, undifferentiated count. (Doc. No. 38 ¶ 34). He alleges violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights through deliberate indifference to his safety (failure to protect) and/or his health (medical
indifference). (Id.). But Tillery does not specify which Defendants he sues for failure to protect,

which he sues for medical indifference, or which he sues for both. (Id.).
Though the Complaint is undifferentiated, the parties’ briefing sheds light on which claims
Tillery is pursuing and against whom he is pursuing them. On the failure-to-protect claim, Tillery
only argues liability as to Vantell and CoreCivic. (Doc. No. 47 at 3). On the medical-indifference
claim, Tillery only argues liability as to Rodela, “T. Robinson” (who Tillery never served and is
not properly before the Court), and Vantell. (Id. at 5). As to the corporate officers, Tillery does
not directly assert either theory against them. Instead, he argues that they are liable for “civil rights
violations” based on their “knowing acquiesc[ence]” in the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates, citing supervisory liability cases. (Id. at 5-6). And finally, Tillery argues that
CoreCivic is liable under Monell. (Id. at 7-8).

Tillery also does not specify whether he is suing the individual Defendants in their
individual capacities, official capacities, or both. Defendants argue in their opening brief that, to
the extent Tillery asserts official-capacity claims, they should be dismissed. (Doc. No. 44 at 25-
26). Tillery neither responded to that argument nor clarified whether he is bringing official-
capacity claims. (See Doc. No. 47). The Court could construe Tillery’s silence as a waiver. But
this Court has construed ambiguous complaints in similar cases as asserting claims both
individually and officially. See, e.g., Est. of Leeper v. CoreCivic, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 3d 797, 806
(M.D. Tenn. 2025). The Court will do so again here, but only as to the claims against Vantell and
Rodela. The Court declines to construe the claims against the corporate officers as individual-
capacity claims because there are no allegations that they have any personal involvement in, or
knowledge of, the facts that led to Tillery’s injuries. See Massey v. CoreCivic, Inc., 2023 WL
5917399, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2023), aff’d, 2024 WL 3086518 (6th Cir. June 21, 2024)
(construing similar claims against CoreCivic officers as only official-capacity claims). The Court

will construe those claims as only official-capacity claims.
The Court will begin with the individual-capacity claims against Vantell and Rodela. It
does so because the official-capacity claims, the supervisory liability claims against the officers,
and the Monell claim against CoreCivic all require an underlying constitutional violation. See
Lowrance v. CoreCivic, Inc., 2026 WL 700444, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 2026) (finding that Monell
claim against CoreCivic failed without an underlying constitutional violation); Cook v. CoreCivic,
Inc., 2025 WL 967544, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2025) (finding that supervisory liability claims
against Hininger, Swindle, and Medlin failed without an underlying constitutional violation). As
explained below, Tillery fails to allege a constitutional deliberate indifference claim against
Vantell in his individual capacity, but he does state one against Rodela. Because the claim against

Rodela is the only underlying constitutional violation, the Court addresses whether it supports the
Monell, official-capacity, and supervisory liability claims. It does not. And with the only
surviving federal claim being asserted against Rodela, the Court will decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against all other Defendants.
A. Failure to Protect
The Court begins with the failure-to-protect claims. Tillery asserts this theory against
Vantell individually, and he also purports to assert it against CoreCivic. (See Doc. No. 47 at 3).
“CoreCivic, however, as a private entity performing a government function,” can be held liable
under Section 1983 only if it caused the constitutional violation at issue “through execution of its
own policies or customs.” Massey, 2023 WL 5917399, at *5 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). The Court will thus, as an initial matter, focus on whether Tillery states
a constitutional claim against Vantell.
The Eighth Amendment bars the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. To state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, Tillery “must allege

facts plausibly showing two components: one objective, one subjective.” Caraway v. CoreCivic
of Tennessee, LLC, 98 F.4th 679, 683 (6th Cir. 2024). Because the failure-to-protect claims fail
under the objective component, the Court need not reach the subjective component.
1. Objective Component
The objective component requires Tillery to plausibly allege that he “faced an objectively
excessive risk of harm.” Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “Even where
a serious injury occurs, the objective prong of a failure-to-protect claim requires an analysis of the
risk to the injured party before the alleged injury occurred.” Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452,
469 (6th Cir. 2022). “The relevant constitutional ‘injury’ is the exposure to an objectively
excessive risk, not any physical harm that befalls the inmate because of that risk.” Caraway, 98
F.4th at 685.

In Zakora and Caraway, the Sixth Circuit clarified the type of allegations that plausibly
state an objectively excessive risk of harm. Both cases involved allegations that CoreCivic, and
its officials, exposed inmates to an unconstitutional risk by allowing drugs to flow freely into the
facility. Zakora, 44 F.4th at 461; Caraway, 98 F.4th at 682. In Zakora, the plaintiff alleged that
two other inmates in his small twelve-to-sixteen person cell block had overdosed two days before
the plaintiff’s fatal overdose. 44 F.4th at 461. The back-to-back overdoses, the court found,
evidenced an objectively serious risk of harm that others in the unit were also exposed to a high
risk of serious health issues stemming from the prevalence of the drugs. Id. at 472. In Caraway,
on the other hand, the plaintiff alleged only “broad statements about overdoses in CoreCivic
facilities,” with no indication of “the magnitude of the overdose problem” in the plaintiff’s roughly
1500 inmate facility. 98 F.4th at 684-85. Framed at that “level of generality,” the court could
“only speculate” as to the actual risk exposure. Id. at 685.
This Court has also addressed the type of allegations that plausibly show an objectively

excessive risk of harm under Zakora and Caraway. In Estate of Leeper, the plaintiff alleged that
inmates at CoreCivic-operated Trousdale Turner Correctional Center were overdosing at a rate of
up to twenty per day, that correctional officers were smuggling the drugs into the facility, and that
those officers were thwarting attempts to root them out. 797 F. Supp. 3d at 808. The plaintiff also
alleged that prison officials—including the warden—were aware of the risk caused by the drug
problem because they engaged in daily radio conversation about the overdoses. Id. On those
detailed, facility-specific allegations, the Court found the objective prong satisfied. Id.
Zakora, Caraway, and Estate of Leeper confirm that only “detailed allegations” from which
the Court can “reasonably infer” an acute exposure to harm beyond that typical of day-to-day life
in prison satisfy the objective prong. Caraway, 98 F.4th at 685; see also Zakora, 44 F.4th at 472;

Est. of Leeper, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 808. That threshold reflects the practical reality that prisons are
inherently dangerous places. Cf. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“Prisons are necessarily dangerous places; they house society’s most antisocial and violent people
in close proximity with one another.”); Spear v. Sowders, 71 F.3d 626, 630 (6th Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (“Prisons are dangerous and filled with law-breaking because that is where the criminals are.
Even the most secure prisons are dangerous places for inmates, employees, and visitors.”).
Tillery’s general allegations about inmate harm due to understaffing do not evidence an
excessive risk of harm beyond the inherent dangers of day-to-day life in prison. Caraway, 98 F.4th
at 685; Zakora, 44 F.4th at 472. On the first assault, Tillery alleges no facts that he faced an
objectively excessive risk of harm before that assault occurred. Tillery does not allege that there
had been other assaults in his unit before he was attacked. Nor does he allege that there had been
other recent assaults in WCF in general before his attack. He alleges only that an inmate assaulted
him while his unit was unguarded. (Doc. No. 38 ¶ 11). And his broader allegations about

understaffing at CoreCivic facilities in Oklahoma, Kansas, Mississippi, and elsewhere in
Tennessee from 2011 to 2022 are not specific enough to fill the gap. (Id. ¶¶ 18-30). Tillery’s
allegations, at best, tell the Court what happened to him, but not the risk he was exposed to before
it happened. The Court can do little more than speculate as to the actual degree of risk. Caraway,
98 F.4th at 685.
The second assault presents a closer question because Tillery can point to a specific recent
incident. Weeks before, he had been severely beaten while his unit was left unguarded. (Doc. No.
38 ¶ 11). Even so, the first assault does not establish that Tillery faced any greater ongoing risk of
harm than he did before the assault. Consider the alleged risk of harm in Zakora and Estate of
Leeper. Illegal drugs flowing into the plaintiffs’ units in those decisions directly exposed the

plaintiffs to a risk of harm (overdose death) that was objectively greater than that which they
typically faced in their day-to-day lives as inmates. Zakora, 44 F.4th at 461; Est. of Leeper, 797
F. Supp. 3d at 808. Unlike those decisions, the facility-wide understaffing here did not expose
Tillery to any risk beyond that which he faced in his day-to-day life at WCF. Was Tillery assaulted
because of personal animus? A gang dispute? Random violence? Were the conditions that led to
the first attack ongoing? Why was he “threatened and extorted” upon returning to general
population? (Doc. No. 38 ¶ 15). Were the attacks inevitable? Prisons are inherently dangerous.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858; Spear, 71 F.3d at 630. Depending on the answers to those questions,
Tillery could just as well have been assaulted in a fully staffed, completely guarded unit. To be
sure, the absence of guards may have presented an increased opportunity for an assault to occur
when it did and may have contributed to the severity of Tillery’s injuries. But the constitutional
injury is the exposure to excessive risk, not the injury itself. Caraway, 98 F.4th at 685. Once
again, the Court can do little more than speculate as to the degree of Tillery’s risk exposure. Id.

In sum, Tillery fails to allege that he was exposed to an objectively excessive risk of harm
to support his failure-to-protect theory against Vantell in his individual capacity. Because the
claim fails under the objective component, the Court need not assess whether Vantell subjectively
knew of and disregarded any such risk.
B. Medical Indifference
The Court next turns to the medical-indifference claims. Tillery asserts this theory against
Vantell individually, Rodela individually, and he also purports to assert it against “T. Robinson.”
(Doc. No. 47 at 5). Because Tillery never served “T. Robinson,” the Court does not consider the
claims against her.
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberately indifferent” to a
prisoner’s “serious medical needs.” Lowrance v. CoreCivic, Inc., 2026 WL 700444, at *2 (6th

Cir. Mar. 12, 2026) (quoting Phillips v. Tangilag, 14 F.4th 524, 532 (6th Cir. 2021)). Like failure-
to-protect claims, medical-indifference claims have objective and subjective components. Id. The
Court begins with the objective component. “Only if a prisoner proves this objective element must
courts consider the second (subjective) part of the deliberate-indifference test.” Id. (quoting
Phillips, 14 F.4th at 535).
1. Objective Component
The objective component requires Tillery to plausibly allege that his medical need was
“sufficiently serious.” Id. (quoting Phillips, 14 F.4th at 534). A medical need is sufficiently
serious when it “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment,” or the need “is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’”
Jones v. Muskegon Cnty., 625 F.3d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Tillery’s allegations establish that his medical need was sufficiently serious. After the first
assault, Tillery suffered multiple facial fractures requiring surgery. (Doc. No. 38 ¶ 12). His

treating physicians at Elvis Presley Trauma Center diagnosed his injuries and specifically directed
an eye clinic visit within two weeks of his discharge. (Id.). Because Tillery’s condition required
surgery and further treatment by an eye clinic, his medical need was sufficiently serious. Jones,
625 F.3d at 941.
2. Subjective Component
The subjective component sets a “high bar.” Lowrance, 2026 WL 700444, at *2 (quoting
Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2018)). Subjectively, the prison official must
“know of and disregard the serious medical need.” Id. (quoting Phillips, 14 F.4th at 535). “That
in turn requires an official to (1) know of the facts that show the serious medical need, (2)
personally conclude that this need exists, and then (3) consciously disregard the need.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Allegations amounting to negligence or malpractice are

not sufficient to satisfy the subjective component. Id. (citing Durham v. Nu’Man, 97 F.3d 862,
868 (6th Cir. 1996)).
i. Vantell
Tillery’s allegations against Vantell are legally insufficient. Vantell is the warden of WCF.
Tillery does not allege that Vantell played any role in treatment decisions at WCF. In fact, Tillery
does not allege that Vantell had any personal knowledge or involvement in the events giving rise
to his claims whatsoever. Instead, Tillery alleges that he filed grievances about the lack of medical
care, and Vantell “ignored” them. (Doc. No. 38 ¶ 17). That allegation is insufficient to establish
that Vantell knew the circumstances of Tillery’s serious medical need. There are no allegations of
when the grievances were filed, who they were filed with, or what they contained. Even if Vantell
knew of Tillery’s medical need, nothing indicates that Vantell concluded that Tillery needed an
eye clinic follow-up and then consciously decided not to send him. At most, Tillery alleges that
Vantell failed to act on a grievance. That may well be negligent, but it does not clear the “high

bar” of conscious disregard of Tillery’s serious medical need. Lowrance, 2026 WL 700444, at *2
(quoting Rhinehart, 894 F.3d at 738). Tillery’s medical-indifference claim thus fails against
Vantell in his individual capacity.
ii. Rodela
Tillery’s allegations against Rodela present a closer case because she actually saw and
presumably treated him. As Tillery’s treating physician at WCF, Rodela supervised Robinson,
and was “familiar with the circumstances of his case.” (Doc. No. 38 ¶ 14). Tillery also repeatedly
complained about headaches and blurred vision to Robinson, who periodically checked in on him
under Rodela’s supervision. (Id. ¶ 13). Those allegations are sufficient to infer that Rodela was
aware of the first assault, including the medical treatment to his head that required surgery, and
she was aware of the directive for an eye clinic follow-up and Tillery’s complaints of headaches

and blurred vision. They are also sufficient to infer that Rodela knew that Tillery had a serious
medical need.
Tillery’s allegations also establish that Rodela consciously disregarded his medical need.
In Lowrance, the Sixth Circuit recently clarified the type of allegations necessary to establish
conscious disregard in a medical-indifference claim. 2026 WL 700444, at *2-3. In that decision,
a prison facility nurse reviewed an inmate’s file at intake, which indicated that he needed an outside
dental visit. Id. at *1. The nurse confirmed that the inmate “would be scheduled” for the dental
treatment, but she “failed to appropriately refer him” to dental. Id. Seven months later, the inmate
died from sepsis “[as] a result of the untreated dental injuries.” Id. The court held that those
allegations did not amount to conscious disregard because there were no facts suggesting that the
nurse “disregarded a known or obvious consequence of her actions in failing to refer him.” Id. at
*2 (cleaned up) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410
(1997)). In other words, the nurse had no knowledge or notice that her failure to schedule the

dental visit would result in sepsis.
Lowrance confirms that simply failing to send an inmate for outside treatment, even when
there is a referral for that treatment, is not conscious disregard. The deliberate choice not to send
an inmate for recommended treatment crosses into conscious disregard only when that choice is
likely to result in some obvious serious harm to the inmate that the defendant recognized and
ignored. If it is not obvious that the inmate will be harmed without the outside treatment, the
failure to send him “may support a claim for professional negligence,” but not “deliberate
indifference.” Id. at *3 (quoting Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 625 (6th Cir. 2012)). So even
if Rodela knew that she could not provide Tillery with the same level of care as the eye clinic could
provide and chose not to send him anyway, the question remains whether it was known or obvious

that Tillery would continue to suffer from the vision issue and headaches.
The Court finds that it was. Tillery’s claim stands on much stronger footing than that in
Lowrance. In Lowrance, the connection between a missed dental visit and the inmate’s eventual
death from sepsis was far from obvious. Few would assume that failing to send someone to a
dentist would be fatal. On the other hand, the hospital here specifically directed an eye clinic
follow-up. Tillery continuously complained of headaches and blurred vision. Given the trauma
to Tillery’s head requiring surgery, it would seem obvious, then, that Tillery would continue to
suffer from headaches and blurred vision if he was never sent to the eye clinic.
Tillery’s case is further distinguishable from Lowrance because the nurse there promised
the inmate that they would be scheduled for the prescribed visit, but then let it fall through the
cracks. Id. at *1. Tillery alleges here, however, that Rodela completely “ignored his complaints”
about “headaches and blurred vision.” (Doc. No. 38 ¶ 13). He also alleges that Rodela “failed to

send him for an eye evaluation as directed by the hospital,” “failed to transfer him to a facility that
was capable of treating his injuries,” and completely ignored “grievances about the lack of medical
care.” (Id. ¶¶ 14, 17).
Those allegations when construed most favorably to Tillery are sufficient to plausibly
allege that Rodela consciously disregarded a known or obvious consequence of her inaction.
Tillery’s medical-indifference claim thus survives as to Rodela in her individual capacity.
C. Remaining § 1983 Claims
The Monell claim against the CoreCivic entities, the official-capacity claims against
Vantell and Rodela, and the supervisory liability claims against Hininger, Swindle, and Medlin all
require an underlying constitutional violation. Lowrance, 2026 WL 700444, at *4 (holding that
“[w]ithout an underlying unconstitutional act,” plaintiff’s claims against CoreCivic “under § 1983

must also fail” (quoting Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 622 (6th Cir. 2015))); Caraway, 98 F.4th
at 687 (“[B]ecause the complaint doesn’t allege an underlying constitutional violation, [the
Monell] claims fail.”); Cook, 2025 WL 967544, at *5, *8 (dismissing supervisory liability claims
against Hininger, Swindle, and Medlin and Monell claim against CoreCivic for the same reason).
The failure-to-protect claims against Vantell fail, so the only remaining underlying
unconstitutional act is Rodela’s alleged medical indifference. The Court will address whether that
alleged unconstitutional act supports Tillery’s Monell, official-capacity claims, and supervisory
liability claims in turn.
1. Monell and Official Capacity claims
CoreCivic can be held liable under Section 1983 “only if its policies, practices, or customs
were the driving or moving force” behind the constitutional violation at issue. Est. of Leeper, 797
F. Supp. 3d at 811 (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 385). The official-capacity claims against Vantell
and Rodela are analyzed under the same framework, because “individuals sued in their official

capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent.” Massey, 2023 WL 5917399, at *5
(quoting Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003)). The inquiry is two-pronged: (1)
whether Tillery has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether CoreCivic’s
official policy or custom is responsible for that deprivation. Est. of Leeper, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 811
(citing Cash v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep’t. of Adult Probation, 388 F.3d 539, 542 (6th Cir. 2004)).
The first prong is satisfied because Tillery sufficiently alleged that Rodela deprived him of
his constitutional right through indifference to his medical needs. The question then is whether
CoreCivic had an official policy or custom responsible for that deprivation. To allege an illegal
policy or custom, Tillery must assert sufficient facts to establish “(1) an illegal official policy or
legislative enactment; (2) an official with final decision-making authority ratified an employee’s

illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the
existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Id. (citing Burgess
v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013)).
Tillery has not alleged a policy or custom responsible for his constitutional deprivation.
Tillery alleges that CoreCivic has “adopted a policy of withholding medical care from inmates in
order to maximize profits.” (Doc. No. 38 ¶ 31). That legal conclusion is accompanied only by
broad allegations about inadequate medical care at CoreCivic facilities in Idaho, Oklahoma,
Kansas, Mississippi, and elsewhere in Tennessee. (Id. ¶¶ 18-30). To be sure, those allegations are
alarming. But there are no allegations from which the Court can conclude that Rodela’s decision
not to send Tillery to the eye clinic was a result of any policy at WCF. The Monell claim against
CoreCivic and the official-capacity claims against Vantell and Rodela thus fail.
2. Supervisory Liability Claims
Tillery argues that Hininger, Swindle, and Medlin are liable for “civil rights violations”
based on their “knowing acquiesc[ence]” in the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates.

(Doc. No. 47 at 5-6). A failure to supervise “must be based on more than respondeat superior, or
the right to control employees.” Est. of Leeper, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 812 (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell,
199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)). A simple failure to act will not suffice without “a showing of
‘direct responsibility’ for the actions of the individual officers.” Id. (quoting Hays v. Jefferson
Cnty., 668 F.2d 869, 873-74 (6th Cir. 1982)). Rather, “supervisory liability requires some ‘active
unconstitutional behavior’ on the part of the supervisor.” Id. (quoting Peatross v. City of Memphis,
818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir. 2016)).
Tillery’s allegations fall well short of that standard. Tillery does not allege that Hininger,
Swindle, or Medlin had any supervisory role over officials at WCF, let alone over Rodela’s
medical decisions. The supervisory liability claims thus fail.

D. State Medical Malpractice and Negligence Claims
Defendants’ sole argument that Tillery’s state claims should be dismissed is that the Court
should decline supplemental jurisdiction over them after dismissing all federal claims. (Doc. No.
44 at 25). Because the claim against Rodela in her individual capacity survives, the Court will
continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims as to Rodela. As to the
remaining Defendants, whose federal claims have been dismissed in their entirety, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims against them. See Royal Canin
U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 31-32 (2025) (explaining that a district court “may
(and indeed, ordinarily should) kick the case to state court” where the district court “has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c))).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 43) will be granted in part
and denied in part.
An appropriate order will enter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Wah. Qussbe
ap llmh > Cincy
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11311565. Public record. Not legal advice.